05/19/2026
DA 25-0630 Case Number: DA 25-0630
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
2026 MT 108
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:
LYNLEA A. CLINE,
Petitioner and Appellee,
and
DAVID R. PRITCHARD,
Respondent and Appellant.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DR-24-433 Honorable John W. Larson, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
David R. Pritchard, Self-Represented, Missoula, Montana
For Appellee:
Thomas H. Stanton, Wells & McKittrick, P.C., Missoula, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: April 15, 2026
Decided: May 19, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________ Clerk Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 David Pritchard appeals pro se various orders of the Montana Fourth Judicial
District Court entered during dissolution proceedings involving his former wife, Lynlea
Cline. We address the following restated issues:
1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Pritchard’s motions to set aside the Final Decree.
2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding Cline a share of equity in the parties’ marital home.
3. Whether Cline is entitled to sanctions.
Pritchard contends he lacked notice of proceedings and that the District Court’s Final
Decree unlawfully awarded Cline equity in the parties’ marital home. Cline denies
Pritchard’s claims and asks this Court to sanction him for a frivolous appeal. We affirm
the District Court on all matters and deny Cline’s request for sanctions.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Dissolution Proceedings: Default Judgment and Final Decree
¶2 After 12 years of marriage, Cline filed a dissolution petition on June 19, 2024, in
the Fourth Judicial District Court, asking the court to dissolve the parties’ marriage and
equitably distribute their marital property and debts if the parties were otherwise unable to
agree on distribution. On June 21, 2024, the District Court issued a summons to Pritchard,
ordering him to answer the petition within 21 days of service and warning: “If you fail to
appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief demanded in
the petition.” The summons included a temporary economic restraining order. A process
2 server certified personal service of the petition and summons on Pritchard at his home
address in Missoula on October 31, 2024.
¶3 On December 2, 2024, after Pritchard failed to respond or otherwise appear, Cline
filed a request for entry of default, which the district court clerk issued that day. Cline’s
attorney certified service of the request for and notice of entry of default on Pritchard by
email. Pritchard later argued that email service was improper under M. R. Civ. P. 5 because
he had not consented to electronic service. In later court filings, Pritchard included a copy
of Cline’s December 3, 2024 email to him showing the request for and notice of entry of
default attached. Pritchard also later referenced arguments Cline’s lawyer made “when he
submitted for default” in text messages Pritchard submitted to the District Court, further
indicating notice of the entry of default. Nevertheless, Pritchard still did not appear.
¶4 One week later, Cline filed a request for hearing on the uncontested dissolution
matter, certifying service of the hearing request on Pritchard by email. By order dated
December 13, 2024, the court set a hearing on the dissolution matter for January 2, 2025,
and, according to the order, copied Pritchard. Pritchard later denied receiving any notice
of the hearing and submitted emails from the clerk of court confirming that the clerk’s
office did not send Pritchard the court’s setting order.1 As discussed below, we need not
resolve whether Pritchard actually received separate notice of the January 2, 2025 hearing
because he had not appeared before default judgment was sought.
1 Pritchard did not file evidence of this email exchange with the court, however, until August 29, 2025, after the court’s order on his second motion to set aside the decree. 3 ¶5 At the January 2, 2025 hearing, which Pritchard did not attend, Cline testified as to
her proposed distribution of the marital estate. That same day, the District Court issued its
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decree, copying Pritchard. As pertinent
to this appeal,2 the court ordered that Pritchard would receive the parties’ marital home in
Missoula, but that he must remove Cline from any associated liability and pay Cline
“$100,000 from the equity of the residence” within 90 days of the decree.3 After that,
Pritchard could receive the property. But, if he failed to remove Cline from liability or pay
her $100,000 within the 90-day timeframe, the house was to be listed and sold immediately,
and Cline was to receive $100,000 of the net proceeds and Pritchard the remainder.
Pritchard’s First Rule 55(c)/60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Final Decree
¶6 On January 28, 2025, Pritchard filed a pro se M. R. Civ. P. 55(c)/60(b) motion to
set aside the default judgment on two primary grounds: he had no notice of the January
2025 hearing and believed he did not have to respond to Cline’s petition, and the $100,000
equity award was unsupported and inequitable.
