Mata v. N.C. Dep't of Transp.

Opinions

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. 217PA24-1

Filed 12 December 2025

ELIZABETH MATA and THE MATA FAMILY, LLC

v.

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATIONN and NORTH CAROLINA TURNPIKE AUTHORITY

On discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-31 of a divided decision of

the Court of Appeals, 294 N.C. App. 705 (2024), affirming in part and reversing in

part an order and judgment entered on 5 June 2023 by Judge G. Bryan Collins, Jr. in

Superior Court, Wake County, and remanding for further proceedings. Heard in the

Supreme Court on 16 September 2025.

Cranfill Sumner LLP, by George B. Autry, Jr., Stephanie H. Autry, and Jeremy P. Hopkins, for plaintiffs-appellees.

The Banks Law Firm, P.A., by Howard B. Rhodes; North Carolina Department of Justice, by Jeanne Washburn, Assistant Attorney General; Smith, Anderson, Blount, Dorsett, Mitchell & Jernigan, LLP, by William H. Moss; and Skidmore Law Group, PLLC, by Matthew W. Skidmore, for defendant-appellant North Carolina Department of Transportation.

EARLS, Justice.

This case requires the Court to clarify two fundamental aspects of just

compensation for takings effectuated under the now-repealed Transportation

Corridor Official Map Act (Map Act), N.C.G.S. §§ 136-44.50 through 44.54 (repealed

2019). On 6 August 1996, the North Carolina Department of Transportation (DOT)

Opinion of the Court

recorded a corridor map covering approximately 9.93 acres of land owned by plaintiffs

Elizabeth A. Mata and The Mata Family, LLC (collectively, Matas), restricting their

fundamental rights to improve, develop, and subdivide the property. These

restrictions remained in place for nearly twenty years until the General Assembly

rescinded all Map Act corridors on 11 July 2016 in response to this Court’s decision

in Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, 368 N.C. 847 (2016), which

held that Map Act restrictions constituted takings by eminent domain requiring just

compensation. Plaintiffs filed an inverse condemnation action in 2019 seeking

compensation for the twenty-year taking. After a hearing, the trial court concluded

that the proper measure of damages was fair rental value, the measure of damages

for a temporary taking. The Court of Appeals agreed that the 2016 legislative

rescission retroactively transformed what Kirby, and Chappell v. North Carolina

Department of Transportation, 374 N.C. 273 (2020), characterized as an “indefinite”

taking into a “temporary” taking, but reversed the trial court’s damages

determination, directing instead that damages be calculated as “the diminution in

value . . . until 11 July 2016.” Mata v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 294 N.C. App. 705, 713

(2024).

We hold that Map Act corridor recordings effectuate indefinite takings of

fundamental property rights at the moment of recording, and subsequent legislative

rescission does not retroactively transform an indefinite taking into a temporary one

for purposes of calculating just compensation. The proper measure of damages is the

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difference between the fair market value of the property immediately before and

immediately after the corridor map recording, considering all pertinent factors

including the indefinite nature of the restrictions and any effect of reduced ad

valorem taxes. Chappell 374 N.C. at 284. Expert appraisers may employ various

acceptable methodologies, including comparable sales, income capitalization (which

may incorporate rental value considerations), or a cost approach to determine these

before-and-after fair market values, provided the ultimate comparison is between fair

market values as of the date of the taking. Id. at 283–85. Accordingly, we reverse the

decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case for proceedings consistent with

this opinion.

I. Background

In 1987, the General Assembly enacted the Roadway Corridor Official Map

Act. With its passage, the Map Act limited a landowner’s rights to obtain a permit to

build any structure or building on the affected land, for example, and prevented the

property from being subdivided or developed in certain ways. See N.C.G.S. § 153A-

335, 136-44.51(a) (1987). Importantly, the Act described these restrictions placed on

property owners as permanent takings; however, when calculating the value of the

land before the corridor map was recorded and the value of the land afterward, all

pertinent factors were to be considered, including the restriction on each plaintiff's

fundamental rights and any effect of the reduced ad valorem taxes on the subject

property. See id; Kirby, 368 N.C. 847 (2016).

