[Cite as Matola v. Mathews Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2025-Ohio-5717.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY
ERIKA M. MATOLA, CASE NOS. 2025-T-0021 2025-T-0022 Appellant, Administrative Appeals from the - vs - Court of Common Pleas
MATHEWS LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION, Trial Court Nos. 2022 CV 01272 2022 CV 00905 Appellee.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: December 22, 2025 Judgment: Affirmed
Charles W. Oldfield, Green Haines Sgambati Co., L.P.A., City Centre One, Suite 800, 100 Federal Plaza East, P.O. Box 849, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Appellant).
Matthew John Markling, McGown & Markling Co., L.P.A., 1894 North Cleveland- Massillon Road, Akron, OH 44333 (For Appellee).
JOHN J. EKLUND, J.
{¶1} In this consolidated appeal, Appellant, Erika M. Matola, appeals the
judgments of the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas dismissing her appeals of
decisions from Appellee, Mathews Local School District Board of Education (“the school
board”), to terminate and to non-renew her limited teaching contract.
{¶2} Appellant raises two assignments of error. First, Appellant argues that the
trial court erred when it dismissed her appeal of the school board’s termination order.
According to Appellant, both the trial court and the school board failed to defer to the
statutory referee’s credibility determinations. Second, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed her appeal of the school board’s nonrenewal decision. According
to Appellant, the school board was required to formally observe her in the classroom, and
a statutory exception did not apply.
{¶3} Having reviewed the record and applicable law, we find that Appellant’s
assignments of error are without merit. First, we find no abuse of discretion regarding the
trial court’s review of the school board’s termination order. The actions of the school
board and the trial court were consistent with the governing law. Second, the trial court
properly found no procedural errors in the school board’s nonrenewal of Appellant’s
contract. The statutory exception at issue encompassed the formal-observations
requirement. Further, Appellant’s suspension qualified as “leave” under that the common
meaning of that term.
{¶4} Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas.
Substantive and Procedural History
{¶5} During the 2020-2021 and 2021-2022 school years, the school board
employed Appellant as an art teacher at Mathews High School in Trumbull County
pursuant to a two-year limited contract. In April 2021, the school board became aware of
misconduct allegations against Appellant.
{¶6} During the 2020-2021 school year, Students A and B were in Appellant’s
sixth-period art class. Student B is Appellant’s cousin. Students A and B were friends
for many years, but their relationship eventually became strained. According to Student
B, she and Student A dated for a period of time but broke up; Student A denies this.
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶7} On April 21, 2021, Student A was given permission to leave Appellant’s
class to go to the principal’s office. Student A instead went to the cafeteria and told
Deputy Steven Smith, the school resource officer, that Student B had a vaping device in
her possession. Deputy Smith and Student A went to Principal James Stitt’s office, where
Student A told him this information. Principal Stitt removed Student B from Appellant’s
classroom and escorted her to his office, where he and Deputy Smith questioned her.
During the questioning, Principal Stitt went back to Appellant’s classroom and retrieved
Student B’s backpack but left some of her belongings behind. Student B admitted to
having the vaping device and was suspended from school for three days.
{¶8} Appellant subsequently obtained possession of Student B’s belongings, at
which time a handwritten note fell out. Appellant read the note, which was between
Student B and her friend, Student C. The note discussed vaping, stating, in relevant part,
that “[Appellant] does care, but we make it decrete [sic].” After reading the note, Appellant
delivered it to the principal’s office. According to Principal Stitt, he did not see the note
until the following day.
{¶9} Later that day, Student A communicated with Student B’s mother via text
message and telephone. She denied involvement in Student B’s suspension and stated
that Appellant was going to be fired because she allowed vaping in her classroom.
Student B’s mother reported this information to Appellant, i.e., her cousin. Appellant, in
turn, texted Principal Stitt about it. Principal Stitt communicated with Deputy Smith, and
they commenced an investigation.
{¶10} On April 23, 2021, the school board placed Appellant on indefinite home
assignment pending an investigation of potential misconduct.
PAGE 3 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶11} Principal Stitt, Deputy Smith, and Superintendent Russell McQuaide
conducted the investigation from April 21, 2021, to approximately April 27, 2021. The
investigation included interviewing and obtaining written statements from Students A, B,
and C and five other students—Students H, D, G, E, and F.
{¶12} Most relevant here, Student A alleged that Appellant allowed Students A
and B to vape in the art supply room; that Appellant allowed Student B to vape in front of
her; and that Appellant used her own vape in front of the two students. Student A also
alleged that Appellant used the words “f**k” and “c**t” in front of students. Student A took
Principal Stitt and Deputy Smith to the art supply room and showed them a charger for a
vaping device hidden on a bookshelf.
{¶13} Students B and H provided written statements alleging that Appellant
allowed students to vape. Deputy Smith shredded Student H’s initial written statement.
According to Deputy Smith, however, he did so in good faith because it was not consistent
with Student H’s verbal statement.
{¶14} The investigation also included discussions with Appellant and with Student
B’s mother. Appellant denied all allegations of wrongdoing.
