1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MARTIN ANAYA FLORES, No. 1:26-cv-00069-DAD-JDP 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 13 v. DENYING PETITION’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 14 TODD M. LYONS, et al., INJUNCTION 15 Respondents. (Doc. Nos. 9, 13) 16 17 18 This matter is before the court on petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction and 19 renewed motion for temporary restraining filed on February 5, 2026, and petitioner’s 20 supplemental motion for preliminary injunction and renewed motion for temporary restraining 21 order filed on March 25, 2026. (Doc. Nos. 9, 13.) On January 5, 2026, petitioner filed a petition 22 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention by United States 23 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. No. 1.) 24 On January 1, 2026, the court granted petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order 25 and ordered that respondents provide petitioner a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 26 (Doc. No. 8.) Therein, the court found that petitioner’s statutory right to a bond hearing provides 27 him with adequate process to protect against an erroneous deprivation of his liberty interests 28 pursuant to Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) (“§ 1226(a)’s procedures 1 satisfy due process, both facially and as applied to Rodriguez Diaz.”). Petitioner’s bond hearing 2 took place on January 20, 2026, before an immigration judge (“IJ”). (Doc. No. 12 at 2.) On 3 February 5, 2026, petitioner filed a motion for preliminary injunction and renewed temporary 4 restraining order. (Doc. No. 9.) Therein, petitioner argues that the bond hearing provided to him 5 was constitutionally inadequate. (Id. at 3.) On February 12, 2026, respondents filed an 6 opposition to petitioner’s pending motion in which they argue the court should deny petitioner’s 7 motion because the proper procedure to follow in challenging an IJ’s bond determination is via 8 appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Doc. No. 11 at 2.) On February 17, 2026, 9 petitioner filed a reply in support of his pending motion in which he argues that his continued 10 detention has now become prolonged because it has crossed the six month threshold, entitling him 11 to a hearing at which respondents bear the burden of showing he is a danger or flight risk. (Doc. 12 No. 12 at 5–7.) On March 25, 2026, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for preliminary 13 injunction and renewed motion for temporary restraining order, in which he argues that his 14 prolonged detention and respondents’ indifference to his medical needs requires his immediate 15 release. (Doc. No. 13 at 5–8.) 16 With regard to petitioner’s first argument, that his hearing was constitutionally inadequate, 17 the court reviews an IJ’s decision for “abuse of discretion” and the court may only determine 18 whether the IJ applied the correct legal standard at the bond hearing. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 19 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that “the district court’s review of the BIA’s ‘dangerousness’ 20 determination is for abuse of discretion” and that “we cannot reweigh evidence . . . [but] can 21 [only] determine whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard.”). Petitioner argues that the 22 January 20, 2026 hearing was inadequate because the IJ’s decision to deny him bond was 23 “untethered to the evidentiary record and contrary to governing standards for custody re- 24 determinations.” (Doc. No. 9 at 3–6.) Petitioner has not provided the court with a transcript of 25 the bond hearing that would allow the court to determine whether the record reflects that the IJ 26 applied the correct legal standard at that hearing. In any event, if petitioner is suggesting that the 27 IJ erred by placing the burden on petitioner at the bond hearing conducted pursuant to this court’s 28 order, his argument is misplaced and a review of the hearing transcript would be unnecessary. 1 That is because at a bond hearing conducted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) it is the petitioner’s 2 burden to prove that he poses neither a danger to the community or a flight risk if released. See 3 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (“Nothing in § 1226(a)’s text—which says only 4 that the Attorney General ‘may release’ the alien ‘on . . . bond’—even remotely supports the 5 imposition of” “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must 6 prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary”); see 7 also Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1203, 1212 (noting that, based on the record before the court, 8 placing the burden of proof on the government did not appear to be “constitutionally necessary in 9 all, most, or many cases” in order to minimize the risk of error). 10 Petitioner next argues that his prolonged detention entitles him to a due process bond 11 hearing where the burden of proof is placed on the government to show that he is a danger or a 12 flight risk. (Doc. No. 12 at 5–7.) The court notes that petitioner has not alleged a due process 13 violation in his petition but instead limited his claim for relief to a violation of the Immigration 14 and Nationality Act (“INA”). (Doc. No. 1 at 6–7.) Regardless, the Ninth Circuit has stated that 15 on its face the Due Process Clause does not entitle petitioner “to a second bond hearing at which 16 the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 17 F.4th at 1203. 