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On 1 June 1973, Elizabeth Mata acquired a fee simple interest in

approximately 94 acres of real property in Apex, Wake County (the Mata Property).

On 20 November 2012, the Mata Property was deeded to The Mata Family, LLC.

On 6 August 1996, the DOT recorded a corridor map (1996 Corridor Map)

pursuant to the Map Act for the I-540 highway project. That corridor map covered

approximately 9.93 acres of the Mata Property. This recording imposed restrictions

on plaintiffs’ core property rights to improve, develop, or subdivide the designated

portion of the Mata Property.

In Kirby v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, this Court clarified

that the restrictions imposed under the Map Act constituted a taking by eminent

domain for which just compensation was due. 368 N.C at 848. Specifically, we noted

that the recorded corridor maps “restricted [the landowner’s] rights to improve,

develop, and subdivide their property for an indefinite period of time.” Id. at 856.

Even though the Act provided certain ways that a landowner could become exempt

from the recorded restrictions, id. at 849–50, we concluded that “[i]n all instances, . . .

the restrictions imposed upon the property remain indefinitely, absent affirmative

action by the owner and either approval from the State or a certain lapse of time.” Id.

In light of that indefinite taking of fundamental property rights, the proper measure

of damages was “the value of the land before the corridor map was recorded and the

value of the land afterward, taking into account all pertinent factors, including the

restriction on each plaintiff’s fundamental rights, as well as any effect of the reduced

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ad valorem taxes.” Id. at 856.

On 11 July 2016, the General Assembly rescinded all corridor maps recorded

pursuant to the Map Act. The General Assembly later repealed the Map Act in its

entirety, effective 13 June 2019. An Act to Repeal the Transportation Corridor

Official Map Act, S.L 2019-35, § 1, 2019 N.C. Sess. Laws 211.

On 26 February 2019, Elizabeth Mata and The Mata Family, LLC filed an

inverse condemnation action under N.C.G.S. § 136-111. Plaintiffs sought

compensation for the Map Act restrictions which had encumbered the Mata Property

from 6 August 1996 to 11 July 2016.

On 7 April 2020, DOT filed a direct condemnation action on the Mata Property

pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 136-103 to acquire additional rights on both the same and

other land covered by the 1996 Corridor Map for the purpose of building the I-540

project. At the time DOT filed its direct condemnation action, the Map Act

restrictions no longer encumbered the Mata Property.

On 17 May 2023, the trial court held a hearing on DOT’s motion to determine

all preliminary issues other than just compensation, pursuant to N.C.G.S. §§ 136-108

and 136-111. Following the hearing, the trial court found and determined that the

DOT had effectuated a temporary taking of the Mata Property from 6 August 1996 to

11 July 2016, by way of the Map Act corridor restrictions. The court decreed that the

Matas were accordingly entitled to just compensation. The measure of that

compensation, namely, should follow the appraisal method for so-called “temporary”

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takings: “[t]he difference in the value of the property immediately before and

immediately after the taking.” In making that calculation, “appraisers may use rental

value to measure the value of the property during the duration of the taking.”

The DOT, together with the North Carolina Turnpike Authority, appealed the

trial court’s order on 30 June 2023. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and

reversed in part. Mata, 294 N.C. App. at 713. The appellate court agreed with the

trial court’s determination that the eventual rescission of the corridor recording

transformed the taking of the Mata’s Property into a temporary taking, and further

concluded that the trial court correctly found that the temporary taking “occurred

between 6 August 1996 until 11 July 2016.” Id. But the Court of Appeals reversed in

part on the measure of just compensation:

The proper measure of the damages to be proven by Plaintiff is the diminution in value on the date of the filing of the highway corridor on 6 August 1996 until 11 July 2016, “taking into account all pertinent factors” to include the reduction in assessed ad valorem taxes Plaintiffs benefitted from during the period of the relevant temporary taking. Chappell, 374 N.C. at 284, 841 S.E.2d at 522. The order of the trial court is reversed on the measure of damages Plaintiff must prove.

Id.