{¶15} On May 5, 2021, a pre-discipline/pre-termination meeting/conference was
held. Superintendent McQuaide alleged that Appellant committed the following
misconduct: (1) Appellant witnessed Students A and B use a nicotine vaping device in
the art supply room and failed to report them; (2) Appellant used a nicotine vaping device
in front of Students A and B in the art supply room; (3) Appellant witnessed Student H
use a nicotine vaping device in the classroom and failed to report him; (4) Appellant
should have known students were using vaping devices in her class, even if she did not
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 personally witness them using them; (5) Appellant improperly left her classroom
unattended without authorization; and (6) Appellant improperly fraternized with and/or
counseled Students A and/or B while in the art supply room.
{¶16} Following the meeting/conference, Superintendent McQuaide determined
that Appellant committed the following misconduct: (1) Appellant allowed students to be
on school premises and/or at school activities involving students while using
tobacco/vaping products; (2) Appellant was on school premises and/or at school activities
involving students while using tobacco/vaping products; (3) Appellant improperly
fraternized with students; (4) Appellant failed to comply with all aspects of the Licensure
Code of Professional conduct for Ohio Educators; (5) Appellant failed to comply with all
aspects of the written rules and regulations as set forth by the school board; and (6)
Appellant engaged in conduct amounting to (a) incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty,
insubordination, and discourteous treatment of the public; (b) acts of misfeasance,
malfeasance, and nonfeasance; and (c) good and just cause for termination.
{¶17} On May 18, 2021, the school board passed a resolution to declare its
intention to consider the termination of Appellant’s contract. On the same date, the school
board suspended Appellant without pay or benefits pending final action.
{¶18} On May 25, 2021, Appellant filed a written demand for a hearing before a
referee. The referee held an evidentiary hearing over seven days in October and
December 2021. The parties presented witnesses and exhibits, and a record of the
hearing was taken. Following the hearing, the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶19} Appellant remained suspended during the entire 2021-2022 school year.
The school board did not conduct any formal observations of Appellant in the classroom
during that school year.
{¶20} On April 20, 2022, the school board declared its intention not to renew
Appellant’s contract.
{¶21} On May 31, 2022, the school board held a meeting and passed a resolution
affirming its intention not to reemploy Appellant.
{¶22} On June 13, 2022, the referee issued a 13-page, double-spaced report and
recommendation in the termination matter. The referee concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to establish good and just cause for Appellant’s termination and recommended
that Appellant be restored to her position. Most relevant here, the referee made the
following findings: First, the referee found that the school’s investigation was deficient in
many respects, including the destruction of Student H’s initial statement, the failure to
include parents in interviews upon request, the failure to interview other students in
Appellant’s class, and “the assumption without any corroborating evidence that the
charging device found in [Appellant’s] art closet belonged to her rather than a student or
other staff member.” Second, the referee found that although Students A, B, and H had
all provided written statements indicating that Appellant had witnessed students vaping,
Students B and H subsequently retracted those statements and testified that they were
not aware of any such activity. Third, the referee found that the evidence showed Student
A’s “written statement, testimony, and unsworn text messages and oral statements” to
others “to be replete with inconsistencies and demonstrable untruths.”
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶23} On June 30, 2022, Appellant appealed the school board’s nonrenewal order
to the trial court (Case No. 2022 CV 00905).
{¶24} On July 26, 2022, the school board held a meeting and adopted an 85-page,
single-spaced resolution rejecting the referee’s recommendation in the termination
matter.
{¶25} On August 10, 2022, the school board held a meeting and adopted an 89-
page, single-spaced resolution terminating Appellant’s contract. First, the school board
accepted 35 of the referee’s findings as being supported by a “preponderance of reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence.” However, the board stated that it rejected the
referee’s recommendation “based upon a different interpretation of the significance of
those facts.” Second, the school board rejected five of the referee’s findings as being
“against the preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” In particular,
the school board rejected all of the referee’s findings summarized above. Third, the
school board rejected 13 of the referee’s conclusions as being “against the
preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” Fourth and fifth, the
school board set forth numerous facts and conclusions that it stated were “supported by
the preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.”
{¶26} On September 9, 2022, Appellant appealed the school board’s termination
order to the trial court (Case No. 2022 CV 01272).
{¶27} On November 2, 2022, the trial court consolidated Appellant’s two appeals.
On January 30, 2023, Appellant filed an amended complaint in the termination matter.
Thereafter, the school board filed responsive pleadings, the record was filed, and the
parties filed merit briefs.
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶28} On March 28, 2025, the trial court filed a judgment entry dismissing
Appellant’s complaints. The trial court found that there was reliable, probative, and
substantial evidence supporting the school board’s termination order. The trial court also
found that there were no procedural errors to correct regarding the school board’s
nonrenewal decision.
{¶29} On April 23, 2025, Appellant timely appealed both matters to this Court. On
May 9, 2025, this Court consolidated the appeals for all purposes. Appellant raises two
assignments of error.
