24CA1220 Marriage of Wroten 04-24-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1220 El Paso County District Court No. 20DR31499 Honorable Monica Jo Gomez, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Matthew Christian Wroten,
Appellee,
and
Cori Elizabeth Slack,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division A Opinion by CHIEF JUDGE ROMÁN Hawthorne* and Berger*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 24, 2025
Matthew Christian Wroten, Pro Se
Cori Elizabeth Slack, Pro Se
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Cori
Elizabeth Wroten, now known as Cori Elizabeth Slack (mother), and
Matthew Christian Wroten (father), mother appeals the district
court’s order granting father sole parenting time and greater
decision-making responsibility. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 After sixteen years of marriage and four biological children,
father filed a petition to dissolve the marriage in 2020.1
¶3 In January 2021, the police arrested father on charges of
domestic violence and child abuse, and the criminal court entered a
mandatory protection order prohibiting him from contacting mother
and the children.
¶4 A few months later, the parties stipulated that father would
follow a phased-in unsupervised parenting-time schedule, with the
goal of equal time, while mother would be the primary residential
parent.
1 The parties also have a fifth child, who was adopted, but none of
the filings or rulings in this case involve that child; they only pertain to the four biological children. In this opinion, our use of the phrase “the children” refers only to the four biological children.
1 ¶5 In October 2021, the district court dissolved the marriage. In
the permanent orders, the court accepted the parties’ prior
parenting time stipulation. The court found that the domestic
violence incident was an “isolated event.” And because the parties
could make decisions cooperatively, the court allocated joint
decision-making responsibility.
¶6 About a year later, mother filed a motion to modify parenting
time and decision-making responsibility for the children. She
alleged a series of concerns about the children’s well-being while in
father’s care: (1) the children voiced a reluctance to see father and
exhibited signs of both physical and emotional distress upon the
children’s return to mother; (2) the children were not safe or
adequately supervised, listing instances where they were dropped
off excessively early at extracurricular activities, leaving them
unattended; (3) the children suffered physical harm, with one child
treated recently for a severe burn; (4) the children’s basic needs
were not being met; (5) father taunted and belittled the children,
leading to emotional volatility and school absences upon their
return to mother; and (6) father told the children to speak
negatively about mother. At this time, father was in the third phase
2 of the stipulated parenting plan, having regular overnight parenting
time every Wednesday and on alternating weekends.
¶7 The district court appointed a Child and Family Investigator
(CFI) to investigate, report, and make recommendations regarding
mother’s modification motion.
¶8 In August 2023, the CFI submitted a written report to the
district court and both parties. While raising serious issues about
mother persistently disparaging father, the CFI also stressed that
the parenting-time situation was immediately and detrimentally
affecting the children’s mental health and well-being. The CFI
proposed that mother continue as the primary parent; father
comply with a parenting time schedule that begins with three
dinner visits per week and progresses toward an equal time
arrangement; both parties retain joint decision-making
responsibility; and the children participate in individual therapy.
To address the children’s emotional suffering, caused by the parties’
animosity toward each other, the CFI recommended that the parties
complete the following educational tasks:
• watch an instructive film to gain perspective on how their
behavior was affecting the children;
3 • enroll in a nurturing parenting course designed to redirect the
children’s insulting remarks about their father and provide
him with skills to manage their acting-out;
• complete an online course on the importance of a father’s role
in a daughter’s life, along with co-parenting;
• attend two co-parenting classes; and
• participate in a co-parenting support group.
¶9 In May 2024, after an evidentiary hearing, the district court
acknowledged mother’s credible domestic violence allegation,
stemming from the January 2021 incident. However, the court
determined that the incident was “not indicative of ongoing
domestic violence.” The court stated that there was no evidence
showing that father was “continuing to be controlling or
threatening.” It found that the “parent-child contact problems
emanated from the [parties] and not from any domestic violence the
[children] may have witnesse[d] in January 2021.”
¶ 10 The district court also found that the children were making
disparaging remarks about father. Because no evidence showed
that mother or her own family members intervened to correct the
4 children, the court concluded that the children were unable to give
their opinion on parenting time.
