[Cite as Mason v. Mason, 2024-Ohio-5950.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
MICHELL L. MASON : : Appellee : C.A. No. 30216 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 DR 840 : JAMES C. MASON : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Domestic Relations) Appellant : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on December 20, 2024
THOMAS J. MANNING, Attorney for Appellant
JAMIE L. ANDERSON, Attorney for Appellee
.............
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant James C. Mason1 appeals from a final judgment and
decree of divorce entered by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
1 For ease of reference, we will refer to the parties by their given names. James Mason uses his middle name, Clyde, rather than his first name. -2-
Relations Deivision. Specifically, he claims the court erred by finding it lacked jurisdiction
over his claim against property owned by a third party. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Michell and Clyde Mason were married in 1999. Michell filed a complaint for
divorce in November 2022. In May 2023, Clyde filed a Civ.R. 75(B)(1) motion to add
Michell’s father, Steven Pennington, as a party-defendant. In the motion, Clyde alleged
that he and Michell had resided in a home on Rohrer Boulevard in Riverside for “several
years prior to their separation.” Clyde admitted that Pennington was the “titled owner of
the property” but alleged that he and Michell had “made substantial improvements to the
Rohrer property at their cost.” The trial court permitted the joinder of Pennington, and
the parties subsequently agreed to join Pennington’s wife as a party-defendant as well,
because she was also a titled owner of the residence.
{¶ 3} Clyde deposed Steven Pennington in July 2023. According to Pennington,
he and his wife had purchased the subject property at a foreclosure sale with the intent
to permit their daughter, Michell, to reside in the home until she “got back on her feet.”
At the time of the purchase, Michell and Clyde were separated and living apart.
Pennington testified that he and his wife expected Michell to eventually purchase the
home, but they intended to resell the property if Michell did not buy it from them.
Pennington testified that he had made substantial improvements to the home. At some
point, Michell and Clyde reconciled, and Clyde moved into the home. Pennington -3-
testified that he had not required Michell and Clyde to make any improvements to the
home and had not authorized any of the improvements for which Clyde claimed he and
Michell expended monies.
{¶ 4} Thereafter, the Penningtons filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss them
as parties for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, finding
that the “property remains titled in the name of the Penningtons; there has been no
evidence that the Plaintiff nor the Defendant paid the [Penningtons] for the Real Estate,
and nothing to suggest that the real estate was gifted to both Plaintiff and Defendant.”
As such, the domestic relations court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the
real estate. The divorce proceeded, and a final judgment and decree of divorce was
entered.
{¶ 5} Clyde appeals.
II. Civ.R. 12(B)(1)
{¶ 6} Civ.R. 12(B)(1) permits parties to seek dismissal for “lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.” “ ‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear
and decide a case upon its merits.’ ” State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell,
2006-Ohio-5202, ¶ 8, quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 (1972), paragraph
one of the syllabus. “The standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1)
is whether any cause of action cognizable by the forum has been raised in the complaint.”
State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989), citing Avco Fin. Servs. Loan,
Inc. v. Hale, 36 Ohio App.3d 65, 67 (10th Dist.1987). When deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) -4-
motion, a court may “consider outside matter attached to a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction without converting it into a motion for summary judgment if such material is
pertinent to that inquiry.” Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio
St.2d 211, 214 (1976).
{¶ 7} Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of Civ.R. 12(B)(1) dismissals.
Cook v. Pitter Patter Learning Ctr., LLC, 2022-Ohio-961, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing State ex
rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State of Ohio, 2016-Ohio-478, ¶ 12. “This means we
apply the same standards as the trial court.” Id., citing Carter v. Trotwood-Madison City
Bd. of Edn., 2009-Ohio-1769, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).
III. Trial Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Over Claim Against the Penningtons
{¶ 8} The first and second assignments of error asserted by Clyde state as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT IT DID NOT HAVE
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE AN EQUITABLE
MARITAL PROPERTY CLAIM CONCERNING REAL ESTATE THAT WAS
TITLED IN THE NAME OF APPELLEE’S PARENTS.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLEE’S
PARENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN JOINED AS DEFENDANTS IN
THE PARTIES’ DIVORCE CASE PURSUANT TO CIV. 75(B)(1).
