23CA1432 Marriage of Scott 11-21-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1432 El Paso County District Court No. 17DR2901 Honorable Russel H. Granger, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Jordan Marc Scott,
Appellant,
and
Crystal Renee Richmond,
Appellee.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDERS VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Freyre and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 21, 2024
Jordan Marc Scott, Pro Se
No appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving
Jordan Marc Scott (father) and Crystal Renee Scott, now known as
Crystal Richmond (mother), father appeals the following orders:
(1) a July 18, 2023, order denying his motion to modify parental
responsibilities and child support (July 18 Order); (2) an August 1,
2023, order denying his motion to reconsider the July 18 Order
(August 1 Order); and (3) a November 1, 2019, order, which
requires him to give mother the children’s travel itinerary when he
takes them on vacation (November 1 Order). We dismiss the appeal
with prejudice in part and dismiss without prejudice in part.
I. July 18 and August 1 Orders
¶2 Father contends, and we agree, that we lack jurisdiction to
review the July 18 and August 1 orders, either because they are not
final and appealable or because his combined motion for
reconsideration and disqualification stands as a barrier to finality.
A. Relevant Facts
¶3 When the parties’ marriage ended in 2019, the district court
granted equal parenting time and joint decision-making
responsibility for their two children and ordered father to pay
mother monthly child support.
1 ¶4 In September 2020, the district court reallocated parental
responsibilities, naming mother the children’s primary residential
parent and sole decision-maker. The court also increased father’s
monthly child support obligation to $1,821.
¶5 Two years later, father filed a motion to modify parental
responsibilities and child support (modification motion). The
district court set the modification motion for a contested hearing on
its trailing docket on July 6, 2023, with a firm date on August 17,
2023.
¶6 Meanwhile, the district court issued a case management order
requiring the parties, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16.2(e), to exchange
mandatory disclosures and file updated sworn financial statements.
¶7 After both parties filed their sworn financial statements,
mother moved to compel discovery from father. At the July 6
hearing, the district court ordered father to respond to mother’s
discovery requests within fourteen days and continued the matter
to the firm date of August 17th.
¶8 On July 14, 2023, father objected to most, if not all, of
mother’s discovery requests, arguing that they were not relevant.
2 ¶9 On July 18, 2023, the district court issued a written order
denying father’s modification motion. In doing so, the court
determined that father failed to comply with its order compelling
discovery, noting that he simply repeated the same objections that
had been considered and rejected during the July 6th hearing. But
viewing the denial as a “significant sanction,” the court stated that
it would allow a request for “reconsideration” if father provided the
required discovery within seven days. The court noted that,
because father had the ability to cure his discovery deficiencies, its
order was not final and appealable, but it added that if he did not
produce the required discovery within seven days, the order would
become final and appealable.
¶ 10 On July 24, 2023, father filed a combined post-trial motion for
reconsideration and disqualification of the judge under C.R.C.P. 97.
He electronically signed, under penalty of perjury, that the
statements in the motion were true and correct.
¶ 11 On August 1, 2023, the district court denied father’s request
for reconsideration, but it did not address his request for
disqualification.
3 B. Relevant Law
¶ 12 An appeal may be dismissed if it is from a nonfinal order. See
C.A.R. 1(a) (appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of final orders);
§ 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2024 (same); see also Scott v. Scott, 2018
COA 25, ¶ 11 (a final order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to review
on appeal). An order is final and therefore appealable when it
disposes of the litigation such that there is nothing further for the
court to do other than execute on the judgment. In re Marriage of
January, 2019 COA 87, ¶ 11; see also In re Marriage of Nelson,
2012 COA 205, ¶ 10.
C. Analysis
¶ 13 We conclude that the July 18 Order, when entered, was not
final for purposes of appeal as it did not end the litigation on the
merits and left more for the court to do. See January, ¶ 11; see
also Nelson, ¶ 10. For example, the July 18 Order gave father a
fixed time to meet his discovery obligations and also invited him to
pursue “reconsideration” of the order. Indeed, the order pointed out
4 that “[s]ince [father] has 7 days to cure, this [order] shall not be
considered a final order for appeal.”1
¶ 14 We further conclude that the August 1 Order is not final and
appealable. Following the entry of the July 18 Order, father filed a
combined post-trial motion, seeking reconsideration2 as well as
disqualification of the judge under C.R.C.P. 97. The August 1
Order denied his reconsideration request, but there is nothing in
the order either acknowledging or ruling on father’s request for
1 We recognize that the July 18 Order also indicated that if father
did not produce the required discovery within seven days, “the order [would] become final and appealable.” And while father did not supplement his discovery responses, he filed a combined post- trial motion for reconsideration (as instructed) and, in the same motion, sought disqualification of the judge under C.R.C.P. 97. In it, he maintained that his discovery obligations were completed on July 14; asserted that the judge refused to accept his discovery responses because of bias and prejudice against him; and asked that the judge disqualify himself. 2 We observe that father’s request for reconsideration of the July 18
Order cannot be construed as a C.R.C.P. 59 motion for reconsideration as no final order had entered. See C.R.C.P. 59(a) (authorizes relief from final orders); see also Przekurat v. Torres, 2016 COA 177, ¶ 53 (“[A] C.R.C.P. 59 motion may only be filed to challenge a final order or judgment, not a non-final or interlocutory order or judgment.”), aff’d, 2018 CO 69, ¶ 53.
