Martin v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing

870 A.2d 982, 2005 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 146

• Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 18, 2005
• Status: Published

Opinions

OPINION BY

Judge LEAVITT.

The Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department), appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial court) that sustained the statutory appeal of Myra J. Martin (Martin) from a one-year suspension of her operating privilege pursuant to Section 1547(b) of the Vehicle Code (Implied Consent Law).¹ We reverse.

On November 27, 2003, Hampden Township Police Officer James Sollenberger was on uniformed patrol in a marked police cruiser. At approximately 1:45 a.m. he observed Martin’s vehicle proceeding along Trindle Road in Hampden Township. Believing that Martin was exceeding the posted 40 mile per hour speed limit, Officer Sollenberger followed her at a steady distance for approximately 100 yards and, using his speedometer, clocked Martin’s speed at 53 miles per hour. Martin reduced her speed and made a wide right turn onto April Drive, a two-lane unmarked street in the Borough of Camp Hill. Notes of Testimony, 5/26/04, at 9 (N.T. -); Reproduced Record at 25a (R.R. -). The only vehicles on April Drive were Officer Sollenberger’s and Martin’s.

As Officer Sollenberger activated his lights to initiate a traffic stop, Martin stopped in front of her residence on April Drive and exited her vehicle. Officer Sol-lenberger asked Martin to return to her vehicle and to produce her driver’s license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. Martin had difficulty locating the requested documents. N.T. 9; R.R. 25a. Officer Sollenberger detected an odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle and noticed that Martin had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Id. Officer Sollenberger asked Martin to get out of her vehicle, at which point he noticed an odor of alcohol about Martin’s person. Martin admitted that she had consumed two glasses of wine that evening at 10:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. N.T. 11; R.R. 27a. Martin refused to perform field sobriety tests and began walking toward her house. As Martin became more belligerent, Officer Sollenber-ger physically restrained her and placed her under arrest for driving under the influence. Officer Sollenberger transported Martin to the West Shore Booking Center at the Lower Allen Township Police Station where she received standard implied consent warnings. Martin was unable to provide two valid breath samples, and her actions were deemed a refusal to submit to a chemical test for blood alcohol content. N.T. 15; R.R. 31a.

By notice dated December 16, 2003, the Department informed Martin that her operating privilege was being suspended for a period of one year in accordance with the Implied Consent Law. Martin filed a statutory appeal to the trial court challenging only Officer Sollenberger’s authority to enforce the Implied Consent Law outside of his jurisdiction. Following a de novo hearing on May 26, 2004, the trial court found that Officer Sollenberger lacked jurisdiction to stop and arrest Martin outside of his jurisdiction and, therefore, was not a “police officer” for purposes of the Implied Consent Law. The trial court sustained Martin’s appeal and reversed her suspension. The Department now appeals.²

On appeal, the Department argues that the trial court erred in its determination that Officer Sollenberger lacked extraterritorial authority to enforce the Implied Consent Law. The Department also maintains that the legality of Martin’s arrest is immaterial.

The Implied Consent Law provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) General Rule. — Any person who drives, operates or is in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle in this Commonwealth shall be deemed to have given consent to one or more chemical tests of breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of blood ... if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving, operating or in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle:

(1) in violation of section ... 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance)....

75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a)(1) (emphasis added). The Vehicle Code defines “police officer” as “[a] natural person authorized by law to make arrests for violations of law.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 102 (emphasis added). Thus, a plain reading of Section 1547(a) evidences the legislature’s intent to trigger the provisions of the Implied Consent Law only when a person with legal authority to make an arrest has reasonable cause to believe a motorist has been driving while intoxicated. Snyder v. Commonwealth, 163 Pa.Cmwlth. 178, 640 A.2d 490, 492 (1994). Where a licensee challenges the legal authority of the arresting officer, as opposed to some aspect of the manner of the arrest, the Department bears the burden of proving that the officer had such authority. Id.3

The Department argues, and we agree, that the Municipal Police Jurisdiction Act (MPJA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8951-8954, is controlling on the issue of Officer Sollenberger’s authority. The MPJA grants broad authority to municipal police officers to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth within their primary jurisdiction. 42 Pa. C.S. § 8952.⁴ The MPJA also provides for statewide municipal police jurisdiction in certain situations, one of which is relevant here:

(a) General rule. — Any duly employed municipal police officer who is within this Commonwealth, but beyond the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction, shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office as if enforcing those laws or performing those functions within the territorial limits of his primary jurisdiction in the following cases:

❖ * *

(5) Where the officer is on official business and views an offense, or has probable cause to believe that an offense has been committed, and makes a reasonable effort to identify himself as a police officer and which offense is a felony, misdemeanor, breach of the peace or other act which presents an immediate clear and present danger to persons or property.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8953(a).⁵ Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that the MPJA “should be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes, one of which ‘is to provide police officers with authority to make arrests outside of their primary jurisdictions in limited situations.’” Commonwealth v. Merchant, 528 Pa. 161, 168, 595 A.2d 1135, 1138 (1991) (quoting Commonwealth v. Ebersole, 342 Pa.Super. 151, 492 A.2d 436, 438 (1985)). See also Commonwealth v. Pratti, 530 Pa. 256, 608 A.2d 488 (1992) (arresting officer on “official business” when he stopped and detained defendant; officer was traveling toward his routine turnaround point outside of his jurisdiction when he heard an automobile accident).

