Matter of Crosby

93 B.R. 798, 20 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 254, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1976, 1988 WL 128837
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedNovember 23, 1988
Docket19-40176
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 93 B.R. 798 (Matter of Crosby) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Crosby, 93 B.R. 798, 20 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 254, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1976, 1988 WL 128837 (Ga. 1988).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTION TO CONVERT

LAMAR W. DAVIS, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

The United States Trustee filed a Motion to Convert this Chapter 11 case on numerous grounds. After a hearing to consider said Motion I conclude that the Motion should be denied for the reasons set forth herein.

Debtor is the proprietor of a retail pharmacy business. In October 1985 his Chapter 11 case was filed. As of this date Debtor has been unable to propose a confirmed plan. The major reason that Debtor is in this Court and that he has been unable to formulate a plan has been his inability to timely receive medicare/medicaid reim *800 bursements from the State of Georgia for prescriptions he claims to have filled for his eligible customers. At the present time, the vast majority of his customers are medicare/medicaid participants and without a reliable flow in payment of claims Debtor will fail. Debtor’s inability to timely receive reimbursement for medicare/medicaid claims stems from a variety of causes or combinations thereof:

1) Debtor has at times lacked a sense of urgency and diligence in filing and substantiating valid claims.
2) Worse, Debtor has been the subject of investigation by the State of Georgia to determine whether he has filed fraudulent claims in the past. This could result in a criminal prosecution.
3) Debtor’s status as a medicare/medicaid provider is the subject of administrative or judicial termination proceedings which if ultimately successful would force him out of business.

No final determination of the criminal matter or Debtor’s provider status has occurred. Despite the fact that Debtor had, inexplicably, not timely submitted claims for reimbursement of many thousands of dollars over a period of several months, at a previous motion to dismiss or convert this case, I decided instead to appoint an Examiner, W. Jan Jankowski to serve. The purpose of appointing the examiner was to provide expertise and assistance to the Debtor in processing his claims on a current basis, and in filing claims for services which had been rendered months earlier. The Examiner has served the estate well and as a result of his efforts substantial sums have been received. By previous order of this Court, Debtor is permitted to retain 25% of all sums received in order to operate his business. The balance is being held in the registry of the Court and amounts to approximately $111,146.91 at this time.

Given the status of this case, and Debtor’s continuing efforts to recover funds I am unable to conclude that the case should be converted under 11 U.S.C. Section 1112 which reads in relevant part:

“(b) ... on request of a party in interest of the United States trustee ... the court may convert a case ... for cause, including—
(1) continuing loss to or diminution of the estate and absence of a reasonable likelihood of rehabilitation;
(2) inability to effectuate a plan;
(3) unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to creditors;
(4) failure to propose a plan under section 1121 of this title within any time fixed by the court;”

As applied to the facts in this case, while each of those criteria arguably exist, a favorable resolution of Debtor’s provider status dispute and favorable termination of any criminal investigation would quite likely enable him to propose a confirmable plan and rehabilitate himself. Indeed, the creditors who appeared at this hearing have asked the Court not to convert the case for essentially two reasons: First, conversion would deprive the estate of the inestimably valuable services of Mr. Jankowski who as Examiner could not serve as trustee or attorney for the trustee by virtue of 11 U.S.C. Section 327(f) and 11 U.S.C. Section 321(b). Second, conversion would reduce the degree of interest, limited as it may have been, of the Debtor in prosecuting his claims and getting his creditors paid.

This leaves the alternative basis for the Motion of the United States Trustee. It is alleged that:

“The debtor has failed to comply with the requirements of the United States Trustee for Debtor-in-Possession in Chapter 11 as authorized pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 586(a)(3).”

Nowhere does 11 U.S.C. Section 1112(b) expressly set forth that failure of a debtor to comply with these “requirements” is a basis for dismissal or conversion. However, the general ground for dismissal or conversion is “for cause” and the list of 10 examples under subsection (b) is clearly a non-exclusive listing. Thus, I am faced with the decision of whether a Debtor’s failure to comply with the United States Trustee “requirements” constitutes *801 “cause” to dismiss or convert. Legislative history indicates that subsection (b) grants “wide discretion to the court to make an appropriate disposition of the case.” S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95 Cong., 2nd Sess. 117-118 (1978); See H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 405-06 (1977) U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1978, pp. 5787, 5903, 5904, 5963, 6361, 6362.

In determining whether the failure to comply with United States Trustee “requirements” constitutes “cause” it is necessary to explore what those requirements are 1 and analyze their relationship to the concept of “cause” for dismissal or conversion.

History and Scope of the United States Trustee Program

28 U.S.C. Section 581 provides for appointment of United States Trustees by the Attorney General on a regional basis. The purpose of the enactment of this system was set forth in 1978 when the pilot United States Trustee program was adopted.

“The second major change proposed by the bill is the creation of a Government officer to supervise the conduct of bankruptcy cases, and to serve as trustee in bankruptcy cases when private trustees are unwilling to serve. Many of the functions assigned to the new official, called the United States trustee, are currently performed by bankruptcy judges. Under the proposed system, the bankruptcy judges will be handling only judicial matters in bankruptcy cases. The proposed United States trustees will be the repository of many of the administrative functions now performed by bankruptcy judges, and will serve as bankruptcy watch-dogs to prevent fraud, dishonesty, and overreaching in the bankruptcy arena.
The United States trustees will be locally based and generally autonomous, but will be loosely supervised and assisted by the Department of Justice.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
93 B.R. 798, 20 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 254, 1988 Bankr. LEXIS 1976, 1988 WL 128837, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-crosby-gasb-1988.