Marriage of Scott

Opinion

25CA0719 Marriage of Scott 07-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0719 El Paso County District Court No. 17DR2901 Honorable Dennis McGuire, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jordan Marc Scott,

Appellant,

and

Crystal Renee Richmond,

Appellee.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division III Opinion by JUDGE KUHN Freyre and Johnson, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 23, 2026

Jordan Marc Scott, Pro Se

No Appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage case involving Jordan

Marc Scott (father) and Crystal Renee Richmond (mother), father

appeals the district court’s order adopting the magistrate’s

judgment finding him in contempt and imposing punitive and

remedial sanctions. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2018, the parties’ marriage ended. The district court

incorporated into the decree of dissolution of marriage their

parenting plan, which provided for equal parenting time and joint

decision-making responsibility for their two children. The court

also set father’s child support obligation.

¶3 About a year later, mother moved for abduction prevention

measures under section 14-13.5-108, C.R.S. 2025, or, in the

alternative, “protective orders.” She alleged, among other things,

that she had just learned from the children that father planned to

take them out of state during his next scheduled parenting time.

¶4 In November 2019, the district court, without a hearing,

denied mother’s section 14-13.5-108 request for abduction

prevention measures, finding that father was not at risk of

abducting the children. But after noting the parties’

1 “extraordinarily high [level] [of] conflict” — and aiming to reduce it

while “add[ing] stability to the children’s lives” — the court entered

“additional orders”:

If either party desires to transport the children out-of-state during their parenting time, at least [thirty] days’ notice of such intent shall be provided to the other parent together with a complete itinerary of any such planned travel. If travel plans change, notice of such changes shall be communicated to the other parent as soon as such changes are known.

No party appealed that order.

¶5 In January 2021, the district court granted mother’s motion to

modify parental responsibilities, naming her the children’s primary

parent and sole decision-maker. However, the court also ordered

that, for any major decision, mother must consult with father. If

they disagreed, mother had the tie-breaking vote.

¶6 The district court also reiterated the travel itinerary

requirement from the November 2019 order:

All prior orders regarding travel or overnights remain in full force and effect so long as they do not contradict an order set out in this [o]rder. This includes the [c]ourt’s prior [o]rder that if the children will be absent more than one overnight from a parent’s ordinary home address, the other parent will be notified as soon as such absence is planned or known.

2 Implicitly this means not just telling the other parent the children will be (address), with whom (names) and phone number of those caring for the children overnight.

¶7 Father appealed the January 2021 order but did not seek

review of the above provision. A division of this court affirmed the

order. See In re Marriage of Scott, (Colo. App. No. 21CA0258, Nov.

4, 2021) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶8 In February 2022, in resolving mother’s motion to modify child

support, the district court referenced its prior orders that the

parties split the out of pocket extraordinary medical expenses for

the children in relation to their income. The court then clarified the

prior orders, explaining that “[mother] will provide a copy of the

medical bill to [father] within [thirty] days of making the payment”

and that [he] then has “[thirty] days to reimburse her for at least

one-half of the uninsured medical expenses.” The court found that

father seemed to be finding almost any reason to avoid paying his

one-half share of the expenses and ordered that mother was not

required to provide an explanation of benefits.

¶9 About two years later, mother moved for indirect contempt,

asserting that father failed to comply with

3 • the January 2021 order by not providing her with travel

itineraries on six separate occasions; and

• the February 2022 order by not paying one-half of the

children’s extraordinary medical expenses. Following a

hearing in December 2024, the magistrate issued an

order on January 2025. The magistrate found father in

contempt for willfully violating the January 2021 order

and imposed a punitive sanction of ninety-six hours in

the county jail. The court also found him in contempt for

not complying with the February 2022 order and imposed

a remedial sanction that required him to reimburse

mother $5,843.11 to purge the contempt.

¶ 10 Father then petitioned for review. The district court modified

the magistrate’s remedial sanction to $5,016.84 with interest but

otherwise adopted the judgment.

