Mathew Thompson v. Nye County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Andrew Letchworth

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: March 10, 2026
• Docket: 2:25-cv-01714
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 3 DISTRICT OF NEVADA 4 * * * 5 Mathew Thompson, Case No. 2:25-cv-01714-JAD-DJA 6 Plaintiff, 7 Order v. 8 Nye County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy 9 Andrew Letchworth,

10 Defendants.

11 12 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se and has requested 13 authority to proceed in forma pauperis (meaning, without paying the filing fee). (ECF No. 4). 14 Plaintiff has also moved to amend his complaint. (ECF No. 5). Because the Court finds that 15 Plaintiff’s application is complete, it grants the application to proceed in forma pauperis. The 16 Court further grants Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint1 and screens Plaintiff’s proposed 17 amended complaint. 18 I. In forma pauperis application. 19 Plaintiff filed the affidavit required by § 1915(a). (ECF No. 4). Plaintiff’s income does 20 not exceed his expenses. So, the Court finds that Plaintiff has shown an inability to prepay fees 21 and costs or give security for them. Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis will be 22 granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The Court will now review Plaintiff’s complaint. 23 24 1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), a party may amend its pleading with the court’s 25 leave and the court “should freely give leave when justice so requires.” Plaintiff seeks to amend his complaint to add additional facts that he has learned and to expand upon certain claims. The 26 Court finds that justice so requires that the Court allow the amendment and thus grants the 27 motion. As a result, the Court screens only the proposed amended complaint because, generally, an amended complaint supersedes an original, rendering the former without any legal effect. See 1 II. Legal standard for screening. 2 Upon granting an application to proceed in forma pauperis, courts additionally screen the 3 complaint under § 1915(e). Federal courts are given the authority to dismiss a case if the action is 4 legally “frivolous or malicious,” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks 5 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 6 When a court dismisses a complaint under § 1915, the plaintiff should be given leave to amend 7 the complaint with directions as to curing its deficiencies, unless it is clear from the face of the 8 complaint that the deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Cato v. United States, 70 9 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 10 Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for dismissal of a 11 complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Review under Rule 12 12(b)(6) is essentially a ruling on a question of law. See Chappel v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 232 F.3d 13 719, 723 (9th Cir. 2000). A properly pled complaint must provide a short and plain statement of 14 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell Atlantic Corp. 15 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although Rule 8 does not require detailed factual 16 allegations, it demands “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 17 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. 18 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). The court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations 19 contained in the complaint, but the same requirement does not apply to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 20 556 U.S. at 679. Mere recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported only by conclusory 21 allegations, do not suffice. Id. at 678. Where the claims in the complaint have not crossed the 22 line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint should be dismissed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. 23 Allegations of a pro se complaint are held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 24 drafted by lawyers. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that liberal 25 construction of pro se pleadings is required after Twombly and Iqbal). 26 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only that power authorized by 27 the Constitution and statute. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004). Under 28 U.S.C. 1 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Cases “arise under” federal law either when 2 federal law creates the cause of action or where the vindication of a right under state law 3 necessarily turns on the construction of federal law. Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 4 F.3d 1086, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 2002). Whether federal-question jurisdiction exists is based on the 5 “well-pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a 6 federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” 7 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), federal 8 district courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions in diversity cases “where the matter in 9 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and where the matter is between “citizens of 10 different states.” Generally speaking, diversity jurisdiction exists only where there is “complete 11 diversity” among the parties; each of the plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each 12 of the defendants. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 13 III. Screening the complaint. 14 A. Background. 15 Plaintiff sues Nye County and Nye County Sheriff’s Deputy Andrew Letchworth in his 16 official and personal capacity2 for damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment. 17 Plaintiff alleges that on March 4, 2024, he was working in his yard at his residence in Tonopah, 18 Nevada. Plaintiff approached his home to enter the front door when Letchworth arrived in a 19 marked police vehicle and ordered Plaintiff, via loudspeaker, to refrain from entering his home 20 and to approach a truck parked in the driveway. Plaintiff asked Letchworth multiple times 21 regarding Letchworth’s authority for his demands and for his presence on Plaintiff’s property. In 22 response, Letchworth told Plaintiff “I don’t need to give you a law; either do as I am directing 23 you or I will place you under arrest.” Given Letchworth’s threat, Plaintiff complied, but was 24 “unlawfully detained on his own property without probable cause or a warrant.” Plaintiff does 25