Contract Termination
{¶30} Appellant’s first assignment of error states: “The trial court erred when it
dismissed [Appellant’s] R.C. 3319.16 appeal because both the trial court and the Board
failed to defer to the referee’s credibility determination.”
{¶31} Appellant argues that the school board improperly “substituted its view of
the credibility of the witnesses and evidence for that of the referee.” She further argues
that the trial court abused its discretion by deferring to the school board’s credibility
determinations rather than the referee’s. According to Appellant, both the school board
and the trial court must defer to the referee’s credibility determinations.
Standard of Review
{¶32} “A court of appeals reviews the lower court’s determination of a R.C.
3319.16 appeal for abuse of discretion.” Ellsworth v. Streetsboro City School Dist. Bd. of
Edn., 2019-Ohio-4731, ¶ 35 (11th Dist.). “‘The phrase “abuse of discretion” is one of art,
denoting a judgment exercised by a court, which does not comport with reason or the
record.’” Id., quoting Lifton v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Health, 2016-Ohio-1299, ¶ 16 (11th
PAGE 8 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 Dist.). “‘An abuse of discretion may be found when the trial court “applies the wrong legal
standard, misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of
fact.”’” Id., quoting Denvir v. Blewitt, 2019-Ohio-187, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), quoting Thomas
v. Cleveland, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.). “Absent an abuse of discretion on the
part of the trial court, the court of appeals may not engage in what amounts to a
substitution of judgment of the trial court in an R.C. 3319.16 proceeding.” Graziano v.
Bd. of Edn. of Amherst Exempted Village School Dist., 32 Ohio St.3d 289, 294 (1987).
The School Board’s Authority
{¶33} The first issue is whether the school board improperly rejected some of the
referee’s findings, including its credibility determinations.
{¶34} R.C. 3319.16 provides that a school board may not terminate a teacher’s
contract “except for good and just cause.” The statute does not define that phrase;
however, the Supreme Court of Ohio has defined it as involving a “fairly serious matter.”
Hale v. Bd. of Edn., City of Lancaster, 13 Ohio St.2d 92, 99 (1968).
{¶35} Before terminating a teacher’s contract, the school board “shall furnish the
teacher a written notice signed by its treasurer of its intention to consider the termination
of the teacher’s contract with full specification of the grounds for such consideration.”
R.C. 3319.16. The teacher may then file with the treasurer a written demand for a hearing
before the school board or before a referee. Id. Where a referee conducts the hearing,
the referee must file a report within ten days after the hearing. Id. “After consideration of
the referee’s report, the board, by a majority vote, may accept or reject the referee’s
recommendation on the termination of the teacher’s contract.” Id. “After a hearing by the
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 board, the board, by majority vote, may enter its determination upon its minutes.” Id. The
order of termination must state the grounds for termination. Id.
{¶36} In Aldridge v. Huntington Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 38 Ohio St.3d 154
(1988), the Supreme Court of Ohio delineated “the respective responsibilities of the
referee and the [school] board in the statutory termination process.” Id. at 156. The
Supreme Court explained that a school board’s “decision to terminate a teacher’s contract
is comprised of two parts: (1) the factual basis for the allegations giving rise to the
termination; and (2) the judgment as to whether the facts, as found, constitute” good and
just cause. Id. at 157. According to the Court, “[t]he distinction between these two is
important in understanding the respective roles of the school board and of the statutory
referee in the termination process.” Id. The Court noted that “[t]he General Assembly
interposed a referee into teacher contract termination disputes by legislative enactment
in 1971,” which “indicates a legislative intent to inject a neutral party into termination
disputes.” Id. The Court determined that “[t]his intent is thwarted if the findings by a
referee can be rejected without explanation by a school board which conducts no hearing
and which does not see or hear any of the witnesses.” Id. “On the other hand,” the Court
stated, “the ultimate responsibility for the school system lies with the school board,” and
the Court “detect[ed] no legislative intent to change that responsibility.” Id.
{¶37} The Court further explained that “[t]he tension between the two (achieving
some objectivity and preserving board authority) can be resolved by an analysis of the
functions of the referee and the board.” Id. at 157-158. “A referee’s report consists of
both fact-findings and a recommendation. The referee’s primary duty is to ascertain
facts.” Id. at 158. “The board’s primary duty is to interpret the significance of the facts.
PAGE 10 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 Though the referee has the primary responsibility for findings of fact, the school board
does have the right and the responsibility to review those findings.” Id.
{¶38} After considering a “spectrum of possible standards,” the Court held that “in
teacher contract termination disputes arising under R.C. 3319.16: (1) the referee’s
findings of fact must be accepted unless such findings are against the greater weight, or
preponderance, of the evidence; [and] (2) a school board has the discretion to accept or
reject the recommendation of the referee unless such acceptance or rejection is contrary
to law.” Id. In addition, “in weighing the evidence, the board must give deference to the
fact that it is the referee who sees and hears the witnesses.” Id. Further, “[i]t is the
responsibility of the board to indicate whether it rejected a referee’s findings as being
against the preponderance of the evidence or accepted the referee’s factual
determination but rejected the referee’s recommendation based upon a different
interpretation of the significance of those facts.” Id. “[T]he board ‘should, in the spirit of
due process, articulate its reasons’ for rejecting a referee’s recommendation.” Id., quoting
Graziano, 32 Ohio St.3d at 293.