5 ¶ 15 C.R.C.P. 97 provides that upon the filing of a motion to recuse,
“all other proceedings in the case shall be suspended until a ruling
is made thereon.”
¶ 16 Thus, once father requested disqualification, the district court
had to rule on that request before addressing father’s request for
reconsideration. The court did not address the C.R.C.P. 97 motion,
however, and as a result, we must vacate the August 1 Order. See
Johnson v. Dist. Ct., 674 P.2d 952, 957 (Colo. 1984) (because the
district court lacked authority to deny a motion for a change of
venue until a disqualification motion was decided, the denial was
vacated).
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23CA1432 Marriage of Scott 11-21-2024
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1432 El Paso County District Court No. 17DR2901 Honorable Russel H. Granger, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Jordan Marc Scott,
Appellant,
and
Crystal Renee Richmond,
Appellee.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART, ORDERS VACATED, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE GROVE Freyre and Lum, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 21, 2024
Jordan Marc Scott, Pro Se
No appearance for Appellee ¶1 In this post-dissolution of marriage proceeding involving
Jordan Marc Scott (father) and Crystal Renee Scott, now known as
Crystal Richmond (mother), father appeals the following orders:
(1) a July 18, 2023, order denying his motion to modify parental
responsibilities and child support (July 18 Order); (2) an August 1,
2023, order denying his motion to reconsider the July 18 Order
(August 1 Order); and (3) a November 1, 2019, order, which
requires him to give mother the children’s travel itinerary when he
takes them on vacation (November 1 Order). We dismiss the appeal
with prejudice in part and dismiss without prejudice in part.
I. July 18 and August 1 Orders
¶2 Father contends, and we agree, that we lack jurisdiction to
review the July 18 and August 1 orders, either because they are not
final and appealable or because his combined motion for
reconsideration and disqualification stands as a barrier to finality.
A. Relevant Facts
¶3 When the parties’ marriage ended in 2019, the district court
granted equal parenting time and joint decision-making
responsibility for their two children and ordered father to pay
mother monthly child support.
1 ¶4 In September 2020, the district court reallocated parental
responsibilities, naming mother the children’s primary residential
parent and sole decision-maker. The court also increased father’s
monthly child support obligation to $1,821.
¶5 Two years later, father filed a motion to modify parental
responsibilities and child support (modification motion). The
district court set the modification motion for a contested hearing on
its trailing docket on July 6, 2023, with a firm date on August 17,
2023.
¶6 Meanwhile, the district court issued a case management order
requiring the parties, pursuant to C.R.C.P. 16.2(e), to exchange
mandatory disclosures and file updated sworn financial statements.
¶7 After both parties filed their sworn financial statements,
mother moved to compel discovery from father. At the July 6
hearing, the district court ordered father to respond to mother’s
discovery requests within fourteen days and continued the matter
to the firm date of August 17th.
¶8 On July 14, 2023, father objected to most, if not all, of
mother’s discovery requests, arguing that they were not relevant.
2 ¶9 On July 18, 2023, the district court issued a written order
denying father’s modification motion. In doing so, the court
determined that father failed to comply with its order compelling
discovery, noting that he simply repeated the same objections that
had been considered and rejected during the July 6th hearing. But
viewing the denial as a “significant sanction,” the court stated that
it would allow a request for “reconsideration” if father provided the
required discovery within seven days. The court noted that,
because father had the ability to cure his discovery deficiencies, its
order was not final and appealable, but it added that if he did not
produce the required discovery within seven days, the order would
become final and appealable.
¶ 10 On July 24, 2023, father filed a combined post-trial motion for
reconsideration and disqualification of the judge under C.R.C.P. 97.
He electronically signed, under penalty of perjury, that the
statements in the motion were true and correct.
¶ 11 On August 1, 2023, the district court denied father’s request
for reconsideration, but it did not address his request for
disqualification.
