Mason County Civic Research Council v. Mason County

72 N.W.2d 292, 343 Mich. 313, 1955 Mich. LEXIS 325

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Decided: October 3, 1955
• Docket: Docket 18, Calendar 46,423
• Status: Published

Opinions

Carr, C. J.

The facts in this case- appear from a stipulation into which the parties have entered, exhibits that have been returned to this Court, and admitted or uncontroverted averments in the pleadings. In 1942 defendant county purchased, for use as a county infirmary, a parcel of land in the city of Ludington on which was located a residence referred to as the Cray home. The building was remodeled to adapt it for use and has since been devoted to the purposes for which it was acquired. At the same time that the Mason county • site for the infirmary was purchased, land comprising the present poor farm was obtained and is now being used for that purpose. •

Under date of September 20, 1952, the board of supervisors of Mason county adopted a . resolution for submission to the electors of-the question as to whether the sum of $165,000 should be raised by a bond issue to construct and equip a new infirmary. Said resolution referred to the' building then in use as inadequate, but contained no suggestion that the site was open to objection. The resolution was silent insofar as a change in location of the infirmary was concerned. It appears from the record in the case that the electors authorized the issuance of the bonds for the purpose indicated. Thereafter the defendant city of Scottville offered to convey to the county as a site for the infirmary a parcel of land in that municipality. Said parcel was a portion of a larger tract previously conveyed to Scottville for use as a public park and for athletic purposes. The board of supervisors of the county voted to accept the offer. Thereupon the plaintiff, a voluntary association composed of electors and taxpayers, brought suit to enjoin the removal of the infirmary from Ludington to the proposed new site. A hearing before the trial court resulted in a decree adverse to the claims of plaintiff, and it has appealed to this Court.

The principal question in the case has reference to the power of the board of supervisors to take the contemplated action in view of the facts involved as disclosed by the record before us. Counsel for defendants in their brief state the question as follows:

“Does the Mason county board of supervisors have the authority to determine to erect a county infirmary at a new location under the facts of this case, the county already maintaining an infirmary in the former Cray home?”

The question presented is one of statutory construction. As an administrative body the board of supervisors has no inherent powers. The present State Constitution (1908), art 8, § 7, in providing for the establishing of said board, declares that it -shall have “such powers as shall be prescribed by law.” A like provision was contained in- the Constitution of 1850, art 10, § 6.

The general law providing for the support of poor persons

* declares in chapter 2, § 6 (CL 1948, § 402.6 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 16.147]) that:

“The board of supervisors of any county in this State in which a county infirmary is not already erected, may, at any annual or special meeting thereof, determine to erect such a house for the reception of the poor of their county; and upon filing such determination with the clerk of the county, they may direct the superintendents of the poor of such county to purchase 1 or more tracts of land, not exceeding'320 acres, and to erect thereon 1 or more suitable .buildings for the purpose aforesaid.”

It will be noted that the authority conferred on the board of supervisors by the above provision is limited to counties “in which a county infirmary is not already erected.” It is clearly implied that the legislature had in mind that it was granting administrative authority rather than powers of local legislative character. It is consistent with the provisions of CL .1948, § 46.11 (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 5.331) which, insofar as material here, reads as follows:

“The said several boards of supervisors shall have power and they are hereby authorized at any meeting thereof lawfully held:

■ “First, To purchase for the use of the county any real estate necessary for the erection of buildings for the support of the poor of such county, and for a farm to be used in connection therewith;

“Second, To purchase any real estate necessary for the site of any court house, jail, clerk’s office, or any other county building in such county;

“Third, To fix upon and determine the site of any such building, if not previously located.”

It may be noted that this section was amended by PA 1955, No 108, which was given immediate effect and approved June 3, 1955, by adding thereto an eighteenth subdivision. Said amendment is not pertinent to any issue in this case.

It is urged that the limitation expressed in the third subdivision, above quoted, should be construed as applicable only to the buildings mentioned in the second subdivision to the exclusion of those referred to in the first. However, if the legislature had so intended we think express reference would have been made to indicate such intent, or the second and third subdivisions would have been combined. Applying general principles of statutory construction, it is a fair conclusion that the legislature had in mind the buildings previously mentioned in the section, and, hence, to grant power to the board of supervisors to fix the. site of the county infirmary and of the-other buildings named if not previously located. Such interpretation is. consistent with the statutory provision first above quoted (CL 1948, § 402.6 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 16.147]). The specific provision in the general law relating to the care of poor persons clearly indicates the legislative intent, and the statute defining the powers of the board of supervisors indicates a like purpose to restrict the administrative authority granted, as a matter of public policy, with reference not only to infirmaries but other public buildings as well.

