NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 24-2565 _____________
MARTIN J. WALSH, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor
v.
WICARE HOME CARE AGENCY, LLC; LUIS D. HERNANDEZ, Appellants ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00224) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 8, 2025 ___________
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 6, 2026)
____________
OPINION * ____________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted
summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) with respect to the
Secretary’s claims that WiCare Home Care Agency, LLC (“WiCare”), 1 an employer of
in-home care providers, failed to pay its employees the minimum wage and overtime
premium required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. WiCare has appealed, arguing primarily that a regulation denying third-party
employers the benefit of a FLSA provision exempting “companionship services” workers
from the Act’s protections is inconsistent with the FLSA and therefore unlawful. 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). We disagree. Congress expressly delegated to the Secretary the
authority to define the scope of the companionship exemption, and the Secretary
exercised this authority in promulgating the regulation that WiCare alleges is unlawful.
Because WiCare cannot claim the benefit of the companionship exemption and has not
otherwise identified a viable basis for relief, we will affirm the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment.
I.
We write for the benefit of the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to
our decision. WiCare is a Pennsylvania corporation that employs in-home care providers.
The Secretary filed a complaint on February 15, 2022 alleging that WiCare failed to pay
1 Luis Hernandez, the sole owner of WiCare and also a defendant to the Secretary’s lawsuit, has appealed jointly with WiCare. We refer to Hernandez and WiCare collectively as “WiCare.”
2 certain employees the minimum wage and overtime premium required by the FLSA.
After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion, the
Secretary filed a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in which it asserted, inter alia,
that WiCare failed between January 2019 and May 2021 to pay 181 of its employees
$468,414.25 in overtime wages, and failed to pay 88 employees $61,354.84 in minimum
wages. WiCare did not respond to the Secretary’s Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts and the District Court deemed the facts stated by the Secretary admitted. The court
granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment and awarded $1,059,540.18 in
total damages, consisting of $529,770.09 in back wages and an equal amount of
liquidated damages. WiCare timely filed this appeal.
II. 2
The FLSA excludes from its protections “any employee employed in domestic
service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of
age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and
delimited by regulations of the Secretary).” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). A regulation
promulgated by the Secretary provides, however, that “[t]hird party employers of
employees engaged in companionship services . . . may not avail themselves of the
minimum wage and overtime exemption provided by section 13(a)(15) of the Act.” 29
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, “applying the same standard it must apply.” Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Huber v. Simon’s Agency, Inc., 84 F.4th 132, 144 (3d Cir. 2023)).
3 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (“Third-Party Regulation” or “Regulation”). WiCare argues that the
Third-Party Regulation is inconsistent with the FLSA’s overtime exemption for
companionship workers and is for that reason unlawful.
We are unpersuaded. It is well established that “some statutes ‘expressly
delegate[]’ to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term.”
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024) (alteration in original)
(quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977)). As the Supreme Court
recognized in Loper Bright, the FLSA’s companionship exemption provision contains
one such express delegation, because it allows that its “terms” may be “defined and
delimited by regulations of the Secretary.” Id. at 395 n.5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(15)). In the Third-Party Regulation, the Secretary chose to “delimit[]”
the scope of the companionship services exemption by excluding third-party employers
from its reach. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). The Secretary’s decision to do so was a lawful
exercise of its expressly delegated authority under the FLSA. We therefore decline to
vacate the Third-Party Regulation as inconsistent with the Act.
III.
WiCare’s remaining arguments are also unavailing. 3 WiCare argues that it is not
subject to the FLSA because it does not engage in “commerce” as defined by the Act.
See 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (defining “[c]ommerce”). But Congress has found “that the
3 Among the purported bases for relief identified by WiCare is that Julie A. Su, the former Acting Secretary of Labor, has “no present authority to continue any enforcement actions against” WiCare. WiCare Br. 36. Because Ms. Su is no longer the Acting Secretary, we decline to consider this argument.
4 employment of persons in domestic service in households affects commerce,” and it is
undisputed that WiCare employs persons in domestic service. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). There
is no basis, therefore, for WiCare’s assertion that its activity does not meet the statutory
definition of “commerce.” 4
WiCare also argues that it is not subject to the Third-Party Regulation because it is
not a third-party employer. The Third-Party Regulation does not expressly define the
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________
No. 24-2565 _____________
MARTIN J. WALSH, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor
v.
WICARE HOME CARE AGENCY, LLC; LUIS D. HERNANDEZ, Appellants ____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00224) District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane ____________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) September 8, 2025 ___________
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, PORTER and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 6, 2026)
____________
OPINION * ____________
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent. CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania granted
summary judgment in favor of the Secretary of Labor (“Secretary”) with respect to the
Secretary’s claims that WiCare Home Care Agency, LLC (“WiCare”), 1 an employer of
in-home care providers, failed to pay its employees the minimum wage and overtime
premium required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA” or “Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 201
et seq. WiCare has appealed, arguing primarily that a regulation denying third-party
employers the benefit of a FLSA provision exempting “companionship services” workers
from the Act’s protections is inconsistent with the FLSA and therefore unlawful. 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). We disagree. Congress expressly delegated to the Secretary the
authority to define the scope of the companionship exemption, and the Secretary
exercised this authority in promulgating the regulation that WiCare alleges is unlawful.
Because WiCare cannot claim the benefit of the companionship exemption and has not
otherwise identified a viable basis for relief, we will affirm the District Court’s order
granting summary judgment.
I.
We write for the benefit of the parties and so recite only those facts pertinent to
our decision. WiCare is a Pennsylvania corporation that employs in-home care providers.