Judge Murphy concurred in part and dissented in part, and would have held

that the property’s rental value was the proper measure of damages in the case of a

temporary taking, consistent with the Court of Appeals reasoning in Sanders v. North

Carolina Department of Transportation, No. COA22-440, slip op. 23–25 (N.C. Ct. App.

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Feb. 6, 2024) (unpublished).1

The DOT sought discretionary review of two issues: (1) whether the Court of

Appeals erred by failing to follow this Court’s decisions in Kirby and Chappell as to

the nature of the taking, and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred by failing to

apply the correct measure of damages for a Map Act taking, which DOT argued “is

the change in the property’s fair market value from immediately before to

immediately after the date of taking, plus interest from the date of taking to the date

of final judgment.” Mata v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., 294 N.C. App. 705 (2024). This

Court allowed discretionary review of both issues on 21 March 2025. We now reverse.

II. Analysis

The DOT advances three main arguments. First, it contends that the Court of

Appeals mischaracterized Map Act takings as “temporary,” contradicting Kirby’s

holding that Map Act takings are indefinite in nature. In essence, DOT’s position is

that the subsequent legislative rescission of the corridor maps does not retroactively

transform an indefinite taking into a temporary one—the character of what was

taken must be determined at the moment of the taking, not by hindsight knowledge

of events that occurred twenty years later. Second and relatedly, DOT asks this Court

to reverse the Court of Appeals as to the correct measure of damages, which that

court described as the ongoing “diminution in value . . . until 11 July 2016,” Mata,

1 This Court simultaneously reverses the Court of Appeals Sanders decision in another

decision filed today, Sanders v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp., No. 87PA24 (N.C. Dec. 12, 2025).

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294 N.C. App. at 713, and to clarify that the proper measure of damages is fair market

value before and after the taking together with the requisite award of interest. Third

and finally, DOT asks this Court to reaffirm that rental value is an acceptable

appraisal method under the income capitalization approach to determining fair

market value, and to disavow any language in the Court of Appeals’ opinion that

could be read to prohibit consideration of rental value.

A. Standard of Review

Our review of a Court of Appeals decision after a final determination by that

court is for errors of law. N.C. R. App. P. 16(a). Questions of law, including statutory

interpretation and the constitutional dimensions of the State’s taking power under

eminent domain, are reviewed de novo. See Wilkie v. City of Boiling Spring Lakes,

370 N.C. 540, 547 (2018); Chappell, 374 N.C. at 281.

B. Nature of the Taking

This Court’s precedent confirms that a Map Act restriction was an indefinite

taking at the time the property was placed on the recording map. That conclusion is

not altered in light of the later rescission of the corridor maps by the General

Assembly on 11 July 2016, because fundamentally the relevant indefinite “taking” of

core property rights occurred at the point of the initial recording.

Kirby confirmed that DOT’s use of the Map Act to record highway

transportation corridor maps constituted an exercise of the Department’s power of

eminent domain and “effectuated a taking of fundamental property rights.” 368 N.C.

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at 856. We characterized Map Act restrictions as creating an “indefinite restraint on

fundamental property rights” that restricted landowners’ rights for an unlimited

period of time. Id. at 855.

The indefinite nature of the taking at the point of the corridor recording was

central to Kirby’s holding. We explained that “[u]pon NCDOT’s recording of the

highway corridor maps at issue here, the Map Act restricted plaintiffs’ fundamental

rights to improve, develop, and subdivide their property for an unlimited period of

time.” Id. at 848. The Map Act imposed restrictions that “remain indefinitely, absent

affirmative action by the owner and either approval from the State or a certain lapse

of time.” Id. at 850. The statute provided no guarantee that the highway would ever

be built, and no deadline for DOT to act, and placed the burden on property owners

to seek relief through administrative processes that themselves had no assured

timeline.

Moreover, “[t]he Map Act’s indefinite restraint on fundamental property rights

is squarely outside the scope of the police power.” Id. at 855. The nature of what the

State restricted made this a taking, as opposed to a valid exercise of regulations

imposed under the police power. The Court expressed concern that were the State to

succeed in classifying these takings as mere temporary regulations, it would

effectively grant itself the right to “hinder property rights indefinitely for a project

that may never be built.” Id.

