OPINION
EASLEY, Justice.
Appellant brought suit for declaratory relief and for damages involving a claimed easement for ingress and egress over appellee’s land. At the close of appellant’s case, the claim was dismissed by the trial court. We reverse and remand.
The question is whether appellant has an easement under the circumstances. He bases his claim on any of three alternative theories: by express grant, by implication, or by necessity.
Abutting tracts of land are owned by the parties to the suit. Both parties gained title to the southern portions of their tracts from their father some years ago. All of the property in question was originally owned by their father, who devised his estate to his twelve sons and daughters as tenants in common. The heirs exchanged warranty deeds in 1973 severing the tenancy in common and creating individual ownership in twelve tracts. Appellant and appellee acquired the northern portions of their abutting tracts in this exchange.
Appellant’s combined tract, consisting of the tract he first owned and the tract to the north obtained by the division of inherited land, is bounded on the north and west by property owned by non-parties to this action, on the south by a public road, and by appellee’s tract on the east. Appellee’s combined tract has a public road on the south and another road called the “middle road” along its eastern edge. The middle road was provided by the heirs’ father in his will for their common use. The appellant seeks an easement across the northern portion of appellee’s inherited, tract to use for ingress and egress to and from the middle road. By expending some money and using some of his previously acquired property, appellant could construct a road with access to the public road to the south.
The 1973 warranty deed by which appellant received title to his tract was signed by appellee and provided for “rights of ingress and egress”. In fact, all of the twelve deeds exchanged by the heirs contain a similar clause. There is no mention in the deed of a particular road or way. However, the record shows that the parties’ father, who owned both tracts until his death in 1973, and then the appellant used a dirt road for thirty years to cross what is now appellee’s land to get from the middle road to what is now appellant’s land. Appellant argues that the “right of ingress and egress” in his deed refers to this dirt road.
The trial court held that appellant did not have an easement across appellee’s land because appellant’s use was permissive. The sole basis for this finding was hearsay testimony by appellant’s son that his father told him that the parties had a verbal agreement concerning use of the existing road. Appellee urges that a permissive use can never give rise to an easement by prescription. We agree. Maestas v. Maestas, 50 N.M. 276, 175 P.2d 1003 (1946); Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646 (1937). However, appellant did not claim an easement by prescription in his complaint.
A preliminary consideration is the proper construction of “rights of ingress and egress”. This phrase has frequently been used interchangeably with the word “access” to express the right of a person to enter, go upon, and return from the lands in question. See Hacker Company v. Joliet, 196 Ill.App. 416 (1915); Commonwealth v. Shapiro, 41 Pa.Super. 96 (1909). Access is “loosely defined as the right of ingress to and egress from the property via the abutting street or highway.” State v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 365, 384 P.2d 241, 244 (1963).
But another, more expanded, meaning of “ingress and egress” is evident in the case law: access to the land in question plus the crossing of another’s land in order to obtain this access. This Court has used “ingress and egress” in this sense. Kennedy v. Bond, 80 N.M. 734, 460 P.2d 809 (1969); Castillo v. Tabet Lumber Company, 75 N.M. 492, 406 P.2d 361 (1965); Hughes v. Lippincott, 56 N.M. 473, 245 P.2d 390 (1952); Michelet v. Cole, 20 N.M. 357, 149 P. 310 (1915). A Texas court has specifically stated that “a right of ingress and egress is a right to go upon and across the land of another.” Parker v. Bains, 194 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Civ.App.1946).
The deed in question provides for a “right of ingress and egress.” Following the above authorities, we hold that this provision gives the appellant the right to cross appellee’s land in order to obtain access to his own land. Appellee was the only one of the twelve heirs who exchanged deeds that owned or received land abutting appellant’s land. The exchanged deeds could only refer to the heirs’ property being divided, not to any third party’s land abutting the devised land. Thus, appellant’s “right of ingress and egress” can only refer to his right to cross appellee’s land to obtain access to his own land.
No particular words of grant are necessary to create an easement. Any words which clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, provided the language is certain and definite in its term. Kennedy v. Bond, supra; State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Dannevik, 79 N.M. 630, 447 P.2d 510 (1968); Dyer v. Compere, 41 N.M. 716, 73 P.2d. 1356 (1937).