II. Analysis

¶ 11 Father contends that the district court erred because (1) the

magistrate violated his due process rights and was biased against

him; (2) the travel itinerary requirement of the January 2021 order

is unlawful because it stems from the court’s erroneous abduction

4 prevention measures from its November 2019 order; (3) the

magistrate should have considered the children’s best interests

before imposing a ninety-six-hour jail sentence during his

upcoming Christmas parenting time at the December 2024 hearing;

and (4) the remedial sanction at $5,016.84 for his unpaid share of

the children’s extraordinary medical expenses in the February 2022

order didn’t account for a statutory offset.

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

¶ 12 C.R.C.P. 107 distinguishes between “two types of contempt —

direct and indirect — and two types of sanctions — remedial and

punitive.” In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning A.C.B., 2022

COA 3, ¶ 21. Indirect contempt occurs “out of the direct sight or

hearing of the court.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(3); see A.C.B., ¶ 22. This

case involves indirect contempt and both types of sanctions.

¶ 13 Punitive sanctions for indirect contempt are designed to

punish “by unconditional fine, fixed sentence of imprisonment, or

both, . . . conduct that is found to be offensive to the authority and

dignity of the court.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4). Such sanctions must be

supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a lawful

order existed; (2) the contemnor had knowledge of the order; (3) the

5 contemnor had the ability to comply with the order; and (4) the

contemnor willfully refused to comply with the order. In re Marriage

of Sheehan, 2022 COA 29, ¶ 25. The court must also expressly find

the contemnor’s conduct offensive to the authority and dignity of

the court. C.R.C.P. 107(d)(1).

¶ 14 In contrast, remedial sanctions for indirect contempt are

“imposed to force compliance with a lawful order or to compel

performance of an act within the person’s power or present ability

to perform.” C.R.C.P. 107(a)(5). To impose such sanctions, the

court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that “the

contemnor (1) failed to comply with a lawful court order; (2) knew of

the order; and (3) has the present ability to comply with the order.”

A.C.B., ¶ 24. The court must also “describ[e] the means by which

the person may purge the contempt.” C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2).

¶ 15 A magistrate has broad discretion in deciding whether a

person is in contempt, and that finding will not be disturbed on

appeal absent a showing of an abuse of discretion. See People in

Interest of K.S-E., 2021 COA 93, ¶ 18. An abuse of discretion

occurs when the magistrate misconstrues or misapplies the law or

6 acts in a manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair manner.

Sheehan, ¶ 23.

¶ 16 Our review of a district court’s order adopting a magistrate’s

decision is effectively a second layer of appellate review, and we

must accept a magistrate’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous. In re Marriage of Carey, 2026 COA 3, ¶ 29; C.R.M. 7(j).

Factual findings are clearly erroneous only if there is no record

support for them. See In re Marriage of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80,

¶ 25. We review de novo the district court’s and magistrate’s legal

conclusions. Carey, ¶ 29.

B. Judicial Bias

¶ 17 To begin, father contends that the magistrate’s bias against

him deprived him of due process. He points to a statement the

magistrate made during a May 5, 2025, hearing, which took place

after he had already filed his notice of appeal on April 22, 2025.

Because we are limited to the record that was before the district

court, we will not consider this issue. See In re Marriage of Rivera,

91 P.3d 464, 466 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 18 Next, we reject father’s argument that the magistrate’s alleged

unfavorable evidentiary rulings against him during the contempt

7 hearing demonstrate bias. But unfavorable evidentiary rulings

alone are not enough to demonstrate bias. In re Marriage of Hatton,

160 P.3d 326, 330 (Colo. App. 2007) (“Adverse rulings, standing

alone, do not constitute grounds for claiming bias or prejudice.”);

see People v. Schupper, 124 P.3d 856, 859 (Colo. App. 2005) (noting

that the propriety of a district court’s rulings, whether right or

wrong, is not relevant in determining recusal issues and do not

alone indicate partiality), aff’d, 157 P.3d 516 (Colo. 2007).

C. January 2021 Order — Travel Itinerary Requirement

¶ 19 Father challenges the magistrate’s contempt finding.

Specifically, he says that the travel itinerary requirement of the

January 2021 order — which the January 2025 order found father

had violated — is unlawful, as that requirement stems from the

district court’s erroneous abduction prevention measures in its

November 2019 order. We disagree.

¶ 20 A district court may impose abduction prevention measures in

a child-custody proceeding if it finds that the evidence establishes a

“credible risk of abduction of the child.” § 14-13.5-104(1), C.R.S.

