MARSHALL v. STENNIS

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJune 20, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00442
StatusUnknown

This text of MARSHALL v. STENNIS (MARSHALL v. STENNIS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MARSHALL v. STENNIS, (S.D. Ind. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

SHAWN MARSHALL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:23-cv-00442-JPH-TAB ) STENNIS Officer, ) ) Defendant. )

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Shawn Marshall is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Pendleton Correctional Facility. He filed this civil action alleging that Officer Stennis violated his First Amendment right to free exercise by preventing him from practicing his religion. Because the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court has an obligation to screen the complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). In this order, the Court also addresses Mr. Marshall's motion to correct the defendant's name. I. Correction of Defendant's name Mr. Marshall's motion to correct the spelling of the defendant's name, dkt. [12], is granted. The clerk is directed to change the defendant's name to Stennis on the docket. II. Screening Standard When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).

Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).

III. The Complaint Mr. Marshall alleges that on February 10, 2023, Officer Stennis informed him that she was confiscating his Holy Qur'an and would destroy it because the inside cover listed another prisoner's name as well as Mr. Marshall's name. This deprivation prevented Mr. Marshall from practicing his religion. He seeks injunctive relief and compensatory damages as a result of this incident. IV. Discussion of Claims Plaintiffs alleging that jail officials have violated their religious rights can

bring a claim under both the free exercise clause of the First Amendment and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.; Grayson v. Schuler, 666 F.3d 450, 451 (7th Cir. 2012). Although Mr. Marshall does not specifically mention RLUIPA in his complaint, "he is proceeding pro se and in such cases [the Court will] interpret the free exercise claim to include the statutory claim." See id. Mr. Marshall seeks damages and injunctive relief. A RLUIPA claim for

injunctive relief shall proceed against Warden Dennis Reagle in his official capacity only, as RLUIPA does not authorize individual-capacity claims against state officials. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2009) (abrogated on other grounds by Jones v. Carter, 915 F.3d 1147, 1149–50 (7th Cir. 2019) (no individual capacity claim under RLUIPA when allegations do not implicate interstate commerce)). RLUIPA prohibits the government from imposing "a substantial burden on the religious exercise" of a prisoner unless the government demonstrates that the imposition of this burden on a prisoner's religious exercise

overcomes strict scrutiny. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a); see also Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that "all that is required to state a claim under RLUIPA" is an allegation that the defendant's actions "imposed a substantial burden on his ability to exercise his religion"). Mr. Marshall has alleged facts sufficient to state a RLUIPA claim, therefore this claim shall proceed. Additionally, Mr. Marshall's First Amendment free exercise claim shall proceed against Officer Stennis in her individual capacity. The First Amendment

provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. " U.S. Const., amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits the government from imposing a "substantial burden" on a "central religious belief or practice." Kaufman v. Pugh, 733 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013); see also McClure v. Waston, No. 2:23-cv-00371-JPH-DLP, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187944, at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 9, 2020) (quoting King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d

634, 638 (7th Cir. 2005) ("Freedom of speech is not merely freedom to speak; it is also freedom to read.")). Mr. Marshall has alleged facts sufficient to state a First Amendment claim, therefore this claim shall proceed. The First Amendment and RLUIPA claims include all of the viable claims identified by the Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If Mr. Marshall believes that additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court, he shall have through July 10, 2023, in which to identify those claims.

The clerk is directed to add Warden Dennis Reagle in his official capacity as a defendant on the docket. V. Service of Process The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process to defendants Warden Dennis Reagle and Officer Stennis in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of the complaint filed on March 10, 2023, dkt. [1], applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this Order.

The clerk is directed to serve the Indiana Department of Correction employees electronically. Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. SO ORDERED. Date: 6/20/2023 Sjamu Patrick ltawloe James Patrick Hanlon United States District Judge Southern District of Indiana

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Omar Grayson v. Harold Schuler
666 F.3d 450 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Nelson v. Miller
570 F.3d 868 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Ortiz v. Downey
561 F.3d 664 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
James J. Kaufman v. Jeffrey Pugh
733 F.3d 692 (Seventh Circuit, 2013)
Roman Lee Jones v. Robert E. Carter
915 F.3d 1147 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Daniel Schillinger v. Josh Kiley
954 F.3d 990 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

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Bluebook (online)
MARSHALL v. STENNIS, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-v-stennis-insd-2023.