25CA0758 Marriage of Sanchez 06-25-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0758 Adams County District Court No. 22DR670 Honorable Teri L. Vasquez, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Susanna Janette Sanchez,
Appellee,
and
Alejandro Omar Sanchez,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Sullivan and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 25, 2026
No Appearance for Appellee
Alejandro Omar Sanchez, Pro Se ¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case, Alejandro
Omar Sanchez (husband) appeals the district court’s order
amending the parties’ separation agreement in favor of Susanna
Janette Sanchez n/k/a Susanna Janette Reynoso (wife). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The court entered a decree of dissolution of marriage
dissolving the parties’ marriage and adopting their separation
agreement in August 2022. The parties were unrepresented.
¶3 Two years later, wife filed a motion to amend the terms of the
separation agreement. In a written order, the district court
construed wife’s motion as a motion for relief under C.R.C.P.
60(b)(5) and set the matter for a hearing. Husband did not respond
to the motion and did not appear at the hearing.
¶4 At the first hearing date, the court expressed concerns about
whether husband had received notice of the hearing because
notices of the motion, a delay prevention order, and the hearing
were mailed to husband in North Carolina and returned to the court
as undeliverable. Accordingly, the court reset the hearing to
provide husband with adequate notice.
1 ¶5 At the rescheduled hearing, the court found that adequate
notice was sent to husband’s address in Lochbuie, Colorado. It
based its finding on wife’s sworn representation, during the prior
hearing, that husband lived at that address. The court found that
husband knowingly and flagrantly failed to appear for the hearing
despite adequate notice, and it proceeded in his absence.
¶6 Wife testified that she was physically and mentally unwell
during the separation process and had attempted suicide ten days
before entering the separation agreement. She further testified that
husband abused her physically, emotionally, and financially
throughout their marriage and that he exerted extreme control over
her personal decisions.
¶7 The district court found wife’s testimony credible and
determined that the separation agreement was unconscionable,
justifying relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5). See C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5)
(authorizing vacatur for “any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment”). The court amended the terms of the
separation agreement, requiring husband to make an equalization
payment to wife in the amount of $72,070 and extending the
duration of maintenance, among other provisions.
2 ¶8 Husband appeals. He argues he did not receive proper notice
of the hearing, the court based its decision on erroneous factual
findings, and the court’s determination was unreasonable due to
the lack of notice. We discern no basis for relief.
II. Standard of Review
¶9 We review an order granting relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) for
an abuse of discretion. In re People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24,
¶ 20. A court abuses its discretion when it makes a manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair decision or when it
misunderstands or misapplies the law. Id.
¶ 10 We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, “meaning
that we won’t disturb such findings if there is any evidence in the
record supporting them.” Heights Healthcare Co. v. BCER Eng’g,
Inc., 2023 COA 44, ¶ 39 (quoting Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo
Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 24).
III. Discussion
¶ 11 Husband primarily argues that the district court erred by
conducting a hearing for which he did not receive notice. He argues
that he was not expecting any court-related correspondence and
that, despite wife’s sworn testimony, he did not live at the address
3 used by the court. Husband further questions how notice of the
hearing could have been adequate when previous notices were
found to be inadequate. We are not persuaded by these arguments.
¶ 12 As an initial matter, the record indicates that notice of the first
scheduled hearing went to a mailing address previously associated
with husband in North Carolina. That notice, as well as the initial
notice of wife’s motion to amend and notice of a delay prevention
order, were returned to the court as undeliverable.
¶ 13 By contrast, the court found that notice of the rescheduled
hearing was sent to husband’s address in Lochbuie, Colorado, and
was adequate. Husband does not dispute that the Lochbuie
address is his and that it has continuously been listed as his
address in the court file. See C.R.C.P. 5(b)(2)(B) (authorizing service
by “[m]ailing a copy to the last known address of the person
served”). Because the record supports the court’s finding, we will
not disturb it.
4 ¶ 14 The district court found that husband lives in Lochbuie based
on wife’s sworn testimony from the first hearing date.1 Wife
confirmed that testimony at the second hearing. To the extent
husband seeks to challenge that finding on appeal, he did not
include the transcript of the previous hearing for our review. See
C.A.R. 10(b) (it is the appellant’s responsibility to certify a transcript
of all evidence relevant to a challenged finding or conclusion). We
must therefore assume that the portions omitted from the record
would support the court’s findings. People v. Duran, 2015 COA
141, ¶ 12.