2025. In determining whether there is a credible risk of abduction,

the district court must consider various risk factors set forth in the

8 Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act. See

§ 14-13.5-107(1)(a)-(m). If, after considering the statutory factors,

the district court finds that there is a credible risk of abduction, it

“shall enter an abduction prevention order.” § 14-13.5-108(2); see

also In re Marriage of Badawiyeh, 2023 COA 4, ¶¶ 17, 21 (reversing

the imposition of abduction prevention measures under the

Uniform Child Abduction Prevention Act when the district court did

not make a specific finding that the father posed a credible risk of

abducting the children).

¶ 21 To start, father did not timely appeal the travel itinerary

requirement provision. See In re Marriage of Scott, (Colo. App. No.

23CA1432, Nov. 21, 2024) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e))

(dismissing father’s appeal of the November 2019 order as

untimely); In re Marriage of Scott, (Colo. App. No. 25CA0492, Dec.

11, 2025) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)) (rejecting father’s

jurisdictional challenge to the travel itinerary requirement

provision).

¶ 22 Nevertheless, in its November 2019 order, the district court

declined to impose abduction prevention measures. But mother

also sought “protective” relief in addition to the abduction

9 prevention measures. And the court then entered a travel itinerary

requirement that applied to both parties. It explained that the

parties’ extraordinarily high level of conflict was affecting the

children and that the requirement would reduce future disputes.

So, contrary to father’s argument, the court did not impose

abduction prevention measures but instead entered an order in the

children’s best interests, a decision well within its discretion. See In

re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 332 (Colo. App. 1996) (“The

[district] court can enter orders in the best interest of the

child[ren].”); see also In re Marriage of Zebedee, 778 P.2d 694, 699

(Colo. App. 1988) (concluding a district court may impose

reasonable conditions on a party’s parenting time if it finds that

doing so is in the child’s best interests); In re Marriage of Hunt, 870

P.2d 720, 724-26 (Mont. 1994) (no abuse of discretion in requiring

the noncustodial father to give the custodial mother his itinerary

and whereabouts during his visitation with the children).

¶ 23 Because the November 2019 order was within the district

court’s discretion — and was therefore lawful — the magistrate did

not err in this regard. See K.S-E., ¶ 18. And given our disposition,

we need not address father’s argument that the magistrate

10 prohibited him from asserting the defense that he had no duty to

comply with the underlying order because it was “void under

Badawiyeh.”

¶ 24 Father also asserts that the district court’s contempt finding

cannot stand because the November 2019 order violates his

fundamental rights under Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).

But he did not raise, and the district court did not address, this

constitutional issue. Because his argument is not preserved for

appellate review, we decline to address it. See People in Interest of

K.L-P., 148 P.3d 402, 403 (Colo. App. 2006) (“[A] party seeking

review of a magistrate’s decision must raise a particular issue in the

district court so that the district court may have an opportunity to

correct any error that may have been made by the magistrate.”); see

also C.R.M. 7(h) (“Any petition for review shall state with

particularity the alleged errors in the magistrate’s order or

judgment . . . .”).

¶ 25 Finally, father argues that the magistrate violated his due

process rights by excluding as hearsay his sworn affidavit

“challenging the lawfulness of the underlying orders.” But he does

not explain why that ruling was wrong. He does not identify an

11 exception to the hearsay rule, let alone show that the affidavit

should have been admitted. Instead, he simply says that the

affidavit was “proper evidence in motion practice” under C.R.C.P.

43(e) and “directly relevant.” We decline to address this

undeveloped argument. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA

149, ¶ 27 (refusing to consider an argument not supported by legal

authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see

also Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n v. Metro. Homes,

Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (noting we will “decline to assume the

mantle” when parties offer no supporting arguments for their

claims).

D. December 2024 Hearing — Punitive Sanction

¶ 26 At the December 2024 hearing, the magistrate sentenced

father to ninety-six hours in the county jail for his violation of the

January 2021 order. The magistrate ordered father to serve his

sentence immediately, which resulted in father missing the

Christmas holiday with the children. Father contends that the

magistrate should have considered the children’s best interests

upcoming Christmas parenting time. However, he provides us with

12 no authority and, we are aware of none, that requires a court to

weigh the impact of imprisonment on the contemnor’s own

parenting time. See In re Marriage of Nussbeck, 974 P.2d 493, 499

(Colo. 1999) (“Plainly and simply, a punitive contempt proceeding is

a matter between the court and the offending party.”).

