NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: August 26, 2025
S25A0720. MARROW v. THE STATE.
PINSON, Justice.
Keith Lamont Marrow was convicted of three counts of malice
murder and several firearm offenses related to the deaths of Court-
ney German, William Mullins III, and Shayla Curtis.1 At trial, Mar-
row admitted to shooting and killing the three victims but claimed
1 German, Mullins, and Curtis died on April 24, 2017. A Chatham County
grand jury returned an indictment charging Marrow with 3 counts of malice murder (Counts 1-3), 6 counts of felony murder (Counts 4-9), 3 counts of aggra- vated assault (Counts 10-12), 12 counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 13-24), and 2 counts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Counts 25-26). After a jury trial from February 11-14, 2019, the jury returned guilty verdicts for each count. The trial court sentenced Marrow to three concurrent sentences of life without parole for each count of malice murder (Counts 1-3); three consecutive sentences of five years to serve in prison for three counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Counts 13-15); and a concurrent sentence of five years to serve in prison for one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 25). The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Marrow timely filed a motion for new trial which was amended by new counsel. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion on October 21, 2024. Marrow timely filed a notice of appeal on November 19, 2024, after which Marrow changed self-defense. On appeal, Marrow contends that the trial court erred
by not instructing the jury on voluntary manslaughter; that his trial
counsel rendered ineffective assistance in several respects; that the
cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors warrants a new trial; and
that his counsel at the motion for new trial stage rendered ineffec-
tive assistance by not presenting evidence in support of his claims
that trial counsel was ineffective. For the reasons that follow, these
claims fail, and his convictions and sentences are affirmed.
1. The evidence at trial showed the following. Marrow lived in
Florida and was a member of a subset of the Bloods, a criminal street
gang. In April 2017, Marrow visited Savannah, Georgia and was
staying with German, who was also a member of the Bloods. Marrow
spent most of the day preceding the shooting with Charlie Dixon, a
friend of German and a former gang member. They went to an apart-
ment complex with other gang members and watched a dice game.
At some point, they went outside; Marrow left Dixon for “[n]ot more
counsel again. This appeal was docketed to the April 2025 term of court and submitted for a decision on the briefs. 2 than five minutes,” then came back and said “let’s go.” They then
went to Marrow’s car and drove to a Wendy’s restaurant where Ger-
man was working. Marrow spoke to German, but Dixon was not part
of their conversation. Marrow then told Dixon that he had robbed
someone at the apartments earlier using a nine-millimeter gun.
The next morning, Savannah police responded to a shooting at
a home on East 31st Street. German, Mullins, and Curtis were found
shot to death inside the home. Autopsies were performed on each
victim. German had four gunshot wounds, including fatal wounds to
his head and neck. Curtis had six gunshot wounds, including fatal
wounds to her head, neck, and chest. And Mullins had three gunshot
wounds, including fatal wounds to the head and neck.
Investigators collected a loaded .380 pistol, twelve .40-caliber
bullet casings, a 9-millimeter bullet casing, .40-caliber ammunition,
and various projectiles and fragments from the crime scene. Finger-
prints were taken from a Wendy’s cup at the crime scene, and the
fingerprints were later matched to Marrow.
Meanwhile, a patrol officer in South Carolina detained Marrow
3 after a high-speed chase that ended when Marrow crashed an SUV,
which had been rented by German. After he was detained, Marrow
told the South Carolina patrol officer that he “threw a gun out” of
the SUV during the chase but the officer did not see Marrow do so
and did not find the gun that Marrow said he had thrown out of the
window. The officer did find a gun “lodged under the gas pedal” of
the SUV and a 9-millimeter magazine, which was a different caliber
than the gun that was found in the SUV. This gun, a .40-caliber pis-
tol, was later test-fired by a GBI firearms examiner who determined
that the .40-caliber cartridge cases collected at the crime scene had
been fired from this gun.
The South Carolina officers read Marrow his Miranda rights,2
and Marrow agreed to speak with the officers. A recording of the
interview was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
Marrow later spoke with Detective Antwan Diggs on two occa-
sions about the shootings in Savannah. Both interviews were rec-
orded, and the recordings were admitted into evidence and played
2 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
4 for the jury. During the first interview, Marrow told Detective Diggs
that he shot the three victims. Marrow said that he and the victims
were sitting at a table and smoking marijuana, their guns were on
the table, and he “just had a bad vibe.” Marrow said he had used
ecstasy and smoked marijuana that day, and he believed the other
gang members were going to kill him. In the second interview, Mar-
row said he suffered from anxiety attacks, and Detective Diggs tes-
tified that Marrow’s anxiety may have made him “more paranoid.”