In Chappell v. North Carolina Department of Transportation, we reaffirmed

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the indefinite nature of Map Act takings. 374 N.C. at 284. We observed that, such

takings created “an indefinite negative easement” id., and an “indefinite restraint on

fundamental property rights.” Id. (quoting Kirby, 368 N.C. at 855–56). Significantly,

we stressed that judicial review of Map Act claims should focus on the substance of

what was deprived to property owners; stating that “what matters is whether the

trial court correctly applied the law concerning how just compensation is measured,

not the label given by the trial court or the parties to the taking that occurred.” Id. at

283.

Against this backdrop, the Court of Appeals, while understandably seeking to

address a challenging circumstance, erred by concluding that the 2016 rescission of

corridor maps retroactively transformed the taking from indefinite to temporary. The

court reasoned:

The “indefinite period of time” referenced in Kirby continued until the DOT either released the property under the statute or filed a direct condemnation action to take title to the fee and complete the highway project. . . . In response to our Supreme Court’s decision in Kirby, the North Carolina General Assembly rescinded all Map Act corridors on 11 July 2016. . . . The termination of all Map Act corridors removed the negative restrictions as of 11 July 2016. . . . The Map Act restrictions dates in effect were properly defined from DOT’s recording the highway corridors on 6 August 1996 until the corridors were rescinded as of 11 July 2016. The taking was no longer “indefinite.”

Mata, 294 N.C. App. at 712 (internal citations omitted).

In our view, this reasoning confuses the duration of a restriction with the

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nature of the property interest taken. When DOT recorded the 1996 Corridor Map on

6 August 1996, it effectuated a taking of Matas’ fundamental rights to improve,

develop, and subdivide 9.93 acres of their property. See Kirby, 368 N.C. at 856. That

taking was, by its very nature and statutory design, indefinite—it imposed

restrictions that would continue without expiration unless and until: (1) DOT acted

to acquire the property or approve development; (2) the property owner successfully

navigated lengthy administrative relief processes; or (3) the General Assembly

intervened to rescind the maps.

The character of the property interest taken is determined at the time of the

taking, not by subsequent events that may—or may not—occur decades later.

Consider that, at the moment DOT recorded the 1996 Corridor Map, neither DOT nor

plaintiffs could predict with certainty:

• Whether the I-540 project would ever be built;

• Whether DOT would eventually acquire the property in fee simple, and if so,

when;

• Whether the Matas would successfully navigate the administrative relief

processes and become exempt from the corridor restrictions;

• Whether the General Assembly would rescind the maps; or

• How long any restrictions would remain in place.

Those uncertainties are precisely what made the taking indefinite. The fact that the

General Assembly ultimately rescinded the maps twenty years later does not change

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what was taken from plaintiffs in 1996: their fundamental rights to improve, develop,

and subdivide their property for an unlimited period of time. See Kirby, 368 N.C. at

848.

Here, when DOT recorded the 1996 Corridor Map covering 9.93 acres of the

Mata Property, it took indefinitely the Mata’s right to improve, develop, and

subdivide that portion of the property. This taking occurred on 6 August 1996. The

accompanying restrictions remained in place until the General Assembly rescinded

all corridor maps on 11 July 2016—a period of nearly twenty years. The nearly

twenty-year duration is a factual consequence of the indefinite restriction DOT

imposed; the eventual rescission of the subject corridor map and the Map Act

generally did not transform the indefinite taking of restricted property into a

temporary one.

We affirm the trial court’s factual finding regarding the applicable dates but

clarify that the taking here was indefinite in nature as established by Kirby and

Chappell, notwithstanding that the Map Act restrictions ultimately ended after

nearly twenty years due to legislative rescission.

C. The Correct Measure of Damages

Having established that the Map Act recording effectuated an indefinite taking

on 6 August 1996, we turn to the proper measure of damages. To the extent that the

Court of Appeals held that the proper measure of damages for the Mata Property was

based on valuation for temporary takings, that decision is reversed.