26 2 Plaintiff asserts that he is suing Letchworth in both his individual and official capacity. 27 However, an official capacity suit against a municipal officer is equivalent to a suit against the entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). So, Plaintiff’s claims against 1 not explain whether Letchworth placed him in cuffs or prohibited from leaving his yard or some 2 other space. Letchworth issued Plaintiff a criminal driving on a suspended license citation and 3 had Plaintiff’s legally registered and insured truck towed. Plaintiff again asked Letchworth about 4 the laws authorizing him to tow Plaintiff’s vehicle from his property and Letchworth responded 5 again, “I don’t have to give you any laws; I know I can tow this vehicle.” 6 As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he incurred towing and impound fees totaling $308.00 7 and $300.00 in interest due to a loan that he took out to release the vehicle. Plaintiff adds that he 8 lost revenue totaling $9,000.00 due to an inability to fulfill a contract (apparently related to his 9 ability to use his truck to work) as a result of Letchworth towing it. Plaintiff claims that on 10 Letchworth’s internal report, Letchworth falsely claimed that the vehicle was not towed, that the 11 address (presumably from which the truck was towed) was commercial, and that Plaintiff had no 12 insurance. Plaintiff also asserts that the report had a checkbox stating, “Racial Profile Created,” 13 which was marked “yes.” Plaintiff claims that this indicates that Nye County has policies for its 14 officers to racially profile individuals they encounter. 15 Within days following the incident, Plaintiff filed internal complaints with the Nye 16 County Sheriff’s Department. After receiving no response for several months, Plaintiff escalated 17 his complaint on July 5, 2024, to the Peace Officer Advisory Review Board. On October 30, 18 2024, the Board found Letchworth negligent in his actions due to “misunderstanding agency 19 policies,” and “failure to follow agency policies.” But Nye County refused to take any 20 disciplinary or corrective action. 21 22 23 24 25 26 /// 27 /// 1 Plaintiff brings the following causes of action arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: 2 (1) unlawful seizure by virtue of his detention; (2) unlawful seizure arising out of Letchworth 3 towing his vehicle; (3) violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth 4 Amendments by virtue of his truck being towed without a pre-deprivation hearing; (4) retaliation; 5 (5) excessive fines; (6) false arrest and malicious prosecution; (7) Monell liability; (8) racial 6 profiling; and (9) conspiracy to violate constitutional rights.3 7 B. Discussion. 8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create substantive rights but instead “provides a mechanism for 9 enforcing individual rights ‘secured’ elsewhere, i.e., rights independently ‘secured by the 10 Constitution and laws’ of the United States.” Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 285 (2002). 11 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a 12 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the 13 alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. See West v. 14 Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). 15 1. Unreasonable seizure by detaining Plaintiff. 16 The Fourth Amendment governs the reasonableness of government searches and seizures. 17 See U.S. Const., amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 18 and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ... but upon probable 19 cause ...”). Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege a claim for unreasonable seizure against 20 Letchworth for detaining him because his allegations do not provide sufficient detail. Plaintiff 21 alleges that he was “unlawfully detained on his own property without probable cause or a 22 warrant.” But without additional detail regarding how or why he was detained and why it was 23 24 3 Plaintiff does not identify which Defendant he brings these claims against. However, as 25 discussed more fully below, municipalities cannot be vicariously liable for their employees actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. So, to the extent Plaintiff brings these claims against Nye 26 County simply because it employed Letchworth when he took the actions alleged, those claims 27 would fail. The Court therefore construes Plaintiff’s complaint as bringing each of these claims—with the exception of the excessive fines and Monell claims—against Letchworth in his 1 unlawful for Letchworth to do so, Plaintiff’s claim is entirely conclusory. The Court therefore 2 dismisses Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim against Letchworth for 3 detaining him without prejudice and with leave to amend. 4 2. Unreasonable seizure by towing Plaintiff’s truck. 5 Plaintiff sufficiently alleges a claim for unreasonable seizure under the Fourth 6 Amendment against Letchworth for towing his vehicle. Plaintiff alleges that Letchworth did not 7 have any probable cause to tow Plaintiff’s car, either in the form of a warrant or exigent 8 circumstances. Letchworth also refused to give Plaintiff any reason for towing the vehicle. 9 Moreover, Letchworth later reported that he did not tow the car at all. The Court therefore allows 10 Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim to proceed against Letchworth for 11 towing Plaintiff’s truck. 12 3. Due process violations. 