Marrow told the police that he had overhead a conversation be-
tween German and someone who went by the nickname “Tabo,” and
based on this conversation, he thought Tabo told German to kill
Marrow. Officer Johnathan Puhala, the supervisor of the gang unit
of the Savannah Police Department, identified Tabo as an inmate at
Wilcox State Prison. Tabo knew German, Curtis, and Mullins, and
had exchanged text messages with them using a contraband cell
phone that Tabo had with him inside the prison. Those conversa-
tions were mainly about getting more contraband into the prison,
and Officer Puhala did not find any evidence that Tabo had ordered
5 German or anyone else to kill Marrow or that the two had “bad
blood.”
Based on his knowledge of the gang, Officer Puhala opined that
an unsanctioned robbery by a gang member would be a violation of
gang rules and would require the robber to return what he had taken
to the victim. Officer Puhala further opined that such a violation
may result in a fight with other gang members but would “[p]robably
not” result in the non-compliant gang member being killed.
2. Marrow contends that the trial court erred by failing to in-
struct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of mal-
ice murder. At the charge conference, Marrow asked for charges on
justification and voluntary manslaughter. The court ruled that it
would not give the voluntary manslaughter charge because the evi-
dence did not show that Marrow’s actions were “the result solely of
a sudden violent irresistible passion resulting from serious provoca-
tion sufficient to excite such passion of a reasonable person,” but
that it would charge the jury on justification. In response, defense
counsel said, “That’s fine, Judge.” The court did not charge the jury
6 on voluntary manslaughter, and defense counsel did not object to
the charge as given.
Because Marrow’s counsel did not object to the jury charge as
given, this claim is reviewed only for plain error. See Johnson v.
State, 321 Ga. 511, 519 (2025). See also OCGA § 17-8-58(b). To es-
tablish plain error, the defendant must show that the trial court
committed a legal error that was not affirmatively waived, was clear
or obvious beyond reasonable dispute, and affected the defendant’s
substantial rights. Id. If those requirements are met, this Court has
the discretion to remedy the error if it “affects the fairness, integrity
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
To warrant a charge on voluntary manslaughter, there must
be “slight evidence” that the defendant “acted solely as the result of
a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious
provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person.”
Smith v. State, 296 Ga. 731, 737 (2015) (cleaned up). See also OCGA
7 § 16-5-2(a). But neither “words alone,” nor “fear that someone is go-
ing to pull a gun[,] nor fighting are the types of provocation which
demand a voluntary manslaughter charge.” Id. On appeal, Marrow
does not cite any specific record evidence to support his claim that a
voluntary manslaughter instruction was required, instead relying
on broad conclusions that the evidence showed the requisite “provo-
cation” and “passion.” At trial, he relied only on evidence from his
own statement to support the giving of the voluntary manslaughter
charge: that there were guns on the table, and German and Mullins
looked at one another and then at Marrow and the guns, then Ger-
man said Marrow was “not that dumb,” a comment that was “offen-
sive.” But this evidence — of “words alone” and, at best, the fear of
someone “pulli[ng] a gun”— is not the type that requires a voluntary
manslaughter instruction. See Smith, 296 Ga. at 737. And even con-
sidering other evidence from Marrow’s statement — that there was
some disagreement or animosity between Marrow and German, he
overheard that Tabo wanted German to kill Marrow, and there was
8 a “bad vibe” while Marrow and the victims smoked marijuana to-
gether — this evidence does not show “serious provocation,” see id.,
and, at best, was slight evidence of Marrow’s reasonable belief that
he needed to defend himself, see Calmer v. State, 309 Ga. 368, 370
(2020).3 So Marrow has not established that the trial court erred, let
alone committed a clear or obvious error by not giving the requested
instruction. See, e.g., id. at 737–38. See also Johnson, 321 Ga. at
519.
3. Marrow contends that his trial counsel rendered constitu-
tionally ineffective assistance in several respects. To establish inef-
fective assistance of counsel, Marrow must show both (1) that coun-
sel’s performance was professionally deficient and (2) that he was
prejudiced as a result. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668,
687 (1984). Trial counsel performs deficiently when his action or in-
action was “objectively unreasonable . . . considering all the circum-
stances and in light of prevailing professional norms.” Burke v.
State, 320 Ga. 706, 708 (2025) (citation and punctuation omitted).
3 The trial court instructed the jury on the defense of justification.
9 Prejudice under Strickland means there exists a “reasonable proba-
bility that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the result of the trial would
have been different.” Id. With this standard in mind, we address
each of Marrow’s ineffective assistance claims in turn.