¶7 In his supporting affidavit, Pritchard admitted he was personally served but did not
respond or appear in the proceedings because Cline told him he did not have to. Also,
believing their ongoing negotiations “regarding . . . the equity in the marital home” would
be resolved “without court intervention,” Pritchard claimed the $100,000 equity award
2 Pritchard stated below and on appeal that he “does not challenge the dissolution itself, the parenting plan, or any non-property aspect of the decree.” We therefore do not address any other aspect of distribution under the decree beyond the disputed $100,000 equity award. 3 The record shows the parties financed the purchase of their marital home through a U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs loan (a VA loan). 4 “came as a surprise” because they had not settled on a dollar amount and Cline did not state
one in her petition. Pritchard repeatedly asserted that he did not contest awarding Cline a
share of the home’s equity, but instead disagreed with the $100,000 award, arguing it was
based on a “general market evaluation of the area” and not an actual home appraisal.4
¶8 Cline disputed all Pritchard’s claims. She personally handed Pritchard the
dissolution petition days after filing it, but he refused to sign the acknowledgment of
service, so she hired a process server who personally served Pritchard with the dissolution
petition and summons on October 31, 2024. Cline denied telling Pritchard not to respond,
and asserted Pritchard instead intentionally declined to respond or appear. Cline also stated
that the $100,000 equity award was based on a “market analysis” that the parties’ realtor
prepared and insisted the award was equitable.
¶9 In reply, Pritchard admitted Cline handed him the dissolution documents on
June 24, 2024, and he opened them in her presence. Pritchard explained he did not sign
the acknowledgment of service because he believed it unnecessary given his being
personally served.5 He also admitted that, though he started to, he “did not respond in
writing to the court,” but only because of Cline’s representations. Pritchard included
4 For example, Pritchard said in briefing, “I am NOT contesting that Ms. Cline is entitled to an appropriate share of equity in the home” and “I cannot state this enough, I do believe Ms. Cline is entitled to equity out of the home.” He also supplied text messages wherein he told Cline the same, i.e., “you said you needed some equity which I agreed and believe you’re entitled to” and “I said and still believe that you are entitled to some equity out of the house.” 5 Cline’s June 24, 2024 delivery of the petition alone did not constitute service of process because the summons and petition must be served together. M. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). Personal service was accomplished on October 31, 2024, when the process server delivered the petition and summons to Pritchard. M. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). 5 county property tax assessment documents, a string of text messages, and various emails
as proof that he lacked notice of the January 2, 2025 default dissolution hearing and that
Cline’s property valuation was incorrect.
¶10 On March 10, 2025, the District Court issued an order denying Pritchard’s motion
to set aside the default judgment. The court concluded Pritchard had actual notice of the
dissolution proceeding for six months prior to entry of the Final Decree in January 2025,
yet he failed to respond or appear at any time. Also, Pritchard’s documentation did not
establish any inequity, so the court sustained the decree.
Pritchard’s Second Rule 55(c)/60(b) Motion to Set Aside the Final Decree
¶11 On April 1, 2025, two days before expiration of the 90-day timeframe to pay Cline
$100,000 and remove her from liability on the home, Pritchard filed a motion for a
90-day extension of the decree deadline. He asserted he was in the process of refinancing,
waiting on appraisal, and needed an extension to finalize and satisfy his obligations under
the decree. That same day, the District Court issued an order extending the deadline
to July 8, 2025.
¶12 On July 18, 2025, ten days past the new deadline, Pritchard filed a second
M. R. Civ. P. 55(c)/60(b) motion to set aside the Final Decree. His second motion was
based on the same two grounds as his first: lack of notice and improper distribution of the
marital home. This time, however, Pritchard added new arguments in support of his claims.
In addition to lack of notice, Pritchard claimed, for the first time, that any service on him
by email was improper because he did not consent to email service under M. R. Civ. P. 5.
