21-2140 Marseille v. Mount Sinai Hosp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 3 City of New York, on the 26th day of October, two thousand twenty-two. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 7 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 8 Circuit Judges, 9 MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, 10 District Judge. * 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 BEATRICE MARSEILLE, 14 15 Plaintiff-Appellant, 16 17 v. No. 21-2140 18 19 THE MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL, DENISE 20 O’DEA, MOUNT SINAI HEALTH SYSTEM INC., 21 MOUNT SINAI HOSPITALS GROUP INC., 22 23 Defendants-Appellees. 24 _____________________________________
*Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. For Plaintiff-Appellant: Beatrice Marseille, pro se, Monsey, NY.
For Defendants-Appellees: Rory J. McEvoy, Brittany A. Buccellato, Akerman LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Valerie E. Caproni, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Beatrice Marseille, now proceeding pro se, appeals from
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former
employers – Defendants-Appellees The Mount Sinai Hospital, Mount Sinai Health
System Inc., Mount Sinai Hospitals Group Inc., and Denise O’Dea (collectively,
“Mount Sinai”) – on Marseille’s claims for discrimination (on the basis of her race,
national origin, age, and disability), hostile work environment, and retaliation, all
in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C.
2 Admin. Code § 8-107. 1 Specifically, Marseille challenges the district court’s
determination that she failed to present sufficient evidence to establish her
NYCHRL claims. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standards as the district court. Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d
120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
I. Discrimination
Under the NYCHRL, it is unlawful for an employer, “because of the actual
or perceived” age, race, national origin, or disability of any person, “[t]o
discriminate against such person . . . in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). NYCHRL discrimination
claims are evaluated under a burden-shifting framework. To make an initial
1 Marseille’s complaint also asserted claims under various federal and state antidiscrimination statutes. After Mount Sinai moved for summary judgment on all of Marseille’s claims, Marseille failed to respond to Mount Sinai’s arguments regarding the federal- and state-law claims, instead arguing only that she had satisfied her burden as to her NYCHRL claims. As a result, the district court found that Marseille had abandoned her federal- and state-law claims and granted summary judgment for Mount Sinai on those claims. Notwithstanding its dismissal of Marseille’s federal claims, the district court exercised its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining NYCHRL claims, concluding that because the parties had already completed discovery and summary-judgment briefing, judicial economy and convenience weighed in favor of exercising jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305–06 (2d Cir. 2003); Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir. 1990).
3 prima facie showing, a plaintiff need only show “differential treatment,” or that
she was “treated less well,” because of a protected characteristic. Mihalik v. Credit
Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The defendant then has “the opportunity to offer legitimate
reasons for its actions.” Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 75–76 (2d
Cir. 2015). If the defendant satisfies that burden, summary judgment is
appropriate if no reasonable jury could conclude either that “the defendant’s
reasons were pretextual” or that “the defendant’s stated reasons were not its sole
basis for taking action, and that its conduct was based at least in part on
discrimination.” Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, even if we were to assume that Marseille could establish a prima facie
case for discrimination, summary judgment in Mount Sinai’s favor was
appropriate. Mount Sinai has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for disciplining and terminating Marseille – concerns about the quality of her
patient care and documentation practices – and, for the reasons explained in the
district court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, no reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Mount Sinai’s stated reasons were pretextual or that unlawful
discrimination was also a motivating factor. On appeal, Marseille highlights
4 evidence that O’Dea once called Marseille’s tone “aggressive” and suggests this
comment alluded to a racial stereotype. The term “aggressive,” however, is a
facially race-neutral term, and Marseille has “fail[ed] to offer evidence that could
lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the statement in context actually reflected
the speaker’s use of th[is] language in a racially coded manner.” Cadet-Legros v.
N.Y. Univ. Hosp. Ctr., 21 N.Y.S.3d 221, 228–29 (1st Dep’t 2015). For these reasons,
we affirm the district court’s determination that Mount Sinai was entitled to
summary judgment on Marseille’s discrimination claim.
II. Hostile Work Environment
Hostile-work-environment claims brought pursuant to the NYCHRL
require a plaintiff to show only “that he or she was treated less well than other
employees because of the relevant characteristic.” Bilitch v. N.Y.C. Health &
Hosps. Corp., 148 N.Y.S.3d 238, 245 (2d Dep’t 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The conduct alleged, however, must exceed “what a reasonable victim
of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial inconveniences,” and
“mere personality conflicts” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Applying this standard, the district court correctly concluded that,
even assuming that the incidents alleged rose to the level of a hostile work
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21-2140 Marseille v. Mount Sinai Hosp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the 3 City of New York, on the 26th day of October, two thousand twenty-two. 4 5 PRESENT: 6 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., 7 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 8 Circuit Judges, 9 MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, 10 District Judge. * 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 BEATRICE MARSEILLE, 14 15 Plaintiff-Appellant, 16 17 v. No. 21-2140 18 19 THE MOUNT SINAI HOSPITAL, DENISE 20 O’DEA, MOUNT SINAI HEALTH SYSTEM INC., 21 MOUNT SINAI HOSPITALS GROUP INC., 22 23 Defendants-Appellees. 24 _____________________________________
*Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. For Plaintiff-Appellant: Beatrice Marseille, pro se, Monsey, NY.