(a) Marrow contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
assistance when he did not stipulate to Marrow’s status as a con-
victed felon. Instead of a stipulation, the State introduced, without
objection, a certified copy of a guilty plea Marrow had entered in
Louisiana. In addition to telling the jury that Marrow had entered a
guilty plea to the felony offense of “unauthorized use of a motor ve-
hicle,” the document read into evidence said that Marrow had “while
armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit a firearm, robbed [the vic-
tim] of a vehicle.” Marrow contends that if his counsel had stipulated
to his felony conviction for “unauthorized use of a motor vehicle,” the
jury would not have heard that he had robbed someone at gunpoint.
Whether or not trial counsel was deficient for not stipulating
to the felony conviction to prevent the jury from hearing the details
of the charged crime, Marrow has not shown that he was prejudiced
10 by the evidence that he had committed a prior armed robbery. The
jury had already heard evidence that Marrow had robbed someone
at gunpoint earlier in the day on April 23. The prior conviction was
not emphasized in any way, or even mentioned again after the cer-
tified conviction was read into the record. And the evidence against
him was strong: he admitted to shooting the victims, and there was
no evidence that the shooting was justified, other than his own self-
serving statement that it was necessary to defend himself because
of a “bad vibe” he got from the victims and the presence of firearms
in the home. Because Marrow has not established that trial counsel’s
failure to stipulate to his prior conviction likely affected the outcome
of his case, this claim of ineffective assistance fails. See Jackson v.
State, 317 Ga. 95, 104 (2023) (assuming counsel’s performance was
deficient, defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s failure to stipu-
late to his prior felony conviction because the evidence against him
was strong, and the State did not emphasize the prior conviction
during its case in chief or in closing argument).
11 (b) Marrow contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective as-
sistance when he did not submit a written request to charge the jury
on voluntary manslaughter. As mentioned above, counsel requested
this instruction during the charge conference but the trial court de-
clined to give it, and counsel did not object to the charge as given.
As discussed above, the trial court did not commit a clear or
obvious error by failing to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaugh-
ter because there was no evidence that supported giving the charge.
So we cannot say that trial counsel’s decision not to further pursue
a voluntary manslaughter instruction, including by submitting a
written request for the instruction, was unreasonable. See Powell v.
State, 307 Ga. 96, 105 (2019) (“Trial counsel was not deficient for
failing to request a charge on voluntary manslaughter because there
was no evidence to support the charge”).
(c) Marrow contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present the testimony of three witnesses: Michelle Ray-
ford, Markajsha Jenkins, and Ernie “Jamal” Mobley. Marrow con-
tends that these witnesses would have corroborated his claim of self-
12 defense. Specifically, he says that Rayford would have testified that
she had purchased a firearm for German; that there were firearms
in the home where the shooting occurred; that the residents were
gang members; that German, Marrow, and someone else had an al-
tercation on the day before the shooting; and that German did not
trust Marrow. He says Jenkins would have testified that she gave
Marrow money, which created “an issue between” German and Mar-
row when she told German about it. And he says Mobley would have
testified that he “received a phone call from victim German, frantic
and scared, asking to switch vehicles.”
Even considering the proffer that was made in his motion for
new trial, Marrow has not shown that his trial counsel acted below
the standard of reasonable professional conduct by not calling these
witnesses. The decision as to which witnesses to call, if any, is a
matter of trial strategy and will only rise to the level of deficient
performance if that decision is “so unreasonable that no competent
attorney would have made [the same decision] under similar circum-
stances.” Butler v. State, 313 Ga. 675, 684 (2022). Marrow contends
13 that the proffered testimony would have corroborated his claims of
self-defense or voluntary manslaughter, but none of the proffered
witnesses observed the shooting and, at best, their proffered testi-
mony was cumulative of other testimony that there was tension be-
tween Marrow and German leading up to the shooting. So Marrow
has failed to show that counsel’s decision not to call these witnesses
was unreasonable. See id. This claim fails as a result.
(d) Marrow contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to preserve an objection to hearsay relayed by Dixon during the trial.