¶ 27 Father also suggests that the ninety-six-hour jail sentence was

“disproportionate to the circumstances.” In support, he relies on In

re Marriage of Campbell, 140 P.3d 320, 322 (Colo. App. 2006), and

Nussbeck for the proposition that a district court must consider the

reasonableness and proportionality of contempt sanctions.

However, Campbell did not involve contempt, and Nussbeck does

not address proportionality of contempt sanctions. And father does

not tell us why the length of the sentence was unusually severe,

particularly in light of his willful and persistent violations of the

January 2021 order and the court’s authority to impose a jail

sentence of up to six months under these circumstances. See

C.R.C.P. 107(d)(1).

¶ 28 Father claims that the magistrate erred in imposing the jail

sentence because other sanctions were available, like scheduling

the sentence around his parenting time, imposing fines, or ordering

13 community service. Given the magistrate’s broad discretion and

that the sanction fell within the range of reasonable options, we

discern no error. See C.R.C.P. 107(a)(4); K.S-E., ¶ 18; see also

Carey, ¶ 32 (“In assessing whether a [district] court’s decision is

manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or unfair, we ask not whether

we would have reached a different result but, rather, whether the

[district] court’s decision fell within a range of reasonable options.”

(quoting E-470 Pub. Highway Auth. v. Revenig, 140 P.3d 227, 230-

31 (Colo. App. 2006))).

¶ 29 Moreover, the ninety-six-hour jail sentence was not a

modification of parenting time as father insists. The sentence was a

proper punitive sanction, and the magistrate had broad discretion

to enforce the order through contempt, including jail time, when the

party willfully refused to comply with the order. See K.S-E., ¶ 18;

see also Kourlis v. Port, 18 P.3d 770, 773 (Colo. App. 2000) (“[T]he

authority to punish contempt is an exercise of a [district] court’s

inherent powers to enforce obedience to its orders.”). The fact that

the jail sentence affected his parenting time does not transform it

into a modification; rather it reflects the consequence of his

noncompliance.

14 E. February 2022 Order — Children’s Extraordinary Medical Expenses

1. Contempt Finding

¶ 30 Father does not dispute the magistrate’s contempt finding as

to the February 2022 order, and we therefore accept it as true. See

In re Marriage of O’Connor, 2023 COA 35, ¶ 11.

2. Remedial Sanction

¶ 31 In determining the remedial sanction, the magistrate found

that mother spent $10,820.58 on the children’s extraordinary

medical expenses from 2022 through 2024. Father contests that

amount, asserting that the magistrate erred by including certain

expenses.

¶ 32 Citing section 14-10-115(10)(c), C.R.S. 2025, father argues

that the magistrate should have set aside the “mental health

expenses” because “no necessity finding was ever made.” Under

that provision,

[t]he amount to be added to the basic child support obligation shall be the actual amount of the total insurance premium that is attributable to the child who is the subject of the order. If this amount is not available or cannot be verified, the total cost of the premium should be divided by the total number of persons covered by the policy. The

15 cost per person derived from this calculation shall be multiplied by the number of children who are the subject of the order and who are covered under the policy. This amount shall be added to the basic child support obligation and shall be divided between the parents in proportion to their adjusted gross incomes.

¶ 33 Because father does not explain how that provision supports

his claim, we decline to address the issue. See Zander, ¶ 27. For

the same reason, we decline to address his one sentence assertion

that the magistrate should have excluded “family/couples” therapy

sessions as it was “definitely . . . not a specific-child only expense.”

See id.

¶ 34 Father also insists that the children’s “second round of

orthodontic braces” for each child totaling $7,850 should have been

excluded from mother’s claimed expenses because she failed to

consult with him. The record, however, shows that she had sole

decision-making responsibility, and although she had to consult

with father, she ultimately had the final say. Further, the court

previously found that he was looking for almost any reason to avoid

paying his one-half share of the uninsured medical expenses and,

therefore, ruled that she did not have to provide an explanation of

benefits.