13 “The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the equal protection component 14 thereof apply only to actions of the federal government—not to those of state or local 15 governments.” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 687 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other 16 grounds by Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125–26 (9th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff 17 does not allege that any of the defendants are federal actors. So, the Court dismisses his due 18 process claim as brought under the Fifth Amendment without prejudice and with leave to amend. 19 To state a colorable Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause violation, a plaintiff must 20 establish (1) a liberty or property interest that he has been deprived of, and (2) that the procedures 21 followed by the State were constitutionally insufficient. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 22 219 (2011). To have a property interest, a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to 23 the property. See Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). If a 24 constitutionally protected property interest exists, the government must provide the deprived 25 individual due process in the form of notice and an opportunity to respond. See Cleveland Bd. of 26 Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985). Here, Plaintiff has alleged that Letchworth 27 deprived him of his property interest in his truck without notice and an opportunity to respond. 1 He has therefore alleged a colorable Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause violation claim 2 against Letchworth and the Court allows this claim to proceed. 3 4. Retaliation. 4 To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the 5 plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant’s actions would 6 chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities; and (3) that 7 the defendant intended to inhibit speech. See Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino 8 County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300–01 n.32 (9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he First Amendment protects a 9 significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers.” City of Houston 10 v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461 (1987); Ford v. City of Yakima, 706 F.3d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 2013), 11 abrogated by Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019). However, “[a] plaintiff may not recover 12 merely on the basis of a speculative ‘chill’ due to generalized and legitimate law enforcement 13 initiatives.” Mendocino Environmental Center v. Mendocino County, 14 F.3d 457, 464 (9th Cir. 14 1994) (internal quotations omitted). 15 Plaintiff has not alleged a colorable claim for First Amendment retaliation against 16 Letchworth. Although Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he was engaged in constitutionally 17 protected activity, he has not alleged the remainder of the elements of this claim. Plaintiff has not 18 alleged that Letchworth’s actions in detaining him (which actions Plaintiff does not describe) 19 caused him to suffer any injury, let alone an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness 20 from continuing to engage in that activity. Plaintiff also does not sufficiently allege that 21 Letchworth detained Plaintiff as a result of Plaintiff questioning Letchworth’s actions. So, 22 Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient factual detail to assert a colorable claim for First Amendment 23 retaliation against Letchworth and the Court therefore dismisses this claim without prejudice and 24 with leave to amend. 25 5. Excessive fines. 26 The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment “limits the government’s power to 27 extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense.” Pimentel v. City 1 609–10 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only punitive fines fall within the Clause’s 2 scope; purely remedial sanctions are not subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. Austin v. United 3 States, 509 U.S. 02, 609–10 (1993); United States v. Mackby, 261 F.3d 821, 829–30 (9th Cir. 4 2001); Pimentel v. City of Los Angeles, 115 F.4th 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub 5 nom. City of Los Angeles, California v. Pimentel, 145 S. Ct. 2735, 222 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (2025). 6 Plaintiff does not allege a colorable claim for violation of the Excessive Fines Clause because he 7 does not allege that he paid the impound fees to Nye County or Letchworth. Plaintiff also does 8 not allege that he obtained the loan to release the vehicle from either Nye County or Letchworth 9 such that the interest on that loan is a “fine” within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. The 10 Court therefore dismisses this claim without prejudice and with leave to amend. 11 6. False arrest and malicious prosecution. 12 As a preliminary matter, the Court liberally construes this claim as one for malicious 13 prosecution only because Plaintiff’s false arrest claim is redundant of his unreasonable seizure 14 claim related to his detention. And, as the Court has already pointed out, Plaintiff does not 15 provide sufficient allegations to constitute this claim. 16 Plaintiff also does not allege sufficient facts to support a malicious prosecution claim. 17 The “gravamen” of the tort of malicious prosecution is the wrongful initiation of charges without 18 probable cause. Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022). In the context of a Fourth 19 Amendment malicious prosecution claim, those charges must result in a seizure as well. 20 Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon, Ohio, 602 U.S. 556, 562 (2024). Here, Plaintiff does not allege 21 that Letchworth wrongfully initiated charges against him without probable cause. Plaintiff 22 alleges that Letchworth “issued a criminal driving on a suspended license citation…” But 23 Plaintiff does not allege that this citation was without probable cause. Later in his complaint, 24 Plaintiff states that he “was charged without probable cause, and the charges were subsequently 25 dismissed.” But Plaintiff does not allege what crimes he was charged with, when, by whom, or 26 the circumstances surrounding their dismissal. Without this information, it is not clear if Plaintiff 27 is referring to the criminal driving on a suspended license citation or some other charges. And 1 more, Plaintiff does not allege a colorable claim for malicious prosecution and the Court 2 dismisses it without prejudice and with leave to amend. 