At trial, the prosecutor asked Dixon if Marrow had told Dixon
“why he came up here from Florida?” Dixon responded that it was
because Marrow was “pretty much homeless” and “doing drugs down
there.” The prosecutor then asked Dixon, “What type of drugs was
he doing in Florida,” and Dixon answered, “Well, what I heard was
Flakka.” Defense counsel objected to hearsay, and the prosecutor
asked to “clarify,” which the trial court allowed. The prosecutor
asked if Dixon had spoken to German “about this,” and Dixon said
he had. The prosecutor then asked, “Did Courtney tell you what
14 types of drugs the defendant was using,” Dixon said yes, and defense
counsel objected to “foundation.” The jury was sent out, and Mar-
row’s counsel said his objection was to “[t]wo-stage hearsay.” The
State responded that the testimony was admissible under OCGA §
24-8-804(b)(5), which sets forth an exception to the rule against
hearsay for out-of-court statements made by an unavailable witness
and “offered against a party that has engaged or acquiesced in
wrongdoing that was intended to, or did, procure the availability of
the declarant as witness.” After the State gave its explanation, Mar-
row’s attorney said, “Not going on that ground, Judge. The question
was entirely leading.” After a colloquy outside the presence of the
jury, the trial court overruled the hearsay objection, said the State
could establish a foundation for asking the question, and allowed the
State to continue its line of questioning. In front of the jury, Dixon
was asked if German had told him “anything about [Marrow’s] drug
use in Florida,” and Dixon said yes. The prosecutor then asked,
“What did Courtney tell you?” and Dixon testified without objection
15 that German told him that Marrow was “on Flakka,” a “mind-alter-
ing drug.”
On appeal, Marrow contends that counsel should have main-
tained his objection to hearsay because the statement was not ad-
missible under OCGA § 24-8-804(b)(5). Marrow contends that, alt-
hough German was not available to testify at trial, this witness-tam-
pering hearsay exception did not apply to his statement to Dixon
because the reason for the homicide was not to prevent him from
testifying. See Morrell v. State, 313 Ga. 247, 251 (2022) (to admit a
statement under OCGA § 24-8-804(b)(5) the proponent “must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the defendant engaged
in or acquiesced in wrongdoing; (2) the wrongdoing was intended to
procure the declarant’s unavailability; and (3) the wrongdoing did
procure the unavailability”) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Even assuming that withdrawing the objection to hearsay was
deficient performance, rather than trial strategy, Marrow has not
established that he was prejudiced by the hearsay statement that
he used the “mind-altering” drug “Flakka” at some point in the past.
16 That statement was somewhat cumulative of properly admitted ev-
idence that he was under the influence of ecstasy and marijuana at
the time of the shooting and that these drugs may have made him
paranoid, and again, the evidence against Marrow was strong. See
Jennings v. State, 318 Ga. 579, 588, 590 (2024) (admission of hear-
say evidence was harmless because it was cumulative and the other,
properly admitted evidence against the defendant was strong, so de-
fendant had not established he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure
to object to the hearsay).
(e) Marrow contends that the four alleged errors of counsel dis-
cussed above had a cumulative prejudicial effect that requires a new
trial. We have assumed two errors by counsel — for not stipulating
to the prior conviction and for not pursuing the hearsay objection —
but Marrow has not explained how these errors, when combined,
had any greater effect when assessed cumulatively than they did
alone. As discussed above, these assumed errors resulted in the ad-
mission of evidence that was cumulative of other, properly admitted
17 evidence and had little bearing on whether the shooting, which Mar-
row admitted to, was justified or the result of passion sufficient to
warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge. Thus, Marrow’s claim of
cumulative prejudice fails. See, e.g., Washington v. State, 320 Ga.
839, 861 (2025) (defendant failed to establish cumulative prejudice
warranting a new trial where the assumed errors “resulted in, at
most, minor prejudice” and “the trial evidence strongly supported
the jury’s guilty verdicts”).
(f) Finally, Marrow contends that the attorney who represented
him at the motion-for-new-trial stage rendered ineffective assis-
tance when he failed to offer evidence to support the above claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Marrow points out that his
trial counsel passed away before the hearing on his motion for new
trial and that his new attorney failed to provide an alternative to
trial counsel’s testimony to support these claims. But even assuming
that post-conviction counsel performed deficiently by not finding an
alternative to trial counsel’s testimony as evidentiary support for
18 the claims of ineffective assistance, Marrow has not established prej-
udice as a result of any such deficiency. For the reasons set out
above, we have already concluded based on the existing record that
the underlying trial counsel ineffectiveness claims fail, and Marrow
has not pointed to or described or even hypothesized the existence of
any particular evidence that counsel might have produced at the
hearing that could have changed the outcome. See Arnold v. State,
321 Ga. 434, 450 (2025) (“Mere speculation is insufficient to estab-
lish prejudice in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (quota-
tion marks omitted)). See also Anthony v. State, 302 Ga. 546, 554–
55 (2017) (because this Court had already concluded on the existing
record that the preserved claims of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel lacked merit, the defendant could not show he was preju-
diced by post-trial counsel’s alleged deficient performance for not
subpoenaing trial counsel to testify at the hearing on the motion for
new trial).
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.