And, in addition to his prior claim disputing the amount of equity awarded, Pritchard
6 asserted, for the first time, that, by awarding Cline equity in the home, the court unlawfully
distributed to her his veterans’ disability benefits, which he said were used to pay the home
mortgage.6, 7
¶13 Cline responded that Pritchard’s claims regarding notice and distribution of the
marital home were previously raised and decided in the court’s March 10, 2025 order
denying his first motion to set aside the Final Decree. The parties also continued to argue
in response and reply over whether Pritchard received notice of the January 2, 2025
hearing.
¶14 On August 13, 2025, the District Court issued an order denying Pritchard’s second
motion to set aside the Final Decree on the grounds that it had previously decided his claims
when it denied his first motion. Pritchard timely appealed pro se.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶15 On review of a district court’s denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment,
“the finding of even a slight abuse of discretion is sufficient to reverse the order.”
In re Marriage of Shannon, 2004 MT 25, ¶ 4, 319 Mont. 357, 84 P.3d 645. Ordinarily, a
ruling on a M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but Montana
6 Pritchard cited Howell v. Howell, 581 U.S. 214, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017), In re Marriage of Strong, 2000 MT 178, 300 Mont. 331, 8 P.3d 763, and 38 U.S.C. § 5301. 7 Pritchard also made additional new arguments, most of which he has abandoned on appeal. He has maintained, however, an unspecified claim of judicial impropriety, presumably because the presiding judge in the dissolution matter also presided, at least for a time before he recused himself, over a contemporaneous civil matter where Pritchard and Cline were co-plaintiffs. Beyond citing cases where this Court overturned the judge’s decisions on appeal, Pritchard provides not a scintilla of record evidence to support his partiality claim and we therefore do not address it beyond noting it was made. 7 applies more searching review when the ruling concerns relief from a default judgment.
Orcutt v. Orcutt, 2011 MT 107, ¶¶ 5-6, 360 Mont. 353, 253 P.3d 884.
¶16 We review a district court’s division of marital property to determine whether the
court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous, and its legal conclusions are correct. If the
findings are not clearly erroneous, we will affirm the distribution of property unless the
court abused its discretion. Collins v. Collins, 2004 MT 365, ¶ 16, 324 Mont. 500, 104
P.3d 1059. A court abuses its discretion if it misapplies controlling law or acts arbitrarily,
without conscientious judgment, resulting in substantial injustice. Bessette v. Bessette,
2019 MT 35, ¶ 13, 394 Mont. 262, 434 P.3d 894.
¶17 We review questions of federal preemption and statutory interpretation
de novo. In re Marriage of Strong, 2000 MT 178, ¶ 11, 300 Mont. 331, 8 P.3d 763.
Our review of alleged due process violations is plenary. State v. Villanueva, 2021 MT 277,
¶ 23, 406 Mont. 149, 497 P.3d 586.
DISCUSSION
¶18 Pritchard attacks the District Court’s January 2025 Final Decree and decisions on
his post-decree motions to set it aside.8 His arguments are many. At bottom, Pritchard
claims the District Court should have set aside the Final Decree because (1) he had no
notice of the January 2, 2025 final dissolution hearing and (2) the court improperly and/or
8 In his notice of appeal, Pritchard only specifically identifies the Final Decree and August 13, 2025 order but states he is also appealing “all related orders . . . to the extent that they address the division of property.” Accordingly, we consider both the March 10 and August 13, 2025 orders on appeal. Additionally, simultaneous to his appeal, Pritchard sought a stay of execution of judgment and waiver of supersedeas bond, claiming indigency, which Cline opposed and the District Court denied. Pritchard does not challenge this ruling on appeal. 8 unlawfully awarded Cline $100,000 in equity both because the equity award was not
supported by the evidence and because the home’s equity was “derived solely” from his
veterans’ disability benefits, which the court could not lawfully distribute as marital
property. Cline contends that Pritchard received all notice due; the $100,000 equity award
was supported by her uncontroverted hearing testimony; and Pritchard’s disability benefits
lost their identity as such when used to make mortgage payments. Cline also asks this
Court to sanction Pritchard for pursuing this appeal.
¶19 1. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying Pritchard’s motions to set aside the Final Decree.