3 7. Monell claim. 4 A municipality may be found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only where the municipality 5 itself causes the violation at issue. City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989) 6 (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). To state a claim 7 for municipal or county liability, a plaintiff must allege that he suffered a constitutional 8 deprivation that was the product of a policy or custom of the local government unit. City of 9 Canton, 489 U.S. at 385. “Official municipal policy includes the decisions of a government’s 10 lawmakers, the acts of its policymaking officials, and practices so persistent and widespread as to 11 practically have the force of law.” See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). 12 Municipalities are not vicariously liable under § 1983 for their employees’ actions. Id. at 60. 13 Municipalities can only be liable for the infringement of constitutional rights under certain 14 circumstances. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-95. “[M]unicipalities may be liable under § 1983 for 15 constitutional injuries pursuant to (1) an official policy; (2) a pervasive practice or custom; (3) a 16 failure to train, supervise or discipline; or (4) a decision or act by a final policymaker.” Horton 17 by Horton v. City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 602–03 (9th Cir. 2019). 18 Here, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to establish Monell liability against Nye 19 County. Plaintiff alleges that because there is a checkbox for “Racial Profile Created” on Nye 20 County’s report forms that Nye County has a policy of allowing its officers to racially profile 21 individuals. However, it is not clear from Plaintiff’s allegations that this checkbox refers to the 22 constitutional violation of racial profiling. And the existence of this checkbox alone does not 23 demonstrate that Nye County had a policy or custom to allow racial profiling. Moreover, as 24 outlined below, Plaintiff provides no other facts to support his allegation that he was profiled 25 based on his race other than pointing to this checkbox. So, even if he did establish that Nye 26 County has a practice or custom of racial profiling, he has not alleged that he suffered a 27 constitutional deprivation that was the result of that practice or custom. The Court therefore 1 8. Racial profiling. 2 “Racial profiling can constitute a deprivation of a citizen’s right to equal protection under 3 the law.” Thomas v. Melendez, No. 1:16-cv-01759-LJO-JLT, 2016 WL 7116720 at *3 (E.D. Cal. 4 Dec. 7, 2016) (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) and James v. City of 5 Seattle, No. C10-1612-JLR, 2011 WL 6150567, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2011)). To state a 6 claim for racial profiling in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, “a 7 plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the 8 plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.” Thornton v. City of St. Helens, 425 F.3d 9 1158, 1166-67 (9th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff does not allege a colorable claim for racial profiling 10 because he does not allege that Letchworth acted with the intent or purpose to discriminate 11 against him based on his membership in a protected class. As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not 12 identify his race or the protected class to which he asserts he belongs. And other than pointing to 13 a checkbox that Letchworth marked, he does not point to any of Letchworth’s other actions that 14 demonstrate a discriminatory intent. The Court therefore dismisses this claim without prejudice 15 and with leave to amend. 16 9. Conspiracy. 17 To state a conspiracy claim under § 1983,4 a plaintiff must show (1) an agreement 18 between the defendants to deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, (2) an overt act in 19 furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) a constitutional deprivation. Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 20 2d 1196, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2012); see also Gilbrook v. City of Westminster, 177 F.3d 839, 856–57 21 (9th Cir.1999). “To be liable, each participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details 22 4 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not invoke 42 U.S.C. §1985(3). But even if the Court were 23 to consider him as bringing a conspiracy claim under that provision, he would not have 24 successfully alleged it. This is because 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) requires an intent to deprive the plaintiff of equal protection, or equal privileges and immunities, meaning that there must be some 25 racial or otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ actions. See Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1028 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Griffin v. 26 Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101-102 (1971)). While Plaintiff alleges that he was racially profiled, 27 he does not provide sufficient allegations to support that claim. Additionally, Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations are too conclusory to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 1 of the plan, but each participant must at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” 2 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 865 F.2d 1539, 1541 (9th Cir. 1989). 