{¶39} Thus, contrary to Appellant’s argument, a school board is not required to
show complete deference to the referee’s credibility determinations. Instead, as stated,
“in weighing the evidence,” a school board “must give deference to the fact that it is the
referee who sees and hears the witnesses.” Aldridge, 38 Ohio St.3d at 158. However, a
school board has “the right and the responsibility” to review the referee’s findings because
the board has “the ultimate responsibility for the school system.” Id. at 157; see Wells v.
Madison Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 1985 WL 7682, *3 (12th Dist. July 15, 1985) (“not
only is it [the school board’s] right to make an independent determination, but they are
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 required to do so”). “R.C. 3319.16 does not require the Board of Education to act merely
as a rubber stamp for the Referee’s decision.” Graziano at 291. Therefore, a school
board may reject the referee’s findings if it determines that “such findings are against the
greater weight, or preponderance, of the evidence.” Aldridge at 158.
{¶40} In addition, the error in Aldridge occurred when the school board “failed to
give an explanation of why it rejected the referee’s findings.” Id.; accord Humphries v.
Lorain City School Dist., 2017-Ohio-8429, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.). Thus, this Court and others
have found no reversible error in cases in which a school board explained its reasons for
doing so. See, e.g., Ellsworth, 2019-Ohio-4731, at ¶ 66 (11th Dist.); Humphries v. Lorain
City School Dist., 2019-Ohio-2263, ¶ 13-15 (9th Dist.); Routson-Gim-Belluardo v.
Jefferson Twp. Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2016-Ohio-1265, ¶ 31 (2d Dist.); see also
Strohm v. Reynoldsburg City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 1998 WL 151082, *4 (10th Dist.
Mar. 31, 1998); Stelzer v. State Bd. of Edn., 72 Ohio App.3d 529, 532 (3d Dist. 1991).
{¶41} In the present case, the referee issued a 13-page, double-spaced report
and recommendation wherein he set forth several conclusory findings. The referee chose
not to explain the bases for his conclusions or cite any portion of the record in support.
As one example, the referee found that “[t]he evidence also showed [Student A’s] written
statement, testimony, and unsworn text messages and oral statements” to others “to be
replete with inconsistencies and demonstrable untruths.”
{¶42} By contrast, the school board adopted an 89-page, single-spaced resolution
wherein it rejected five of the referee’s findings as being “against the preponderance of
reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.” In each instance, the school board set forth
the referee’s applicable finding, explained its reasons for rejecting the finding, and cited
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 specific portions of the record in support. As an example, one of the board’s findings
states as follows:
The Board rejects findings of the Referee that “the evidence also showed Student A’s written statement, testimony, and unsworn text messages and oral statements to [Parent of Student B] and others to be replete with inconsistencies and demonstrable untruths” as such findings are against the preponderance of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence (Report at 6). In rejecting this finding, the Board, in the spirit of due process, articulates the Board’s reasons for rejecting these findings as follows:
1. Student A's testimony corroborates the verbal and written statements provided to Principal James Stitt and SRO Smith on April 22, 2021 (Board Ex. 3, Bates 000005).
2. Principal Stitt and SRO Smith located the vaping device exactly where Student A described it would be in Teacher Matola’s closet (J. Ex. 16; October 2021 Trp. 490-491 ).
3. Notwithstanding Teacher Matola’s self-serving denial and Student B contradictory denials, no evidence discredits the truthfulness of Student A’s testimony and statements regarding Teacher Matola vaping in front of Student B and Student A.
4. Student A never recanted any statements to Principal Stitt, SRO Smith, and/or Superintendent McQuaide (Trp. 349 ¶ 13-17).
5. Superintendent McQuaide’s recommendation to terminate Teacher Matola were [sic] based on the compilation of evidence regarding the truthfulness of Student A’s statements, the existence of vaping in classroom, and Teacher Matola leaving the classroom unattended (October 2021 Trp. 264-265).
6. While the Referee failed to find Student A’s testimony and statements to be reliable or probative in nature despite Student A’s consistency and credibility provided in the record, the Board does not.
7. While the Referee failed to find Principal Stitt, SRO Smith and Superintendent McQuaide’s findings to be reliable and probative in nature despite their competence to independently ascertain the truthfulness of Student A’s statements, the Board does not.
8. While the Referee fails to cite to the record or explain the Referee’s findings, the Board does not.
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 9. While the Referee failed to find Student A’s testimony credible, the Board does not.
10. The Board reincorporates by reference all the findings and conclusions of the Board as if fully rewritten herein.
{¶43} We find the school board’s actions to be fully consistent with Aldridge.
The Trial Court’s Authority
{¶44} The second issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by applying
an incorrect legal standard in reviewing the school board’s termination order.