We hold that the language in this deed is certain and definite. An easement is the generic term for a “liberty, privilege, right or advantage which one has in the land of another, (citation omitted.)” State v. Begay, 63 N.M. 409, 412, 320 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1958). A right of ingress and egress is descriptive of the easement right. Thus, this Court stated that “[t]he term ‘right-of-way’ is merely descriptive of the easement rights, (citation omitted.)” State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Dannevik, supra at 632, 447 P.2d at 512. We hold that appellant has an express easement to cross appellee’s land in order to obtain access to his land.
In addition, it is the duty of this Court to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. The intention of the parties as gleaned from all the evidence reinforces our holding that appellant has an express easement.
When their father devised his land to his twelve children, he provided in his will that the middle road was “for the common use of all the heirs.” This middle road is the one bordering appellee’s land from which appellant claims he has access to his northern tract of land. Although appellant’s other previously acquired property is bordered on the south by a public road, in order to reach the northern portion of his land appellant would have to build a road through his land and across an irrigation ditch. The southern portion of appellant’s land was owned well before the exchange of deeds gave him his northern tract.
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OPINION
EASLEY, Justice.
Appellant brought suit for declaratory relief and for damages involving a claimed easement for ingress and egress over appellee’s land. At the close of appellant’s case, the claim was dismissed by the trial court. We reverse and remand.
The question is whether appellant has an easement under the circumstances. He bases his claim on any of three alternative theories: by express grant, by implication, or by necessity.
Abutting tracts of land are owned by the parties to the suit. Both parties gained title to the southern portions of their tracts from their father some years ago. All of the property in question was originally owned by their father, who devised his estate to his twelve sons and daughters as tenants in common. The heirs exchanged warranty deeds in 1973 severing the tenancy in common and creating individual ownership in twelve tracts. Appellant and appellee acquired the northern portions of their abutting tracts in this exchange.
Appellant’s combined tract, consisting of the tract he first owned and the tract to the north obtained by the division of inherited land, is bounded on the north and west by property owned by non-parties to this action, on the south by a public road, and by appellee’s tract on the east. Appellee’s combined tract has a public road on the south and another road called the “middle road” along its eastern edge. The middle road was provided by the heirs’ father in his will for their common use. The appellant seeks an easement across the northern portion of appellee’s inherited, tract to use for ingress and egress to and from the middle road. By expending some money and using some of his previously acquired property, appellant could construct a road with access to the public road to the south.
The 1973 warranty deed by which appellant received title to his tract was signed by appellee and provided for “rights of ingress and egress”. In fact, all of the twelve deeds exchanged by the heirs contain a similar clause. There is no mention in the deed of a particular road or way. However, the record shows that the parties’ father, who owned both tracts until his death in 1973, and then the appellant used a dirt road for thirty years to cross what is now appellee’s land to get from the middle road to what is now appellant’s land. Appellant argues that the “right of ingress and egress” in his deed refers to this dirt road.
The trial court held that appellant did not have an easement across appellee’s land because appellant’s use was permissive. The sole basis for this finding was hearsay testimony by appellant’s son that his father told him that the parties had a verbal agreement concerning use of the existing road. Appellee urges that a permissive use can never give rise to an easement by prescription. We agree. Maestas v. Maestas, 50 N.M. 276, 175 P.2d 1003 (1946); Hester v. Sawyers, 41 N.M. 497, 71 P.2d 646 (1937). However, appellant did not claim an easement by prescription in his complaint.
A preliminary consideration is the proper construction of “rights of ingress and egress”. This phrase has frequently been used interchangeably with the word “access” to express the right of a person to enter, go upon, and return from the lands in question. See Hacker Company v. Joliet, 196 Ill.App. 416 (1915); Commonwealth v. Shapiro, 41 Pa.Super. 96 (1909). Access is “loosely defined as the right of ingress to and egress from the property via the abutting street or highway.” State v. Danfelser, 72 N.M. 361, 365, 384 P.2d 241, 244 (1963).
But another, more expanded, meaning of “ingress and egress” is evident in the case law: access to the land in question plus the crossing of another’s land in order to obtain this access. This Court has used “ingress and egress” in this sense. Kennedy v. Bond, 80 N.M. 734, 460 P.2d 809 (1969); Castillo v. Tabet Lumber Company, 75 N.M. 492, 406 P.2d 361 (1965); Hughes v. Lippincott, 56 N.M. 473, 245 P.2d 390 (1952); Michelet v. Cole, 20 N.M. 357, 149 P. 310 (1915). A Texas court has specifically stated that “a right of ingress and egress is a right to go upon and across the land of another.” Parker v. Bains, 194 S.W.2d 569 (Tex.Civ.App.1946).