¶20 M. R. Civ. P. 55(c) sets a “good cause” standard for setting aside “an entry of
default.” By contrast, M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) governs setting aside “a default judgment.”
See M. R. Civ. P. 55(c); Essex Ins. Co. v. Jaycie, Inc., 2004 MT 278, ¶¶ 10-12, 323 Mont.
231, 99 P.3d 651; Green v. Gerber, 2013 MT 35, ¶¶ 40-41, 369 Mont. 20, 303 P.3d 721;
accord Cribb v. Matlock Comm., 236 Mont. 27, 30, 768 P.2d 337, 339 (1989) (an entry of
default “is simply an interlocutory order that in itself determines no rights or remedies,
whereas the default judgment is a final judgment that terminates the litigation and decides
the dispute” (citation omitted)). Because Pritchard sought relief from a final decree entered
after default, we analyze the post-judgment rulings under Rule 60(b), while applying the
more searching review applicable to default judgments.
9 ¶21 Rule 60(b) gives a court discretion to grant relief from a final judgment for
numerous enumerated reasons. In his post-decree motions,9 citing Rule 60(b)(1), (2),
(3), (4), and (6), Pritchard asserted he was entitled to setting aside the Final Decree for
lack of notice, surprise, excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence, fraud and
misrepresentation, void judgment, and extraordinary circumstances.
¶22 As a threshold matter, beyond general assertion, Pritchard did not identify
any specific evidence of fraud by the opposing party as required by Rule 60(b)(3).
See In re Marriage of Weber, 2004 MT 211, ¶¶ 25-26, 322 Mont. 341, 96 P.3d 716
(fraud requires some showing of intentional concealment preventing “a fair submission of
the controversy”). Nor did Pritchard establish surprise under Rule 60(b)(1); exhibits he
submitted plainly showed he knew of the realtor’s “market analysis” prior to Cline filing
for divorce and that Cline told him in May 2024 that, based on that valuation, she would
be entitled to as much as $175,000 in equity. Also, Pritchard’s “newly discovered
evidence” was only that his veterans’ disability benefits paid the mortgage and other
associated costs of purchasing the marital home. But Pritchard failed to show how this
“new” evidence satisfied Rule 60(b)(2), i.e., how it was not previously discoverable despite
due diligence. See In re Matter of B.B., 2001 MT 285, ¶ 40, 307 Mont. 379, 37 P.3d 715
(listing four-factor test for entitlement to relief from judgment based on newly discovered
evidence); Weber, ¶ 29. Pritchard was not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief for any of these
above reasons.
9 Pritchard’s January 2025 motion to set aside the default judgment and July 2025 motion for relief from judgment blended the requirements of Rules 55(c) and 60(b). 10 ¶23 We now turn to Pritchard’s remaining claims under Rule 60(b)(1), (4), and (6)—
excusable neglect, lack of notice, void judgment, and extraordinary circumstances.
Excusable Neglect
¶24 The M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) “excusable neglect” standard requires some degree of
diligence by the defaulted party. Essex, ¶¶ 10-12; JAS, Inc. v. Eisele, 2014 MT 77, ¶ 34,
374 Mont. 312, 321 P.3d 113. There can be no excusable neglect “where a defendant has
willingly slumbered on his rights and ignored the judicial machinery established by law.”
Dudley v. Stiles, 142 Mont. 566, 568, 386 P.2d 342, 343 (1963).
¶25 Here, the record established that Cline personally handed Pritchard the dissolution
petition on June 24, 2024, according to Pritchard’s own admission; Pritchard possessed the
dissolution petition and summons as of August 15, 2024, according to his own emails
submitted to the court; and a process server personally served Pritchard with the petition
and summons on October 31, 2024. The summons expressly stated that Pritchard’s failure
to respond or appear would result in a default judgment against him for Cline’s requested
relief. Despite this warning, Pritchard, again by his own admission, “did not respond in
writing to the court” or otherwise appear in the proceedings.
¶26 The District Court, in its discretion, rejected Pritchard’s post-decree excuse that he
defaulted because Cline told him he did not have to respond. We will not disturb the court’s
determination that Pritchard had notice of the dissolution action, failed to answer, and
allowed default to be entered. Pritchard was not entitled to Rule 60(b)(1) relief for
excusable neglect.