{¶45} The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[w]hile an appeal before the
common pleas court pursuant to R.C. 3319.16 does not include a right to a trial de novo,
. . . the clear statutory language does however empower the court to weigh the evidence,
hold additional hearings and render factual determinations.” Graziano, 32 Ohio St.3d at
293. “The Common Pleas Court may reverse an order of termination of a teacher’s
contract, made by a Board of Education, where it finds that such order is not supported
by or is against the weight of the evidence.” Hale, 13 Ohio St.2d at paragraph one of the
syllabus. Thus, courts have held that “[i]f substantial and credible evidence is presented
to support the charges of the board, and a fair administrative hearing is had, the reviewing
court cannot substitute its judgment for the judgment of the administrative authorities.”
Strohm, 1998 WL 151082, at *4. Thus, the trial court, in reviewing the school board’s
termination order, is not required to show complete deference to the referee’s credibility
determinations.
{¶46} In its judgment entry, the trial court stated that it “very thoroughly reviewed
the transcript of the proceedings in the administrative hearing, reviewed the exhibits, the
referee’s report, and the resolution terminating [Appellant’s] conduct.” The trial court
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 determined that “[g]iving all required deference to the Referee’s report,” there was
“sufficient evidence in the record to support the school board’s findings by a
preponderance of the evidence that the improper conduct was committed, warranting a
termination of [Appellant’s] teaching contract for good and just cause, as is required under
R.C. 3319.16.” We find that the trial court utilized the correct legal standard in its review
of the school board’s termination order.
{¶47} The case that Appellant cites in support of her argument, Hiss v. Perkins
Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2019-Ohio-3703 (6th Dist.), is distinguishable. In Hiss, a
teacher and students gave testimony that was “often diametrically opposed.” Id. at ¶ 158.
The referee resolved the conflicts in favor of the students. Id. The school board adopted
the referee’s findings and recommendation and voted to terminate the teacher’s contract.
Id. at ¶ 135. On appeal, however, the common pleas court overturned the school board’s
termination order. See id. at ¶ 136-137.
{¶48} The Sixth District reversed, determining that “[i]n addition to using the wrong
standard for determining whether good and just cause existed, the common pleas court
failed to defer to the referee’s resolution of conflicting testimony.” Id. at ¶ 157. According
to the appellate court, the common pleas court “is required to give due deference to the
administrative resolution of evidentiary conflicts because, in a refereed hearing, it is the
referee who sees and hears the witnesses testify and can best weigh their credible.”
(Emphasis added.) Id. The common pleas court, however, “based only on the transcript
of the referee hearing,” “discounted all of the students’ testimony,” “found [the teacher]
wholly credible,” and in so doing, “gave no deference to the referee’s resolution of
evidentiary conflicts.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 159, 160.
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶49} Hiss is not analogous to the present case. In Hiss, the school board
adopted the referee’s findings and recommendation. See id. at ¶ 135. Thus, unlike the
present case, the administrative resolution of the conflicting testimony was aligned. As
explained above, a school board and a trial court have different legal obligations in a
termination proceeding. In addition, a trial court’s legal authority to overturn a school
board’s termination order is limited.
{¶50} Further, in Hiss, the common pleas court showed no deference to the
referee’s findings. See id. at ¶ 160. Here, both the school board and the trial court
showed due deference. In particular, the school board expressly acknowledged the
referee’s credibility determination but explained, in detail, the reasons why it disagreed
and cited the evidence upon which it relied. The trial court also expressly acknowledged
that the referee’s findings were entitled to deference but found that the evidence
supported the school board’s termination order. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion
in the trial court’s review of the school board’s termination order.
{¶51} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit.
Contract Nonrenewal
{¶52} Appellant’s second assignment of error states: “The trial court erred when
it dismissed [Appellant’s] appeal of the Board’s decision to non-renew her limited teaching
contract because the Board failed to comply with the evaluation requirements of R.C.
3319.11(E) and 3319.111(E) and because R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i)’s exception to the
evaluation requirement does not apply here.”
{¶53} Appellant argues that the school board failed to comply with R.C.
3319.111(E), which requires “at least three formal observations” of a teacher under a
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 limited contract “who is under consideration for nonrenewal.” The school board argues
that another statutory provision—R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i)—excused it from that
obligation. Appellant counters that the exception only applies to the immediately
preceding requirement in (C)(1) that a school board conduct an annual evaluation of each
teacher. According to Appellant, the exception does not apply to the formal-observations
requirement in R.C. 3319.111(E). Alternatively, Appellant argues that even if the
exception applies, she was not “on leave from the school district” under that exception.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶54} R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] teacher may appeal
an order affirming the intention of the board not to reemploy the teacher to the court of
common pleas . . . on the grounds that the board has not complied with this section or
section 3319.111 of the Revised Code.” The common pleas court “is limited to the
determination of procedural errors and to ordering the correction of procedural errors.”