3 Because conspiracies are secret agreements, “[a] defendant’s knowledge of and participation in a 4 conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence and from evidence of the defendant’s 5 actions.” Gilbrook, 177 F.3d at 856–57. 6 To plead a claim of conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff must allege facts with sufficient 7 particularity to show an agreement or a meeting of the minds to violate the plaintiff’s 8 constitutional rights. Miller v. California, 355 F.3d 1172, 1177 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004); Margolis v. 9 Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 853 (9th Cir. 1998); Woodrum v. Woodward County, 866 F.2d 1121, 1126 10 (9th Cir. 1989). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights 11 violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. 12 of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 13 1977); Davis v. Powell, 901 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1217 (S.D. Cal. 2012). 14 Plaintiff does not allege a claim for conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because his 15 allegations are entirely conclusory. Plaintiff does not allege facts to establish an agreement 16 between Letchworth and any other person or demonstrate that Letchworth’s actions were in 17 furtherance of that conspiracy. Because Plaintiff does not allege facts with sufficient particularity 18 to show an agreement or a meeting of the minds, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim 19 without prejudice and with leave to amend. 20 21 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma 22 pauperis (ECF No. 4) is granted. Plaintiff shall not be required to pre-pay the filing fee. 23 Plaintiff is permitted to maintain this action to conclusion without the necessity of prepayment of 24 any additional fees or costs or the giving of a security therefor. This order granting leave to 25 proceed in forma pauperis shall not extend to the issuance and/or service of subpoenas at 26 government expense. 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint (ECF No. 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to file Plaintiff’s 2 amended complaint (ECF No. 5-1) on the docket and issue summons to Nye County Sheriff’s 3 Deputy Andrew Letchworth. 4 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the following claims are dismissed without 5 prejudice and with leave to amend: 6 (1) Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim for his alleged detention; 7 (2) Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due process claim; 8 (3) Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim; 9 (4) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive fines claim; 10 (5) Plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim; 11 (6) Plaintiff’s Monell claim; 12 (7) Plaintiff’s racial profiling claim; 13 (8) Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim. 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff may proceed on the following claims: 15 (1) Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim arising out of Letchworth 16 towing his truck; 17 (2) Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; 18 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis 19 under 42 U.S.C. § 1915, he is entitled to rely on the United States Marshal’s Service (“USMS”) 20 for service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send the 22 following to the USMS for service: (1) the summons issued to Letchworth; (2) a copy of the 23 amended complaint; and (3) a copy of this order. 24 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send the 25 following to Plaintiff: (1) a copy of this order; and (2) a copy of the Form USM-285. 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have until March 31, 2026, to 27 complete the Form USM-285 and send that completed form to the USMS. ] IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon receipt of Plaintiff's Form USM-285, the 2 || USMS shall attempt service on the defendant. 3 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within twenty-one days after receiving a copy of the 4 || Form USM-285 back from the USMS showing whether service has been accomplished, Plaintiff 5 || must file a notice with the Court identifying whether the defendant was served. If Plaintiff wishes 6 || to have service again attempted on an unserved defendant, the Plaintiff must file a motion with 7 || the Court identifying the unserved defendant and specifying a more detailed name and/or address 8 || for said defendant or whether some other manner of service should be attempted. 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that service must be perfected on or before June 9, 2026. 10 || See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). 11 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall serve upon defendant(s), or if an 12 || appearance has been entered by counsel, upon their attorney(s), a copy of every pleading, motion 13 || or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. If Plaintiff electronically files a 14 || document with the Court’s electronic-filing system, no certificate of service is required. Fed. R. 15 || Civ. P. 5(d)(1)(B); Nev. Loc. R. IC 4-1(b); Nev. Loc. R. 5-1. However, if Plaintiff mails the 16 || document to the Court, Plaintiff shall include with the original document submitted for filing a 17 || certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of the document was mailed to the 18 || defendants or counsel for the defendants. If counsel has entered a notice of appearance, Plaintiff 19 || shall direct service to the individual attorney named in the notice of appearance, at the physical or 20 || electronic address stated therein. The Court may disregard any document received by a district 21 || judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk, and any document received by 22 || adistrict judge, magistrate judge, or the Clerk which fails to include a certificate showing proper 23 || service when required. 24 25 DATED: March 10, 2026 IO DANIEL J. ALBREGTS |, 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28