09/15/2026
DA 26-0138
Case Number: DA 26-0138
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 222N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
ROBERTA JEAN SCOBEE, A/K/A ROBERTA JEAN WHITE,
Petitioner and Appellant, and GEORGE HARRISON WHITE, Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, In and For the County of Yellowstone, Cause No. DR 17-1327 Honorable Rod Souza, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Roberta Jean Scobee, Self-Represented, Shepherd, Montana For Appellee:
Ryan A. Ballard, David L. Vicevich, Vicevich Law, Butte, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: August 12, 2026 Decided: September 15, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 This appeal arises from two orders denying relief following the December 2022 decree of dissolution of marriage entered in the Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County. Petitioner Roberta Jean Scobee (Scobee) and Respondent George Harrison White (White) resolved their property and parenting disputes, agreeing that Scobee would pay child support for their two children beginning in September 2021, with the Child Support Services Division (CSSD) to calculate the support amount. On January 11, 2024, Scobee consented to an administrative modification that set support at $314 per month per child, retroactive to September 2021.
¶3 In August 2024, White moved for an order to show cause based on Scobee’s failure to pay the stipulated child support. After a September 2024 hearing, the District Court found Scobee in contempt and allowed her to purge the contempt by paying approximately $21,125 within 90 days. When Scobee failed to purge the contempt, the District Court entered an April 23, 2025 order requiring Scobee to serve five days on the Yellowstone County Sheriff’s Labor Detail. Scobee appealed.
¶4 In January 2026, we affirmed the April 23, 2025 order and declined to revisit matters resolved by the December 2022 decree. While that appeal remained pending, Scobee filed
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a July 3, 2025 motion to amend the parenting plan, a supporting affidavit, and a proposed amended parenting plan. The District Court denied that motion without prejudice because the pending appeal had divested it of jurisdiction.
¶5 In December 2025, Scobee filed a motion under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) and a merged motion seeking relief from judgment, sanctions, emergency relief, enforcement, and amendment of the parenting plan. On January 27, 2026, before the District Court ruled on those motions, Scobee filed a separate motion for Rule 60 relief based on a newly discovered recording of a June 2018 administrative child-support hearing. The District Court denied the December motions on February 3, 2026, and the recording-based motion on February 26, 2026.
¶6 Scobee appeals both orders. We restate the issues as follows: (1) whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Scobee’s parenting-related requests for relief, sanctions, emergency relief, enforcement, and parenting plan amendments; (2) whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying Rule 60 relief from judgment based on the newly located June 2018 audio recording; and (3) whether the District Court abused its discretion by denying relief based on alleged financial misrepresentations and an incomplete financial record. We affirm.
¶7 Scobee’s timely appeal places the February 3 and February 26, 2026 orders before us. This appeal does not revive review of the December 2022 decree or parenting plan, the September 2024 contempt order, the November 2024 temporary suspension of parenting time, or the April 2025 labor-detail order. An appeal from the denial of Rule 60 relief does not substitute for a timely appeal from the underlying judgment. Donovan v. Graff,
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248 Mont. 21, 25, 808 P.2d 491, 494 (1991). We consider the earlier proceedings only as necessary to determine whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying the post-judgment motions now before us.
¶8 In cases not involving a default judgment, we review a district court’s denial of a motion filed under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Wagenman, 2016 MT 176, ¶ 8, 384 Mont. 149, 376 P.3d 121. We review parenting-plan decisions for abuse of discretion, underlying findings of fact for clear error, and conclusions of law for correctness. In re Marriage of Cline, 2026 MT 108, ¶ 16, 428 Mont. 158, ___ P.3d ___; In re Marriage of Handy, 2026 MT 90, ¶ 14, 428 Mont. 1, 588 P.3d 816; Guill v. Guill, 2014 MT 316, ¶ 9, 377 Mont. 216, 339 P.3d 81.
¶9 Our review is confined to the certified District Court record. M. R. App. P. 8(1); Jerome v. Jerome, 175 Mont. 429, 431, 574 P.2d 997, 998 (1978). We therefore consider materials in Scobee’s appellate appendix only to the extent she identifies a corresponding document that formed part of the certified record and was before the District Court when it ruled. Although Scobee’s briefing does not clearly distinguish her Rule 60, amendment, or enforcement theories, her principal claims are discernible, and White responded to them. Moreover, to the extent Scobee challenges lower-court representations regarding service, she fails to establish that any discrepancy affected either February order. We address the preserved claims rather than dismiss the appeal. Requests for Parenting-Plan Amendments, Enforcement & Related Relief
¶10 Scobee’s parenting-related arguments implicate three distinct forms of relief: (1) relief from the 2022 judgment under Rule 60, (2) prospective amendment based on later
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events, and (3) enforcement of the existing agreed-upon parenting plan. Each rests on a different legal basis.
