UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO
NORMAN JACOB MASON, Case No. 3:23-cv-00570-AKB Plaintiff, INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY v. SCREENING JUDGE
TWIN FALLS COUNTY SHERIFF,
Defendant.
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed Plaintiff Norman Jacob Mason’s Complaint as a result of Plaintiff’s status as an inmate and in forma pauperis request. The Court now reviews the Complaint to determine whether it should be summarily dismissed in whole or in part under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Having reviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order directing Plaintiff to file an amended complaint if Plaintiff intends to proceed. 1. Pleading Standards and Screening Requirement A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Under modern pleading standards, Rule 8 requires a complaint to “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal/Twombly “facial plausibility” standard is met when a complaint contains “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but a plaintiff must offer “more than . . . unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability,” or if there is an “obvious alternative explanation” that would not result in liability, the complaint has not stated a plausible claim for relief. Id. at 678, 682 (internal quotation marks omitted). Bare allegations
amounting to a mere restatement of the elements of a cause of action, without adequate factual support, are not enough. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”)1 requires the Court to review complaints filed by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity, as well as complaints filed in forma pauperis, to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The Court must dismiss any claims lacking adequate factual support or claims that are frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) & 1915A. The Court also must dismiss claims that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or claims seeking monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
These last two categories—together with claims falling outside a federal court’s narrow grant of jurisdiction—encompass those claims that might, or might not, have factual support but nevertheless are barred by a well-established legal rule. The Court liberally construes the pleadings to determine whether a case should be dismissed for a failure to plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory or for the absence of a cognizable legal theory. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an arguable factual and legal basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)), superseded
1 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq. by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that Rule 12(b)(6) authority to dismiss claims was expanded by the PLRA, giving courts power to dismiss deficient claims, sua sponte, before or after opportunity to amend). 2. Factual Allegations Plaintiff is a prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction. The events
giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred when Plaintiff was detained in the Twin Falls County Jail. Plaintiff alleges that his religious beliefs require him to eat kosher meals. (Compl., Dkt. 3 at p. 2). When Plaintiff arrived at the Twin Falls County Jail, he was not immediately approved for a kosher diet. Instead, he had to wait seven days for that approval. (Id.). On one occasion after Plaintiff was approved for kosher meals, an unidentified jail deputy brought him what was supposed to be a kosher meal. Plaintiff complained that there was hair in the food, and the jail deputy took the meal away. Instead of bringing a new meal, the deputy returned with “the same food” (presumably without the hair), which Plaintiff refused because it was not kosher. The deputy responded, “[C]omplain to someone else, dude.” (Id.). A different jail
deputy then came to Plaintiff’s cell and told him he could eat the meal he was provided or give up the meal. The deputy then removed the meal and threatened to “lock [Plaintiff] down.” (Id.). Plaintiff also alleges that the trays on which the kosher meals are served are not themselves kosher because of “improper washing.” (Id. at p. 3). Finally, Plaintiff complains that the kosher meals he receives are not blessed by a rabbi. (Id.). Plaintiff sues the Twin Falls County Sheriff, alleging claims under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. To state a plausible civil rights claim, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). 3. Discussion Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The Court will, however, grant Plaintiff twenty-eight days to amend the Complaint. Any amended complaint should take
into consideration the following. A. Standards of Law Jail officials generally are not liable for damages in their individual capacities under § 1983 unless they personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“[E]ach Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”). Section 1983 does not allow for recovery against an employer or principal simply because an employee or agent committed misconduct. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. However, “[a] defendant may be held liable as a supervisor under § 1983 ‘if there exists … a sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional
violation.’” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989)). A plaintiff can establish this causal connection by alleging a defendant (1) set in motion a series of acts by others that violated the Constitution, or knowingly refused to terminate a series of such acts, which the supervisor “knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional injury”; (2) knowingly failed to act or acted improperly “in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates”; (3) acquiesced in the constitutional deprivation; or (4) engaged in conduct showing “a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Id. at 1205-09 (internal quotation marks omitted). A claim that a supervisor or training official failed to adequately train subordinates ordinarily requires that, “in light of the duties assigned to specific officers or employees[,] the need for more or different training [was] so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the [supervisor or training official] can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989).