¶ 11 The court expressed concern about the “emotional chasm”
between the parties, which was forcing the children to an
“unhealthy level.” The court held mother primarily responsible for
the “high degree of discord” in the parties’ co-parenting efforts. In
fact, one of the children was in distress and in need of mental
health therapy, which mother resisted. The court reasoned that
father’s support for the children’s consistent school attendance and
therapy “cut against any suggestion he’s abusive to the children, as
both teachers and therapists [were] mandatory reporte[rs].”
¶ 12 The court found that father had finished all the CFI-
recommended educational tasks except for those requiring mother’s
participation. The court also found that father asked mother to
cooperate with the CFI recommendations, to which she disagreed.
¶ 13 In the end, the district court ordered that the children reside
with father until mother completed the CFI’s recommendations, and
that in the meantime, she have video contact with the children at
least four times a week. The court also granted father sole decision-
5 making responsibility over the children’s medical decisions,
including mental health therapy.
¶ 14 On July 9, 2024, mother filed her notice of appeal.
II. Mootness
¶ 15 Because it could be dispositive, we first address father’s
assertion that mother’s appeal is moot. He says that, following her
notice of appeal, the parties agreed to revise the court-ordered
educational requirements, which are now satisfied, resulting in an
equal parenting time arrangement since August 30, 2024. In her
reply brief, mother does not dispute that statement.
¶ 16 If an event occurs during the pendency of an appeal that
makes it “impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief’ . . .
to a prevailing party,” the appeal must be dismissed as moot.
DePriest v. People, 2021 CO 40, ¶ 8 (citation omitted); see also In re
Marriage of Thomas, 2021 COA 123, ¶ 21 (an issue is moot when
the relief requested, if granted, would have no practical effect on an
existing controversy); In re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 301
(Colo. App. 2005) (original parenting time orders deemed moot when
they were superseded by later modifying orders). An appellate court
will not render an opinion on an issue’s merits when later events
6 have rendered it moot. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning
S.Z.S., 2022 COA 105, ¶ 50.
¶ 17 Mother sought “full parental responsibilities,” not the equal
parenting time schedule currently in place. Because hypothetically
we could reverse the district court’s order and the court could, on
remand, grant mother’s requested relief, an actual controversy
exists, and the appeal is not moot. So, we will address the merits.
III. Modification of Parenting Time
A. Children’s Safety
¶ 18 Mother contends that the district court erred by granting
father sole parenting time. She reasons that the court did not give
“paramount consideration to the safety of the children in
accordance with the best interests of the child standard,” thereby
violating section 14-10-124(1.5)(a), C.R.S. 2024, and section 14-10-
127.5(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024. We are not persuaded.
¶ 19 A district court has broad discretion when modifying parenting
time, and we must exercise every presumption to uphold its
decision. In re Marriage of Dale, 2025 COA 29, ¶ 7. The court
abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or if it misapplies the law. Id.
7 ¶ 20 But we review de novo whether the district court applied the
correct legal standard. Id. at ¶ 8.
¶ 21 A district court may generally modify an order granting or
denying parenting time rights whenever such modification would
serve the child’s best interests. See § 14-10-129(1)(a)(I), C.R.S.
2024. However, the court must not restrict a party’s parenting time
rights unless it finds that the parenting time would endanger the
child’s physical health or significantly impair their emotional
development. § 14-10-129(1)(b)(I).
¶ 22 In all cases, a court must determine the allocation of parenting
time according to the child’s best interests, “giving paramount
consideration to the child’s safety and the physical, mental, and
emotional conditions and needs of the child.” § 14-10-124(1.5); see
also § 14-10-123.4(1)(a), C.R.S. 2024 (a child has the right to have
parental responsibilities determined based on their best interests).
In determining the best interests, the court must consider the
factors set forth in section 14-10-124(1.5)(a). In re Marriage of
Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 327 (Colo. App. 1996).
¶ 23 The court is also required to consider any domestic violence or
child abuse allegations. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a), (4)(a). If the court
8 finds that one parent has committed either, it shall consider, as the
primary concern, the child’s and the abused person’s safety and
well-being. § 14-10-124(4)(d).