11 Void Judgment for Lack of Notice/Jurisdiction and Due Process Violation
¶27 Pritchard made several arguments on this point, namely that lack of proper service
deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to enter the Final Decree and that his lack of
notice of the January 2, 2025 hearing violated due process and rendered the Final Decree
void. A judgment may be challenged as void under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) for lack of
jurisdiction. See Greater Missoula Area Fedn. of Early Childhood Educators v. Child
Start, Inc., 2009 MT 362, ¶ 21, 353 Mont. 201, 219 P.3d 881.
¶28 First, the District Court obtained personal jurisdiction over Pritchard through
personal service of the dissolution petition and summons on October 31, 2024.
See M. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), (e)(1), 5(b)(2)(A). The District Court’s subject matter
jurisdiction over the dissolution and marital property issues arose from Montana’s
dissolution statutes and the parties’ Montana domicile, not from service itself. Personal
service, however, gave Pritchard formal notice of the action and subjected him to the
court’s authority to enter judgment, including a default judgment if he failed to answer or
otherwise appear.
¶29 Pritchard nevertheless argues that the Final Decree is void because he received no
separate notice of the January 2, 2025 default prove-up hearing. The record on that point
is not clean. Cline certified email service of the hearing request, and the District Court’s
later order stated that the clerk forwarded the notice of hearing. Pritchard, however,
submitted correspondence from the clerk’s office stating that the clerk’s office did not send
him the hearing notice after default had been entered. We need not resolve that factual
dispute. Even assuming Pritchard did not receive separate notice of the January 2, 2025
12 hearing, the rules did not require written notice of the default-judgment hearing because
Pritchard had not appeared.
¶30 “When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed
to plead or otherwise defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk
must enter the party’s default.” M. R. Civ. P. 55(a). After the clerk of court entered
Pritchard’s default, Cline proceeded to seek a default judgment on her uncontested
dissolution petition. M. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) provides that, “[i]f the party against whom
a default judgment is sought has appeared personally or by a representative, that
party . . . must be served with written notice of the application [for default judgment] at
least 7 days before the hearing.” (Emphasis added.) Because Pritchard had not “appeared
personally or by a representative,” he was not entitled to notice of the default judgment
hearing under Rule 55(b)(2).
¶31 To Pritchard’s final point, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be
heard. In re Marriage of Fishbaugh, 2002 MT 175, ¶ 15, 310 Mont. 519, 52 P.3d 395
(due process is accorded where a party is given sufficient notice of a proceeding,
“regardless of whether the party actually avails himself of the opportunity to be heard”).
Pritchard received both: he was properly served with the petition and summons and had
an opportunity to respond but chose not to respond and thereby was defaulted. Due process
did not require the District Court to provide a second opportunity to contest the property
distribution after Pritchard failed to appear in the action and allowed default to be entered.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to set aside the Final Decree for
lack of notice.
13 Void Judgment for Distribution of Veterans’ Disability Benefits in Violation of Federal Law
¶32 Pritchard also claimed the Final Decree should be set aside as void due to the
District Court’s unlawful distribution of his veterans’ disability benefits. Pritchard says
the $100,000 equity award “necessarily transferred federally protected income” to Cline in
violation of federal law. By his logic, his veterans’ disability benefits “paid every mortgage
payment,” so “equity exists solely because of” those protected benefits.
¶33 The District Court declined to consider this new argument in Pritchard’s second
post-decree motion, having previously decided that distribution of the marital home was
equitable. However, the question presented in Pritchard’s claim for relief under Rule
60(b)(4) is not one of equity, but of legality. Whether the Final Decree was void because
the court lacked authority to distribute Pritchard’s veterans’ disability benefits presents a
legal question subject to de novo review. See Strong, ¶ 11. Although the District Court
did not separately analyze Pritchard’s federal-preemption theory, we will affirm a lower
court where it reaches the correct result, even for the wrong reason.
Essex, ¶ 16; State v. Christensen, 2014 MT 294, ¶ 12, 377 Mont. 7, 338 P.3d 45.