{¶ 9} Clyde contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his claim against the
Penningtons and that it also incorrectly determined that joinder was improper. -5-
Conversely, the Penningtons argue that the domestic relations court had no jurisdiction
over them or their property.
{¶ 10} “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of
a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case[.]” Ostanek v. Ostanek, 2021-
Ohio-2319, ¶ 21, quoting Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-5220, ¶ 14. “[T]he focus
is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id., citing Corder,
quoting State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23. “The General Assembly has granted the
common pleas courts, and where applicable, their domestic-relations divisions, subject-
matter jurisdiction over divorce actions, R.C. 3105.17, and the division of marital property,
R.C. 3105.171.” Ostanek at ¶ 27.
{¶ 11} “Marital property” is defined in relevant part as “all interest that either or both
of the spouses currently has in any real or personal property . . . that was acquired by
either or both of the spouses during the marriage[.]” R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(ii). “An
‘interest’ is any right in the nature of property, but less than title.” Alimonos v. Alimonos,
1996 WL 535289, *2 (2d Dist. Aug. 23, 1996). “Therefore, marital property subject to
division and distribution in an action for divorce may include an interest in real property to
which neither spouse holds the title, so long as one of them, or both of them, acquired
that interest during the marriage.” Id.
{¶ 12} Clyde contends that he has an equitable interest in the Penningtons’
residential property by virtue of having “made considerable improvements to the property”
which “substantially increased” the value of the property and by virtue of making
“payments towards the taxes, insurance, and utilities for the property.” Clyde cites -6-
Alimonos as support for his claim that the monies expended on the Pennington real estate
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as Mason v. Mason, 2024-Ohio-5950.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
MICHELL L. MASON : : Appellee : C.A. No. 30216 : v. : Trial Court Case No. 2022 DR 840 : JAMES C. MASON : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Domestic Relations) Appellant : :
...........
OPINION
Rendered on December 20, 2024
THOMAS J. MANNING, Attorney for Appellant
JAMIE L. ANDERSON, Attorney for Appellee
.............
TUCKER, J.
{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant James C. Mason1 appeals from a final judgment and
decree of divorce entered by the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic
1 For ease of reference, we will refer to the parties by their given names. James Mason uses his middle name, Clyde, rather than his first name. -2-
Relations Deivision. Specifically, he claims the court erred by finding it lacked jurisdiction
over his claim against property owned by a third party. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} Michell and Clyde Mason were married in 1999. Michell filed a complaint for
divorce in November 2022. In May 2023, Clyde filed a Civ.R. 75(B)(1) motion to add
Michell’s father, Steven Pennington, as a party-defendant. In the motion, Clyde alleged
that he and Michell had resided in a home on Rohrer Boulevard in Riverside for “several
years prior to their separation.” Clyde admitted that Pennington was the “titled owner of
the property” but alleged that he and Michell had “made substantial improvements to the
Rohrer property at their cost.” The trial court permitted the joinder of Pennington, and
the parties subsequently agreed to join Pennington’s wife as a party-defendant as well,
because she was also a titled owner of the residence.
{¶ 3} Clyde deposed Steven Pennington in July 2023. According to Pennington,
he and his wife had purchased the subject property at a foreclosure sale with the intent
to permit their daughter, Michell, to reside in the home until she “got back on her feet.”
At the time of the purchase, Michell and Clyde were separated and living apart.
Pennington testified that he and his wife expected Michell to eventually purchase the
home, but they intended to resell the property if Michell did not buy it from them.
Pennington testified that he had made substantial improvements to the home. At some
point, Michell and Clyde reconciled, and Clyde moved into the home. Pennington -3-
testified that he had not required Michell and Clyde to make any improvements to the
home and had not authorized any of the improvements for which Clyde claimed he and
Michell expended monies.
{¶ 4} Thereafter, the Penningtons filed a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) motion to dismiss them
as parties for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, finding
that the “property remains titled in the name of the Penningtons; there has been no
evidence that the Plaintiff nor the Defendant paid the [Penningtons] for the Real Estate,
and nothing to suggest that the real estate was gifted to both Plaintiff and Defendant.”
