Martin v. Children's Aid Society

544 N.W.2d 651, 215 Mich. App. 88

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 12, 1996
• Docket: Docket 140360, 152486, 152489
• Status: Published

Opinions

Bandstra, J.

In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs sued various defendants, including employees of the Department of Social Services (the dss defendants) and the Children’s Aid Society and four of its employees (the cas defendants). The trial court granted defendants’ motions for summary disposition and denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint. We affirm.

On December 18, 1984, plaintiffs brought their thirteen-week-old daughter, Ashley Lynn, to an emergency pediatric clinic. Blood tests and x-rays revealed that Ashley was suffering from pneumonia, numerous broken ribs (possibly as many as eighteen) in various stages of healing, fractures of both femurs, a bruise on the lower back, and a bruise on the left leg. The doctor suspected abuse, and the dss filed an emergency petition with the Wayne County Probate Court, requesting that Ashley be temporarily detained. The order was issued. Thereafter, another petition was filed, requesting that Ashley be made a temporary ward of the court. Plaintiffs denied that they had abused Ashley and requested a jury trial with respect to the allegations contained in the petition.

Trial originally was scheduled for August 1985, but was adjourned by mutual agreement of the parties. Plaintiffs wanted extra time to determine if brittle bone disease or some other medical problem might explain Ashley’s injuries. In January 1986, a trial was held in which the jury found that the dss had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Ashley had been abused and that she should be made a temporary ward of the court. At trial, plaintiffs presented evidence that Ashley possibly suffered from a medical disorder (e.g., copper deficiency) that made her susceptible to bone fractures, and the dss presented evidence that Ashley’s injuries were the result of abuse.

The dss had contracted with the cas, a private organization, to provide services for neglected and abused children. When Ashley was removed from plaintiffs’ care, the dss transferred her to the cas, which placed her in a foster home. After the jury trial in January 1986, additional hearings were held before the probate court pursuant to MCL 712A.19; MSA 27.3178(598.19) and MCR 5.973. On February 24 and 25, 1986, a dispositional hearing was held to determine whether Ashley should be returned to plaintiffs. The dss asserted that a potential for reabuse existed until plaintiffs admitted responsibility for Ashley’s injuries. Plaintiffs continued to claim that they had never abused Ashley. After hearing the evidence presented by both sides, the probate court continued Ashley in foster care. At a review hearing held in August 1986, Ashley was again continued in foster care.

At a March 1987 review hearing, plaintiffs argued a motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs presented evidence from two physicians stating that Ashley’s injuries were caused by a copper deficiency or some other metabolic disorder. The court denied the motion, stating that it did not believe that the documents from the physicians constituted newly discovered evidence. The court continued Ashley in foster care.

At an October 1987 statutory rehearing, two additional reports were submitted into evidence. The first report, from a pediatric psychology professor, recommended that Ashley be slowly returned to plaintiffs’ care. The second report, from a pediatric therapist, stated that continued placement of Ashley in foster care could cause irreparable psychological and emotional damage to her. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated that it would not reconsider the issue of what caused Ashley’s injuries because the issue had been resolved at the jury trial in January 1986. The court ordered Ashley’s attorney to locate a neutral therapist to immediately implement an observational treatment situation between plaintiffs and Ashley. Ashley was continued in foster care.

Another hearing was held on January 13, 1988. A neutral therapist who would be agreeable to all parties had not yet been located. The foster care worker testified that Ashley had recently become more anxious and aggressive. Although the foster care worker did not recommend that Ashley be returned home, he did recommend that plaintiffs be allowed to assume greater responsibility for Ashley. The court continued Ashley in foster care.

While Ashley was in foster care, plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal in the Court of Appeals, asserting that the probate court lacked jurisdiction over the matter and that the probate court’s continued placement of Ashley in foster care constituted an abuse of discretion. The Court of Appeals dismissed the claim of appeal. The Supreme Court remanded to this Court for plenary consideration, as on leave granted. In re Martin, 429 Mich 852 (1987). On April 5, 1988, this Court affirmed the probate court’s jurisdiction, but reversed the order continuing Ashley’s placement in foster care and remanded for further proceedings. In re Martin, 167 Mich App 715, 733; 423 NW2d 327 (1988). As a result of these proceedings, Ashley was returned to plaintiffs’ care.

Thereafter, plaintiffs filed two lawsuits, claiming that they had been wrongly separated from Ashley. Plaintiffs made various allegations against defendants, including negligence, breach of statutory and contractual duties, bad faith, and violation of their constitutional rights. The trial court subsequently granted the dss defendants’ motion for summary disposition on the basis of qualified immunity. With regard to the cas defendants, the trial court denied their motion for summary disposition on the basis of absolute immunity, but granted the motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and (C)(10) (no genuine issue of material fact). The trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims and denied plaintiffs’ motion for leave to amend their complaint. Plaintiffs now appeal as of right, and the cas defendants cross appeal.

I

The dss defendants were protected from liability unless their conduct violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of plaintiffs of which the dss defendants should have known.¹ Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818; 102 S Ct 2727; 73 L Ed 2d 396 (1982). As plaintiffs argue, there is a constitutional right to family integrity. Santosky v Kramer, 455 US 745, 753; 102 S Ct 1388; 71 L Ed 2d 599 (1982). However, this is not an absolute right, and it must be balanced against the state’s interest in protecting children’s health and welfare. Frazier v Bailey, 957 F2d 920, 929-930 (CA 1, 1992). See also Santosky, supra at 766 (state has parens patriae interest in the welfare of the child). Similarly, the statute that plaintiffs rely upon as granting them a right² to reunification with Ashley only states that reunification "may” occur "as soon as it appears possible.” MCL 400.18c; MSA 16.418(3).

The trial court correctly granted summary disposition for the dss defendants. Their involvement with the case was only to review reports filed by the cas personnel contracted to handle Ashley’s placement. There is no factual evidence to support a finding that, in doing so, the dss defendants knew that plaintiffs’ constitutional or statutory right to reunification was being denied. That right had to be balanced against the interest in protecting Ashley’s health and welfare, including protecting her from abuse. In repeatedly adopting the cas recommendations against reunification, the probate court implicitly determined that this approach represented an appropriate balancing of these competing interests. Nothing in the record indicates that, by similarly accepting the cas recommendations, the dss defendants’ conduct violated any statutory or constitutional interest plaintiffs had in reunification.

ii

In their cross appeal, the cas defendants argue that the trial court improperly denied their motion for summary disposition on the basis of immunity. We agree.³

Federal appellate courts have extended absolute immunity to social workers initiating and monitoring child placement proceedings and placements in cases similar to the instant case.⁴ Babcock v Tyler, 884 F2d 497 (CA 9, 1989); Vosburg v Dep’t of Social Services, 884 F2d 133 (CA 4, 1989); Coverdell v Dep’t of Social & Health Services, 834 F2d 758 (CA 9, 1987); Meyers v Contra Costa Co Dep’t of Social Services, 812 F2d 1154 (CA 9, 1987); Kurzawa v Mueller, 732 F2d 1456 (CA 6, 1984).⁵ These precedents recognize the important role that social workers play in court proceedings to determine when to remove a child from the home and how long to maintain the child in foster care. They also recognize that, to do that difficult job effectively, social workers must be allowed to act without fear of intimidating or harassing lawsuits by dissatisfied or angry parents. Kurzawa, supra at 1458.

[Caseworkers need to exercise independent judgment in fulfilling their post-adjudication duties. The fear of financially devastating litigation would compromise caseworkers’ judgment during this phase of the proceedings and would deprive the court of information it needs to make an informed decision. . . . There is little sense in granting immunity up through adjudication . . . and then exposing caseworkers to liability for services performed in monitoring child placement and custody decisions pursuant to court orders. [Babcock, supra at 503.]

Accord Coverdell, supra at 765 ("[T]o permit the [social] worker to become 'a lightning rod for harassing litigation . . .’ would seriously imperil the effectiveness of state child protection schemes.”).

When a court is involved, granting immunity from civil suit does not mean that the parents of a child taken from their home are without recourse to contest wrongful conduct by a social worker. "The parent of the apprehended child is not left remediless — he or she may always attack the court’s order directly or on appeal.” Id. Accord Vosburg, supra at 136 ("[Safeguards against . . . misconduct were built into the . . . adjudication process itself.”).

Although we have found no Michigan precedent regarding this question, we find convincing the decisions granting absolute immunity to social workers. As the cas defendants persuasively point out in their brief, absolute immunity is necessary to assure that our important child protection system can continue to function effectively:

No more heinous act can be alleged than the physical abuse of a helpless infant by an adult. The volatile mix of accused parents, deprived of the custody of the baby, observing it in the care of foster parents, finding themselves in the unfamiliar confines of the court system, required to retain counsel at great cost, subject to the social services bureaucracy and its necessary interrogation and probing of the most intimate aspects of the family psyche, is almost guaranteed, rightly or wrongly, to produce resentment and a desire for retribution by the parent. Many parents in this situation are seriously psychologically disturbed.

Professional assistance to the Probate Court is critical to its ability to make informed, life deciding judgments relating to its continuing jurisdiction over abused children. Its advisors and agents cannot be subject to potential suits by persons, aggrieved by the Court’s decision vindictively seeking revenge against the Court’s assistant as surrogates for the jurist. Faced with such liability, the social worker would naturally tend to act cautiously and refrain from making difficult decisions, delay in intervening to protect the child, avoid confronting the aggressive parent with the necessity of changing his attitudes and seeking psychiatric help to do so. Such an atmosphere defeats the function of the continuing jurisdiction of the Probate Court in the abstract, and in reality poses the potential for death for an abused child who is not protected because the social worker exercised excessive caution in arriving at a judgment as to whether there is sufficient evidence of abuse to merit action on his or her part.

Mere qualified immunity is not enough protection to prevent the chilling effect of a potential suit on the exercise of a social worker’s professional judgment and discretion in operating as an arm of the Probate Court to protect abused children. This litigation is vivid proof of that. Judge Stephens has ruled that Cross-Appellants have qualified immunity, but that has not prevented years of litigation. The threat of a suit like this one could make any social worker back off from making discretionary decisions that he or she would otherwise believe to be in the child’s best interest.

Further, plaintiffs have not been without a remedy regarding the allegedly wrongful conduct of the cas defendants. The probate court regularly reviewed the placement recommendations of the cas defendants at statutorily required hearings. This provided judicial oversight sufficient to protect plaintiffs from allegedly wrongful conduct against their interests by the cas defendants. Plaintiffs had the statutory right to request accelerated hearings to contest their case service plan. MCL 712A.19(3); MSA 27.3178(598.19)(3). The probate court had broad power to address concerns with the case service plan if, after a hearing, they were found to be legitimate. MCR 5.973(B). To allow plaintiffs additional protection in the form of a cause of action against the cas defendants for money damages would be too costly; it would "disserve the broader public interest in having participants [in contested child protection cases] . . . perform their respective functions without fear of having to defend their actions in a civil lawsuit.” Babcock, supra at 502.

Although the trial court incorrectly denied summary disposition for the cas defendants on the basis of immunity, the trial court did reach the right result by granting them summary disposition on other grounds. In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 591; 528 NW2d 799 (1995); Henry v Hospital & Health Services Credit Union, 164 Mich App 90, 94; 416 NW2d 338 (1987). The trial court’s order granting summary disposition for the dss defendants and for the cas defendants are affirmed.

We affirm.

W. P. Cynar, J., concurred.

1 The dss defendants may also be protected by judicial immunity as discussed in part n of this opinion. However, plaintiffs’ claim against the dss defendants rests, in part, upon 42 USC 1983, and it is not clear whether judicial immunity is afforded to social workers under that statute. Hoffman v Harris, 511 US —; 114 S Ct 1631; 128 L Ed 2d 354 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

2 We assume without deciding that the statute plaintiffs rely upon grants them a right.

3 Because we decide that summary disposition should have been granted on immunity grounds, we do not reach the issues plaintiffs raise on appeal regarding the propriety of the trial court’s later dismissal of their complaint against the cas defendants on other grounds.

4 As noted earlier, immunity may be unavailable for social workers in an action brought under 42 USC 1983. However, plaintiffs do not allege a cause of action against the CAS defendants under that section. The concerns expressed by Justice Thomas in Hoffman regarding whether social workers existed or were provided immunity when § 1983 was enacted in 1871 are thus not applicable. See Hoffman, supra n 1, 128 L Ed 2d 355-356 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

5 We find all these cases persuasive with respect to the cas defendants, even though, as the dissent points out, most involved governmental employees. The distinction between governmental and nongovernmental employees is important only under statutes like MCL 691.1407(5); MSA 3.996(107X5), but no such statute was at issue in these precedents, and the immunity we afford to the cas defendants does not arise from this kind of statute. Further, while Kurzawa has been described as granting "blanket absolute immunity” to social workers, as the dissent notes, our decision is not properly so described. It is limited to the facts of this case, in which the close oversight of the social worker’s placement recommendations by the probate court is especially noteworthy. Finally, the dissent correctly notes that these cases all involved § 1983 claims, but the immunity afforded seems equally available with regard to other claims. See, e.g., Kurzawa, supra, 732 F2d 1458 (in dicta, the court noted that "notwithstanding their already successful statute of limitations defense, the other defendants [a psychologist, two psychiatrists, and a lawyer functioning as guardian ad litem sued under negligence, malpractice, and other state law theories] would have also been entitled to immunity”).