Id. The common pleas court has “no jurisdiction to order a board to reemploy a teacher,
except that the court may order a board to reemploy a teacher . . . when the court
determines that evaluation procedures have not been complied with pursuant to section
3319.111 of the Revised Code or the board has not given the teacher written notice on
or before the first day of June of its intention not to reemploy the teacher.” Id. “Otherwise,
the determination whether to reemploy or not reemploy a teacher is solely a board’s
determination and not a proper subject of judicial review.” Id. Further, “no decision of a
board whether to reemploy or not reemploy a teacher shall be invalidated by the court
on any basis, including that the decision was not warranted by the results of any
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 evaluation or was not warranted by any statement given pursuant to division (G)(2) of
this section.” Id.
{¶55} Thus, “R.C. 3319.11(G)(7) limits judicial review ‘to the determination of
procedural errors.’” Jones v. Kent City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-2844, ¶ 21.
Consequently, the common pleas court “may examine only whether the [school] board
complied with the teacher-evaluation procedures required under R.C. 3319.111.” Id. An
appellate court reviews the common pleas court’s decision for an abuse of discretion.
Jones v. Kent City School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2023-Ohio-265, ¶ 16 (11th Dist.); Skilton v.
Perry Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2002-Ohio-6702, ¶ 19 (11th Dist.).
Scope of Exception
{¶56} The first issue is whether the exception in R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i)
excused the school board from satisfying the formal-observations requirement in R.C.
3319.111(E).
{¶57} “In assessing the language of a statute, ‘a court cannot pick out one
sentence and disassociate it from the context, but must look to the four corners of the
enactment to determine the intent of the enacting body.’” State v. Staffrey, 2025-Ohio-
2889, ¶ 18, quoting State v. Wilson, 1997-Ohio-35, ¶ 9. “The court ‘must “read words and
phrases in context and construe them in accordance with rules of grammar and common
usage”’ in a manner that does ‘not restrict, constrict, qualify, narrow, enlarge, or abridge
the General Assembly's wording.’” Id., quoting State ex rel. Carna v. Teays Valley Local
School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2012-Ohio-1484, ¶ 18, quoting State ex rel. Russell v. Thornton,
2006-Ohio-5858, ¶ 11.
PAGE 18 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶58} Based on our review of the statutory scheme, in context, we disagree with
Appellant’s reading of the statute. “A ‘limited contract’ for teachers is a contract for a term
of up to five years.” Jones, 2024-Ohio-2844, at ¶ 3. R.C. 3319.11(E) provides, in relevant
part:
Any teacher employed under a limited contract . . . is, at the expiration of such limited contract, considered reemployed under the provisions of this division at the same salary plus any increment provided by the salary schedule unless evaluation procedures have been complied with pursuant to section 3319.111 of the Revised Code and the employing board, acting upon the superintendent's written recommendation that the teacher not be reemployed, gives such teacher written notice of its intention not to reemploy such teacher on or before the first day of June.
{¶59} Thus, “[a] teacher employed under a limited contract is presumed to be
reemployed for another term at the end of the existing contract; the teacher’s employment
can be nonrenewed only if the school board has complied with the evaluation procedures
in R.C. 3319.111 and the superintendent recommends the teacher’s nonrenewal in
writing.” (Emphasis added.) Jones at ¶ 3.
{¶60} “Evaluation procedures” are “the procedures required by the policy adopted
pursuant to division (A) of section 3319.111.” R.C. 3319.11(A)(1). R.C. 3319.111(A), in
turn, requires school boards to “update its standards-based teacher evaluation policy to
conform with either the framework for evaluation of teachers adopted under section
3319.112 of the Revised Code or a framework created or adopted by the board.” R.C.
3319.112(A), in turn, provides that “[t]he framework shall establish an evaluation system
that,” among other things, “[r]equires observation of the teacher being evaluated,
including at least two formal observations by the evaluator of at least thirty minutes each
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Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 and classroom walk-throughs . . . .” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 3319.112(A)(3). Finally,
R.C. 3319.111(E) provides, in relevant part:
Notwithstanding division (A)(3) of section 3319.112 of the Revised Code, the board shall require at least three formal observations of each teacher who is under consideration for nonrenewal and with whom the board has entered into a limited contract . . . under section 3319.11 of the Revised Code.
{¶61} The foregoing provisions demonstrate that formal observations are one
component of a teacher evaluation. See R.C. 3319.112(A).1 Generally, a teacher
evaluation requires at least two formal observations. See R.C. 3319.112(A)(3). However,
for a teacher under a limited contract who is under consideration for nonrenewal, an
evaluation requires at least three formal observations. See R.C. 3319.111(E).
{¶62} R.C. 3319.111(C)(1) provides:
The board shall conduct an evaluation of each teacher employed by the board at least once each school year, except as provided in division (C)(2) of this section. The evaluation shall be completed by the first day of May and the teacher shall receive a written report of the results of the evaluation by the tenth day of May.
{¶63} One such exception is R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i), which provides:
The board may elect not to conduct an evaluation of a teacher who meets one of the following requirements:
The teacher was on leave from the school district for fifty per cent or more of the school year, as calculated by the board.
