Matter of Barnett

30 B.R. 119, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 6320
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedApril 27, 1983
Docket19-00379
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 30 B.R. 119 (Matter of Barnett) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matter of Barnett, 30 B.R. 119, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 6320 (Ala. 1983).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

EDWIN D. BRELAND, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the debtors’ motion to avoid a non-purchase money security interest taken in their household goods in May of 1982. On August 11, 1982 the debtors filed a Chapter 7 petition in bankruptcy listing Household Finance Corporation as a secured creditor and declaring the household furnishings as exempt property.

Between the time the Order for Relief was entered and the debtors’ discharge, Household Finance failed to appear at the first meeting of creditors, or take any other action in the bankruptcy proceeding. Subsequent to the debtors’ discharge, Household Finance filed a replevin action in the District Court of Lauderdale County, Alabama.

On March 1, 1983 the debtors filed a motion for a contempt citation, which this Court set down for hearing. The Court entered an Order dated March 21, 1983 denying the motion, but allowing the bankruptcy proceeding to be reopened pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 350 and Rule 515 and allowing the debtors to file a motion to avoid the creditor’s security interest. The Court further ordered that the creditor was stayed from proceeding with the State Court action until the Court ruled on the extent of the debtors’ avoidance powers under 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f).

The facts before the Court in the present case are of first impression, in that subsequent to the discharge, an action for replev-in intervened prior to the debtors’ filing a motion to avoid the lien under Section 522(f). In previous cases the Court has recognized no time limit, absent laches, for the debtor to avoid liens under 522(f). See Matter of Holyst, 19 B.R. 14 (Bkrtcy., Conn. 1982); In re Hall, 22 B.R. 701 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Pa.1982); In re Stephenson, 19 B.R. 185 (Bkrtcy., M.D.Tenn.1982), In re Gortmaker, 14 B.R. 66 (Bkrtcy., S.D.1981), and Matter of Baskins, 14 B.R. 110 (Bkrtcy., E.D.N.C.1981).

Several Courts have held that avoidance actions must be brought prior to discharge on the basis of 11 U.S.C. Section 524(c), which requires reaffirmation agreements to be entered into prior to discharge. In re Krahn, 10 B.R. 770 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Wis.1981) and In re Adkins, 7 B.R. 325 (Bkrtcy., S.D.Cal.1980). In the present ease the value of the collateral does not exceed the personal property exemption available to the debtors under State Law, thereby rendering reaffirmation unnecessary. See In re Swanson, 13 B.R. 851 (Bkrtcy., Idaho 1981); In re Newton, 15 B.R. 640 (Bkrtcy., W.D.N.Y.1981), and In re Smart, 13 B.R. 838 (Bkrtcy., Ariz.1981).

Two Courts have recognized a time limitation based upon the relationship of 11 U.S.C. Sections 522(i)(l) and 550. In re Porter, 11 B.R. 578 (Bkrtcy., W.D.Okl.1981), and Beneficial Finance Company of Virginia v. Franklin, 26 B.R. 636 (D.C.Va.1983). In Beneficial Finance the District Court interpreted Sections 522(i) and 550 to re *121 quire the debtor to take three affirmative steps to avoid a lien. First the debtor must avoid the transfer under 522(f), then “recover” the property pursuant to 522(i)(l), and finally claim the property as exempt under applicable Federal or State exemption statutes. Id. at 639. If indeed the debtor is required to take affirmative action in order to “recover” the exempted property pursuant to 522(i)(l), then 550(e) prohibits a recovery action from being commenced after the earlier of:

“(1) one year after the avoidance of the transfer on account of which recovery under this section is sought; and (2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.”

The District Court’s requirement that the debtor “recover” the property subject to the avoided lien, arises from the fact that the beneficial interest held by and transferred to the creditor, i.e. the lien, does not, at the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding, become part of the debtor’s estate. Thus, the debtor must avoid the lien, recover the property for the estate and then exempt the property. Id. at 641.

Until directed otherwise, this Court will continue to interpret 522(f) as allowing the debtor to avoid liens without a time limitation, absent prejudice or injury to the lienholder, or an innocent third party. The basis of this decision on the part of the Court is twofold. Foremost, it would be contrary to providing the debtor with a fresh start if he or she were denied the means of regaining property claimed as exempt. As stated by the Court in In re Newton, 15 B.R. 640, 642 (Bkrtcy.W.D.N.Y.1981):

“... the debtors’ rights were not exercised properly because of delays on the part of the debtors’ attorneys rather than by a knowing and voluntary waiver of rights under Section 522(f) by the debt- or.”

As a result, the Court will continue to view 11 U.S.C. Section 522(f) as remedial in nature, and liberally construe the statute in light of Congressional intent to relieve debtors from the burden of hopeless insolvency and grant to them the opportunity for a fresh start. See Matter of Dino, 17 B.R. 316 (Bkrtcy., M.D.Fla.1982).

In addition, the Court is of the opinion that 522(i)(l) and 550 have no application to the facts of the present case. Section 522(i)(l) applies the same limitations on the debtors’ 522(f) powers, as 550 places on the powers of the Trustee. Neither the debtor nor the Trustee may recover property from a good faith transferee, of the initial transferee, who takes for value and with no knowledge of the voidability of the transfer. As it affects the debtors’ 522(f) powers, the reference in 522(i) to Section 550 should not be viewed as a statutory limitation on the right of a debtor to avoid liens under 522(f), but instead as a time limitation on the right to recover from a transferee. Matter of Swanson, 13 B.R. 851 (Bkrtcy., Idaho 1981) and Matter of Montney, 17 B.R. 353 (Bkrtcy., E.D.Mich.1982).

In the proceedings currently before the Court, the debtors do not need to “recover” any property from Household Finance. At the time the debtors filed their petition in bankruptcy they listed their household goods as exempt. These assets were listed as property of the debtors and, although property of the estate during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, they were not administered by the Chapter 7 case Trustee. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 554(c), property that is not administered before a ease is closed is deemed abandoned by the estate. Abandonment by the estate is to the parties who have a possessory interest in the property abandoned, who in this case are the debtors.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
30 B.R. 119, 1983 Bankr. LEXIS 6320, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matter-of-barnett-alnb-1983.