Stated another way, to maintain a failure-to-train claim, a plaintiff must allege facts showing a “pattern of violations” amounting to deliberate indifference. Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 72 (2011). Likewise, “a failure to supervise that is sufficiently inadequate may amount to deliberate indifference” supporting a § 1983 claim, but there generally must be a pattern of violations sufficient to render the need for further supervision obvious. Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). If a supervisory or training official had “knowledge of the unconstitutional conditions” through such a pattern of violations— including knowledge of the “culpable actions of his subordinates”—yet failed to act to remedy
those conditions, the official can be said to have acquiesced “in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates” such that a causal connection between the supervisor and the constitutional violation is plausible. Starr, 652 F.3d at 1208. A plaintiff cannot simply restate these standards of law in a complaint. Instead, a plaintiff must provide specific facts supporting the elements of each claim and must allege facts showing a causal link between each defendant and Plaintiff’s injury or damage. Alleging “the mere possibility of misconduct” is not enough. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. B. Religious Meal Claims The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, incorporated to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, absolutely protects the right to believe in a religion. It does not absolutely protect all conduct associated with a religion. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). Inmates retain their free exercise of religion rights in prison. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987). An inmate who is an adherent of a minority religion must be afforded a “reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith comparable to the opportunity afforded fellow
prisoners who adhere to conventional religious precepts.” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972) (per curiam). A prison need not, however, provide “identical facilities or personnel” for “every religious sect or group within a prison,” and a “special chapel or place of worship need not be provided for every faith regardless of size; nor must a chaplain, priest, or minister be provided without regard to the extent of the demand.” Id. at 322 n.2. To serve as a basis for a viable claim challenging a prison restriction under the Free Exercise Clause, an inmate’s belief must be both sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir. 2008); Malik v. Brown, 16 F.3d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1994). Further, the burden placed on the inmate’s religious exercise by the defendants’ actions
must be substantial. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). De minimis—or minor— burdens on the free exercise of religion are not of a constitutional dimension, even if the belief upon which the exercise is based is sincerely held and rooted in religious belief. See, e.g., Rapier v. Harris, 172 F.3d 999, 1006 n.4 (7th Cir. 1999). Challenges to prison restrictions that are alleged “to inhibit First Amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system, to whose custody and care the prisoner has been committed in accordance with due process of law.” Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Union, 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977) (citation omitted). What constitutes a reasonable opportunity for religious exercise, therefore, must be evaluated within the context of a prison’s need for security, among other legitimate goals. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-53 (1987) (holding that a prison’s policy of not allowing Muslim inmates on work detail to return to the prison to attend Jumu’ah, a group worship service, did not violate the Constitution). So long as a restriction on an inmate’s religious practice “is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” that restriction is valid. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Factors to
be considered in this reasonableness inquiry include (1) whether there is a logical connection between the governmental interest and the particular policy or decision at issue; (2) whether “alternative means of exercising the right remain open to prison inmates”; (3) the impact that accommodating a prisoner’s religious practice would have on “other inmates, on prison personnel, and on allocation of prison resources generally”; and (4) whether there is an absence of “obvious, easy alternatives to the policy adopted by” prison officials. O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 350-53 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Courts must take care to avoid “substitut[ing] [their] judgment on difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration.” Id. at 353 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
A prison’s occasional failure to accommodate a religious practice does not violate the Free Exercise Clause where there is no evidence that the failures were caused by “anything other than institutional shortage.” Rapier, 172 F.3d at 1006 n.4. Similarly, a temporary delay in accommodating religious practice does not violate the First Amendment when caused by ordinary administrative or institutional delay. Tapp v. Stanley, 2008 WL 4934592, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2008) (unpublished). With respect to religious diets, prisoners “have the right to be provided with food sufficient to sustain them in good health that satisfies the dietary laws of their religion.” McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1987). However, this right must be balanced, under Turner, 482 U.S. 78, with the prison’s “legitimate interest in running a simplified food service, rather than one that gives rise to many administrative difficulties.” Ward v. Walsh, 1 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 1993). The First Amendment does not require that a jail provide a specific religious meal for an inmate. Instead, the jail may require an inmate to choose from a range of diets, provided that one of these diets allows the inmate to comply with his religious dietary restrictions:
Because Plaintiffs can choose a diet plan that does not include any food that would violate their religious dietary laws, they have not established that they are substantially burdened by the failure of IDOC to offer a specific, separately-prepared Catholic or Halal meal. Plaintiffs are not entitled to demand meat in a religious diet— they are perfectly able to choose a vegan diet (or a non-pork or lacto- ovo diet) that complies with their religious dietary restrictions. IDOC’s decision to offer the selective diets instead of specific religious meals prepared according to each inmate’s religious beliefs is reasonably related to the legitimate penological purpose of meeting and maintaining each prisoner’s nutritional needs, while still running an efficient institution. The First Amendment does not require prison officials to offer each prisoner his own religious meal option, tailored to that particular prisoner’s expressed religious belief.