Applying subsection (a)(5) to the facts of this case, we find that Officer Sollenberger was “on official business” prior to and during his encounter with Martin. He was on routine patrol in a marked police cruiser in an area within his primary jurisdiction, albeit at the boundary with neighboring Camp Hill Borough. He was also in uniform and was unquestionably identifiable as a police officer. While still in his primary jurisdiction, Officer Sollenberger viewed at least one offense by Martin, speeding, as evidenced by his uncontro-verted testimony that he clocked her speed for a distance of approximately 100 yards.⁶ He viewed a second offense on the geographical boundary when Martin made a wide right turn onto April Drive and crossed over the opposing lane. Together these acts of erratic driving presented an immediate clear and present danger to persons or property and further investigation was warranted. That the events occurred in a short period of time and happened to traverse a jurisdictional boundary should not negate Officer Sollenberger’s authority. By concluding otherwise, the trial court thwarted the liberal construction of the MPJA mandated by our Supreme Court.

Section 1547(a) of the Vehicle Code requires, in addition to the arresting officer’s authority, “reasonable grounds” for the officer to believe the licensee was driving under the influence of alcohol. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(a)(1). Here, there were several indicia of Martin’s intoxication, including an odor of alcohol emanating from her vehicle and about her person, her bloodshot eyes, slurred speech and difficulty producing her license, registration and insurance documentation. Martin also admitted to Officer Sollenberger that she had consumed alcohol only hours before her arrest. Under these circumstances, Officer Sollenberger unquestionably had reasonable grounds to believe Martin had driven her vehicle while intoxicated.

In accordance with the foregoing analysis, we reverse the order of the trial court sustaining Martin’s appeal and reversing her suspension.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 18th day of March, 2005, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County dated June 2, 2004, in the above-captioned matter is hereby REVERSED.

1 . It states that "[i]f any person placed under arrest for [driving under the influence of alcohol or controlled substance] is requested to submit to chemical testing and refuses to do so, the testing shall not be conducted but upon notice by the police officer, the department shall suspend the operating privilege of the person ... for a period of 12 months.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b)(l)(i).

2 . In reviewing a decision of the trial court in a license suspension case, the standard of review of an appellate court is to determine if the factual findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence, and whether the trial court committed an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Scott, 546 Pa. 241, 247, 684 A.2d 539, 542 (1996).

3 . In a typical license suspension case the Department must establish that the licensee: (1) was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) was asked to submit to a chemical test; (3) refused to do so; and (4) was specifically warned that a refusal would result in a license suspension. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Holsten, 150 Pa.Cmwlth. 1, 615 A.2d 113, 114-115 (1992) (quoting Commonwealth v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989)). In this case, Martin stipulated that the Department satisfied the second, third and fourth elements of its prima facie case. N.T. 5; R.R. 21a. Her challenge to Officer Sollen-berger's authority to arrest her relates to the first element.

4 . It provides as follows:

Any duly employed municipal police officer shall have the power and authority to enforce the laws of this Commonwealth or otherwise perform the functions of that office anywhere within his primary jurisdiction as to:

(1) Any offense which the officer views or otherwise has probable cause to believe was committed within his jurisdiction.

(2) Any other event that occurs within his primary jurisdiction and which reasonably requires action on the part of the police in order to preserve, protect or defend persons or property or to otherwise maintain the peace and dignity of this Commonwealth.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8952.

5 .Although the parties cite extensively to McKinley v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 576 Pa. 85, 838 A.2d 700 (2003), that case has no application here. In McKinley, our Supreme Court held that airport officers lack the authority to enforce provisions of the Implied Consent Law outside of their territorial boundaries absent an express legislative grant of extraterritorial authority. By contrast, our General Assembly, by enacting the MPJA, has expressly authorized municipal police officers like Officer Sollenberger to enforce laws outside of their primary jurisdiction. See also Stein v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 857 A.2d 719 (Pa.Cmwlth.2004) (distinguishing McKinley in case involving extraterritorial authority of municipal police officer).

6 . We acknowledge that because Officer Sol-lenberger clocked Martin’s speed for only 100 yards that she could not be charged with speeding. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3368(a) (valid speedometer clock must be measured "for a distance of not less than three-tenths of a mile.”). This is of no moment, however, since a license suspension is a civil proceeding. See Banner v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 558 Pa. 439, 444, 737 A.2d 1203, 1206 (1999) ("Thus the licensee's operating privileges could be suspended for refusing chemical testing even though the initial stop of his vehicle did not comport with constitutional mandates.”); Department of Transportation v. Wysocki, 517 Pa. 175, 179, 535 A.2d 77, 79 (1987) (”[F]or purposes of a license suspension proceeding for refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, the legality of the arrest [is] immaterial.”).