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The General Assembly has specified the exclusive measure of damages for

partial takings in inverse condemnation proceedings:

Where only a part of a tract is taken, the measure of damages for said taking shall be the difference between the fair market value of the entire tract immediately prior to said taking and the fair market value of the remainder immediately after said taking, with consideration being given to any special or general benefits resulting from the utilization of the part taken for highway purposes.

N.C.G.S. § 136-112(1) (2023). In Chappell, we reaffirmed that this “fair market value”

assessment is the measure of damages that applies to Map Act takings: namely, the

amount of the immediate diminution in value on the date of the taking, plus interest

at the statutory rate from the date of taking until the date of final judgment. 374 N.C.

at 283–84, 289; accord Kirby, 368 N.C. at 855–56 (“Through inverse condemnation

the owner may recover to the extent of the diminution in his property’s value as

measured by the difference in the fair market value of the property immediately

before and immediately after the taking.” (cleaned up) (emphasis added) (citing

N.C.G.S. § 136-112(1) (2015))). The “immediately” before and after standard calls for

a snapshot comparison: the fair market value of the property immediately before the

taking versus the fair market value immediately after the taking. Both valuations

are anchored to the date of the taking—not calculated across a span of years as with

a taking of temporary duration.

This measure of damages applies to Map Act takings, as said in Kirby:

On remand, the trier of fact must determine the value of the loss of these fundamental rights by calculating the

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value of the land before the corridor map was recorded and the value of the land afterward, taking into account all pertinent factors, including the restriction on each plaintiff’s fundamental rights, as well as any effect of the reduced ad valorem taxes.

368 N.C. at 856.

Chappell reinforced this framework, emphasizing that “the relevant

determination when calculating just compensation for a taking that involves less

than the entire parcel of property starts with the fair market value of the entire

property before the taking and the fair market value of what remains after the

taking.” 374 N.C. at 284. We made it clear that this approach applies uniformly: “This

is true whether the taking is an indefinite negative easement, as in the case of Map

Act takings, or involves some other taking for public use.” Id.

In addition, Kirby specifically directed that the trier of fact must consider “any

effect of the reduced ad valorem taxes” when calculating the value of the land after

the corridor map was recorded. 368 N.C. at 856. Moreover, as Chappell clarified, the

way to account for reduced taxes depends on the particular facts of each case. In

Chappell, “where the evidence was that the property essentially had no fair market

value once the 1992 corridor map was recorded,” the Court opined that “it was

appropriate, following Kirby, for the trial court to take into account the effect of the

reduced ad valorem taxes in the way that it did, and compensate the Chappells for

the actual taxes they paid at a time when their property had virtually no fair market

value.” 374 N.C. at 289.

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On remand, then, the trial court should adhere to the measure of damages

outlined in Kirby, Chappell, and N.C.G.S. § 136-112(1) to assess the diminution in

fair market value from immediately before to immediately after the taking. The

parties may present evidence of that diminution in fair market value consistent with

established appraisal methods, such as comparable sales, capitalization of income,

and cost, but excluding any evidence of lost business profits, pursuant to established

precedent. E.g., Chappell, 374 N.C. at 284–85 (“While it speaks to the exclusive

measure of damages, the statute does not restrict expert real estate appraisers with

regard to the method they use to determine fair market value. . . . NCDOT was

entitled to present evidence of the before and after fair market value of the Chappells’

property using acceptable methods of appraisal, but only methods using factors that

legally can be considered.” (internal citations omitted)); Dep’t of Transp. v. M.M.

Fowler, Inc., 361 N.C. 1, 13 n.5 (2006) (“Methods of appraisal acceptable in

determining fair market value include: (1) comparable sales, (2) capitalization of

income, and (3) cost. While the comparable sales method is the preferred approach,

the next best method is capitalization of income when no comparable sales data are

available.” (citations omitted)).

Applying this framework to the proceedings below, the appropriate measure of

damages should be the fair market value of the Mata Property immediately before

and after the taking plus the requisite award of interest. Specifically, on 6 August

1996, the Mata Property had a fair market value unencumbered by Map Act

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restrictions (the “before” value). On that same date, immediately after DOT recorded

the 1996 Corridor Map, the property had a diminished fair market value reflecting

the indefinite restrictions on 9.93 acres (the “after” value). Following precedent from

Kirby and Chappell, the Mata Property’s fair market value was established

immediately before and after the taking on 6 August 1996.