¶ 15 Husband explains in his opening brief that his work in the
natural gas pipeline industry requires him to work in different
locations throughout the country and it is “not feasible to change
[his] address every time” he moves. But husband makes no specific
argument that he failed to receive notice because he was traveling
during the relevant period, nor did he seek to set aside the court’s
order on this basis under C.R.C.P. 60(b). In any event, husband
1 A review of the record indicates that the parties owned the
Lochbuie address at the time the petition for dissolution was filed, it was titled in husband’s name, and the property was awarded to husband in the separation agreement.
5 concedes that he receives mail at the Lochbuie address and that,
assuming it was junk mail, he “asked [his] tenants to throw away
any mail with [his] name on it.” Despite husband’s arguments, the
question of adequate notice is a factual issue reserved for the
district court. See Hamman v. Cnty. Ct., 753 P.2d 743, 749 (Colo.
1988). Because the record supports the court’s finding, we may not
disturb it.
¶ 16 Husband also claims on appeal that wife made false
statements at the hearing and the court erred by failing to request
supporting documentation from her. But by failing to appear at the
hearing, husband missed his opportunity to challenge the evidence
wife submitted in support of her motion to amend. See In re
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25CA0758 Marriage of Sanchez 06-25-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0758 Adams County District Court No. 22DR670 Honorable Teri L. Vasquez, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Susanna Janette Sanchez,
Appellee,
and
Alejandro Omar Sanchez,
Appellant.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Sullivan and Meirink, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 25, 2026
No Appearance for Appellee
Alejandro Omar Sanchez, Pro Se ¶1 In this post-decree dissolution of marriage case, Alejandro
Omar Sanchez (husband) appeals the district court’s order
amending the parties’ separation agreement in favor of Susanna
Janette Sanchez n/k/a Susanna Janette Reynoso (wife). We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 The court entered a decree of dissolution of marriage
dissolving the parties’ marriage and adopting their separation
agreement in August 2022. The parties were unrepresented.
¶3 Two years later, wife filed a motion to amend the terms of the
separation agreement. In a written order, the district court
construed wife’s motion as a motion for relief under C.R.C.P.
60(b)(5) and set the matter for a hearing. Husband did not respond
to the motion and did not appear at the hearing.
¶4 At the first hearing date, the court expressed concerns about
whether husband had received notice of the hearing because
notices of the motion, a delay prevention order, and the hearing
were mailed to husband in North Carolina and returned to the court
as undeliverable. Accordingly, the court reset the hearing to
provide husband with adequate notice.
1 ¶5 At the rescheduled hearing, the court found that adequate
notice was sent to husband’s address in Lochbuie, Colorado. It
based its finding on wife’s sworn representation, during the prior
hearing, that husband lived at that address. The court found that
husband knowingly and flagrantly failed to appear for the hearing
despite adequate notice, and it proceeded in his absence.
¶6 Wife testified that she was physically and mentally unwell
during the separation process and had attempted suicide ten days
before entering the separation agreement. She further testified that
husband abused her physically, emotionally, and financially
throughout their marriage and that he exerted extreme control over
her personal decisions.
¶7 The district court found wife’s testimony credible and
determined that the separation agreement was unconscionable,
justifying relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5). See C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5)
(authorizing vacatur for “any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment”). The court amended the terms of the
separation agreement, requiring husband to make an equalization
payment to wife in the amount of $72,070 and extending the
duration of maintenance, among other provisions.
2 ¶8 Husband appeals. He argues he did not receive proper notice
of the hearing, the court based its decision on erroneous factual
findings, and the court’s determination was unreasonable due to
the lack of notice. We discern no basis for relief.
II. Standard of Review
¶9 We review an order granting relief under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) for
an abuse of discretion. In re People in Interest of A.P., 2022 CO 24,
¶ 20. A court abuses its discretion when it makes a manifestly
arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair decision or when it
misunderstands or misapplies the law. Id.
¶ 10 We review the court’s factual findings for clear error, “meaning
that we won’t disturb such findings if there is any evidence in the
record supporting them.” Heights Healthcare Co. v. BCER Eng’g,
Inc., 2023 COA 44, ¶ 39 (quoting Woodbridge Condo. Ass’n v. Lo
Viento Blanco, LLC, 2020 COA 34, ¶ 24).