¶34 Pritchard is incorrect that the $100,000 equity award and his veterans’ disability
benefits are the same thing, either in form or substance. He relies on Howell v. Howell,
581 U.S. 214, 137 S. Ct. 1400 (2017), and Strong, but these cases are distinguishable.
¶35 Howell, applying Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 109 S. Ct. 2023 (1989),
overturned a state court decision ordering a husband to reimburse his ex-wife for a
reduction in her share of his military retirement benefits after the husband later waived a
14 portion of those retirement benefits to receive disability compensation for a later-diagnosed
service-connected disability. Howell, 581 U.S. at 220-23, 137 S. Ct. at 1405-06 (“federal
law completely preempts the States from treating waived military retirement pay as
divisible community property”). In other words, Howell governs distribution of military
retirement benefits waived to receive disability benefits and indemnification orders
designed to replace the waived retirement pay. Those circumstances are not at issue here,
so Pritchard’s reliance on Howell is misplaced.
¶36 Howell’s underpinning, Mansell, however, did inform our decision in Strong,
a case not about military retirement benefits but about whether veterans’ disability benefits
can be awarded to a spouse “as part of the equitable distribution of marital property.”
Strong, ¶¶ 13-17, 20, 27. The trial court in Strong awarded the ex-wife a $5,000 promissory
note and the remaining $1,440 balance of a lump-sum back-pay disability benefits award;
the husband’s sole source of income was his veterans’ disability pay. Strong, ¶¶ 12,
35-36. We held that the USFSPA10 precluded such an award because, under Mansell and
our caselaw applying it,11 10 U.S.C. § 1408 allows distribution as marital property only
“disposable retired pay,” which, by its definition, excludes disability benefits received
under U.S.C. Title 38. In short, due to federal preemption in the area, a Montana court is
not allowed to consider or divide a spouse’s veterans’ disability benefits as marital
10 The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982). 11 In re Marriage of Murphy, 261 Mont. 263, 862 P.2d 1143 (1993).
15 property. Strong, ¶¶ 18-27.12 Strong therefore protects veterans’ disability benefits
themselves from division as marital property; it does not hold that every asset purchased
with funds traceable to disability benefits remains exempt from equitable distribution
indefinitely.
¶37 Strong is inapplicable here because the District Court did not award Cline any
amount of Pritchard’s veterans’ disability benefits. Instead, the court awarded her
$100,000 equity in the parties’ marital home. The court ordered that Pritchard was to
receive the home upon removing Cline from the loan and then paying her $100,000 for her
share of the equity. Pritchard did not do as ordered—either within the decreed 90-day
timeframe or the later 90-day extension. Accordingly, under the decree, the home is to be
sold and Cline to receive $100,000 “from [the] sale,” with Pritchard receiving “any
remaining net proceeds.” The decree thus operates on the marital residence and sale
proceeds from that residence, not on future veterans’ disability payments or a segregated
disability benefits account.
¶38 Pritchard’s assertion that his veterans’ disability benefits funded the mortgage
payments does not make the home equity exempt from equitable distribution. The exempt
status granted “payments of benefits due or to become due” under 38 U.S.C. § 5301
does not “extend to any property purchased in part or wholly out of such payments.”
38 U.S.C. § 5301(a)(1); Porter v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 370 U.S. 159, 160-61,
12 However, the USFSPA does not preempt state court authority to consider veterans’ disability benefits as part of a party’s overall financial circumstances, Strong, ¶¶ 31-35, or order a spouse to satisfy child support or maintenance obligations with disability-benefits-derived income, Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619, 107 S. Ct. 2029 (1987). 16 82 S. Ct. 1232, 1232-33 (1962). Rather, once “converted into permanent investments,”
veterans’ disability benefits lose “the quality of moneys” and thereby their exempt status.
Porter, 370 U.S. at 160-61 n.3, 82 S. Ct. at 1232-33 (unlike benefits that, once deposited,
remain immediately “subject to demand and use as the needs of the veteran for support and
maintenance require[]” (citation omitted)). Accord Bischoff v. Bischoff, 987 S.W.2d 798,
799-800 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (veterans’ disability benefits “lost their exempt status when
invested in the parties’ residence”); Pfeil v. Pfeil, 341 N.W.2d 699, 702-03 (Wis. Ct. App.