¶11 To the extent Scobee sought relief from the 2022 judgment under Rule 60(b)(3), her request was untimely and substantively deficient. A motion under Rule 60(b)(3) must be filed no more than one year after entry of judgment. M. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Rule 60(b)(3) requires fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct that prevented a fair submission of the controversy resulting in the judgment under attack. See M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1), (3); In re Marriage of Weber, 2004 MT 211, ¶¶ 25-26, 322 Mont. 341, 96 P.3d 716; In re Marriage of Cline, ¶ 22. Scobee filed her motion more than one year after entry of the 2022 judgment, identified no false representation made during the 2022 proceeding, and did not explain how White prevented her from presenting her position. Conduct allegedly occurring in 2024 and 2025 does not establish that White procured the 2022 stipulated parenting plan through fraud. See Roberts v. Nickey, 2002 MT 37, ¶ 22, 308 Mont. 335, 43 P.3d 263. The District Court correctly concluded that later parenting disputes cannot retroactively prove procurement fraud. Scobee’s invocation of fraud upon the court does not alter that result. Fraud upon the court concerns misconduct directed at the judicial process itself that deprives the adversary of an opportunity to obtain trial or fully present her case. See Wise v. Nirider, 261 Mont. 310, 316, 862 P.2d 1128, 1132 (1993) (“Generally, fraud between the parties, without more, does not rise to the level of fraud upon the court.”); Falcon v. Faulkner, 273 Mont. 327, 332, 903 P.2d 197, 200 (1995). Alleged violations of an existing parenting plan years after its entry do not constitute fraud upon the court in procurement of the earlier judgment.
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¶12 A district court “may in its discretion amend a prior parenting plan if it finds, upon the basis of facts that have arisen since the prior plan or that were unknown to the court at the time of entry of the prior plan, that a change has occurred” in the child’s circumstances and “the amendment is necessary to serve” the child’s best interest. Section 40-4-219(1), MCA. The bases for the amendment must be set forth in “an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the requested . . . amendment.” Section 40-4-220(1), MCA. Scobee’s request for amendment did not comply with §§ 40-4-219 and 40-4-220, MCA. Section 40-4-219(1)(a)(iv), MCA, recognizes that a parent’s willful and consistent refusal to allow contact or attempt to frustrate or deny contact may support amendment. With the motion for amendment of a parenting plan, a party seeking the amendment must file and serve, in addition to the affidavit required by § 40-4-220(1), MCA, a proposed amended parenting plan. Section 40-4-219(7), MCA. Unless the affidavits establish adequate cause for a hearing based on the child’s best interests, the court shall deny the motion. Section 40-4-220(1), MCA. In the motion Scobee filed in December, she did not establish the statutorily-required changed-circumstances and best-interest requirements, identify the provisions she sought to amend, include a proposed amended parenting plan, or include the affidavit required by § 40-4-220(1), MCA. In re Marriage of Handy does not require reversal. In In re Marriage of Handy, the moving parent properly invoked the amendment statutes and made the threshold showing of adequate cause to trigger the statutorily-mandated evidentiary hearing, but the district court then resolved disputed material facts and amended the parenting plan without the required evidentiary hearing.
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In re Marriage of Handy, ¶¶ 16-20. In this case, the District Court denied a filing that never satisfied the threshold statutory requirements for amendment.
¶13 Here, the District Court denied an omnibus Rule 60 filing that did not satisfy the statutory amendment procedure. We do not adopt the District Court’s categorical statement that one missed weekend can never contribute to changed circumstances. An isolated scheduling incident ordinarily will not justify permanent amendment, but its significance depends on context, including whether it forms part of a willful and consistent pattern under § 40-4-219(1)(a)(iv), MCA. We affirm the denial of amendment because Scobee did not present a procedurally sufficient request, not because the alleged later conduct could never support prospective relief.