III. Discussion
¶ 11 Husband primarily argues that the district court erred by
conducting a hearing for which he did not receive notice. He argues
that he was not expecting any court-related correspondence and
that, despite wife’s sworn testimony, he did not live at the address
3 used by the court. Husband further questions how notice of the
hearing could have been adequate when previous notices were
found to be inadequate. We are not persuaded by these arguments.
¶ 12 As an initial matter, the record indicates that notice of the first
scheduled hearing went to a mailing address previously associated
with husband in North Carolina. That notice, as well as the initial
notice of wife’s motion to amend and notice of a delay prevention
order, were returned to the court as undeliverable.
¶ 13 By contrast, the court found that notice of the rescheduled
hearing was sent to husband’s address in Lochbuie, Colorado, and
was adequate. Husband does not dispute that the Lochbuie
address is his and that it has continuously been listed as his
address in the court file. See C.R.C.P. 5(b)(2)(B) (authorizing service
by “[m]ailing a copy to the last known address of the person
served”). Because the record supports the court’s finding, we will
not disturb it.
4 ¶ 14 The district court found that husband lives in Lochbuie based
on wife’s sworn testimony from the first hearing date.1 Wife
confirmed that testimony at the second hearing. To the extent
husband seeks to challenge that finding on appeal, he did not
include the transcript of the previous hearing for our review. See
C.A.R. 10(b) (it is the appellant’s responsibility to certify a transcript
of all evidence relevant to a challenged finding or conclusion). We
must therefore assume that the portions omitted from the record
would support the court’s findings. People v. Duran, 2015 COA
141, ¶ 12.
¶ 15 Husband explains in his opening brief that his work in the
natural gas pipeline industry requires him to work in different
locations throughout the country and it is “not feasible to change
[his] address every time” he moves. But husband makes no specific
argument that he failed to receive notice because he was traveling
during the relevant period, nor did he seek to set aside the court’s
order on this basis under C.R.C.P. 60(b). In any event, husband
1 A review of the record indicates that the parties owned the
Lochbuie address at the time the petition for dissolution was filed, it was titled in husband’s name, and the property was awarded to husband in the separation agreement.
5 concedes that he receives mail at the Lochbuie address and that,
assuming it was junk mail, he “asked [his] tenants to throw away
any mail with [his] name on it.” Despite husband’s arguments, the
question of adequate notice is a factual issue reserved for the
district court. See Hamman v. Cnty. Ct., 753 P.2d 743, 749 (Colo.
1988). Because the record supports the court’s finding, we may not
disturb it.
¶ 16 Husband also claims on appeal that wife made false
statements at the hearing and the court erred by failing to request
supporting documentation from her. But by failing to appear at the
hearing, husband missed his opportunity to challenge the evidence
wife submitted in support of her motion to amend. See In re
Marriage of Ensminger, 209 P.3d 1163, 1167 (Colo. App. 2008) (we
will not address an argument never presented to the district court);
see also In re Marriage of Powell, 750 P.2d 1099, 1101-02 (Mont.
1988) (“The decision not to attend was husband’s prerogative, but
he cannot later introduce testimony which cannot be verified or
cross-examined.”).
¶ 17 To the extent husband seeks to challenge the district court’s
findings regarding his income based on different evidence presented
6 in his opening brief, we cannot consider these arguments for the
first time on appeal. It is unclear whether husband is challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s orders. But
even if we broadly construe his opening brief to that effect, there is
evidence in the record to support the court’s income-related
findings. The court found wife’s testimony regarding husband’s
income to be credible. And while husband disputes the court’s
calculation of his annual bonus, his argument requires us to
reweigh the evidence, which we may not do. In re Marriage of Rahn,
914 P.2d 463, 465 (Colo. App. 1995).
¶ 18 Finally, we are not persuaded by husband’s conclusory
argument that the court’s decision was otherwise unreasonable.
While he frames his appeal as challenging the entry of default
judgment, no default judgment entered in this case. The court
conducted the hearing under C.R.C.P. 60(b) after providing notice.
And, under C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(6), when a party fails to
appear at a hearing, “without prior showing of good cause for [the
party’s] non-appearance, the court may proceed to hear and rule
on” the matter.
¶ 19 For these reasons, husband is not entitled to relief.
7 IV. Disposition
¶ 20 The order is affirmed.
JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUDGE MEIRINK concur.