1. Our conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court of Ohio’s interpretation of the prior version of the statutory scheme in Farmer v. Kelleys Island Bd. of Edn., 69 Ohio St.3d 156 (1994): “A proper evaluation under former R.C. 3319.111(A) contains all the elements delineated in R.C. 3319.111(B), including the observation requirements listed in 3319.111(B)(2).” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus.
PAGE 20 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶64} Since formal observations are a component of a teacher evaluation, the
exception in R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i) necessarily encompasses that component.
Accordingly, R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i), when satisfied, excuses a school board from
conducting three formal observations of a teacher under a limited contract who is under
consideration for nonrenewal.
{¶65} The authorities that Appellant cites in support of her argument do not require
a different interpretation. For instance, Appellant cites Koncsol v. Niles, 105 Ohio App.3d
535 (11th Dist. 1995), for the proposition that “‘[a] special statutory provision which relates
to the specific subject matter involved in litigation is controlling over a general statutory
provision which might otherwise be applicable.’” Id. at 539, quoting Andrianos v.
Community Traction Co., 155 Ohio St. 47 (1951), paragraph one of the syllabus. Koncsol
involved conflicting statutes of limitation. Here, there is no conflict between R.C.
3319.111(E) and (C)(2)(d)(i) that we must resolve.
{¶66} Appellant also cites the Supreme Court of Ohio’s following statement in
Jones, 2024-Ohio-2844:
The plain language of R.C. 3319.111(E) requires three “observations of [the] teacher who is under consideration for nonrenewal.” And this is without exception. See Skilton v. Perry Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 2004-Ohio-2239, ¶ 11 (“a teacher’s medical leave of absence does not excuse a school board from complying with R.C. 3319.111. To hold otherwise would ignore the clear language of R.C. 3319.111”).
(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 26.
{¶67} The Supreme Court’s statement is not dispositive in the present case.
Jones did not involve the applicability of any of the exceptions in R.C. 3319.111(C)(2);
therefore, it is dicta. “‘Obiter dictum’ is defined as ‘[a] judicial comment made while
delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and
PAGE 21 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 therefore not precedential (although it may be considered persuasive).’” Willowick Bldg.
Dept. v. Shoregate Towers NS, LLC, 2024-Ohio-5650, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.), quoting Black’s
Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024).
{¶68} In addition, the case that the Supreme Court cited—Skilton—was decided
in 2004, which was before the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i). In
Skilton, the school board decided not to renew a teacher’s contract less than five months
into her approved one-year medical leave of absence. Id. at ¶ 2, 5. However, the school
board had not completed a second teacher evaluation that the prior version of R.C.
3319.111(A) required. Id. at ¶ 6. The school board argued that the requirement should
be excused “when the teacher is unavailable for evaluation in the narrow time frame
allotted by” the statute. Id. at ¶ 9. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, stating
that “[i]t is not the role of the courts to question the public policy values of a legislatively
enacted statutory scheme”; rather, courts are “limited to applying the statutes as written
and passing upon the constitutionality thereof.” Id. at ¶ 14. The Court noted, however,
that if the school board or its amicus curie, the Ohio School Boards Association, “find a
statute not to their liking, they may seek recourse at the General Assembly.” Id. at ¶ 17.
It appears the parties did just that—in 2014, the General Assembly enacted the evaluation
exception in R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i). See Sub.H.B. No. 362, 2014 Ohio Laws 112.
{¶69} Appellant further cites 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 197 (“H.B. 197”), which the
General Assembly enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic “to allow school districts to
forgo any evaluations required under R.C. Ch. 3319 if it was impossible or impracticable
to complete them.” Jones at ¶ 10. According to Appellant, H.B. 197 demonstrates that
“the General Assembly knows how to create exceptions to R.C. 3319.111(E) evaluation
PAGE 22 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 requirements.” However, Appellant does not quote H.B. 197 or explain how it supports
her position. In fact, H.B. 197 made no specific reference to R.C. 3319.111(E). See id.
at Section 17(M).
Meaning of “Leave”
{¶70} The second issue is whether Appellant was “on leave from the school
district” pursuant to R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i). (Emphasis added.)
{¶71} Appellant contends that “leave” is governed by R.C. 3319.13, which
provides, in relevant part:
Upon the written request of a teacher . . . , a board of education may grant a leave of absence for a period of not more than two consecutive school years for educational, professional, or other purposes, and shall grant such leave where illness or other disability is the reason for the request. Upon subsequent request, such leave may be renewed by the board. Without request, a board may grant similar leave of absence and renewals thereof to any teacher . . . because of physical or mental disability, but such teacher may have a hearing on such unrequested leave of absence or its renewals in accordance with section 3311.82 or 3319.16 of the Revised Code . . . .
{¶72} Appellant also cites R.C. 3319.131 (leave of absence for professional
growth); R.C. 3319.14 (military leave of absence); R.C. 3319.141 (sick leave); R.C.
3319.142 (personal leave for nonteaching employees); and R.C. 3319.143 (policy of
assault leave). According to Appellant, she was not on “leave” under these provisions;
rather, she was suspended pursuant to R.C. 3319.16, which provides: “The board may
suspend a teacher pending final action to terminate the teacher’s contract if, in its
judgment, the character of the charges warrants such action.”