• The principle has been repeatedly recognized that an express grant of power to administrative officers, boards or commissions, is subject to a strict interpretation. Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, § 511. In accord with such principle, it is said in 67 CJS, Officers, §107, p 378, that: •

' “The power and authority to be exercised by boards or commissions must be conferred by clear and unmistakable language, since a doubtful power does not exist.” ' ,

Of like import is the decision of this Court in Township of Lake v. Millar, 257 Mich. 135, in which it .was held that the defendant drain commissioner had undertaken to act without jurisdiction. In reaching such conclusion, it was said (p 142):

“The extent of the authority of the people’s public agents is measured by the statute from which they derive their authority, not by their own acts and assumption of authority.” ¡

On behalf of defendants attention is directed to the fact that the provision of the law relative to the care of indigent persons above quoted (CL 1948, § 402.6 [Stat Ann 1950 Rev § 16.147]) limits the authority of the board of supervisors to instances “in which a county infirmary is not already erected.” Emphasis is placed on the use of the word “erected,” it being urged in effect that the term necessarily imports the construction of a building for use as a county infirmary. The argument carries with it the assumption that a remodeling of an existing structure may not be regarded as within the scope of 'the provision. In other words, it is claimed that remodeling is not the equivalent of erecting, building, or constructing. While the contrary view is not unsupported by authority, we think it unnecessary to discuss this angle of the situation. ;

The question before us relates to the intent of the legislature in the enactment of the' statutes here involved. The word “erected” may in a proper context be construed to mean built or constructed. Having in mind the purpose of the legislature in the enactment of the statutes above quoted, we think its obvious that such restricted meaning was not intended. A fairer construction is that the legislature deemed it proper to withhold from the board of supervisors the power to change the site of a county infirmary in an instance where such infirmary has been previously established. In the case at bar there is no question but that the county of Mason, pursuant to action of its board of supervisors, did in 1942 establish the convalescent home or infirmary at a definite location in the city of Ludington. It purchased a site and remodeled the building thereon to adapt it for the contemplated use. That use has continued to the present time. On the same date a farm was acquired to be used in connection with the infirmary, the precise location of said farm not appearing in this record or in the exhibits returned here.

If “erected” means “established” the situation presented here is subject to the restrictive clause of the statute. In determining the legislative intent it must be borne in mind that the mere erection or construction of a building is not sufficient to furnish a county with an infirmary. Such structure must be properly equipped for the purposes for which it is designed. Facilities must be supplied ■ to the end that inmates in such institutions may receive proper care. In 1942 the defendant county did more than .to provide a building for the infirmary. It equipped that building and established it as the type of institution authorized by statute.

That the word “erected” may be construed as “established” is recognized by leading lexicographers. Anderson’s Dictionary of Law; Webster’s New International Dictionary; New Century Dictionary. In Port Huron & Northwestern Railway Company v. Richards, 90 Mich 577, suit was brought on a written instrument executed by defendant whereby he undertook to pay plaintiff the sum of $500 when plaintiff completed the construction of its railway to the village of Port Austin and “have erected” a station for passengers and freight. It appears that the plaintiff company had constructed a building at the place designated for the station, and it claimed that it had thereby complied with its agreement. However, the said building had not been established as a station, and the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. In approving such action, this Court said (p 579):

“The agreement contemplated that facilities should be furnished, not only for the accommodation of passengers, but for the reception and shipment of freight. This involved more than a mere place of shelter. ‘And have erected a regular station’ means more than the erection of a station-house. The word ‘erect’ may mean ‘to build,’ or it may mean ‘to set up’ or ‘found’ or ‘establish’ or ‘institute,’ according to the context. In the connection here used, it means ‘to set up,’ ‘to establish.’ ”

While the case involved the interpretation of a contract, we think like principles are applicable in construing a statute. In either situation the ultimate question is' one of intent, to be determined in the light of what is said and the real purpose to be accomplished. The language, above quoted, from the opinion of the Court in the case cited is applicable in the instant suit. Í

The earlier decision in Kiefer v. German American Seminary of the City of Detroit, 46 Mich 636, is also in point. In 1861 the legislature of the State granted to defendant seminary 25,000 acres of so-called State swamp lands to aid defendant in “erecting” buildings for its use. The act contained a proviso that in the event the seminary “shall fail to erect •buildings, in pursuance of the terms of the lease or grant made by the city of Detroit of land to said seminary, and within the time therein mentioned,” the grant should be forfeited. The legislature later. required that the trustees of the seminary execute a bond to the people of the State in the sum of $25,000, conditioned that the proceeds of the sales of the lands should be applied to the purposes contemplated. The plaintiffs in the case were the sureties on said bonds. The lands granted, or some of them at least, were sold but instead of erecting buildings the defendant seminary, as a result of consolidating with another educational institution, received a building worth several thousand dollars, to which building a substantial addition was later made. The plaintiffs brought suit in equity for an accounting and to enjoin the defendant from making any use of the moneys received from the sale of swamp lands other than in the erection of buildings. The trial court entered a decree in favor of the plaintiffs. This Court, in an opinion written by Justice Cooley, concluded that the' purpose of the State grant had been substantially complied with and that, in consequence, defendant had not acted improperly.