1983) (veterans’ disability benefits lost exempt status when “invested in [a] mortgage note”
and “real estate purchase[s]”); Gray v. Gray, 1996 OK 84, ¶¶ 11-14, 922 P.2d 615 (reversed
trial court decision that personal property “traceable” to veterans’ disability benefits was
spouse’s indivisible separate property; “once he converted those benefits to personal
property the exempt status of those funds was lost”). As in these cases, once Pritchard
converted his veterans’ disability benefits into mortgage payments to fund the purchase of
the parties’ marital property, their protected status was lost.
¶39 The District Court did not accomplish indirectly what federal law forbids directly.
It did not divide disability benefits; it divided marital home equity. The court’s $100,000
equity award to Cline therefore did not violate the USFSPA, U.S.C. Title 38, or any other
federal or state law. Even though the court did not specifically address Pritchard’s benefits
claim, the Final Decree was not void and Pritchard was therefore not entitled to relief
under Rule 60(b)(4).
17 Extraordinary Circumstances
¶40 Finally, Rule 60(b)(6) permits relief from judgment for “any other reason that
justifies relief.” Rule 60(b)(6) is not a lower-standard catch-all ground for relief—it is
designed primarily for extraordinary situations where a party is wronged through no fault
of his or her own. Green, ¶¶ 41-43; Estate of Kinnaman v. Mt. W. Bank, N.A., 2016 MT
25, ¶¶ 29-31, 382 Mont. 153, 365 P.3d 486. See also Detienne v. Sandrock, 2017 MT 181,
¶ 41, 388 Mont. 179, 400 P.3d 682 (Rule 60(b)(6) is only an available ground for relief
“upon a showing that subsections (1) through (5) of Rule 60(b) do not apply”).
¶41 Pritchard claimed his lack of notice of the January 2, 2025 hearing qualified as
“extraordinary circumstances” warranting relief. However, as decided, Pritchard failed to
respond or appear before entry of default and did not move to set aside the default judgment
until after the Final Decree was entered. Accordingly, Pritchard failed to show he was
“blameless” for the default judgment. Green, ¶ 42 (movant’s burden under Rule 60(b)(6)
to show extraordinary circumstances and blamelessness). Nor did Pritchard’s second
post-decree motion identify any extraordinary circumstance that could not have been raised
in his first motion. We hold that the District Court correctly denied relief under Rule 60(b).
¶42 2. Whether the District Court abused its discretion in awarding Cline a share of equity in the parties’ marital home.
¶43 Courts are vested with broad authority under § 40-4-202, MCA, to apportion a
marital estate in a manner equitable to both parties under the particular circumstances.
In re Marriage of Funk, 2012 MT 14, ¶ 6, 363 Mont. 352, 270 P.3d 39. Although courts
must render findings “sufficient as a whole to manifest an equitable division of the marital
18 estate,” § 40-4-202 “does not require a strict, itemized accounting and valuation of every
marital asset and liability in every case.” In re Marriage of Edler & Mahlum, 2020 MT
91, ¶ 9, 399 Mont. 532, 462 P.3d 209. That principle is particularly relevant when the party
contesting valuation failed to appear before entry of the decree and left the other party’s
claims unchallenged.
¶44 The only aspect of the Final Decree Pritchard contests is the $100,000 equity award.
The District Court based this award on Cline’s testimony that she and Pritchard co-owned
the parties’ marital home and that her proposed distribution—Pritchard keeps the house
and pays Cline her share of the equity—was fair and equitable. The evidentiary record
supporting the exact $100,000 figure was limited. But given Pritchard’s default and
nonappearance, the District Court had before it only Cline’s sworn testimony and proposed
decree, and Pritchard did not present competing valuation evidence before judgment.
Under that posture, the court did not abuse its discretion by adopting the uncontroverted
proposed distribution.
¶45 Instead of availing himself of the forum and opportunity to challenge Cline’s equity
claim prior to entry of the Final Decree, despite notice of the dissolution action and
summons, Pritchard instead chose to dispute the court’s equity award after the fact.
