Martin v. Schnurr

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
• Decided: May 1, 2026
• Docket: 26-3005
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Appellate Case: 26-3005 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 05/01/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 1, 2026 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court PATRICK E. MARTIN,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. No. 26-3005 (D.C. No. 5:25-CV-03049-JWL) DAN SCHNURR; MISTY KROEKER; (D. Kan.) JEREMY BELL; ELIZABETH ALLEN,

Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________

ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________

Before MATHESON, MURPHY, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges. _________________________________

Patrick Martin, a Kansas Department of Corrections (“KDOC”) inmate, filed this

42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that prison officials failed to protect him from another

inmate’s attack. The district court dismissed the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for

failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Mr. Martin now appeals.

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 26-3005 Document: 10-1 Date Filed: 05/01/2026 Page: 2

Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse and remand for further

proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Screening Original Complaint

Mr. Martin sued six Hutchinson Correctional Facility (“HCF”) officials. The

complaint alleged three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including one claiming that the

defendants violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to prevent inmate Dawson Slater’s

attack on Mr. Martin.

The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A(a). It concluded that Mr. Martin’s Eighth Amendment claim was deficient

because the complaint “provide[d] no indication that any defendant knew that

[Mr.] Slater posed a significant risk to [Mr. Martin] but disregarded that knowledge.”

ROA, Vol. 1 at 40. The court directed Mr. Martin “to show good cause why [his]

Complaint should not be dismissed for th[is] reason[],” and afforded him “the

opportunity to file a complete and proper amended complaint . . . that cure[d] . . . the

[identified] deficiencies.” Id. at 45.

B. Amended Complaint

Mr. Martin responded by filing an amended complaint naming four HCF officials

as defendants and asserting a single claim for “deliberate indifference in violation of the

Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id. at 52 (capitalization omitted).

Mr. Martin’s amended complaint alleged:

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On March 26, 2023, Mr. Martin was confined at HCF in Hutchinson, Kansas.

Mr. Slater stabbed him approximately 16 times in his upper body, left shoulder, and right

leg.

Mr. Slater “had stabbed 2 other inmates on 2 seperate [sic] occasions” before

stabbing Mr. Martin. Id. Although the defendant officials knew or should have known

that “[Mr.] Slater posed a significant threat to the inmate population,” they continued to

release “him back into [the] HCF . . . general population from segregaion [sic] housing.”

Id. at 49-50; see also id. at 52.

The district court screened the amended complaint and concluded “that the proper

processing of [Mr. Martin’s] claims [could not] be achieved without additional

information from appropriate [KDOC] officials.” Id. at 75. The court therefore ordered

KDOC officials “to prepare and file a Martinez Report.” Id. (citing Martinez v. Aaron,

570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978)).

C. Martinez Report

A Martinez Report is an investigative report meant “to enable the trial court to

decide . . . jurisdictional issues and make a determination [of frivolity]” by helping the

court determine “which facts alleged in the complaint were relevant, accurate, and subject

to bona fide dispute.” Sampley v. Ruettgers, 704 F.2d 491, 493 n.3 (10th Cir. 1983) (first

quoting Martinez, 570 F.2d at 319; then quoting Martinez v. Chavez, 574 F.2d 1043, 1046

(10th Cir. 1978)).

Defendants prepared and filed a Martinez Report. It outlined in detail the

grievances filed by Mr. Martin regarding the attack by Mr. Slater and concluded:

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“It does not appear that [he] has exhausted any available administrative remedy.”

ROA Vol. I at 84.

The Report also described Mr. Slater’s actions before the attack on Mr. Martin,

noting that Mr. Slater (a) “was part of a fight on December 4, 2022, involving multiple

inmates”; (b) “had a weapon” during that fight; (c) “was sentenced to serve disciplinary

segregation” for that fight “from December 4, to December 19, 2022”; (d) “was found

[on March 6, 2023,] with a weapon hidden in a leg of his desk in his cell”; and (e) “was

sentenced to five days of disciplinary segregation and 30 days restriction.” Id. at 85.

The Report said nothing about the two prior stabbings alleged in the amended complaint.

The Report concluded that “[t]he March 26, 2023, attack by [Mr.] Slater” on

Mr. Martin “was different than the prior disciplinary offenses” committed “by

[Mr.] Slater.” Id. at 86. It also noted that Mr. Martin “disclosed that he was wrongly

believed to have been involved in providing information to convict another inmate” and

that this false information was the reason Mr. Slater carried out the attack. Id.

Finally, the Report said that although one of the named defendants served on

HCF’s “Segregation Review Board,” id. at 84-85, “[n]othing about [Mr. Slater’s]

disciplinary violations on December 4, 2022, nor on March 6, 2023, raised any concern

that would have caused the board to consider whether to look more closely at whether to

hold [him] in a longer period of administrative segregation,” id. at 85-86.