{¶73} We are mindful that “[w]ords and phrases that have acquired a technical or
particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise, shall be construed
PAGE 23 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 accordingly.” R.C. 1.42. However, the statutes that Appellant cites address specific types
of “leave” or “leave of absence” under particular circumstances. The exception in R.C.
3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i), by contrast, uses the term “leave” without reference to any statutory
authority. Thus, there is no indication that the meaning of “leave” is governed by the cited
statutory provisions. In fact, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “[t]he General
Assembly’s use of different words signals a different meaning.” Obetz v. McClain, 2021-
Ohio-1706, ¶ 21.
{¶74} Since there is no applicable statutory definition of “leave,” we must
determine and apply its common meaning. See State v. Dorso, 4 Ohio St.3d 60, 62
(1983) (“any term left undefined by statute is to be accorded its common, everyday
meaning”); R.C. 1.42 (“Words and phrases shall be . . . construed according to the rules
of grammar and common usage”). “In determining the ‘common and ordinary meaning’
of words, courts may look to dictionaries.” Athens v. McClain, 2020-Ohio-5146, ¶ 30.
{¶75} The dictionary defines “leave” as “authorized absence from duty or
employment.” Merriam-Webster Online, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
leave (accessed November 21, 2025). Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th Ed. 2024),
defines “leave” as “extended absence for which someone, often an employee, has
authorization.” Thus, the common meaning of “leave” is “permitted or authorized absence
from work.”
{¶76} Appellant contends that she was not “on a permitted absence from work”;
rather, “she was ordered not to work because she was suspended.” According to
Appellant, “leave” must be voluntary and bilateral. We reject Appellant’s proposed
distinction. The common meaning of “leave” is not limited to a bilateral or voluntary
PAGE 24 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 arrangement. In fact, not even a “leave of absence” under R.C. 3319.13 is so limited:
“Without request, a board may grant similar leave of absence and renewals thereof to any
teacher . . . because of physical or mental disability.” (Emphasis added.) As stated, it
appears the General Assembly enacted R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i) to excuse the
evaluation requirement “when the teacher is unavailable for evaluation.” (Emphasis
added.) Skelton at ¶ 9. Our reading is fully consistent with that legislative intent: a teacher
suspended under R.C. 3319.16 is as equally unavailable as a teacher on a permitted
leave of absence under R.C. 3319.13.
{¶77} Appellant cites Pollett v. Rinker Materials Corp., 477 F.3d 376 (6th Cir.
2007), in support of her assertion that suspension is not “leave.” In Pollett, a panel
majority of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the term “excused leave of
absence” in an ERISA plan document did not encompass an employee’s suspension
without pay, reasoning:
Certainly a suspension and excused leave create an absence from work. But to equate a suspension without pay with an excused leave defies common sense. A suspension without pay constitutes a unilateral penalty which an employer imposes upon an employee. In contrast, an excused leave is more akin to a bilateral understanding during which an employer grants an employee permission to be absent from work. During an excused leave the employee suffers no monetary or other penalty and all employment privileges remain intact. An excused absence connotes a lack of punishment while a suspension implies the exact opposite. Merriam- Webster’s online dictionary defines “suspend” as “to debar temporarily especially from a privilege.” http://www.mw.com/dictionary/suspend. The same dictionary defines “excuse” as “to grant exemption or release.” http://www.mw.com/dictionary/excuse. The plain meaning of the phrase “suspended without pay” denotes [the employer] barred [the employee] from employment and all its attendant privileges during the period of his suspension.
(Emphasis in original and footnote omitted.) Id. at 378.
PAGE 25 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 {¶78} Notably, one judge dissented, writing that based on the “plain meaning” of
“leave of absence” in Black’s Law Dictionary, an “employer-ordered suspension simply
cannot be distinguished from other employer-authorized leaves of absence.” Id. at 380
(Clay, J., dissenting). However, since Pollett involves a federal court’s construction of a
different term (“excused leave of absence”) in a different context (ERISA plan document),
we do not find it to be persuasive authority.
{¶79} By suspending Appellant, the school board authorized her to be absent from
work pending further action regarding her contract. There is no dispute that Appellant
was absent for the entire 2021-2022 school year. Thus, as a matter of law, Appellant was
“a teacher who . . . was on leave from the school district for fifty per cent or more of the
school year, as calculated by the board.” R.C. 3319.111(C)(2)(d)(i). Accordingly, the trial
court properly found no procedural errors in the school board’s nonrenewal of Appellant’s
contract.
{¶80} Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit.
{¶81} For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the Trumbull County Court of
Common Pleas are affirmed.
ROBERT J. PATTON, P.J.,
SCOTT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
PAGE 26 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022 JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, Appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgments of the
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas are affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against Appellant.
JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND
PRESIDING JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON, concurs
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PAGE 27 OF 27
Case Nos. 2025-T-0021, 2025-T-0022