Marshall Co. v. United States

67 Cust. Ct. 316, 334 F. Supp. 643, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2254
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedNovember 1, 1971
DocketC.D. 4291
StatusPublished
Cited by13 cases

This text of 67 Cust. Ct. 316 (Marshall Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Marshall Co. v. United States, 67 Cust. Ct. 316, 334 F. Supp. 643, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2254 (cusc 1971).

Opinion

Rao, Judge:

This case, originally decided on December 18, 1970 (Marshall Co., Inc., Hoyt, Shepston & Sciaroni v. United States, 65 Cust. Ct. 629, C.D. 4148, 320 F. Supp. 1003 (1970)), is now before us upon additional evidence presented at a rehearing granted on timely motion made by defendant.

In the decision previously rendered, we held that the merchandise, rubber sheeting insulating material composed of rayon fabric coated [318]*318or laminated with, rubber, the rubber forming the exposed surfaces of the merchandise, was properly dutiable as flexible strips, almost wholly of rubber, under item 771.42 of the Tariff 'Schedules of the United States, as amended by the Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1965, rather than as textile fabrics, including laminated fabrics, of man-made fibers, not specially provided for, under item 359.50, as classified by the district director. On the basis of the record then before us, we found that the merchandise was “almost wholly of” rubber within the meaning of General Headnote 9(f) (iii) on the ground that the rubber imparted the essential character to the articles. We held that item 771.42, as amended, did not require that the merchandise covered thereby be “unsupported,” but that in any event, the merchandise involved was not “supported” rubber. We also held that within the meaning of headnote 5, schedule 3 of said tariff schedules, the merchandise wa's an article of which the rubber portion formed the exposed surfaces and that it was therefore to be deemed wholly of rubber for classification purposes.

On the basis of the additional testimony presented at the rehearing, defendant claims that the merchandise is not “almost wholly of” rubber because the fabric rather than the rubber imparts the essential character to the article. Defendant also maintains that the merchandise was intended by Congress to be classified as “wholly of” textile ■fibers since it is nothing more than a coated or laminated man-made fiber fabric material. Amici curiae take the position that the record now establishes that the fabric is at least as essential to the merchandise as the rubber. It is also claimed that this merchandise is “supported” rubber and is not included under item 771.42, and that it is a f abric, coated, filled or laminated with rubber and not an article wholly or in part of such fabric within the meaning of headnote 5, schedule 3.

The pertinent provisions of the tariff schedules, as amended, are as follows:

General Headnotes and Rules of Interpretation
* * * . * * * *
9. Definitions. For the purposes of the schedules, unless the context otherwise requires—
*******
(f) * * *
*******
(iii) “almost wholly of” means that the essential character of the article is imparted by the named material, notwithstanding the fact that significant quantities of some other material or materials may be present; * * *
[319]*319Schedule 3 lieadnotes:
$ $ $ í» 5¡! $
2. For the purposes of the tariff schedules—
(a) the term “textile materials” means—
(vi) except as provided by headnote 5, articles produced from any of the foregoing products;
# Hí ❖ % ❖ # ❖
4. For the purposes of the tariff schedules—
(b) In determining the component fibers of chief value in coated or filled, or laminated, fabrics and articles wholly or in part thereof, the coating or filling, or the nontextile laminating substances, shall be disregarded in the absence of context to the contrary.
5. For the purposes of parts 5,6, and 7 of this schedule and parts 1 (except subpart A), 4, and 12, of schedule 7, in determining the classification of any article which is wholly or in part of a fabric coated or filled, or laminated, with nontransparent rubber or plastics (which fabric is provided for in part 4C of this schedule), the fabric shall be regarded not as a textile material but as being wholly of rubber or plastics to the extent that (as used in the article) the nontransparent rubber or plastics forms either the outer surface of such article or the only exposed surface of such fabric.

Schedule 3, Part 4, Subpart C:

Subpart C headnotes:
1. The provisions of this subpart do not cover—
* * * * * * *
(vii) other articles specially provided for hi schedule 7 or elsewhere.
2. For the purposes of the tariff schedules—
(a) the term “coated or filled”, as used with reference to textile fabrics and other textile articles means that any such f abric or other article has ■been coated or filled (whether or not impregnated) with gums, starches, pastes, clays, plastic materials, rubber, flock, or other substances, so as to visibly and. significantly affect the surface or surfaces thereof otherwise than by change in color, whether or not the color has been changed thereby;
*******
[320]*320Textile fabrics, including laminated fabrics, not specially provided for:
* * * * * * *
359.50 Of man-made fibers- 250 per lb. +30% ad val.
Schedule 7, Part 12, Subpart B:

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Bluebook (online)
67 Cust. Ct. 316, 334 F. Supp. 643, 1971 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 2254, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marshall-co-v-united-states-cusc-1971.