¶ 24 In section 14-10-127.5(1)(b)(I), the general assembly recently
declared that the district court’s priority, when making decisions
regarding parental responsibilities, is the child’s safety. And in all
cases where the court believes that a party has committed domestic
violence or child abuse, the court, as pertinent here, must consider
evidence of the accused party’s past abuse, including protection
orders and arrest records, and coercive control. See § 14-10-
127.5(3)(a)(II)-(III). The court is prohibited from removing or
restricting a child’s contact with a protective parent solely to
improve the child’s relationship with the accused party. § 14-10-
127.5(3)(b)(I). If allegations of domestic violence or child abuse have
been made, the court must give “strong consideration to a child’s
stated preference made to the court [or] [CFI], if the stated
preference is consistent with the paramount consideration given to
the child’s safety and the physical, mental, and emotional
conditions and needs of the child.” § 14-10-127.5(3.5).
9 ¶ 25 Even so, a finding that a parent has committed domestic
violence or child abuse does not automatically preclude an award of
parenting time. See In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 333
(Colo. App. 2007) (“[E]ven in those circumstances of serious
criminal conduct and domestic abuse, which by their nature would
likely establish endangerment and thus be most susceptible of an
order denying parenting time rights, the best interests standard
applies to the determination of whether parenting time should be
permitted.”); see also In re Marriage of Yates, 148 P.3d 304, 308-09
(Colo. App. 2006) (district court did not abuse its discretion in
naming the mother the child’s primary parent after she was
convicted of misdemeanor child abuse and felony menacing
stemming from an incident in which she threatened the father with
a knife in the child’s presence); In re Marriage of Bertsch, 97 P.3d
219, 220-22 (Colo. App. 2004) (district court did not abuse its
discretion in granting primary residential parent status to the father
who had been abusive to the children in the past but was in
therapy and was recommended as their primary parent by
evaluators).
10 ¶ 26 While acknowledging mother’s credible domestic violence
allegation from January 2021, the district court found that the
incident did not constitute ongoing domestic violence by father.
The court pointed out that he pled guilty, took responsibility for his
actions, completed court-ordered classes, and complied with the
protection order. It also did not observe any evidence supporting
mother’s allegations that father was engaging in controlling or
threatening behavior. As well, it identified that the parent-child
contact problems arose from the parties’ conduct, independent of
any domestic violence the children may have witnessed in January
2021. A few months after the domestic violence incident, mother
consented to modify the criminal protection order and later
stipulated to allow father unsupervised parenting time, with the
intention of establishing equal parenting time.
¶ 27 The court indicated that the CFI testified about mother
coaching the children to dislike father. The court found that the
children’s disparaging remarks disqualified them from making
informed decisions about parenting time.
¶ 28 The district court then focused on the children’s emotional
well-being, highlighting the “emotional chasm” between the parties
11 and the anguish it caused the children. The court specified that the
children were exposed to significant discord in the parties’ co-
parenting efforts, with mother being the primary source of conflict.
One child engaged in self-harm and required mental health therapy,
which mother resisted, dismissing father’s related concerns.
Because therapists and teachers were mandatory reporters, the
court found that father’s push for the children’s therapy and school
attendance undermined any suggestion of child abuse.
¶ 29 The court also found that father was trying to improve the co-
parenting situation, but mother was not. For example, father had
completed all CFI-recommended educational tasks, except those
requiring mother’s participation, and had asked her to cooperate
with the recommendations, but she refused.
¶ 30 Based on these findings, the district court modified the
existing parenting time order, granting father sole parenting time
until mother completes the CFI-recommended educational tasks.
¶ 31 Contrary to mother’s contention, the court complied with the
directives of section 14-10-124(1.5)(a) and section 14-10-
127.5(1)(b)(I) by thoroughly evaluating the children’s safety before
granting sole parenting time to father. Given that the court’s
12 findings and ultimate determination are well-supported by the
record, we cannot say that the court exceeded its broad discretion.
See Dale, ¶ 7.