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D. Screening Amended Complaint and Show Cause Order

The district court again screened the amended complaint “in light of the

[Martinez] Report” and issued an order to show cause, id. at 249-50, which provided as

follows:

First, “[b]ased on the Report,” Mr. Martin “failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies before filing this action.” Id. at 259. But Mr. Martin would “be given an

opportunity to show cause why this action should not be dismissed on that basis by

demonstrating with specificity that he was somehow thwarted from exhausting his

remedies.” Id. at 259-60 (quotations omitted).

Second, the amended complaint made “conclusory allegations that all of the

defendants were involved in the classification of [Mr.] Slater resulting in his release from

segregation,” and the report indicated at least three of the four defendants “were not

personally involved in decisions about the classification of [Mr.] Slater.” Id. at 261. But

Mr. Martin would “be given an opportunity to show cause why these defendants should

not be dismissed from this case.” Id.

Third, the Martinez Report established that Mr. Slater “had a history of violence

against other inmates[,] but not that he had stabbed two other inmates within two months

of the attack on [Mr. Martin].” Id. at 262. “Neither [Mr. Martin] nor the Report

show[ed] that officials had any knowledge that [Mr.] Slater and [Mr. Martin] had

previous problems or that [Mr. Martin] was at any heightened risk.” Id. And “[w]hile

[Mr. Martin], and every other inmate, may have been at some risk from [Mr.] Slater, there

[wa]s no evidence that officials should have concluded that [Mr.] Slater presented a

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strong likelihood of injury to [Mr. Martin].” Id. Thus, Mr. Martin failed to “show[] that

any defendant acted with deliberate indifference, making his [amended] Complaint

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment

rights.” Id.

The district court granted Mr. Martin one month to “respond to the

Martinez Report and to show good cause why this action should not be dismissed for

failure to state a claim and for failure to exhaust.” Id. at 264. It advised him that

“[f]ailure to respond by the Court’s deadline may result in dismissal of this action without

further notice.” Id.

E. Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim

Mr. Martin failed to file a response by the deadline. The district court therefore

dismissed the action “under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim . . . and for

failure to exhaust administrative remedies” and entered final judgment. Id. at 265.

Shortly after the entry of final judgment, Mr. Martin filed a response to the

show cause order and a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. Because

Mr. Martin’s response was dated before the deadline in the show cause order, the court

“consider[ed] the response as timely filed” and reopened the case. Id. at 285.

After considering Mr. Martin’s response, the district court again dismissed the

amended complaint for failure to state a claim. 1 It determined that Mr. Martin’s response

1 Although the district court’s final memorandum and order dismissing the amended complaint does not cite to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), it is consistent with the statute based on language in its prior dismissal order.

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raised disputed issues of fact regarding his efforts to exhaust his administrative remedies,

so the amended complaint was not subject to dismissal at the screening stage for failure

to exhaust. But the court reaffirmed that Mr. Martin failed to show the defendants

“should have concluded that [Mr.] Slater presented a strong likelihood of injury [to

Mr. Martin], not a mere possibility,” and that Mr. Martin “failed to state a constitutional

claim for failure to protect.” Id. at 298-99 (quotations omitted).

Mr. Martin now appeals from the district court’s dismissal order.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a complaint under § 1915A(b)(1)

for failure to state a claim. See Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009). 2

In doing so, “[w]e must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true

and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (quotations

omitted). Because Mr. Martin is a pro se litigant, “we construe his pleadings liberally,

but we do not act as his advocate.” Ford v. Pryor, 552 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2008).

2 We have explained that dismissals under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(b)(ii) for failure to state a claim are analyzed under the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard. See Jennings v. Yates, 792 F. App’x. 606, 609 (10th Cir 2017) (unpublished) (“We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) or 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim, applying the same standards we employ to review dismissals under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).”).

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B. Eighth Amendment Deliberate Indifference

“Prison officials have a duty to provide humane conditions of confinement,

including taking reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of . . . inmates.” Hooks v.

Atoki, 983 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2020) (brackets and quotations omitted). This duty

obligates prison officials “to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other

prisoners.” Id. (quotations omitted). “Yet, ‘prison officials who act reasonably cannot be

found liable.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994)).

Thus, for example, “[p]rison officials charged with deliberate indifference might

show . . . that they did not know of the underlying facts indicating a sufficiently

substantial danger and that they were therefore unaware of a danger.” Brennan, 511 U.S.

at 844. Or, if “prison officials . . . actually knew of a substantial risk to inmate health or

safety,” they “may be found free from liability if they responded reasonably to the risk,

even if the harm ultimately was not averted.” Id.

