Martinez Ex Rel. Martinez v. School Board of Hillsborough County

711 F. Supp. 1066, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4104, 1989 WL 41014
CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedApril 26, 1989
Docket87-1308-CIV-T-17(A)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 711 F. Supp. 1066 (Martinez Ex Rel. Martinez v. School Board of Hillsborough County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Martinez Ex Rel. Martinez v. School Board of Hillsborough County, 711 F. Supp. 1066, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4104, 1989 WL 41014 (M.D. Fla. 1989).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

KOVACHEVICH, District Judge.

This cause of action is before the Court on remand from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The matter previously came before the Court for trial, without jury, on July 13 and 14, 1988. The Court issued its memorandum opinion in the case on August 8, 1988. The Court made the following relevant conclusions of law:

1. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 does not add to the rights available to Plaintiff under the EHCA. Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984). As in that case, the claims under the constitution are identical to those under the EHCA and the legal and factual questions are thus the same. The Smith decision has been amended by Congress insofar as recovery of attorney’s fees under the EHCA has been added to the statute. The Supreme Court’s conclusions with respect to identity of relief available under the two statutes and the constitution are still valid. Therefore, this cause may be decided using the legal test developed under the EHCA.
2. Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (hereafter EHCA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401, et seq., Plaintiff is *1067 entitled to a free, appropriate public education in the least restrictive appropriate environment.
3. The EHCA does not require the State provide services sufficient to maximize each child’s potential “commensurate with the opportunity provided other children.” Hendrick Hudson District Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Implicit in the congressional purpose of providing access to a “free appropriate public education” is the requirement that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. Id. at 200, 102 S.Ct. at 3047.
4. The parties agree that the appropriate standard for placement of Eliana Martinez (hereinafter Eliana) is a “free appropriate public education” in the “least restrictive environment” appropriate to the circumstances of the case. The parties, however, do not agree what the appropriate least restrictive environment is in this case.
5. Plaintiff asserts that the appropriate placement is in a TMH classroom, without further modification. Plaintiff has proposed some restrictions to that access, if the Court does not agree to unrestricted access, such as placement in a non-ambulatory TMH class or provision for a full-time aide for Eliana; these are acceptable to Plaintiff in order to change Eliana’s placement.
6. Defendant asserts, on the other hand, that the appropriate placement for Eliana remains homebound education, due to the facts that Eliana has AIDS, is not potty trained, and therefore poses a potential danger to the students of the TMH class which she desires to attend. Defendant additionally alleges that the EHCA does not require the School Board to provide one-on-one education within the context of the integrated classroom.
7. The homebound program which is now being provided to Eliana clearly deprives her of certain benefits of a classroom education, including socialization and modeling processes. The question the Court must address is whether or not other factors outweigh this clear deprivation of educational benefits so as to prevent the placement of Eliana in a TMH classroom.
8. The parties have offered the Court two divergent views on what is the most appropriate and least restrictive educational placement for Eliana Martinez: homebound education, and, placement in an integrated TMH classroom, with or without special accommodations. The Court believes the appropriate educational placement lies somewhere between these two positions.
9. The Court, once again, is faced with the challenge of making a medical judgment based on divergent medical testimony and opinion. The Court must balance the right of Eliana Martinez to get the most appropriate education available, against the danger, if any, posed to the specific population, the TMH students, who will be exposed to Eliana. The children in this TMH classroom are there because of their right to an appropriate and free public education and as required by the laws of the state for school attendance. As this Court said in Ray v. The School District of DeSoto County, 666 F.Supp. 1524, 1535 (M.D.Fla.1987): The public at large has several interests to be considered here. First, is the concern of the public to provide adequate, non-discriminatory education to all the children of the state. The children of this state include children like the Ray boys, who, through no fault of their own, have contracted this disease; it clearly provokes in many, fear and a desperate desire to segregate them from mainstream life. However, there is an equally important public interest in protecting the health and safety of the public at large, and here, specifically, the school population which would be in contact with the Ray boys, if they are returned to an integrated classroom.
10. The Court’s inquiry should focus on the following factors, based upon reasonable medical judgment and the state of medical knowledge: the nature of the risk, the duration of the risk, the severity *1068 of the harm, and the probability of transmission which will cause varying degrees of harm. See, School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987).
11. These factors have been addressed by this Court in the findings of fact. The severity of the harm if transmission occurs is clear; it is most likely fatal. At this time, the only time transmission would not be fatal is if the transmission resulted in seroconversion which never became symptomatic; otherwise, medical opinion is that all persons infected and symptomatic will die at some future time, perhaps as little as six (6) months from the onset of becoming symptomatic.
12. To the best of medical knowledge, at this time, the duration of the risk of transmission is perpetual; there is no evidence that transmissibility changes during the course of the disease.
13. The last two factors are essential to the consideration of this cause of action: the nature of the risk (How is the disease transmitted?) and the probabilities of transmission. AIDS has been proven to be transmitted in various ways: sexual intercourse, homosexual or heterosexual; intravenous drug use, sharing of needles and other equipment; perinatally; through breast milk; and through the transfusion of blood and blood products.
14.

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Bluebook (online)
711 F. Supp. 1066, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4104, 1989 WL 41014, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/martinez-ex-rel-martinez-v-school-board-of-hillsborough-county-flmd-1989.