18 Rodriguez Diaz left open as-applied due process challenges to detention pursuant to § 19 1226(a). Id. at 1213. The petitioner in Rodriguez Diaz was detained for approximately fourteen 20 months and received a bond hearing approximately two months into his detention, yet the court 21 found that his as-applied challenge failed in part because, “we cannot simply count his months of 22 detention and leave it at that. We must also consider the process he received during this time, the 23 further process that was available to him, and the fact that his detention was prolonged due to his 24 decision to challenge his removal order.” Id. at 1208. Here, petitioner has been detained for 25 approximately nine months and has received a bond hearing. (See Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 5 ) (stating 26 petitioner was detained on July 4, 2025). Pursuant to the § 1226(a) procedures, petitioner had the 27 opportunity to appeal his bond determination to the BIA or request a custody re-determination 28 hearing pursuant 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). Given that petitioner did not assert an as-applied Due 1 Process Clause challenge in his pending petition, the court is unable to find that petitioner is 2 likely to succeed on the merits of such a claim. 3 Finally, petitioner’s argument regarding respondents’ indifference to his medical needs 4 appears to challenge the conditions of his confinement. Petitioner also did not allege this claim in 5 his pending habeas petition and, even if he had, whether such a claim is cognizable under habeas 6 review is at the very least questionable. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 7 2016) (“We have long held that prisoners may not challenge mere conditions of confinement in 8 habeas corpus . . .”); cf. Roman v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 MARTIN ANAYA FLORES, No. 1:26-cv-00069-DAD-JDP 12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND 13 v. DENYING PETITION’S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 14 TODD M. LYONS, et al., INJUNCTION 15 Respondents. (Doc. Nos. 9, 13) 16 17 18 This matter is before the court on petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction and 19 renewed motion for temporary restraining filed on February 5, 2026, and petitioner’s 20 supplemental motion for preliminary injunction and renewed motion for temporary restraining 21 order filed on March 25, 2026. (Doc. Nos. 9, 13.) On January 5, 2026, petitioner filed a petition 22 for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention by United States 23 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). (Doc. No. 1.) 24 On January 1, 2026, the court granted petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order 25 and ordered that respondents provide petitioner a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). 26 (Doc. No. 8.) Therein, the court found that petitioner’s statutory right to a bond hearing provides 27 him with adequate process to protect against an erroneous deprivation of his liberty interests 28 pursuant to Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189 (9th Cir. 2022) (“§ 1226(a)’s procedures 1 satisfy due process, both facially and as applied to Rodriguez Diaz.”). Petitioner’s bond hearing 2 took place on January 20, 2026, before an immigration judge (“IJ”). (Doc. No. 12 at 2.) On 3 February 5, 2026, petitioner filed a motion for preliminary injunction and renewed temporary 4 restraining order. (Doc. No. 9.) Therein, petitioner argues that the bond hearing provided to him 5 was constitutionally inadequate. (Id. at 3.) On February 12, 2026, respondents filed an 6 opposition to petitioner’s pending motion in which they argue the court should deny petitioner’s 7 motion because the proper procedure to follow in challenging an IJ’s bond determination is via 8 appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (Doc. No. 11 at 2.) On February 17, 2026, 9 petitioner filed a reply in support of his pending motion in which he argues that his continued 10 detention has now become prolonged because it has crossed the six month threshold, entitling him 11 to a hearing at which respondents bear the burden of showing he is a danger or flight risk. (Doc. 12 No. 12 at 5–7.) On March 25, 2026, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for preliminary 13 injunction and renewed motion for temporary restraining order, in which he argues that his 14 prolonged detention and respondents’ indifference to his medical needs requires his immediate 15 release. (Doc. No. 13 at 5–8.) 16 With regard to petitioner’s first argument, that his hearing was constitutionally inadequate, 17 the court reviews an IJ’s decision for “abuse of discretion” and the court may only determine 18 whether the IJ applied the correct legal standard at the bond hearing. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 19 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024) (noting that “the district court’s review of the BIA’s ‘dangerousness’ 20 determination is for abuse of discretion” and that “we cannot reweigh evidence . . . [but] can 21 [only] determine whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard.”). Petitioner argues that the 22 January 20, 2026 hearing was inadequate because the IJ’s decision to deny him bond was 23 “untethered to the evidentiary record and contrary to governing standards for custody re- 24 determinations.” (Doc. No. 9 at 3–6.) Petitioner has not provided the court with a transcript of 25 the bond hearing that would allow the court to determine whether the record reflects that the IJ 26 applied the correct legal standard at that hearing. In any event, if petitioner is suggesting that the 27 IJ erred by placing the burden on petitioner at the bond hearing conducted pursuant to this court’s 28 order, his argument is misplaced and a review of the hearing transcript would be unnecessary. 