Furthermore, the reduced tax burden on plaintiffs for the subject property from

1996 to 2016 is a pertinent factor affecting the fair market value of the property

immediately after the 1996 recording. A prospective buyer in 1996, evaluating the

encumbered property, would consider not only the restrictions but also the tax

benefits that accompanied them. Here the record does not yet reflect whether the

Mata Property had essentially no fair market value after the 1996 recording or

whether it retained some degree of value despite the restrictions. On remand, the

trier of fact must determine the appropriate treatment of tax benefits based on the

specific valuation evidence presented.

III. Conclusion

Kirby and Chappell establish clear, binding precedent that Map Act recordings

effectuate indefinite takings of fundamental property rights at the moment corridor

maps are recorded. The proper measure of just compensation is the difference

between the fair market value of the property immediately before and immediately

after that recording. This framework applies regardless of whether the Map Act is

later rescinded, or the project is eventually built, or the property is subsequently

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acquired in fee simple.

The Court of Appeals’ analysis erred by characterizing the taking as

“temporary” based on subsequent legislative rescission. We reverse the Court of

Appeals’ decision and remand this case to that court for further remand to the trial

court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including calculating just

compensation based on the fair market value of the Mata Property immediately

before and immediately after the taking on 6 August 1996, considering all pertinent

factors including any effect of reduced ad valorem taxes.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

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Justice Dietz, concurring

Justice DIETZ concurring.

I agree with the majority that the reasoning of the Court of Appeals cannot be

squared with this Court’s decisions in Kirby and Chappell. Our precedent requires

trial courts to treat Map Act takings as indefinite, not temporary.

But in fairness to our Court of Appeals colleagues, I think they were grappling

with something that we simply ignore. As the majority observes, the Map Act

recording was an indefinite taking of Mata’s “core property rights to improve, develop,

or subdivide” the property. See majority supra Part I. We often describe property

rights in terms of a “bundle of sticks,” meaning “a collection of individual rights

which, in certain combinations, constitute property.” United States v. Craft, 535 U.S.

274, 278 (2002). In North Carolina, the “rights to improve, develop, or subdivide”

described by the majority are all sticks within that bundle. See Kirby v. N.C. Dep’t of

Transp., 368 N.C. 847, 853 (2016).

In other words, through the Map Act recording in this case, the State

effectively reached in and took a handful of sticks out of Mata’s bundle. Under our

precedent in Kirby and Chappell, Mata is entitled to just compensation for this

indefinite taking based on “the difference between the fair market value of the

property immediately before and immediately after that recording.” See majority

supra Part III.

But many years after that indefinite taking, the State did something unusual:

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it changed its mind and gave all those sticks back. After that, the entire bundle of

sticks, in fee simple absolute, once again belonged to Mata.

I think the Court of Appeals and the trial court in this case (and the many

companion cases) were trying to make sense of the implications of that. They were

reckoning with how an “indefinite” Map Act taking interacts with a future direct

condemnation proceeding. After all, under this Court’s precedent, the State needs to

pay just compensation for any taking based on the fair market value of the bundle of

sticks the landowner possesses at the time of the taking. See Town of Midland v.

Wayne, 368 N.C. 55, 63 (2015). After the Map Act rescission and repeal, that bundle

of sticks includes all the ones the State gave back.

This Court has decided there is no need to ponder this issue today. I respect

that. But I think we should acknowledge that the lower courts were not simply

ignoring our precedent—they were trying to wrap their minds around the “double

payment” that will result from a strict adherence to Kirby and Chappell. See, e.g.,

Order on Hearing Pursuant to G.S. § 136-108, Mata v. N.C. Dep’t of Transp.,

No. 19CVS2633-910, 2023 WL 9785672, at *8 (N.C. Super. June 2, 2023). They were

trying to assess whether that was truly what our precedent intended. See id. We now

know that it was.

Justice BERGER joins in this concurring opinion.

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