In deciding the case cited, it was recognized that a technical construction of the grant would require the moneys realized from the sale of the lands to be applied to the erection of buildings. The Court, however, did not feel impelled to give such construction. While the defendant had not used the funds derived by it from the sale of the lands granted to construct its buildings, it had accomplished an equivalent result. The decision is authority for the proposition that the word “erecting” does not necessarily require the building of structures in order to accomplish the end in view. Whether the result contemplated has been accomplished is the question at issue. Applying the line of reasoning of the decision to the facts in the case at bar we think the conclusion cannot be avoided that while the county of Mason did not construct a new building in Ludington to be used for-the purposes of.an infirmary* nonetheless ■it actually established such institution in the manner above indicated.' See, also, Tom v. Board of County Com’rs of Lincoln County, 43 NM 292 (92 P2d 167); State, ex rel. Davis, v. Barber, 139 Fla 706 (190 So 809).

Counsel for defendants cite Plummer v. Kennedy, 72 Mich 295, as bearing on the question of the authority of a board of supervisors with reference to the rebuilding of á county infirmary. In that case the building was located on the “county farm.” It does not appear that any change in site was involved. The precise question at issue was the- authority of the board to employ agents to handle details of the work. The decision is not in point in the instant controversy. .

We think the legislative intent is clearly expressed in the statutory provisions above quoted. In accordance therewith the administrative power-to change the site of a. county infirmary, previously established, is withheld from-the board of supervisors. .No other conclusion, can be reached without ignoring the express provision limiting the authority of said board. With the wisdom or policy thereof courts are not concerned! Rather, the statutes must be construed as enacted, in the light of the purpose to be accomplished and giving due and proper meaning to all provisions.'. As said in MacQueen v. City Commission of City of Port Huron, 194 Mich 328, 342:

“It is a cardinal rule that the legislature must be held to intend the meaning which it has plainly expressed, and in such cases there is no room for construction, or attempted interpretation to vary such meaning.” •

The above language was quoted with approval in the recent decision in Nordman v. Calhoun, 332 Mich 460, 465.

In City of Grand Rapids v. Crocker, 219 Mich 178, 182, 183, this Court stated the general rule of statutory construction as follows:

“There seems to he no lack of harmony in the rules governing the interpretation of statutes. All are agreed that the primary one is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. All others serve but as guides to assist the courts in determining such intent with a greater degree of certainty. If the language employed in the statute is plain, certain and unambiguous, a bare reading suffices and no interpretation is necessary. The rule is no less elementary that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, sentence and section. To that end, the entire act must be read, and the interpretation to be given to a particular word in one section arrived at after due consideration of every other section so as to produce, if possible, a harmonious and consistent enactment as a whole.”

Among decisions of like import are: Gardner-White Co. v. State Board of Tax Administration, 296 Mich 225; Staiger v. Liquor Control Commission, 336 Mich 630. In the last case cited it was said (p 633):

“It is not the province of this Court to alter or change the clear, distinct and unequivocal wording of a legislative enactment.”

In the case at bar there is no claim that the present site of the county infirmary is not a proper one. As above noted, the resolution of the board of supervisors submitting the question of issuing bonds to raise money for the construction of an infirmary did not aver any lack of suitability as to the existing site, nor did it set forth any intent to procure a site in another municipality. It appears also from the stipulation of facts that the State department of welfare was asked for an opinion as to the comparative suitability of the Ludington and Scottville sites, and replied that it found no objection to either. Presumably the expression of opinion had reference to the physical aspects of the sites rather than to any legal questions involved.' It is fairly apparent from the record, considered in its entirety, that the proposed removal of the infirmary from Ludington to Scottville is not sought because the present site is for any reason an improper-one. It has been used since acquired in 1942.

No question is here involved as to the legality of the establishment of the infirmary at its present location. The plaintiff recognizes the validity thereof and for obvious reasons the defendants are not in position to raise any question in that regard. Apparently said action when taken was acquiesced' in by all parties concerned. It is not subject to challenge in this case. The situation presented is that members of the board of supervisors wish to remove the infirmary to Scottville and locate it on the land donated by that city. The question is, as stated at the outset, whether the board of supervisors is by statute granted such authority. For the reasons above set forth we think that the board, under the present statutes pertaining to the matter, does not have the power claimed by it. If it is deemed desirable that the-right to change such site after it has been previously established should be vested in the board, the matter of granting such power rests with the legislature and not with the courts. As the statutes now stand they are clearly inconsistent with such authority.

The determination of the primary question involved renders it unnecessary to consider other issues raised by the parties to the case. The decrée from which the appeal has been taken is reversed, and a decree will enter in this Court, in accordance herewith. Inasmuch as questions of statutory construction are involved, no costs are allowed.

Sharpe, Reid, Dethmers and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Carr, C. J.

PA 1925, No 146, as amended (CL 1948, § 401.1 et seq., as amended [Stat Ann 1950 Rev and Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 16.121 et seq.).