As such, the domestic relations court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the
real estate. The divorce proceeded, and a final judgment and decree of divorce was
entered.
{¶ 5} Clyde appeals.
II. Civ.R. 12(B)(1)
{¶ 6} Civ.R. 12(B)(1) permits parties to seek dismissal for “lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter.” “ ‘Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear
and decide a case upon its merits.’ ” State ex rel. Ohio Democratic Party v. Blackwell,
2006-Ohio-5202, ¶ 8, quoting Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87 (1972), paragraph
one of the syllabus. “The standard of review for a dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1)
is whether any cause of action cognizable by the forum has been raised in the complaint.”
State ex rel. Bush v. Spurlock, 42 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1989), citing Avco Fin. Servs. Loan,
Inc. v. Hale, 36 Ohio App.3d 65, 67 (10th Dist.1987). When deciding a Civ.R. 12(B)(1) -4-
motion, a court may “consider outside matter attached to a motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction without converting it into a motion for summary judgment if such material is
pertinent to that inquiry.” Southgate Dev. Corp. v. Columbia Gas Transm. Corp., 48 Ohio
St.2d 211, 214 (1976).
{¶ 7} Appellate courts conduct a de novo review of Civ.R. 12(B)(1) dismissals.
Cook v. Pitter Patter Learning Ctr., LLC, 2022-Ohio-961, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing State ex
rel. Ohio Civ. Serv. Emps. Assn. v. State of Ohio, 2016-Ohio-478, ¶ 12. “This means we
apply the same standards as the trial court.” Id., citing Carter v. Trotwood-Madison City
Bd. of Edn., 2009-Ohio-1769, ¶ 26 (2d Dist.).
III. Trial Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Over Claim Against the Penningtons
{¶ 8} The first and second assignments of error asserted by Clyde state as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT IT DID NOT HAVE
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE AN EQUITABLE
MARITAL PROPERTY CLAIM CONCERNING REAL ESTATE THAT WAS
TITLED IN THE NAME OF APPELLEE’S PARENTS.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY HOLDING THAT APPELLEE’S
PARENTS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN JOINED AS DEFENDANTS IN
THE PARTIES’ DIVORCE CASE PURSUANT TO CIV. 75(B)(1).
{¶ 9} Clyde contends the trial court erred when it dismissed his claim against the
Penningtons and that it also incorrectly determined that joinder was improper. -5-
Conversely, the Penningtons argue that the domestic relations court had no jurisdiction
over them or their property.
{¶ 10} “Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or statutory power of
a court to adjudicate a particular class or type of case[.]” Ostanek v. Ostanek, 2021-
Ohio-2319, ¶ 21, quoting Corder v. Ohio Edison Co., 2020-Ohio-5220, ¶ 14. “[T]he focus
is on whether the forum itself is competent to hear the controversy.” Id., citing Corder,
quoting State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 23. “The General Assembly has granted the
common pleas courts, and where applicable, their domestic-relations divisions, subject-
matter jurisdiction over divorce actions, R.C. 3105.17, and the division of marital property,
R.C. 3105.171.” Ostanek at ¶ 27.
{¶ 11} “Marital property” is defined in relevant part as “all interest that either or both
of the spouses currently has in any real or personal property . . . that was acquired by
either or both of the spouses during the marriage[.]” R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(ii). “An
‘interest’ is any right in the nature of property, but less than title.” Alimonos v. Alimonos,
1996 WL 535289, *2 (2d Dist. Aug. 23, 1996). “Therefore, marital property subject to
division and distribution in an action for divorce may include an interest in real property to
which neither spouse holds the title, so long as one of them, or both of them, acquired
that interest during the marriage.” Id.
{¶ 12} Clyde contends that he has an equitable interest in the Penningtons’
residential property by virtue of having “made considerable improvements to the property”
which “substantially increased” the value of the property and by virtue of making
“payments towards the taxes, insurance, and utilities for the property.” Clyde cites -6-
Alimonos as support for his claim that the monies expended on the Pennington real estate
constituted marital property pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(ii). Thus, he argues that
that the domestic relations court erred in finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
his claim.
