Martinez-Brooks v. Easter

District Court, D. Connecticut·Decided August 11, 2020·No. 3:20-cv-00569·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

JAMES WHITTED, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, No. 3:20-cv-00569 (MPS) Petitioner, v.

DIANE EASTER, Warden of Federal Correctional Institution at Danbury in her official capacity,

Respondent.

ORDER CERTIFYING CLASS FOR SETTLEMENT PURPOSES ONLY AND ORDERING NOTICE

On August 3, 2020, Petitioner filed a motion to certify a class for settlement purposes only, and to appoint class counsel and a class representative. ECF No. 133. On the same day, Petitioner filed a motion for an order of notice to the class. ECF No. 135. The Court held a telephonic status conference on August 5, 2020 to discuss both motions. As a result of that conference, the Government filed the “side letter,” ECF No. 138, and Petitioner filed a revised Notice in both English and Spanish, ECF No. 139, 139-1, 139-2. Respondent consents to both motions. ECF No. 133 at 1; ECF No. 135 at 1. Having considered the motions and the supporting memoranda and materials filed therewith, the Settlement Agreement (ECF No. 134-1) and side letter (ECF No. 138-1), and the revised Notice (ECF No. 139), the Court certifies the proposed class for settlement purposes, grants the Motion for Order of Notice (ECF No. 135) by approving the revised Notice (ECF No. 139), and finds and orders as follows: 1. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, this Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this litigation and all related matters and all claims raised in this action and released in the Settlement Agreement. The Court also has personal jurisdiction over all parties and Class Members. 2. The Court finds that, under U.S. ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1125 (2d Cir. 1974), a multiparty proceeding analogous to a class action is appropriate here substantially for the reasons set forth in the Court’s Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). ECF No. 30 at 63-

65; see also ECF No. 134 at 7-9. In particular: (1) the issue of the constitutionality of the Warden’s implementation of her home confinement and compassionate release authority is plainly “applicable on behalf of the entire class” and is “uncluttered by subsidiary issues”; (2) the majority of the vulnerable inmates would be unlikely to have the benefit of counsel in pursuing individual habeas petitions absent a multi-party proceeding; and (3) multi-party treatment avoids the “considerable expenditure of judicial time and energy in hearing and deciding numerous individual petitions presenting the identical issue.” ECF No. 30 at 63-65 (citing Preiser, 506 F.2d at 1126). As a result, and acknowledging “that the precise provisions of Rule 23 do not apply to habeas corpus proceedings,” the Court finds that the class action procedures set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 provide an appropriate mode of procedure to resolve this multi-party habeas

proceeding . See Preiser, 506 F.2d at 1125 (citing Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294, 299 (1969) (confirming the power of the judiciary to fashion “appropriate modes of procedure, by analogy to existing rules or otherwise in conformity with judicial usage” under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1970))). 3. The Court finds that the requirements for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(2) are satisfied for settlement purposes only with respect to the following Class: any person incarcerated at FCI Danbury anytime from the Effective Date of the parties’ Settlement Agreement, i.e., July 27, 2020, until the termination date of the Agreement, i.e., October 31, 2021, unless otherwise modified by the parties pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, who either (a) is a List One Inmate or List Two Inmate (as those terms are defined in the Settlement Agreement, ECF No. 134-1 at 3-4), or (b) possesses one or more underlying medical conditions which, according to current CDC guidance (i.e., the CDC guidance in effect at the time of the individual’s home confinement review), either (i) places that inmate at increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19 (“Tier 1 medical conditions”); or (ii) might place that inmate at an increased risk of severe illness from COVID-19 (“Tier 2 medical conditions”).

4. The Court finds that Rule 23(a)’s requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy are met for substantially the reasons set forth in the TRO. ECF No. 30 at 65-66; see also ECF No. 134 at 9-14; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1)-(4). The proposed class is so numerous that the joinder of all members is impracticable, given that at least 439 inmates at FCI Danbury have been identified as medically vulnerable within the meaning of the class definition set forth above. ECF No. 134 at 10; see also Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that “numerosity is presumed at a level of 40 members”). When new admissions to FCI Danbury are accounted for, the class may exceed 600. ECF No. 134 at 10-11. The Court also finds that there are questions of law or fact that are common to the class, even under Preiser’s stringent standards. 506 F.2d at 1127. That is so because: (1) each class member is recognized as being a part of the high-risk group as to which a prompt and constitutionally adequate home confinement review is justified; and (2) the factual and legal questions regarding the Warden and Bureau of Prison’s (“BOP”) process for considering inmates for home confinement are common to the entire class. ECF No. 134 at 12-13. This is true even though members of the class may face varying levels of heightened risk of severe illness from COVID-19. The Court finds that Rule 23(a)(3)’s typicality requirement is met because “each class member’s claim arises from the same course of events [i.e., application of respondent’s home confinement review process], and each class member makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant’s liability.” Cent. States SE. & SW. Areas Health and Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 504 F.3d 229, 245 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court also finds that that the Plaintiff and Settlement Class Counsel will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the Class under Rule 23(a)(4). Because of his medical conditions (see ECF No. 134 at 14), Mr. Whitted is an appropriate and adequate class representative for the proposed class of medically vulnerable individuals. He has incentives to seek a home confinement review process that is speedy and fair and that best accounts for class members’ shared medical vulnerabilities to

COVID-19 regardless of each member’s individual conditions. Further, class counsel are “qualified, experienced and able to conduct the litigation,” Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2000), and meet the requirements of Rule 23(g). See Declarations of Professor Sarah F. Russell, Professor Marisol Orihuela, David S. Golub, Esq. and Professor Alexandra Harrington (ECF No. 134-2, 134-3, 134-4, 134-5, respectively). 5.

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