The deed in question provides for a “right of ingress and egress.” Following the above authorities, we hold that this provision gives the appellant the right to cross appellee’s land in order to obtain access to his own land. Appellee was the only one of the twelve heirs who exchanged deeds that owned or received land abutting appellant’s land. The exchanged deeds could only refer to the heirs’ property being divided, not to any third party’s land abutting the devised land. Thus, appellant’s “right of ingress and egress” can only refer to his right to cross appellee’s land to obtain access to his own land.
No particular words of grant are necessary to create an easement. Any words which clearly show intention to grant an easement are sufficient, provided the language is certain and definite in its term. Kennedy v. Bond, supra; State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Dannevik, 79 N.M. 630, 447 P.2d 510 (1968); Dyer v. Compere, 41 N.M. 716, 73 P.2d. 1356 (1937).
We hold that the language in this deed is certain and definite. An easement is the generic term for a “liberty, privilege, right or advantage which one has in the land of another, (citation omitted.)” State v. Begay, 63 N.M. 409, 412, 320 P.2d 1017, 1019 (1958). A right of ingress and egress is descriptive of the easement right. Thus, this Court stated that “[t]he term ‘right-of-way’ is merely descriptive of the easement rights, (citation omitted.)” State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Dannevik, supra at 632, 447 P.2d at 512. We hold that appellant has an express easement to cross appellee’s land in order to obtain access to his land.
In addition, it is the duty of this Court to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the parties. The intention of the parties as gleaned from all the evidence reinforces our holding that appellant has an express easement.
When their father devised his land to his twelve children, he provided in his will that the middle road was “for the common use of all the heirs.” This middle road is the one bordering appellee’s land from which appellant claims he has access to his northern tract of land. Although appellant’s other previously acquired property is bordered on the south by a public road, in order to reach the northern portion of his land appellant would have to build a road through his land and across an irrigation ditch. The southern portion of appellant’s land was owned well before the exchange of deeds gave him his northern tract.
At trial, there was testimony to the effect that appellant is not the only heir who received land which could not be reached by the middle road without crossing another of the heir’s land. It is clear that the litigants’ father did not intend that any of his heirs be landlocked. Their father knew the situation when he executed the will: that, regarding the land being devised, what is now appellant’s northern tract could only be reached by crossing what is now appellee’s land. The litigants’ father stated in his will that the middle road was for the use of all of his heirs. And this intent was reiterated by his twelve children when they included in all of their deeds “rights of ingress and egress.” Further, when a common ancestor simultaneously conveys, or when there is partition of a tenancy in common, the implication of an easement is stronger. See Rest.Property, § 476(f) (1944); 2 Thompson, Real Property, § 356 (1961 Repl.).
The second issue raised by this appeal is the location of appellant’s easement. The record shows that the dirt road claimed by appellant as his easement crosses through the middle of appellee’s land. The record also states that there was some discussion between the parties, if not actual use, of a dirt road bordering appellee’s land to the north.
The trial court held that appellant has no easement because of his permissive use of appellee’s land. The parties’ agreement went to the location of the easement, not its existence. The parties’ behavior can furnish the scope or location of the missing details; it does not permit a disregard of the language in the conveyance. See 3 Powell, The Law of Real Property § 415, 34, 188, 191 (1979). We therefore remand to the district court for a determination of the location of appellant’s easement.
Concluding as we do that there is an express easement in the deed, it becomes unnecessary to decide the questions of easement by implication or necessity.
Although findings of fact and conclusions of law were not requested by appellant and not entered in detail by the trial court, we find that the ultimate and controlling facts are not substantially in dispute. We are not, therefore, bound by the trial court’s conclusions' of law. State ex rel. Apodaca v. New Mexico State Bd. of Ed., 82 N.M. 558, 484 P.2d 1268 (1971). We address the legal issues because the trial judge applied incorrect principles of law in arriving at his decision.
We reverse and remand.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
SOSA, C. J., and FELTER, J., concur. PAYNE and FEDERICI, JJ., respectfully dissenting.