His burden was therefore higher in post-judgment proceedings. Pritchard had to show not
merely that he disagreed with the valuation, but that the court’s decision should be set aside
under Rule 60(b). Pritchard submitted documents purporting to contradict or at least call
into question Cline’s $100,000 equity claim by showing that the realtor’s assessment Cline
relied on was outdated or not a true appraisal. But those materials did not establish that the
19 District Court lacked authority to enter the decree, that the decree was void, or that the
valuation information could not have been presented earlier through reasonable diligence.
When considering Pritchard’s post-decree motions, the District Court, in its discretion,
determined that Pritchard failed to show the Final Decree was inequitable. For all the
reasons stated above, this was also not an abuse of the court’s discretion.
¶46 For the first time on appeal, Pritchard submits a September 2025 “Comparative
Market Analysis” and October 2025 “Seller Net Sheet” prepared by the parties’ realtor and
copies of email exchanges regarding these documents. He calls this “new evidence” that
supports his valuation of the marital home. These documents were prepared after the
District Court’s decisions on review, were not part of the record, and we will not consider
them. Arlington v. Miller’s Trucking, Inc., 2012 MT 89, ¶ 23, 364 Mont. 534, 277 P.3d
1198. Even if considered only for context, the documents are later market estimates and
seller-net calculations, not proof that the District Court’s January 2025 Final Decree was
clearly erroneous or that Rule 60(b) relief was required.
¶47 Based on the record here as a whole, and under the unique circumstances of this
case, Funk, ¶ 6, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Cline $100,000
equity in the parties’ marital home. Nor did the court abuse its discretion in denying
post-judgment relief from that award.
¶48 3. Whether Cline is entitled to sanctions.
¶49 Cline asks this Court to sanction Pritchard under M. R. App. P. 19 for what she
considers a dilatory, vexatious, and frivolous appeal. She insists Pritchard filed his
post-decree motions and appeal only to prolong payment of the equity award and drive her
20 into financial ruin. Cline, through her counsel, critiques Pritchard’s briefing, claiming his
arguments are unsupported and have no merit. True, Pritchard’s pro se briefing is not
perfect, but this Court generally affords leeway to pro se parties so long as there is no
prejudice to the other party. Greenup v. Russell, 2000 MT 154, ¶ 15, 300 Mont. 136,
3 P.3d 124. Answering Pritchard’s pro se appeal, however challenging given his imprecise
arguments and citations, is not prejudicial, especially when a briefing schedule is extended,
as it was here. And although Pritchard’s arguments ultimately fail, his notice and
federal-preemption arguments were not so wholly baseless as to justify sanctions.
¶50 This Court may, under M. R. App. P. 19(5), award sanctions to a prevailing party
upon determining that an appeal is “frivolous, vexatious, filed for purposes of harassment
or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds.” Sanctions are only warranted
“where the appeal is entirely unfounded and intended to cause delay,” or where a party’s
actions “otherwise constitute an abuse of the judicial system.” Little Big Warm Ranch,
LLC v. Doll, 2018 MT 300, ¶ 22, 393 Mont. 435, 431 P.3d 342 (citation omitted).
Pritchard’s pro se post-decree motions and appeal were permitted under the rules, timely,
and not dilatory. Pritchard’s post-decree conduct was not objectively vexatious. Because
the appeal was not entirely unfounded and the record does not show an abuse of the judicial
system, we decline to order sanctions.
CONCLUSION
¶51 We hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Cline
$100,000 equity in the parties’ marital home. We also hold that the court’s denial of
Pritchard’s post-decree motions to set aside the Final Decree did not constitute even a slight
21 abuse of discretion. Pritchard was personally served with the petition and summons, failed
to appear, and suffered entry of default; because he had not appeared, he was not entitled
to written notice of the default-judgment hearing under M. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). The decree
divided marital home equity, not protected veterans’ disability benefits. Accordingly, the
January 2025 Final Decree and the March and August 2025 orders denying post-judgment
relief are affirmed. Cline’s request for sanctions is denied.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY
We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ JIM RICE