Marriage of Sanchez

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: March 19, 2026
• Docket: 25CA0538
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

25CA0538 Marriage of Sanchez 03-19-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA0538 City and County of Denver District Court No. 24DR30037 Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Maria Victoria Rosales Sanchez,

Appellee,

and

Jaime Gerardo De Santiago Santacruz,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division VII Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR Johnson and Gomez, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced March 19, 2026

Maria Victoria Rosales Sanchez, Pro Se

Monclova Law PC, Eric L. Martinson, Denver, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage proceeding involving Jaime

Gerardo De Santiago Santacruz (husband) and Maria Victoria

Rosales Sanchez (wife), husband appeals the property division

portion of the permanent orders relating to his claim of separate

property. We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In 2025, the district court entered permanent orders resolving

issues concerning the dissolution of the parties’ marriage. The

court found that the parties married in 2022 and, about eleven

months later, bought a home, with each contributing to an

approximately $200,000 downpayment. The court determined that

all the equity in the home was marital property subject to division.

It awarded the home to husband and equally divided the equity. In

doing so, the court rejected husband’s request to set aside his

portion of the downpayment as his separate property but gave him

an additional $30,500 to “credit” him for what he had paid wife for

her share of the downpayment.

¶3 On appeal, husband contends that the district court (1) should

have classified his portion of the downpayment as his separate

property and (2) failed to follow section 14-10-113, C.R.S. 2025.

1 II. Governing Law and Standard of Review

¶4 When dividing a marital estate, a district court must first

determine whether each asset is marital property, which is subject

to division, or separate property, which is not. § 14-10-113(1). All

property acquired by either spouse during the marriage is

presumptively marital. § 14-10-113(3). But this presumption may

be overcome by evidence establishing that the property in question

was, as relevant here, “acquired in exchange for property acquired

prior to the marriage.” § 14-10-113(2)(b). A spouse seeking to set

aside property acquired during the marriage as separate bears the

burden of overcoming the presumption. In re Marriage of Medeiros,

2023 COA 42M, ¶ 52; see also In re Marriage of Seewald, 22 P.3d

580, 586 (Colo. App. 2001) (“A spouse claiming ownership under

[the] exchange provision must prove a series of exchanges back to

an original separate asset.”).

¶5 The classification of property as marital or separate is a legal

determination that may depend on the resolution of factual

disputes. In re Marriage of Smith, 2024 COA 95, ¶ 42. We defer to

the district court’s factual findings unless they are clearly

erroneous but review its legal determinations de novo. Id.

2 III. Discussion

¶6 It was undisputed that the home was acquired during the

marriage. Thus, it was presumed to be marital property, regardless

of how title was held, see § 14-10-113(3), and husband had the

burden to overcome that presumption. The court rejected

husband’s claim of separate property because it found that

husband did not present enough evidence to carry his burden. We

agree.

¶7 Husband testified that he received $102,357 as part of a

divorce settlement from a prior marriage approximately two years

before the parties purchased the current marital home. He said he

used those funds, along with additional “money [he] had before the

marriage,” toward the downpayment. The remainder of the

downpayment, approximately $30,000, came from wife. Husband

said he reimbursed wife for her share of the downpayment.

¶8 As the court correctly noted, husband provided no evidence

showing, among other things, where the monies from his prior

divorce were held or whether they were kept separate from marital

funds during the intervening two years from the time he received

them until the purchase of the home. See Medeiros, ¶ 52; see also

3 In re Marriage of Corak, 2014 COA 147, ¶ 11 (separate property that

is commingled with marital property so that it cannot be traced to

its original form does not retain its separate character). With

respect to the remainder of his downpayment, roughly $67,000,

husband offered no documentation of the funds’ origin and how the

funds were maintained during the marriage. That is, he did not

provide any evidence tracing the funds to property he acquired

before the marriage, nor did he prove that the funds, even if

separate at some point in time, were maintained as separate and

not commingled with marital income or assets. See Corak, ¶ 11.

Instead, husband relied solely on his general and conclusory

testimony that he contributed premarital money. See In re Marriage

of Thorburn, 2022 COA 80, ¶ 50 (stating that the district court can

believe all, part, or none of a witness’s testimony, even if

uncontroverted); Medeiros, ¶ 54.

¶9 On this scant record, we conclude the district court properly

determined that husband did not meet his burden of proving

separate property. He did not present any evidence tracing the

4 funds to his separate property and establishing that he maintained

those funds as separate.1

¶ 10 Husband also asserts that the district court did not provide

the “legal analysis” he was “entitled” to, including considering the

factors in section 14-10-113(1) when determining an equitable

property division. But other than citing the statute, husband does

not support his contention with substantial argument or

meaningful analysis. Because it is undeveloped, we decline to

address it. See In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27, aff’d,

2021 CO 12; see also Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n

v. Metro. Homes, Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (mere generalization of

points is insufficient and will not be considered upon review (citing

Farrell v. Bashor, 344 P.2d 692, 693 (Colo. 1959))). In any event, to

the extent we could construe husband’s second claim as further

challenging the court’s rejection of his separate property claim,

given our conclusion above, we reject husband’s related argument

under section 14-10-113.

1 Because we affirm on this basis, we need not consider the court’s

alternate basis for its ruling. See Cent. Bank of Denv., N.A. v. Deloitte & Touche, 928 P.2d 754, 758 (Colo. App. 1996).

5 IV. Disposition

¶ 11 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE JOHNSON and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.