Marshall v. Splunge

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: November 20, 2024
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2369
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TAMIKA BENSON MARSHALL, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02369 (UNA) ) ANGELA SPLUNGE, ) ) ) Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter is before the Court on its initial review of Plaintiff’s pro se complaint

(“Compl.”), ECF No. 1, and application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP App.”), ECF

No. 2. For the reasons explained below, the Court denies Plaintiff’s IFP application and dismisses

this matter without prejudice.

At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s IFP application is not captioned for this Court–

–it is captioned for the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 10(a); D.C. LCvR 5.1(g). Furthermore, it is largely blank, failing to apprise the Court

of Plaintiff’s current financial circumstances. See generally IFP App. Therefore, Plaintiff has

fallen short of establishing that she qualifies for IFP status at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1).

Plaintiff’s complaint is also not captioned for this court––the caption is left blank, again

contravening Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a); D.C. LCvR 5.1(g), and the pleading is also unsigned, in

contravention of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). See generally Compl. Furthermore, Plaintiff only provided

a partial address for herself and the Defendant, contravening D.C. LCvR 5.1(c)(1) and 5.1(g). See

id. at 1. Plaintiff’s allegations fare no better. Plaintiff, who appears to reside somewhere in

Alabama, sues an individual defendant, who also appears to reside in Alabama. See id. Plaintiff

does not cite to any legal authority, and merely states without context, that Defendant “hacked into

[Plaintiff’s] phone [and is] harassing [her].” See id. at 1. The remainder of the complaint is blank,

with no facts or details necessary to state, or even so much as infer, a legal claim. Indeed, the

relief sought is unknown.

Pro se litigants must comply with the Rules of Civil Procedure. Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F.

Supp. 237, 239 (D.D.C. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to

contain “(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction [and] . . . (2) a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 8(a); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009). The Rule 8 standard ensures that

defendants receive fair notice of the claim being asserted so that they can prepare a responsive

answer and an adequate defense. Brown v. Califano, 75 F.R.D. 497, 498 (D.D.C. 1977). Here, as

presented, neither the Court nor Defendant can reasonably be expected to understand Plaintiff’s

claims, as her allegations fall well short of stating a plausible claim.

And even if Plaintiff had stated a claim, as presented, this matter presents no connection to

the District of Columbia. Venue in a civil action is proper only in (1) the district where any

defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state in which the district is located, (2) a

district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred (or

a substantial part of the property that is the subject of the action is situated), or (3) a district in

which any defendant may be found, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be

brought. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). All parties appear to be located in Alabama, and there is

absolutely no indication that the alleged events or omissions occurred in this District. Consequently, the Court dismisses this case without prejudice. A separate order

accompanies this memorandum opinion.

Date: November 20, 2024 /s/_________________________ ANA C. REYES United States District Judge