1 That is because at a bond hearing conducted pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) it is the petitioner’s 2 burden to prove that he poses neither a danger to the community or a flight risk if released. See 3 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018) (“Nothing in § 1226(a)’s text—which says only 4 that the Attorney General ‘may release’ the alien ‘on . . . bond’—even remotely supports the 5 imposition of” “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General must 6 prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary”); see 7 also Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1203, 1212 (noting that, based on the record before the court, 8 placing the burden of proof on the government did not appear to be “constitutionally necessary in 9 all, most, or many cases” in order to minimize the risk of error). 10 Petitioner next argues that his prolonged detention entitles him to a due process bond 11 hearing where the burden of proof is placed on the government to show that he is a danger or a 12 flight risk. (Doc. No. 12 at 5–7.) The court notes that petitioner has not alleged a due process 13 violation in his petition but instead limited his claim for relief to a violation of the Immigration 14 and Nationality Act (“INA”). (Doc. No. 1 at 6–7.) Regardless, the Ninth Circuit has stated that 15 on its face the Due Process Clause does not entitle petitioner “to a second bond hearing at which 16 the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 17 F.4th at 1203. 18 Rodriguez Diaz left open as-applied due process challenges to detention pursuant to § 19 1226(a). Id. at 1213. The petitioner in Rodriguez Diaz was detained for approximately fourteen 20 months and received a bond hearing approximately two months into his detention, yet the court 21 found that his as-applied challenge failed in part because, “we cannot simply count his months of 22 detention and leave it at that. We must also consider the process he received during this time, the 23 further process that was available to him, and the fact that his detention was prolonged due to his 24 decision to challenge his removal order.” Id. at 1208. Here, petitioner has been detained for 25 approximately nine months and has received a bond hearing. (See Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 5 ) (stating 26 petitioner was detained on July 4, 2025). Pursuant to the § 1226(a) procedures, petitioner had the 27 opportunity to appeal his bond determination to the BIA or request a custody re-determination 28 hearing pursuant 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e). Given that petitioner did not assert an as-applied Due 1 Process Clause challenge in his pending petition, the court is unable to find that petitioner is 2 likely to succeed on the merits of such a claim. 3 Finally, petitioner’s argument regarding respondents’ indifference to his medical needs 4 appears to challenge the conditions of his confinement. Petitioner also did not allege this claim in 5 his pending habeas petition and, even if he had, whether such a claim is cognizable under habeas 6 review is at the very least questionable. See Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 933 (9th Cir. 7 2016) (“We have long held that prisoners may not challenge mere conditions of confinement in 8 habeas corpus . . .”); cf. Roman v. Wolf, 977 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2020) (explaining it need not 9 reach the issue of whether conditions of confinement may be remedied on habeas review because 10 plaintiffs brought, “a class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to 11 remedy allegedly unconstitutional conditions at Adelanto[]”); Zepeda Rivas v. Jennings, 845 F. 12 App’x 530, 534 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that, “[t]he Fifth Amendment requires the government to 13 provide conditions of reasonable health and safety to people in its custody,” and explaining the 14 showing required in order to support such a claim).1 Again, because petitioner has not asserted 15 such a claim in his habeas petition, the court is unable to find that he is likely to succeed on the 16 merits of a claim that respondents have acted with indifference to his serious medical needs. 17 For the reasons explained above, 18 1. Petitioner’s renewed motion for a temporary restraining order, or alternatively, 19 motion for preliminary injunction (Doc. No. [9]) is DENIED; 20 2. Petitioner’s supplemental motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary 21 injunction (Doc. No. 13) is DENIED; and 22 ///// 23 ///// 24 ///// 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 1 Citation to this unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion is appropriate pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 28 36–3(b). 1 3. Petitioner’s habeas petition (Doc. No. 1) and motion to amend the petition (Doc. 2 No. 14) are REFERRED to Magistrate Judge Jeremy D. Peterson for further 3 proceedings. > | Dated: _ April 28, 2026 Da A. 2, sxe 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28