¶ 32 Still, mother insists that other evidence compels a different
conclusion. For example, she cites her testimony at the
modification hearing plus certain exhibits purportedly establishing
safety concerns about father. But this argument essentially asks
us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. See In re Marriage
of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 49 (it is for the district court to
determine witness credibility and the weight, probative force, and
sufficiency of the evidence, as well as the inferences and
conclusions to be drawn therefrom); see also In re Marriage of Kann,
2017 COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed
unbridled confidence in [district] courts to weigh conflicting
evidence.”); In re Marriage of Udis, 780 P.2d 499, 504 (Colo. 1989)
(an appellate court may presume that the district court considered
all of the evidence admitted).
¶ 33 In her opening brief, mother also relies on newspaper articles
about how courts ignore allegations of abuse in contentious custody
cases as well as a November 2023 El Paso Department of Human
13 Services assessment summary. But those documents were neither
offered nor admitted into evidence at the modification hearing. So
we do not consider the new information. See In re Marriage of
Drexler, 2013 COA 43, ¶ 24 (declining to consider exhibit appended
to a party’s brief that was not part of the certified record); see also
Boulder Plaza Residential, LLC v. Summit Flooring, LLC, 198 P.3d
1217, 1222 (Colo. App. 2008) (an appellate court will not consider
evidence not admitted at the hearing or submitted to the district
court before ruling).
B. In Camera Interview of the Children
¶ 34 Mother contends that the district court erroneously ignored
section 14-10-127.5(3.5) by denying her request for an in-chambers
interview of the children. We will not address the issue because it
is undeveloped. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27
(an appellate court may decline to consider an argument not
supported by legal authority or any meaningful legal analysis),
aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see also Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo.
Ass’n v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (an appellate court
will “decline to assume the mantle” when parties offer no
supporting arguments for their claims); In re Marriage of Dean,
14 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31 (an appellate court will not consider arguments
in a reply brief that seek to expand on contentions raised in an
opening brief).
C. CFI Report
¶ 35 Mother next contends that the district court erred by
admitting the CFI report because “it had multiple factual errors and
recommendations that rel[ied] on unproven theories, not supported
by evidence-based and peer-reviewed research.” But when father
moved to admit the report as an exhibit, she did not object. We
therefore will not review this evidentiary objection for the first time
on appeal. See Antolovich v. Brown Grp. Retail, Inc., 183 P.3d 582,
600 (Colo. App. 2007) (“If a party makes no contemporaneous
objection to the introduction of evidence, we will not review the
alleged error on appeal.”); see also In re Marriage of Garrett, 2018
COA 154, ¶ 35 (issues not raised before the district court will not be
addressed for the first time on appeal).
¶ 36 To the extent mother argues that the district court should
have deemed the CFI’s report and testimony not credible and biased
against her, we cannot disturb the court’s credibility assessment.
See Thorburn, ¶ 49; see also In re Marriage of Amich, 192 P.3d 422,
15 424 (Colo. App. 2007) (the district court can believe all, part, or
none of a witness’s testimony, even if uncontroverted).
¶ 37 We decline to address mother’s “concern about the validity of
[the CFI’s] expertise” under section 14-10-127(4)(a.5), C.R.S. 2024
because it lacks any meaningful legal analysis. See Zander, ¶ 27.
IV. Modification of Decision-Making Responsibility
¶ 38 Finally, mother contends that the district court erred by
modifying decision-making responsibility. Again she does not
demonstrate, with any legal analysis, how the court erred in that
regard. So we decline to address the issue. See Zander, ¶ 27; see
also Dean, ¶ 31.
V. Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs
¶ 39 Father asks for his appellate attorney fees based on this
appeal’s frivolity. Although mother has not prevailed, we deny his
request. See In re Estate of Shimizu, 2016 COA 163, ¶ 34 (“[A]n
award of fees on appeal is appropriate only in clear and unequivocal
cases where no rational argument is presented . . . .”).
¶ 40 However, father is entitled to costs on appeal, see C.A.R. 39(a),
and may seek those costs in the district court, see C.A.R. 39(c).
16 VI. Disposition
¶ 41 The order is affirmed.
Judge HAWTHORNE and Judge BERGER concur.