Martinez v. Wilber

810 S.W.2d 461, 1991 Tex. App. LEXIS 1782, 1991 WL 129720

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 5, 1991
• Docket: 04-90-00354-CV
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION

CARR, Justice.

This is a direct appeal by John Martinez, appellant, from a default judgment. We reverse and remand.

The record reflects that Rex Wilber, ap-pellee, filed suit against Superior Pool and Spa, Inc. (Superior) on June 5, 1989, under cause number 06-89-11158-CV.¹ On October 6, 1989, the trial court rendered a default judgment against Superior, which is not part of this appeal.

On October 23, 1989, Wilber filed an amended petition in cause number 06-89-11158-CV, naming as additional parties John Martinez, Kenny O’Kane, and “Home Improvement.” In addition to the causes of action originally pleaded, Wilber alleged: (1) that Superior was the alter ego of Martinez and co-defendant O’Kane, and (2) that co-defendant “Home Improvement” was the recipient of fraudulent transfers of property from Superior. On October 23 and 26, 1989, the trial court entered identical orders of severance and docketed the causes of action against Martinez, O’Kane and “Home Improvement” under cause number 06-89-11158A-CV.

On January 31, 1990, the trial judge entered an order in the severed case (cause number 06-89-11158A-CV) authorizing substituted service on Martinez. The court’s order for substituted service in cause number 89-11158A-CV provided in material part that the citation be left with

anyone over the age of 16 years at 8709 Highway 90 West, San Antonio, Bexar County, Texas which is the Defendant’s usual place of business or by placing it inside the premises through a door mail chute, or by slipping it under the front door, or by securely affixing it to the front door or main entry of his usual place of business as stated above.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the return of John S. Toscano be endorsed on or attached to the citation, state when and how the citation was served, and be signed by him officially.

(Emphasis added.)

On February 7, 1990, the original citation issued on October 23, 1989, for cause number 06-89-11158-CV, was executed at 8719 Highway 90 West, by hand delivery to a David Roach. On Martinez’s answer date, the trial court heard Wilber’s evidence and rendered a default judgment against Martinez in cause number 06-89-11158A-CV.

In five points of error, Martinez contends that the trial court erred in entering a default judgment against him. He argues that:

1) the default judgment was rendered prematurely (point of error 1);

2) the citation is defective because it contains the wrong cause number (point of error two);

3) the citation was improperly served (points of error 3 and 4); and

4) there is no evidence to support Wil-ber’s damage award (point of error 5).

A default judgment is improper against a defendant who has not been served in strict compliance with the law. Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex.1990); Investors Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Bruner, 366 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston 1963, writ ref’d n.r.e.). While presumptions are ordinarily made in support of a judgment, including presumptions of due service of citation, no such presumptions are made in a direct attack upon a default judgment. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.1965).

Rule 99(b) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the citation show the file number of the suit in which the defendant is summoned to answer. With an order of severance which specifically establishes a separate cause number, the failure to include that new designation in the citation is a fatal defect. See Gutierrez v. Cuellar, 236 S.W. 497, 499 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1922, no writ) (file number of suit must appear in body of citation); Duke v. Spiller, 51 Tex.Civ.App. 237, 111 S.W. 787, 787 (1908, no writ) (citation which does not comply with requirement that citation state file number of suit is not sufficient to sustain default judgment). Because Martinez’s citation had an incorrect file number, which is a fatal defect, the default judgment requires reversal.

Wilber argues that Martinez judicially admitted that he was “duly served” in his motion for new trial. We disagree. Martinez never conceded that service was proper. See Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 837 (actual receipt and proper service are distinguishable). Martinez’s second point of error is granted. We need not address his remaining points. TEX.R.APP.P. 90(a).

Judgment is reversed and remanded.

1 . Wilber filed suit to recover damages and to seek specific performance based on an alleged breach of contract and a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act in connection with a contract to construct a swimming pool and related improvements on his property.