Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

United States Court of Federal Claims·Decided June 8, 2021·No. 19-830·Unpublished

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 19-830V UNPUBLISHED

DANIEL JOSEPH MARTIN, Chief Special Master Corcoran

Petitioner, Filed: May 5, 2021 v. Special Processing Unit (SPU); SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND Decision Awarding Damages; Pain HUMAN SERVICES, and Suffering; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine; Shoulder Injury Related to Respondent. Vaccine Administration (SIRVA)

Kevin Kelly Fitzharris, Barrett McNagny LLP, Fort Wayne, IN, for Petitioner.

Zoe Wade, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.

DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES 1

On June 5, 2019, Daniel Joseph Martin filed a petition for compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq. 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner alleged that he suffered a shoulder injury related to vaccine administration (“SIRVA”) as a result of an influenza (“flu”) vaccine administered on October 2, 2017. Petition at 1. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters (the “SPU”) – and although the parties agreed Petitioner should receive compensation for his injury, they could not resolve the damages to be awarded, so the matter was submitted for an SPU Motions Day hearing.

1 Because this unpublished decision contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E- Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the decision will be available to anyone with access to the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such material from public access. 2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all section references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 300aa (2012). For the reasons described below, and pursuant to my oral ruling on April 30, 2021 (which is fully adopted herein), I find that Petitioner is entitled to an award of damages in the amount of $102,764.79, representing $100,000.00 for actual pain and suffering, and $2,764.79 for past unreimbursable expenses.

I. Relevant Procedural History

As noted above, this case was initiated on June 5, 2019. On October 20, 2020, Respondent filed a Rule 4(c) Report (ECF No. 23) conceding entitlement, and l issued a ruling finding Petitioner entitled to compensation on October 26, 2020. ECF No. 24.

On November 30, 2020, Petitioner filed a status report stating that the parties were unable to reach a settlement and requested that I determine damages. ECF No. 27. On January 4, 2021, the parties confirmed that they had reached an impasse concerning the appropriate compensation for Petitioner’s pain and suffering, although they agreed $2,764.79 was appropriate compensation for Petitioner’s unreimbursable expenses. ECF No. 29. I subsequently set a briefing schedule to resolve this issue. ECF No. 32.

The parties filed their respective briefs simultaneously on February 12, 2021. Respondent’s Brief on Damages (“Res. Br.”), ECF No. 33; Petitioner’s Brief in Support of Damages (“Pet. Br.”), ECF No. 34. On March 15, 2021, I proposed that the parties be given the opportunity to argue their positions at an SPU Motions Day hearing, at which time I would decide the disputed pain and suffering issue. ECF No. 35. The parties confirmed that they were amenable to this proposal (ECF No. 36), and the hearing was held on April 30, 2021. This written decision memorializes my resolution of the matter. 3

II. Legal Standard

Compensation awarded pursuant to the Vaccine Act shall include “[f]or actual and projected pain and suffering and emotional distress from the vaccine-related injury, an award not to exceed $250,000.” Section 15(a)(4). Additionally, a petitioner may recover “actual unreimbursable expenses incurred before the date of judgment award such expenses which (i) resulted from the vaccine-related injury for which petitioner seeks compensation, (ii) were incurred by or on behalf of the person who suffered such injury, and (iii) were for diagnosis, medical or other remedial care, rehabilitation . . . determined to be reasonably necessary.” Section 15(a)(1)(B). The petitioner bears the burden of proof with respect to each element of compensation requested. Brewer v. Sec’y of Health &

3 At the end of the hearing, I issued an oral ruling from the bench on damages in this case. That ruling is set forth fully in the transcript from the hearing, which is yet to be filed with the case’s docket. The transcript from the hearing is, however, fully incorporated into this Decision.

2 Hum. Servs., No. 93-0092V, 1996 WL 147722, at *22-23 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 18, 1996).

There is no mathematic formula for assigning a monetary value to a person’s pain and suffering and emotional distress. I.D. v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 04-1593V, 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 14, 2013) (“[a]wards for emotional distress are inherently subjective and cannot be determined by using a mathematical formula”); Stansfield v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 93-0172V, 1996 WL 300594, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 22, 1996) (“the assessment of pain and suffering is inherently a subjective evaluation”). Factors to be considered when determining an award for pain and suffering include: 1) awareness of the injury; 2) severity of the injury; and 3) duration of the suffering. I.D., 2013 WL 2448125, at *9 (quoting McAllister v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No 91-1037V, 1993 WL 777030, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Mar. 26, 1993), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 70 F.3d 1240 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).

I may also consider prior pain and suffering awards to aid my resolution of the appropriate amount of compensation for pain and suffering in this case. See, e.g., Doe 34 v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 87 Fed. Cl. 758, 768 (2009) (finding that “there is nothing improper in the chief special master’s decision to refer to damages for pain and suffering awarded in other cases as an aid in determining the proper amount of damages in this case.”). And I may of course rely on my own experience (along with my predecessor Chief Special Masters) adjudicating similar claims. 4 Hodges v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (noting that Congress contemplated the special masters would use their accumulated expertise in the field of vaccine injuries to judge the merits of individual claims).

Although pain and suffering in the past was often determined based on a continuum, as Respondent argues, that practice was cast into doubt by the Court several years ago. Graves v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 109 Fed. Cl. 579, 489-90 (2013). In Graves, Judge Merrow rejected a special master’s approach of awarding compensation for pain and suffering based on a spectrum from $0.00 to the statutory $250,000.00 cap.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2021).

Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Martin v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related