For Defendants-Appellees: Rory J. McEvoy, Brittany A. Buccellato, Akerman LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Valerie E. Caproni, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff-Appellant Beatrice Marseille, now proceeding pro se, appeals from
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former
employers – Defendants-Appellees The Mount Sinai Hospital, Mount Sinai Health
System Inc., Mount Sinai Hospitals Group Inc., and Denise O’Dea (collectively,
“Mount Sinai”) – on Marseille’s claims for discrimination (on the basis of her race,
national origin, age, and disability), hostile work environment, and retaliation, all
in violation of the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C.
2 Admin. Code § 8-107. 1 Specifically, Marseille challenges the district court’s
determination that she failed to present sufficient evidence to establish her
NYCHRL claims. We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying
the same standards as the district court. Garcia v. Hartford Police Dep’t, 706 F.3d
120, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying
facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.
I. Discrimination
Under the NYCHRL, it is unlawful for an employer, “because of the actual
or perceived” age, race, national origin, or disability of any person, “[t]o
discriminate against such person . . . in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(a). NYCHRL discrimination
claims are evaluated under a burden-shifting framework. To make an initial
1 Marseille’s complaint also asserted claims under various federal and state antidiscrimination statutes. After Mount Sinai moved for summary judgment on all of Marseille’s claims, Marseille failed to respond to Mount Sinai’s arguments regarding the federal- and state-law claims, instead arguing only that she had satisfied her burden as to her NYCHRL claims. As a result, the district court found that Marseille had abandoned her federal- and state-law claims and granted summary judgment for Mount Sinai on those claims. Notwithstanding its dismissal of Marseille’s federal claims, the district court exercised its discretion to retain supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining NYCHRL claims, concluding that because the parties had already completed discovery and summary-judgment briefing, judicial economy and convenience weighed in favor of exercising jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367; Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305–06 (2d Cir. 2003); Raucci v. Town of Rotterdam, 902 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir. 1990).
3 prima facie showing, a plaintiff need only show “differential treatment,” or that
she was “treated less well,” because of a protected characteristic. Mihalik v. Credit
Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 110 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). The defendant then has “the opportunity to offer legitimate
reasons for its actions.” Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 75–76 (2d
Cir. 2015). If the defendant satisfies that burden, summary judgment is
appropriate if no reasonable jury could conclude either that “the defendant’s
reasons were pretextual” or that “the defendant’s stated reasons were not its sole
basis for taking action, and that its conduct was based at least in part on
discrimination.” Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, even if we were to assume that Marseille could establish a prima facie
case for discrimination, summary judgment in Mount Sinai’s favor was
appropriate. Mount Sinai has proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for disciplining and terminating Marseille – concerns about the quality of her
patient care and documentation practices – and, for the reasons explained in the
district court’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, no reasonable factfinder
could conclude that Mount Sinai’s stated reasons were pretextual or that unlawful
discrimination was also a motivating factor. On appeal, Marseille highlights
4 evidence that O’Dea once called Marseille’s tone “aggressive” and suggests this
comment alluded to a racial stereotype. The term “aggressive,” however, is a
facially race-neutral term, and Marseille has “fail[ed] to offer evidence that could
lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the statement in context actually reflected
the speaker’s use of th[is] language in a racially coded manner.” Cadet-Legros v.
N.Y. Univ. Hosp. Ctr., 21 N.Y.S.3d 221, 228–29 (1st Dep’t 2015). For these reasons,
we affirm the district court’s determination that Mount Sinai was entitled to
summary judgment on Marseille’s discrimination claim.
II. Hostile Work Environment
Hostile-work-environment claims brought pursuant to the NYCHRL
require a plaintiff to show only “that he or she was treated less well than other
employees because of the relevant characteristic.” Bilitch v. N.Y.C. Health &
Hosps. Corp., 148 N.Y.S.3d 238, 245 (2d Dep’t 2021) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The conduct alleged, however, must exceed “what a reasonable victim
of discrimination would consider petty slights and trivial inconveniences,” and
“mere personality conflicts” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Applying this standard, the district court correctly concluded that,
even assuming that the incidents alleged rose to the level of a hostile work
5 environment, Marseille had not shown any connection between those incidents
and a relevant protected characteristic. For this reason, we affirm the district
court’s determination that Mount Sinai was entitled to summary judgment on
Marseille’s hostile-work-environment claim.
III. Retaliation
The NYCHRL provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory
practice . . . to retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any person because
such person has . . . opposed any practice forbidden under this chapter.”
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(7). To prevail on a retaliation claim under the
NYCHRL, the plaintiff must show that she took an action opposing her employer's
discrimination – i.e., engaged in a protected activity – and that, as a result, the
employer engaged in conduct that was reasonably likely to deter a person from
engaging in such action. See Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 112. Implicit references to
unlawful conduct may suffice to establish protected activity. Id. at 115; see also
Albunio v. City of New York, 16 N.Y.3d 472, 479 (2011). Moreover, the plaintiff
“need not prove that her underlying complaint . . . had merit, but only that it was
motivated by a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying employment
practice was unlawful.” Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013)
6 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court correctly concluded that Marseille’s asserted
protected activity – an email asserting that it was inappropriate for O’Dea to
contact her while she was on medical leave and referencing years of
“intimidation” – cannot reasonably be construed as an implicit complaint about
unlawful conduct. For this reason, we affirm the district court’s determination
that Mount Sinai was entitled to summary judgment on Marseille’s retaliation
claim.
* * *
We have considered all of Marseille’s remaining arguments and find them
to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court