16 ¶ 35 In all, we see no reason to disturb the magistrate’s finding that

mother spent $10,820.58 on the children’s extraordinary medical

expenses from 2022 through 2024. See Carey, ¶ 29.

¶ 36 Still, father contends that the district court erred by setting

the remedial sanction at $5,016.84 because the court failed to

exclude the $250 in annual extraordinary medical expenses per

child. We conclude that any error is harmless.

¶ 37 Under section 14-10-115(10)(h)(I), C.R.S. 2024, “[a]ny

extraordinary medical expenses incurred on behalf of the children

shall be added to the basic child support obligation and shall be

divided between the parties in proportion to their adjusted gross

incomes.”1 Extraordinary medical expenses are uninsured

expenses, including deductibles and copayments, in excess of $250

per child per calendar year. § 14-10-115(10)(h)(II); see In re

Marriage of Alvis, 2019 COA 97, ¶ 15. “Extraordinary medical

expenses include[] . . . such reasonable costs as are reasonably

necessary for . . . professional counseling or psychiatric therapy for

behavioral or mental health disorders . . . . ” § 14-10-115(10)(h)(II).

1 We cite the version of the statute in effect at the time of the court’s

ruling.

17 ¶ 38 The parties have two children, and mother sought, as a

remedial sanction, reimbursement for extraordinary medical

expenses incurred over three years. She indicated that she spent

$10,820.58 and that father’s share was $5,410.29, which with 8%

interest, came to $5,843.11. The magistrate imposed a remedial

sanction against father in the amount of $5,843.11.

¶ 39 In his petition for review, father asserted that the remedial

sanction amount should be reduced to account for the $250 annual

per-child exclusion. With two children over three years, that

exclusion totaled $1,500. In response, mother conceded that she

had not subtracted the $250 per child per calendar year when

calculating the remedial sanction.

¶ 40 On review, the district court began with mother’s total

extraordinary medical expenses for the children of $10,820.58. The

court then deducted $1,000, apparently to account for the $250

annual per-child exclusion for two years, leaving a balance of

$9,820.58. From there, it calculated father’s one-half share at

$4,910.29 plus interest. The court instructed the parties to file an

amended order for the magistrate to sign. The magistrate’s later

18 order included additional interest of $106.55, and the remedial

sanction was lowered to $5,016.84.

¶ 41 Father is right that the remedial sanction of $5,016.84 is

inaccurate. The error comes from the district court not excluding

$500 more in extraordinary medical expenses and the magistrate

not properly calculating the statutory interest.

¶ 42 We accept mother’s $10,820.58 in extraordinary medical

expenses from 2022 through 2024. Then, after subtracting $1,500,

which represents the $250 exclusion for each child for three years,

a balance of $9,320.58 remains. Father’s one-half share of that

amount is $4,660.29. However, although the magistrate ordered

statutory interest to apply to the sanction, he only added $106.55

to the remedial sanction amount. Statutory interest is 8% per

year — which rises to 10% per year for child support arrearages

and debts — compounded annually. §§ 5-12-101, 14-14-106(1)(b),

C.R.S. 2025. Regardless of how statutory interest is applied to

father’s remedial sanction amount, it would have raised the amount

that he owed by more than $1,000.

¶ 43 But we only reverse if the error affects a party’s substantial

rights. See C.A.R. 35(c) (“The appellate court may disregard any

19 error or defect not affecting the substantial rights of the parties.”).

An error affects a party’s substantial rights “only if it can be said

with fair assurance that the error substantially influenced the

outcome of the case or impaired the basic fairness of the

[proceeding] itself.” Stockdale v. Ellsworth, 2017 CO 109, ¶ 32

(quoting Laura A. Newman, LLC v. Roberts, 2016 CO 9, ¶ 24). We

conclude this error did not.

¶ 44 The district court ordered father to pay $5,016.84 instead of

the amount including statutory interest that the magistrate should

have used. The error inured to father’s benefit, meaning that

correcting it would increase his remedial sanction by more than

$1,000. Thus, any error was harmless and does not require

reversal. See C.A.R. 35(c).

III. Disposition

¶ 45 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.