Master Homecraft Co. v. Zimmerman

222 A.2d 440, 208 Pa. Super. 401, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 870, 1966 Pa. Super. LEXIS 858
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedSeptember 15, 1966
DocketAppeal, 307
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 222 A.2d 440 (Master Homecraft Co. v. Zimmerman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Master Homecraft Co. v. Zimmerman, 222 A.2d 440, 208 Pa. Super. 401, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 870, 1966 Pa. Super. LEXIS 858 (Pa. Ct. App. 1966).

Opinion

Opinion by

Spaulding, J.,

This appeal is from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County making absolute a rule to strike off a judgment entered in favor of the Master Homecraft Company, appellant, on a judgment *403 note executed by Edward T. and Alice Zimmerman, appellees.

Tbe appellant company contracted to remodel tbe appellees’ home. In connection with this work, tbe appellees on August 4, 1964, executed a judgment note in tbe principal amount of $9747. On tbe same date, at tbe direction of Edward Berg, partner of appellant company, tbe Protbonotary entered a judgment against appellees in tbe principal amount of tbe note.

On September 17, 1964, execution was issued by appellant upon tbe judgment and appellees’ funds on deposit with tbe First National Bank of Export were attached on a writ naming tbe bank as garnishee. Following tbe allowance of a rule and tbe filing of an answer, tbe Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County ordered tbe judgment stricken on tbe grounds that it was impossible to determine from tbe face of tbe note tbe amount due or tbe date of maturity. Appellant entered its appeal and secured tbe issuance of a supersedeas.

Tbe note in question reads in part:

$9,747.00 No.........

(Total Amount of Note)

Pittsburgh, Pa. 8/4/64

For value received, I/we or either of us promise to pay to tbe order of Master Homecraft Company, tbe sum of Nine Thousand Seven Hundred Forty-seven Hollars in . . . monthly installments of $...... each, beginning on tbe day of ................, 19.., and continuing on tbe same day of each and every month thereafter until tbe full amount thereof is paid. . . .

Tbe undersigned, for tbe purpose of assuring collection of tbe within note and securing tbe same by a first lien on improved real estate, does hereby empower any attorney of any court of record within tbe State of Pennsylvania or any other state or territory of tbe *404 United States to appear for the undersigned and with or without declaration filed, confess judgment against the undersigned or any of them in any court in the State of Pennsylvania or any other state or territory of the United States and in favor of the said payee or holder of this note, at any time and as of any term, whether or not the payments provided herein are in default, for the full amount due or to become due hereunder, . . .

Edward K. Berg,

Witness

Edward T. Zimmerman (Seal)

Alice Zimmerman (Seal)

The law is clear that a motion to strike a judgment operates as a demurrer to the record and will be granted only when there are defects apparent on the face of the record. Mountain City Savings and Loan Association of Hazleton v. Bell, 413 Pa. 67, 197 A. 2d 608 (1963); Kros v. Bacall Textile Corporation, 386 Pa. 360, 126 A. 2d 421 (1956); 7 Pennsylvania Standard Practice 186 (rev. ed. 1961). In the instant case there were no such defects because both the time of default and the amount due were ascertainable from the face of the instrument.

The Uniform Commercial Code provides: “Instruments payable on demand include those payable at sight or on presentation and those in which no time for payment is stated." April 6, 1953, P. L. 3, 12A P.S. §3-108. (Emphasis added.) Under this section, the note in question is a demand note, due and payable immediately. This presumption as to payment on demand existed long before the Code, Horner v. Horner, 145 Pa. 258, 23 A. 441 (1892); Hall v. Toby, 110 Pa. 318, 1 A. 369 (1885), and applies whether or not the note is negotiable. As was said in Liberty Aluminum Products Co. v. Cortis, 14 Pa. D. & C. 2d 624, 625, 626 (1958) : “Even if this were not so [under the Code], the *405 logic of the situation compels this conclusion. The parties have the right to use a blank and tailor it to their needs. And the failure to include installment payments simply and clearly means that none were intended.”

The note is not rendered defective because the blanks for alleged installment payments appear unused. On its face the note designates a principal sum of $9747. The failure to fill in the monthly installment blanks does not indicate that no principal sum was intended.

On this issue the court below stated: “This Court does not know the reason for the failure to complete the note. The parties to this note either inadvertently or unintentionally failed to complete the blanks.” This conclusion is without support in the record. The empty blanks could also mean that no installment payments were intended. Oortis, supra, at 626.

In Hinkson v. Southard, 67 Pa. D. & C. 609 (1949), which involved a judgment note with unused installment blanks, the court granted a petition to strike. This case, decided before the Code, is not controlling since under the Code the absence of a specific maturity date is not a fatal defect.

If the appellees wish to raise a defense, the proper remedy would be a petition to open the judgment which would permit additional evidence. 7 Standard Pennsylvania Practice 39 (rev. ed. 1961). Speculation as to the intent of the parties in not filling in the blanks involves matters dehors the record and is not relevant on a motion to strike. Id. at 51. It should be noted that our reversal of the order of the trial court does not preclude appellees from their remedy of opening the judgment.

Reversed without prejudice and remanded to the lower court with directions to allow appellees to file a petition to open the judgment.

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Bluebook (online)
222 A.2d 440, 208 Pa. Super. 401, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (West) 870, 1966 Pa. Super. LEXIS 858, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/master-homecraft-co-v-zimmerman-pasuperct-1966.