Massachusetts Medical Society v. United States

514 F.2d 153, 35 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1304, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15109
CourtCourt of Appeals for the First Circuit
DecidedApril 16, 1975
Docket74-1426
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 514 F.2d 153 (Massachusetts Medical Society v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the First Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Massachusetts Medical Society v. United States, 514 F.2d 153, 35 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1304, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15109 (1st Cir. 1975).

Opinion

McENTEE, Circuit Judge.

Taxpayer, a corporation exempt from income taxes under § 501(c)(6) of the Internal Revenue Code, publishes the New England Journal of Medicine, an activity admittedly related to its educational purpose. In 1968 the Commissioner, citing newly adopted regulations, asserted deficiencies against taxpayer on the ground that the profits from advertising in the Journal constituted taxable income of an unrelated trade or business as defined by then Int.Rev.Code §§ 511-13. 1 Taxpayer paid the deficiency and *154 brought the instant suit for refund, and the court granted its motion for summary judgment. Taxpayer acknowledges that its advertising activities come within the new regulations’ definition of an unrelated trade or business, 26 C.F.R. § 1.513 — 1(b) and (d)(4)(iv), examples 6 and 7, but challenges the definition’s validity as an interpretation of the statute under which it was promulgated seventeen years later. 2

We concur in the virtually unanimous opinion of commentators that the 1967 regulations contravene the congressional intent in fragmenting an integrated enterprise into its constituent “activities” in search of an unrelated trade or business under § 513(a). 3 The impetus for the original legislation lay in fears occasioned by a rash of acquisitions like New York University’s of the Mueller Macaroni Co., of a spiraling cycle in which exempt institutions would acquire unrelated businesses on favorable payout terms and use their exemptions to undercut commercial competitors, forcing some out of business and increasing the tax burden on the remainder. In his message to Congress in 1950, President Truman sought legislation to correct “the few glaring abuses of the tax exemption privilege,” stating that it had been “misused in a few instances to gain competitive advantage over private enterprise through the conduct of business and industrial operations entirely unrelated to educational activities.” Hearings on Revenue Revision Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, 5 (1950). Secretary of the Treasury Snyder testified that the abuses aimed at included business undertakings like the production of automobile parts, china-ware, food products and the operation of theatres, oil wells and cotton gins. Id. at 18, 19. The examples of the operations to which the tax would or would not be applied that are furnished in the Committee reports, H.R.Rep.No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36-37 (1950), S.Rep.No.2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 29, 107 (1950), U.S.Code Cong.Serv.1950, p. *155 3053, contemplate integrated “enterprises” — a university press, the manufacture and sale of tires, an agricultural college’s wheat farm, the operation of university athletic programs, dining halls, or dormitories — even though unrelated profit-producing “activities” could probably have been distilled from such enterprises. 4 Hence the regulation’s flat equation of a trade or business with any activity albeit conducted as an integral part of an exempt enterprise finds little support in the legislative history. 5 Rather, that history and the immediate background against which the legislation was enacted suggest a fairly limited measure designed to distinguish the customary activities of exempt organizations from the “abuses,” the unusual ones that had latterly appeared. See Note, The Macaroni Monopoly, supra at 1291. The publication of advertising in exempt educational journals was a well established practice even then; we do not believe Congress intended to treat it on par with, e. g., an independently run advertising placement agency.

The Commissioner notes that the House report, supra at 109, likened the phrase “trade or business” to the same phrase appearing in present § 162 (governing deductions for business expenses) and argues that the sale of advertising space in a periodical could be conducted as a business within that definition. While this is undoubtedly true, the integrated publication of a magazine including advertising would qualify as a “trade or business” too, and the Commissioner cites no § 162 precedent for fragmenting an operation run as an integrated whole into its component parts. Although this reference in the report provides a test for judging activities, it is at best irrelevant to the particular question of the scope of the activity to which the test should be applied; at worst, it is an indication that the Service was to approach the taxpayer as it does under § 162, without such fragmentation in mind. Indeed, the committee report also refers to definitions of trade Or business found’ elsewhere in the Code, and in instances where it is important to determine whether a particular activity is a business in its own right or part of another, the Commissioner has eschewed any notion of fragmentation in his interpretations. 6 The Commissioner also contends that his policy would further Congress’ stated purpose of preventing unfair competition since taxpayer’s publication competes for advertising with other non-exempt publications aimed at the same market. But in view of the considerations detailed above we doubt that Congress would have considered the competitive advantage enjoyed in this traditional realm of exempt undertaking to be unfair. Finally, the Commissioner seeks support for his interpretation in the statement in the House Report that it *156 did not matter whether the unrelated trade or business was conducted through a subsidiary organization or the exempt organization itself. But the distinction at issue here is not the arbitrary one of the legal form in which an activity is conducted, but rather the nature of the ’ activity itself and its relation to the exempt activity.

The problematical nature of the regulations’ attempt to treat taxpayer’s advertising activities as a separate business is apparent in their handling of deductions. The statute limits deductions to those “directly connected” with the unrelated business, § 512(a), and the regulation defines these as deductions having “a proximate and primary relationship” to the business, § 1.512(a) — 1(a). If the advertising function is construed to constitute a separate unrelated business, expenses of the collateral editorial business would not seem to satisfy this criterion. 7 Yet if no deduction were allowed for such expenses exempt organizations like the taxpayer would be in a less favorable position than non-exempt organizations publishing magazines, which may deduct all their expenses, both advertising and editorial. It is doubtful that Congress would have approved such an anomalous result.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. American College of Physicians
475 U.S. 834 (Supreme Court, 1986)
United States v. American College of Physicians
9 Cl. Ct. 1591 (Federal Circuit, 1986)
The American College of Physicians v. The United States
743 F.2d 1570 (Federal Circuit, 1984)
Carolina Farm & Power Equipment Dealers Ass'n v. United States
541 F. Supp. 86 (E.D. North Carolina, 1982)
Harris v. Lynn
555 F.2d 1357 (Eighth Circuit, 1977)
American College of Physicians v. United States
530 F.2d 930 (Court of Claims, 1976)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
514 F.2d 153, 35 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 1304, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 15109, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/massachusetts-medical-society-v-united-states-ca1-1975.