3 B. Relevant Law
¶ 12 An appeal may be dismissed if it is from a nonfinal order. See
C.A.R. 1(a) (appellate jurisdiction is limited to review of final orders);
§ 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2024 (same); see also Scott v. Scott, 2018
COA 25, ¶ 11 (a final order is a jurisdictional prerequisite to review
on appeal). An order is final and therefore appealable when it
disposes of the litigation such that there is nothing further for the
court to do other than execute on the judgment. In re Marriage of
January, 2019 COA 87, ¶ 11; see also In re Marriage of Nelson,
2012 COA 205, ¶ 10.
C. Analysis
¶ 13 We conclude that the July 18 Order, when entered, was not
final for purposes of appeal as it did not end the litigation on the
merits and left more for the court to do. See January, ¶ 11; see
also Nelson, ¶ 10. For example, the July 18 Order gave father a
fixed time to meet his discovery obligations and also invited him to
pursue “reconsideration” of the order. Indeed, the order pointed out
4 that “[s]ince [father] has 7 days to cure, this [order] shall not be
considered a final order for appeal.”1
¶ 14 We further conclude that the August 1 Order is not final and
appealable. Following the entry of the July 18 Order, father filed a
combined post-trial motion, seeking reconsideration2 as well as
disqualification of the judge under C.R.C.P. 97. The August 1
Order denied his reconsideration request, but there is nothing in
the order either acknowledging or ruling on father’s request for
1 We recognize that the July 18 Order also indicated that if father
did not produce the required discovery within seven days, “the order [would] become final and appealable.” And while father did not supplement his discovery responses, he filed a combined post- trial motion for reconsideration (as instructed) and, in the same motion, sought disqualification of the judge under C.R.C.P. 97. In it, he maintained that his discovery obligations were completed on July 14; asserted that the judge refused to accept his discovery responses because of bias and prejudice against him; and asked that the judge disqualify himself. 2 We observe that father’s request for reconsideration of the July 18
Order cannot be construed as a C.R.C.P. 59 motion for reconsideration as no final order had entered. See C.R.C.P. 59(a) (authorizes relief from final orders); see also Przekurat v. Torres, 2016 COA 177, ¶ 53 (“[A] C.R.C.P. 59 motion may only be filed to challenge a final order or judgment, not a non-final or interlocutory order or judgment.”), aff’d, 2018 CO 69, ¶ 53.
5 ¶ 15 C.R.C.P. 97 provides that upon the filing of a motion to recuse,
“all other proceedings in the case shall be suspended until a ruling
is made thereon.”
¶ 16 Thus, once father requested disqualification, the district court
had to rule on that request before addressing father’s request for
reconsideration. The court did not address the C.R.C.P. 97 motion,
however, and as a result, we must vacate the August 1 Order. See
Johnson v. Dist. Ct., 674 P.2d 952, 957 (Colo. 1984) (because the
district court lacked authority to deny a motion for a change of
venue until a disqualification motion was decided, the denial was
vacated).
¶ 17 Because the August 1 Order is vacated, the July 18 Order is
not final and appealable as father’s combined post-trial motion for
reconsideration and disqualification remains pending below. See In
re Marriage of Salby, 126 P.3d 291, 295 (Colo. App. 2005) (an order
that does not resolve all issues between the parties cannot be
appealed until all final orders are entered); see also Nguyen v. Lai,
2022 COA 141, ¶ 14.
¶ 18 We therefore do not have jurisdiction over this portion of the
appeal and dismiss it without prejudice. See C.A.R. 1(a)(1); see also
6 § 13-4-102(1). When the district court enters a final order, either
party may appeal that order as well as any ruling on father’s motion
for disqualification.
¶ 19 Given our disposition, we need not address father’s other
contentions.
II. November 1 Order
¶ 20 On November 1, 2019, the district court entered an order
requiring father to provide mother with the children’s travel
itinerary when he takes them on vacation.
¶ 21 At the July 6, 2023, hearing, the district court enforced that
order, directing father to give mother an itinerary of an upcoming
two-week vacation with the children.
¶ 22 Father now asks us to overturn the November 1 Order —
which was entered more than three years before he filed his notice
of appeal in this court. But that order was final when it was
entered. Because father did not timely appeal it, we dismiss this
part of the appeal with prejudice. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1) (a party is
required to appeal a final order within forty-nine days); see also In
re Marriage of Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 12 (issues resolved in an
order not appealed are not properly before the reviewing court).
7 III. Disposition
¶ 23 We dismiss without prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction, the part
of the appeal concerning the July 18 Order so that the district court
may enter a final order as to father’s combined post-trial motion for
reconsideration and disqualification. Once a final order has been
entered below, either party may seek appellate review.
¶ 24 We vacate the August 1 Order denying father’s request for
reconsideration because the district court had no authority to rule
on the matter unless and until it addressed father’s request for
¶ 25 We dismiss with prejudice, for lack of jurisdiction, the part of
the appeal concerning father’s challenge to the district court’s
November 1 Order.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE LUM concur.