The Secretary filed a complaint on February 15, 2022 alleging that WiCare failed to pay
1 Luis Hernandez, the sole owner of WiCare and also a defendant to the Secretary’s lawsuit, has appealed jointly with WiCare. We refer to Hernandez and WiCare collectively as “WiCare.”
2 certain employees the minimum wage and overtime premium required by the FLSA.
After discovery, both parties moved for summary judgment. In support of its motion, the
Secretary filed a Statement of Undisputed Material Facts in which it asserted, inter alia,
that WiCare failed between January 2019 and May 2021 to pay 181 of its employees
$468,414.25 in overtime wages, and failed to pay 88 employees $61,354.84 in minimum
wages. WiCare did not respond to the Secretary’s Statement of Undisputed Material
Facts and the District Court deemed the facts stated by the Secretary admitted. The court
granted the Secretary’s motion for summary judgment and awarded $1,059,540.18 in
total damages, consisting of $529,770.09 in back wages and an equal amount of
liquidated damages. WiCare timely filed this appeal.
II. 2
The FLSA excludes from its protections “any employee employed in domestic
service employment to provide companionship services for individuals who (because of
age or infirmity) are unable to care for themselves (as such terms are defined and
delimited by regulations of the Secretary).” 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). A regulation
promulgated by the Secretary provides, however, that “[t]hird party employers of
employees engaged in companionship services . . . may not avail themselves of the
minimum wage and overtime exemption provided by section 13(a)(15) of the Act.” 29
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Our Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, “applying the same standard it must apply.” Morgan v. Allison Crane & Rigging LLC, 114 F.4th 214, 220 (3d Cir. 2024) (quoting Huber v. Simon’s Agency, Inc., 84 F.4th 132, 144 (3d Cir. 2023)).
3 C.F.R. § 552.109(a) (“Third-Party Regulation” or “Regulation”). WiCare argues that the
Third-Party Regulation is inconsistent with the FLSA’s overtime exemption for
companionship workers and is for that reason unlawful.
We are unpersuaded. It is well established that “some statutes ‘expressly
delegate[]’ to an agency the authority to give meaning to a particular statutory term.”
Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 394 (2024) (alteration in original)
(quoting Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977)). As the Supreme Court
recognized in Loper Bright, the FLSA’s companionship exemption provision contains
one such express delegation, because it allows that its “terms” may be “defined and
delimited by regulations of the Secretary.” Id. at 395 n.5 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 29
U.S.C. § 213(a)(15)). In the Third-Party Regulation, the Secretary chose to “delimit[]”
the scope of the companionship services exemption by excluding third-party employers
from its reach. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(15). The Secretary’s decision to do so was a lawful
exercise of its expressly delegated authority under the FLSA. We therefore decline to
vacate the Third-Party Regulation as inconsistent with the Act.
III.
WiCare’s remaining arguments are also unavailing. 3 WiCare argues that it is not
subject to the FLSA because it does not engage in “commerce” as defined by the Act.
See 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (defining “[c]ommerce”). But Congress has found “that the
3 Among the purported bases for relief identified by WiCare is that Julie A. Su, the former Acting Secretary of Labor, has “no present authority to continue any enforcement actions against” WiCare. WiCare Br. 36. Because Ms. Su is no longer the Acting Secretary, we decline to consider this argument.
4 employment of persons in domestic service in households affects commerce,” and it is
undisputed that WiCare employs persons in domestic service. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a). There
is no basis, therefore, for WiCare’s assertion that its activity does not meet the statutory
definition of “commerce.” 4
WiCare also argues that it is not subject to the Third-Party Regulation because it is
not a third-party employer. The Third-Party Regulation does not expressly define the
term “[t]hird party employer[].” See 29 C.F.R. § 552.109(a). But the Regulation clearly
distinguishes a third-party employer from an employer who is “the individual [receiving
companionship services] or member of the family or household using the services.” Id.
Context makes clear, therefore, that a third-party employer is one who is neither the
individual receiving companionship services nor a member of that individual’s family or
household. WiCare is a “[t]hird party employer[]” so defined. Id.
WiCare contends that, even if it were liable for violations charged, the District
Court abused its discretion by awarding liquidated damages. 5 The FLSA provides that
“[a]ny employer who violates the [minimum wage and overtime] provisions . . . shall be
liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid . . . wages . . .
and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). An
4 Because WiCare asserts only that its activity does not meet the statutory definition of commerce, we do not examine whether that definition is consistent with the Commerce Clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 5 We review a district court’s award of liquidated damages under the FLSA for abuse of discretion. See Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Am. Future Sys., Inc., 873 F.3d 420, 433 (3d Cir. 2017).
5 employer may avoid liquidated damages, however, by “show[ing] that it acted in good
faith and that it had reasonable grounds for believing that it was not violating the Act.”
Am. Future Sys., 873 F.3d at 433. WiCare argues that certain “fact sheets” published by
the Department of Labor provided it reasonable grounds to believe that its employees
were not subject to the FLSA. We disagree. One fact sheet cited by WiCare provides
that “[t]hird party employers of direct care workers . . . are not permitted to claim the
exemption for companionship services.” Appendix (“App.”) 1244. Another notes that
the availability of the companionship exemption “depend[s] upon . . . the nature of the
working relationship” between employer and employee. App. 1240. And a third states
that “third party employers of direct care workers . . . are not permitted to claim . . . the
exemption for companionship services.” App. 1462. If anything, the fact sheets
affirmatively demonstrate the unreasonableness of WiCare’s belief that it could claim the
companionship exemption. The District Court therefore did not abuse its discretion in
awarding liquidated damages.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting
summary judgment in favor of the Secretary.