Mary Louise Seely Jenkins v. Johnnie Mae Cooper Seely

Louisiana Court of Appeal

Mary Louise Seely Jenkins v. Johnnie Mae Cooper Seely

DecidedDecember 8, 2010

DocketCA-0010-0586

StatusUnknown

This text of Mary Louise Seely Jenkins v. Johnnie Mae Cooper Seely (Mary Louise Seely Jenkins v. Johnnie Mae Cooper Seely) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Mary Louise Seely Jenkins v. Johnnie Mae Cooper Seely, (La. Ct. App. 2010).

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Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-586

MARY LOUISE SEELEY JENKINS

VERSUS

JOHNNIE MAE COOPER SEELEY

**********

APPEAL FROM THE THIRTY-FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS, NO. C-609-09 HONORABLE CRAIG STEVE GUNNELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

JOHN D. SAUNDERS JUDGE

Court composed of John D. Saunders, J. David Painter, and Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Carey Elizabeth Messina Graves, Carley, LLP P. O. Box 14203 Baton Rouge, LA 70898-4203 (225) 757-7676 Counsel for Defendant Appellee: Johnnie Mae Cooper Seeley Mary Louise Seeley Jenkins In Proper Person 11285 Hwy 26 Jennings, LA 70546 (337) 616-8389 Counsel for Plaintiff Appellant: Mary Louise Seeley Jenkins SAUNDERS, Judge.

In this case, the plaintiff filed suit, pro se, in Jefferson Davis Parish asserting

three claims for relief. They are to annul the marriage of the defendant to the

plaintiff’s father, to have the last will and testament of the plaintiff’s father

invalidated, and to recover personal injury damages for herself and her deceased

mother from the defendant for breaking up the marriage between the plaintiff’s

parents and for herself due to the defendant’s acts during the sickness and eventual

death of the plaintiff’s father.

The defendant filed several exceptions including lack of subject matter

jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and improper venue. The trial court granted

these three exceptions, without specifying which exception applied to which of the

plaintiff’s claims, and simply dismissed the plaintiff’s entire case, without prejudice.

The plaintiff filed this appeal. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

On July 31, 2009, Mary Louise Seeley Jenkins (Jenkins) filed suit against

Johnnie Mae Cooper Seeley (Seeley) in Jefferson Davis Parish seeking the annulment

of Seeley’s marriage to Jenkins’ late father, the invalidation of the last will and

testament of her late father, and the recovery of damages from Seeley for personal

injuries, individually, and on behalf of Jenkins’ late mother. According to Jenkins,

Seeley purposefully “lured” her father away from her mother at some time in the late

1940’s to the early 1950’s. Jenkins’ late rather and Seeley were married on or about

February 15, 1954, in Minden, Louisiana. The couple then moved from Louisiana to

Michigan in 1955 where they became domiciliary residents. Jenkins’ father executed

at least two wills in Michigan prior to his death on January 7, 2009, while still

domiciled in Michigan. Seeley continues to be domiciled in Michigan. In response to Jenkins’ suit, Seeley filed several exceptions, including lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and improper venue. The

exceptions were set for hearing on October 27, 2009. On that date, counsel for Seeley

attended the hearing, while Jenkins failed to attend. The trial court sustained Seeley’s

exceptions and dismissed Jenkins’ suit, assessing the costs to Jenkins. The judgment

was set aside by Jenkins, and a rehearing was set for March 2, 2010. At that hearing,

both Jenkins and counsel for Seeley were present. After oral argument by both

parties, review of the pleadings, and consideration of the applicable law, the trial

court again dismissed Jenkins’ suit due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction, personal

jurisdiction, and improper venue. Jenkins then filed the appeal now before us.

DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS:

Jenkins has failed to properly assign any errors by the trial court. Rather, her

brief merely raises various arguments that the trial court should not have dismissed

her claims. Jenkins’ petition, as best we can discern, asserts three claims: (1) a

request to annul the marriage between Seeley and Jenkins’ father, (2) a request to

have the last will and testament of her father declared invalid, and (3) two claims for

personal injuries against Seeley, one for acts that injured herself and her deceased

mother and another solely for injures to herself. Given that Jenkins is proceeding pro

se, in the interest of justice and judicial economy, we will look to the record and

conduct a general review of whether the trial court properly dismissed Jenkins’ entire

suit.

Claim to Annul Marriage:

Jenkins filed suit to annul the marriage between Seeley and her father. We

find that the trial court had no jurisdiction over this matter.

2 Whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a claim posits a question of law and,

thus, is subject to a de novo review to determine if the lower court was legally correct.

Chavers v. Bright Truck Leasing, 06-1011 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/6/06), 945 So.2d 838,

writ denied, 07-304 (La. 4/5/07), 954 So.2d 141. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure

Article 10(A)(6)(emphasis added) states that “[a] court which is otherwise competent

under the laws of this state has jurisdiction of the following actions or proceedings

only under the following conditions: [a]n action to annul a marriage if one or both

of the parties are domiciled in this state.”

It is not disputed that Seeley is domiciled in Michigan. Further, it is not

disputed that Jenkins’ father was domiciled in Michigan for many years prior to and

at the time of his death. Given the mandate of La.Code Civ. P. art. 10, we find that

the trial court could not entertain Jenkins’ action to annul the marriage given its lack

of jurisdiction, as neither party is now or was domiciled in Louisiana. Thus, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing Jenkins’ claim to annul Seeley’s marriage

without prejudice.

Validity of Last Will and Testament:

Jenkins alleges that her late father’s last will and testament was invalid. We

find that Jenkins has no right of action on this issue.

“[A] peremptory exception of no right of action may be noticed by either the

trial or appellate court sua sponte where the record supports such an action.” Gorum

v. Louisiana Hosp. Ass’n. Employee Benefit Trust, 95-468, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/2/95), 664 So.2d 662, 664, citing La.Code Civ.P. art. 927. The exception of no

right of action is appropriate procedurally when questioning whether a plaintiff has

any interest in judicially enforcing a right. Greenbriar Nursing Home, Inc. v. Pilley,

3 93-2059 (La. 5/23/94), 637 So.2d 429; Byrd v. International Paper Co., 594 So.2d

961 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1992).

Jenkins argues that should the final will be invalidated, she would receive a

portion of her late father’s estate. This is inaccurate. The prior will attached by

Jenkins to her brief indicates that she would only receive property from her father’s

estate if Seeley would have predeceased him. Clearly this is not what happened. Any

judgment that invalidates the last will and testament of her father and enforces the

prior will would still leave Jenkins with no recovery. As such, Jenkins is not a party

that has any interest in which of her father’s wills are probated. Further, allowing

Jenkins to amend her petition in an attempt to assert some right of action in relation

to her late father’s wills would be a vain and useless act. Thompson v. Harrington,

99-571 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 652. Accordingly, we find that Jenkins

is precluded from raising this issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing

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