C. Role of Martinez Reports in § 1915A Screening

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a district “court shall review . . . a complaint in a

civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or

employee of a governmental entity.” The court must “dismiss the complaint” if it “is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).

Courts may use a Martinez Report to clarify the complaint’s factual allegations

and assess their frivolity. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109 (10th Cir. 1990).

As we noted in Hall, “[s]ection 1915(d) gives the district court the unusual power to

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pierce the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose

factual contentions are clearly baseless.” 935 F.2d at 1109 (quotations omitted); 3 see also

El’Amin v. Pearce, 750 F.2d 829, 832 (10th Cir. 1984) (“We approved the

Martinez procedure under section 1915 as a means of determining jurisdiction, sorting

and clarifying issues, and otherwise elucidating the often obscure complaints filed by

pro se plaintiffs.”).

A Martinez Report may not be used, however, “to resolve . . . a [bona fide factual]

dispute,” El’Amin, 750 F.2d at 832, or to determine whether a complaint states a plausible

claim for relief, see Winkel v. Hammond, 704 F. App’x. 735, 737 (10th Cir. 2017)

(unpublished) (“Generally, the sufficiency of a complaint must rest on its contents alone.

While there are limited exceptions, Martinez Reports don’t fall within those exceptions

. . . .” (citations and quotations omitted)). 4

Instead, unless the court uses a Martinez Report to determine whether a complaint

is frivolous, it may consider the Report only to determine whether to enter summary

judgment. See Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285, 287 n.2 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[O]nce it is

determined . . . that a particular claim is not subject to dismissal [for frivolousness] under

3 In 1996, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pub. L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-73 to 1321-75 (1996). Subsection 1915(d) became § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Id. Section 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1) contain substantially identical language. Both provisions allow district courts to dismiss a complaint if it is “frivolous,” “malicious,” or “fails to state a claim.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-ii), 1915A(b)(1). 4 Unpublished cases are not binding precedent, but we may consider them for their persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

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§ 1915[(e)(2)(B)(i)], a requested disposition of that claim premised upon materials

outside the pleadings should be treated as a motion for summary judgment, with due

regard for the requirements of notice and opportunity to respond.”); see also Gee v.

Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186. (10th Cir. 2010).

In short, a court may consider a Martinez Report to dismiss a complaint as

frivolous under § 1915A(b)(1) but not to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

D. Procedural Error

The district court erred when it relied on the Martinez Report to dismiss

Mr. Martin’s complaint for failure to state a claim under § 1915A(b)(1).

The Martinez Report conflicted with Mr. Martin’s amended complaint. The

amended complaint alleged that all four defendants “[1] recommended and approved the

release of [Mr.] Slater from segregation back into HCF general population twice [2] after

stabbing 2 other inmates on 2 seperate [sic] occasions.” ROA, Vol. I at 53.

By contrast, the Martinez Report disputes that Mr. Slater stabbed two inmates

before attacking Mr. Martin. It further states that only Defendant Jeremy Bell served on

HCF’s Segregation Review Board and that “the Segregation Review Board did not see

[Mr.] Slater during th[e] time” period in question “nor would the board normally see an

inmate who was serving a short period of disciplinary segregation as was the case with

[Mr.] Slater.” Id. at 85.

The district court should not have relied on the Martinez Report to determine that

the amended complaint failed to state a claim. As we said in Janke v. Price, 43 F.3d

1390 (10th Cir. 1994), “[i]t is improper” for a district court “to accept the prison officials’

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report of events” in a Martinez Report “when they are in conflict with the pleadings.” Id.

at 1392; see also Winkel, 704 F. App’x. at 737. And the court did not consider the

Martinez Report to enter summary judgment. 5

The district court therefore erred, and “the matter must be remanded for further

proceedings.” Janke, 43 F.3d at 1392. As in Janke, “we make no comment on the

ultimate merit of Mr. [Martin’s] claims.” Id. “Our ruling today is limited to a

determination that it was error to dismiss Mr. [Martin’s] complaint” under § 1915A(b)(1)

based on factual statements in the Martinez Report. Id. “On remand, the court may take

whatever steps are appropriate to consider Mr. [Martin’s] claims.” Id.

III. CONCLUSION

We reverse the district court’s judgment, grant Mr. Martin’s motion to proceed

in forma pauperis on appeal, and remand for further proceedings.

Entered for the Court

Scott M. Matheson, Jr. Circuit Judge

5 The district court’s order to show cause following its receipt of the Martinez Report may have contemplated that Mr. Martin should respond with evidence beyond the amended complaint, but it can hardly be read as converting the §1915A screening into a summary judgment proceeding.