Marson v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.

87 F.R.D. 151, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12344, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 626
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJuly 17, 1980
DocketCiv. A. No. 76-C-493
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 87 F.R.D. 151 (Marson v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marson v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 87 F.R.D. 151, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12344, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 626 (E.D. Wis. 1980).

Opinion

DECISION and ORDER

TERENCE T. EVANS, District Judge.

Pending in this four year old Age Discrimination action is plaintiff’s recent motion for leave to amend his complaint.

Plaintiff states that “subsequent to the interposition of the initial complaint in this action on or about July 12, 1976, there have been several important developments that mandate that amendments be accomplished at this juncture.” In addition, plaintiff’s comprehension of the “quantum of damages” due him has been clarified by his “employment experiences during the period subsequent to the commencement of this action.” Plaintiff’s memorandum, filed March 26, 1980, p. 1. Plaintiff seeks to add allegations that his severance was part of a corporate-wide “ * * * severance of employees (hundreds of employees) engaged in by Jones & Laughlin knowingly and in bad faith even though it recognized that many, if not most, of the proposed severances would run afoul of the Age Discrimination commandment.” Plaintiff’s memorandum, supra, p. 2. Plaintiff seeks to amend the “Wherefore” clause to add claims for liquidated damages in the maximum amount authorized by law and punitive damages in the amount of five million dollars.

In the court’s view, the amendment seeks to clarify that plaintiff alleges willfulness on the part of Jones & Laughlin, which under the statute gives rise to a claim for liquidated double damages. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The amendment also seems to attempt to set forth allegations of a corporate-wide force-reduction undertaken in bad faith and aimed at older employees. The force reduction is apparently the basis for the punitive damage claim.

[152]*152Some courts have allowed claims for punitive damages. See Murphy v. American Motors Sales Corp., 410 F.Supp. 1403 (D.C. Ga.1976); Walker v. Pettit Construction Co., 437 F.Supp. 730 (D.C.S.C.1977). However, a greater number of cases hold that punitive damages are not recoverable under the ADEA. See Ellis v. Philippine Airlines, 443 F.Supp. 251 (D.C.Cal.1977); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 428 F.Supp. 533 (D.C.Mich.1977). Because the statute itself includes a built-in punishment for willful discrimination, the goal of punitive damages is satisfied. ' The better reasoned eases, in this court’s opinion, reject punitive damages.

Plaintiff’s counsel, Quarles & Brady— though having submitted an inordinately long brief

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Bluebook (online)
87 F.R.D. 151, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12344, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 626, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marson-v-jones-laughlin-steel-corp-wied-1980.