{¶ 13} The cases Clyde cites are distinguishable from the facts herein. For
example, in Alimonos, the evidence established that a house titled solely in the name of
the husband’s parents was originally purchased with marital money as well as monies
provided by the parents. Thus, the house was considered a marital asset. In another
case, insurance policies held by a third-party trust were considered marital property
because the policies had been purchased with marital monies. Kim v. Kim, 2020-Ohio-
22 (9th Dist.). In Neeley v. Neeley, 1998 WL 639288 (2d Dist. Aug. 28, 1998), the
husband gave his brother marital monies to purchase a car; the brother bought a car
solely with the monies provided by husband, but only brother’s name was placed on the
title. Id. at *4. During the divorce proceedings, husband admitted that he and his
brother were joint owners of the car. The court classified the car as a marital asset. Id.
{¶ 14} We need not discuss every case cited by Clyde as they, like Alimonos and
Kim, all have one factual similarity: the assets at issue were originally purchased either
wholly or partially with marital monies. Here, the record established that the real estate
was purchased solely by the Penningtons; the Masons did not expend any marital monies
or other assets toward the purchase.
{¶ 15} We do note Clyde has cited one case in which marital monies expended on
improvements to a house owned by a third-party were classified as an equitable interest -7-
in the residence. In Steward v. Steward, 2002-Ohio-3700 (6th Dist.), the parties
occupied a home that belonged to the husband’s father. Id. at ¶ 32. The parties
intended to purchase the home from the father but were unable to obtain a mortgage
loan. Id. Therefore, “in exchange for ‘rent’ or mortgage payments, the parties
expended $35,000 in improvements on the property. Id. Eventually, husband’s brother
“purchased and obtained a mortgage on the property to circumvent [husband’s] credit
problems and tax liabilities with the IRS.” Id. After the divorce was initiated, husband
continued to live in the house with his girlfriend. Id. The court awarded “any interest in
the property” to husband but credited the $35,000 expenditure as an equitable interest in
the home. Id.
{¶ 16} The facts in Steward are not entirely clear. However, it is clear that the
court concluded the monies expended by the parties constituted mortgage payments
toward the purchase of the home, thereby entitling wife to reimbursement for a portion of
those payments. Here, there was no evidence to support a finding that the monies
expended on the Pennington property constituted mortgage payments or even rent.
Instead, the record demonstrates that the improvements made by the Masons were not
approved or requested by the Penningtons.
{¶ 17} We conclude that the domestic relations court in this case properly
permitted joinder of the Penningtons when Clyde first requested it. However, after
considering the pleadings and the evidence submitted by Clyde, the trial court determined
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Clyde’s claim against the
Penningtons. This was not error. -8-
{¶ 18} Civ.R. 75(B)(1) permits joinder, as a party defendant, of persons “having
possession of, control of, or claiming an interest in property, whether real, personal, or
mixed, out of which a party seeks a division of marital property, a distributive award, or
an award of spousal support or other support[.]” Here, Clyde did not seek a division of
marital property, a distributive award, or a support award from the Pennington residence.
Instead, as stated during oral argument, Clyde sought reimbursement from the
Penningtons for his share of the monies allegedly expended in improving the residence.
This is no different than a tenant making a claim against an unrelated landlord for
improvements made by the tenant to rental property.
{¶ 19} The domestic relations court’s subject matter jurisdiction is limited to the
division and distribution of marital property. Under the facts of this case, the Rohrer
Boulevard real estate was not a marital asset. As such, the domestic relations court
correctly concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Clyde’s
claim against the Penningtons. This result could have been different if the record
supported a conclusion that 1) marital funds had been used to acquire the property or 2)
there had been some agreement between Michell and her parents that, by virtue of the
expenditure of marital funds, she would receive an ownership interest in the real estate.
{¶ 20} The domestic relations court did not err in finding it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over Clyde’s claims against the Pennington property. Thus, the court did not
err in dismissing the action against them.
{¶ 21} Accordingly, both assignments of error are overruled. -9-
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 22} The judgment of the domestic relations court is affirmed.
LEWIS, J. and HUFFMAN, J., concur.