Hogan et al. v. IDOC, Case No. 1:15-cv-00308-BLW, Dkt. 11 at p. 11 (D. Idaho Dec. 15, 2015). The First Amendment is not the only source of religious protection within a prison. RLUIPA provides, “No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution … even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person[] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). RLUIPA applies to entities receiving federal financial assistance. Id. at (b)(1). By accepting federal funds, however, states do not waive sovereign immunity to suits for money damages under RLUIPA. Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 280 (2011). Further, although the statute provides for injunctive relief, RLUIPA does not allow for monetary damages against individuals. Wood v. Yordy, 753 F.3d 899, 902-04 (9th Cir. 2014). An inmate asserting a claim under RLUIPA must plausibly allege that the governmental action constitutes a substantial burden on the exercise of the inmate’s religious beliefs. Warsoldier v. Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005). For an official’s action to constitute a substantial
burden on an inmate’s religious exercise, it “must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.” San Jose Christian College v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004). In determining whether an inmate’s religious exercise is substantially burdened, a court may not inquire “into whether a particular belief is ‘central’ to a prisoner’s religion.” Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)). However, “the Act does not preclude inquiry into the sincerity of a prisoner’s professed religiosity.” Id. If the inmate establishes “the prima facie existence” of a substantial burden on the exercise of the inmate’s religion, then the burden shifts to prison officials “to prove that [the] substantial burden on [the inmate’s] exercise of his religious beliefs is both ‘in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest’ and the ‘least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.’” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 995 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); § 2000cc-2(b)). As the Supreme Court has explained, The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding, and it requires the government to show that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting party. If a less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use it.
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 364–65 (2015) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). Prison officials or a state department of correction “cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.” Warsoldier, 418 F.3d at 999. Although RLUIPA is to be construed broadly in favor of protecting an inmate’s religious rights, id., the statute does not “elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety,” Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722. A prisoner’s requests for
religious accommodation must not override other significant interests within a prison setting. “Should inmate requests for religious accommodations become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize the effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition.” Id. at 726. In the words of the Supreme Court, “context matters.” Id. at 723 (quotation marks and alteration omitted). With respect to religious dietary restrictions, RLUIPA does not require a prison to provide a separate kosher kitchen in which to prepare meals for inmates like Plaintiff. In Baranowski v. Hart, the Fifth Circuit held that a prison’s failure to provide kosher meals did not violate RLUIPA because it was the least restrictive means to serve the compelling government interests of
“maintaining good order and controlling costs.” 486 F.3d 112, 125–26 (5th Cir. 2007). The court relied on the following: (1) the prison’s budget was “not adequate to cover the increased expense of either providing a separate kosher kitchen or bringing in kosher food from the outside”; (2) the prison’s “ability to provide a nutritionally appropriate meal to other offenders would be jeopardized (since the payments for kosher meals would come out of the general food budget for all inmates)”; (3) “such a policy would breed resentment among other inmates”; and (4) “there would be an increased demand by other religious groups for similar diets.” Id.; see also Mathis v. Brazoria Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, No. CIV.A. H-08-3703, 2011 WL 3648101, at *14 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 17, 2011) (unpublished) (jail’s denial of kosher meals did not violate RLUIPA where jail’s budget would not allow it and where “[c]ooking kosher meals at the jail would require the construction of a new and separate kitchen area, the purchase of separate equipment and utensils, and hiring more personnel”). If a jail generally accommodates an inmate’s religious dietary restrictions—for example, by providing kosher food—the jail’s rare failure to strictly abide by those accommodations does
not violate RLUIPA. That is, RLUIPA allows prisons some leeway in accommodating religious diets. See Holsombach v. Norris, No. 2:08CV00022JMMBD, 2009 WL 424166, at *6 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 18, 2009) (unpublished). In Holsombach, the prison maintained a separate kosher kitchen. However, the kitchen was not always kept strictly kosher. For example, (1) “Kosher food trays and main-line food trays [we]re washed together”; (2) pork was “cooked in the same kitchen where Kosher meals are prepared”; (3) “main-line food items sometimes were placed on Kosher trays”; and (4) inmates used “utensils from the main food line to steal peanut butter from the Kosher kitchen, thereby contaminating the tins of Kosher peanut butter.” Id. at *5-6. However, the prison “employ[ed]
reasonable measures to maintain a division between the main-line food preparation and Kosher food preparation.” Id. at *6. Because the prison could not be held “to an absolute standard” in accommodating inmates’ religious rights, these occasional failures in accommodation did not violate RLUIPA. Id. The Complaint fails to state a religious freedom claim under either the First Amendment or RLUIPA. Both legal frameworks require a plaintiff to plausibly allege a prima facie existence of a substantial burden on the exercise of religious belief. Plaintiff alleges that it took the jail seven days to approve him for a kosher diet. As explained above, a temporary delay in accommodating an inmate’s request for a religious diet does not constitute a substantial burden. See Tapp, 2008 WL 4934592, at *7 (holding that a three-month delay in providing a prisoner with a religious meal did not substantially burden the prisoner’s sincerely held religious beliefs). Further, the jail has a compelling interest in ensuring that inmates who request religious diets are, in fact, sincere in their religious beliefs. Given ordinary incidents of institutional delay, a seven-day investigation to determine whether an inmate should be approved for a kosher diet violates neither the Free
Exercise Clause nor RLUIPA. With respect to Plaintiff’s allegations that he was denied a kosher meal on one occasion because it contained hair, this single instance of failing to provide Plaintiff with a kosher meal also does not constitute a substantial burden on the exercise of the inmate’s religious beliefs. See Rapier, 172 F.3d at 1006 n.4 (holding that the unavailability of a non-pork tray for inmate at three meals out of 810 does not constitute more than a de minimis burden on inmate’s free exercise of religion). Nor did a substantial burden arise from the jail’s allegedly improper washing of trays or failure to ensure that each meal was blessed by a rabbi. Plaintiff admits the meals themselves were
kosher, and courts have already determined that jails and prisons have some leeway, under both the First Amendment and RLUIPA, in accommodating religious diets. See Holsombach, 2009 WL 424166, at *6. Moreover, Plaintiff sues only the Twin Falls County Sheriff, and the Complaint contains no allegations plausibly suggesting that the Sheriff personally participated in the alleged constitutional violations or that the Sheriff knew of, and failed to prevent or rectify, those violations. See Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045. For these reasons, the Complaint fails to state a plausible First Amendment or RLUIPA claim.2 C. Eighth Amendment Claim Plaintiff also asserts a violation of the Eighth Amendment, which protects prisoners against cruel and unusual punishment and guarantees the right to minimally adequate conditions of
confinement. “[T]he Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, and prisons . . . which house persons convicted of serious crimes[] cannot be free of discomfort.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). However, although prison conditions may be restrictive—even harsh— without violating the Eighth Amendment, prison officials are required to provide prisoners with adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id. at 347-48; Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir. 1982), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). To state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that he is (or was) “incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” or that he has been deprived of “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” as a result of the defendants’
actions. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). An Eighth Amendment claim requires the plaintiff to satisfy both (1) an objective standard, “that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual punishment,” and (2) a subjective standard, that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.” Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978,
2 Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims are implausible for the additional reason that Plaintiff is no longer detained at the Twin Falls County Jail. See Jackson v. Sullivan, 692 F. App’x 437, 439 (9th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) (holding that prisoner’s claims for equitable relief under RLUIPA were rendered moot by prisoner’s release from facility’s security housing unit, because prisoner faced “no adverse consequences” from wearing religious hairstyle after release). RLUIPA does not provide for monetary damages, and Plaintiff’s transfer renders any injunctive claims moot. 985 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled in part on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). As for the objective prong of the analysis, “[n]ot every governmental action affecting the interests or well-being of a prisoner is subject to Eighth Amendment scrutiny.” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986). Rather, the deprivation alleged must be objectively sufficiently harmful
or, in other words, sufficiently “grave” or “serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991); see Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (“After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). With respect to the subjective prong of an Eighth Amendment violation, “deliberate indifference entails something more than mere negligence, [but] is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “To be cruel and unusual punishment, conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all must involve more than ordinary lack of due care for the prisoner’s interests
or safety.” Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319. To exhibit deliberate indifference, a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. “If a [prison official] should have been aware of the risk, but was not, then the [official] has not violated the Eighth Amendment, no matter how severe the risk.” Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016). The protections of the Eighth Amendment are reserved for serious incidents causing “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” where such pain has been inflicted by prison officials’ “deliberate indifference to the inmates’ health or safety.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737-38 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether the Constitution has been violated, “[c]ourts must decide whether the [facts] are closer to the physical torture against which the Constitution clearly protects or the de minimis harms against which it does not.” See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41 (2002) (Fifth Amendment context). As for claims regarding prison or jail food, “[t]he Eighth Amendment requires only that
prisoners receive food that is adequate to maintain health; it need not be tasty or aesthetically pleasing.” LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444, 1456 (9th Cir. 1993) (approving the use of “Nutraloaf,” a blended variety of foods baked into a solid loaf exceeding minimum daily requirement for calories, proteins and vitamins); see also Foster v. Runnels, 554 F.3d 807, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a denial of sixteen meals over twenty-three days was sufficiently serious “because food is one of life’s basic necessities”). Plaintiff has not plausibly established an objectively grave or serious condition of confinement based on the denial of a single meal. As a matter of law, this is a de minimis harm that does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation. See id.
4. Standards for Amended Complaint If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the actions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. See Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227, 229 (9th Cir. 1980), abrogated on other grounds by Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991). Plaintiff must also allege a sufficient causal connection between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Taylor, 880 F.2d at 1045; Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). “Vague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss” or to survive screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A. Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). Rather, for each cause of action against each defendant, Plaintiff must state the following: (1) the name of the person or entity that caused the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; (2) facts showing the defendant is a state actor (such as state employment or a state contract)
or a private entity performing a state function; (3) the dates on which the conduct of the defendant allegedly took place; (4) the specific conduct or action Plaintiff alleges is unconstitutional; (5) the particular constitutional or statutory provision Plaintiff alleges has been violated; (6) facts alleging the elements of the violation are met—for example, Plaintiff must allege facts satisfying the elements of a First Amendment or RLUIPA claim; (7) the injury or damages Plaintiff personally suffered; and (8) the particular type of relief Plaintiff is seeking from each defendant. Further, any amended complaint must contain all of Plaintiff’s allegations in a single pleading and cannot rely upon, attach, or incorporate by reference other pleadings or documents. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 15.1 (“Any amendment to a pleading, whether filed as a matter of course
or upon a motion to amend, must reproduce the entire pleading as amended. The proposed amended pleading must be submitted at the time of filing a motion to amend.”); see also Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1474 (9th Cir. 1997) (“[An] amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-existent.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc); Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the district court erred by entering judgment against a party named in the initial complaint, but not in the amended complaint). Plaintiff must set forth each different factual allegation in a separate, numbered paragraph. The amended complaint must be legibly written or typed in its entirety, and it should be clearly designated as an “Amended Complaint.” Plaintiff’s name and address should be clearly printed at the top left corner of the first page of each document filed with the Court. If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must also file a “Motion to Review the Amended
Complaint.” If Plaintiff does not amend within twenty-eight days, or if the amendment does not comply with Rule 8, this case may be dismissed without further notice. See Knapp v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”). ORDER IT IS ORDERED: 1. The Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Plaintiff has twenty-eight days within which to file an amended complaint as described above.
If Plaintiff does so, he must file (along with the amended complaint) a Motion to Review the Amended Complaint. Alternatively, Plaintiff may file a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal if he no longer intends to pursue this case.3 2. If Plaintiff does not file a timely amended complaint, this case may be dismissed with prejudice and without further notice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, failure to prosecute, or failure to comply with a Court order.
3 A voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) is not a dismissal for frivolity, for maliciousness, or for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and, therefore, does not count as a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). 3. Because an amended complaint is required for Plaintiff to proceed, his request for appointment of counsel (contained in the Complaint) is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiff may renew the request for counsel in an amended complaint.
es DATED: February 14, 2024
*. NU } | a i A Amanda K. Brailsford i .S. District Court Judge LG U.S. District Court Judg
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 18