¶14 The December 2025 cruise communications support Scobee’s assertion that White failed to provide advance notice, violated parenting-time rules by scheduling travel during Scobee’s parenting weekend, and did not provide a timely itinerary. White acknowledged the communication failure, apologized, and offered replacement time. Those facts do not establish reversible error in the denial of Scobee’s omnibus motion. Although § 40-4-234, MCA, provides remedies for noncompliance with a parenting plan, Scobee did not develop an enforcement argument sufficient to establish reversible error. She did not identify the particular provision she sought to enforce, request a defined make-up schedule or authorized remedy, or establish the alleged broader parenting plan pattern through materials demonstrably within the certified record. To the extent Scobee directly challenges the November 2024 temporary suspension order, that order is not before us. Nothing in this decision bars a properly supported prospective motion to enforce or amend
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the parenting plan based on admissible evidence of later conduct. Our decision concerns only the motions and record presently before us. The June 2018 Administrative Child-Support Recording
¶15 In January 2026, the Office of Administrative Hearings informed Scobee that it had located a recording of the June 2018 administrative child-support hearing. Although State information technology restrictions prevented the District Court from playing the USB device, the court assumed the recording existed, accepted Scobee’s description of the hearing, and concluded that it would not affect her later obligations.
¶16 The newly located recording did not establish a mistake under Rule 60(b)(1). Scobee participated in the 2018 hearing and had firsthand knowledge of the proceeding before she entered the 2022 settlement and signed the January 11, 2024 administrative modification. The later discovery of a recording of a proceeding in which she participated did not establish a mistake arising from ignorance, surprise, or an unintentional omission. See In re Estate of Johnson, 2024 MT 224, ¶ 28, 418 Mont. 198, 557 P.3d 36. The recording likewise did not establish fraud under Rule 60(b)(3). Scobee did not identify a particular representation concerning the hearing, who made it, why it was false, or how it prevented her from presenting her position. See In re Marriage of Hopper, 1999 MT 310, ¶ 26, 297 Mont. 225, 991 P.2d 960; In re Marriage of Cline, ¶ 22.
¶17 The District Court did not deny relief solely because it could not play the USB device. We therefore need not decide whether technological incompatibility alone could justify declining to consider material evidence. The 2022 settlement and January 2024 administrative modification independently required Scobee to pay child support, fixed the
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amount at $314 per month per child, and made the obligation effective September 2021. Because the contempt order enforced those later obligations, the asserted statement during the 2018 hearing did not negate the child-support obligation Scobee later accepted. Even assuming the administrative law judge discussed White’s responsibility for household expenses in 2018, that discussion did not negate the separate child-support obligation Scobee later accepted. Because Scobee did not make a specific proffer showing how the recording could undermine the later agreements on which the support obligation rested, she cannot demonstrate that the District Court’s inability to play it caused her prejudice. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Rule 60 relief based on the recording. Alleged Financial Misrepresentations
¶18 White argues that Scobee’s financial-disclosure claims are untimely. We need not determine the full scope of post-judgment relief potentially available under §§ 40-4-252(6), MCA, and 40-4-253(5), MCA. Scobee did not invoke those provisions in the motions underlying the February 2026 orders, identify a qualifying declaration containing perjury, identify a judgment affected by such perjury, or establish the statutory prerequisites for relief.
¶19 Scobee also does not identify where the C-1 through C-4 materials were filed or admitted, show that she presented them with the motions under review, or direct the District Court to an existing record counterpart. Scobee cannot establish an abuse of discretion by asking this Court to conduct a new financial investigation from an appellate appendix.
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¶20 The asserted disparity between White’s reported annual income and documents reflecting substantial assets or business interests did not, by itself, establish fraud. Annual income, gross business receipts, partnership allocations, capital-account balances, equity, and total assets are different financial measures. Scobee did not explain which figure should have entered a particular support calculation, show that CSSD omitted it, or identify a specific knowingly false statement on which the District Court relied. Rule 60(c)(1) also barred Scobee’s December 2025 Rule 60(b)(3) motion to the extent she sought to reopen the December 2022 decree. To obtain relief from a later order, she still had to identify specific and material fraud that prevented a fair submission of the controversy resulting in that order. Scobee failed to do so.
¶21 Scobee’s allegation that White restricted her access to joint accounts may concern a separate dispute over household-expense disagreements, but it does not identify fraud in obtaining the later child-support obligation or establish grounds for Rule 60 relief from the orders now before us.
¶22 Scobee therefore failed to establish a statutory nondisclosure claim, satisfy Rule 60(b)(3), or provide a record permitting appellate review of her financial allegations. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief on this issue. White’s Vexatious-Litigant Request
¶23 White asks this Court to designate Scobee a vexatious litigant and require her to obtain prefiling approval in every Montana court. The record contains no findings or developed record directed to the statewide filing restriction White requests. We decline to consider the request on this record.
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¶24 We affirm the District Court’s February 3 and February 26, 2026 orders. We decline to address White’s request that this Court designate Scobee a vexatious litigant.
¶25 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent or modify existing precedent.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
We Concur:
/S/ CORY J. SWANSON /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON