Marriage of Otis v. Otis

299 N.W.2d 114, 1980 Minn. LEXIS 1599

Opinions

TODD, Justice.

Emmanuel and Georgia Contos Otis’ marriage was terminated by divorce. Georgia Otis has appealed from that portion of the decree which terminates her maintenance after four years. We affirm.

The parties were married on June 6,1954. At the time of the marriage, Mrs. Otis was a skilled executive secretary, earning a substantial income. She left her employment to give birth to the parties’ only child and has remained absent from the employment market since that time. Mr. Otis has achieved a high degree of success in the business world and is employed by Control Data Corporation as an executive vice president. At the time of the divorce, Mrs. Otis was 45 and Mr. Otis was 46 years of age.

The divorce decree divided the property of the parties as follows:

Mr. Otis was also awarded his substantial interest in his vested pension plan. In addition, he was awarded property in Greece valued at $85,000 which he had inherited.

At the time of the divorce, Mr. Otis received an annual salary in excess of $120,-000, plus bonuses. The trial court found that Mrs. Otis was in good health and had held a highly paid secretarial job in the past. Further, the court found that Mrs. Otis, with some additional training, is capable of earning $12,000 to $18,000 per year.¹

In addition to the property settlement outlined above, Mrs. Otis was awarded as “alimony” the sum of $2,000 per month, commencing December 1,1978, through and until the last day of 1980, and $1,000 per month, commencing on January 1, 1981, through and until the last day of 1982. Thereafter, no further “alimony” must be paid.

The only issue presented by this appeal is the correctness of the trial court’s order terminating monthly payments to the wife after four years.

This case was submitted to the trial court in 1978. The 1978 Minnesota Legislature adopted substantial legislative changes relating to the entire subject of domestic relations. Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 772, 1978 Minn. Laws at 1062. The effective date of this legislation was March 1,1979. Id. 1978 Minn. Laws 1088, § 64. The parties to this action agree that the matter was decided under the principles of law established by the 1978 legislation and that this court should interpret 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 772, in determining the validity of the trial court’s order.

We have not had occasion previously to interpret 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 772. The pertinent sections of the statute to be considered in this case involve the payment of money to a former spouse following termination of the marriage. Initially, we observe the substantial change in language defining such payments. Minn. Stat. § 518.54 (1976) was a definitional section. Included therein was a definition of the term “alimony.” As amended by 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 772, the term “alimony” no longer appears in the statute. The term “maintenance” has been substituted without a substantial change in the definition. The elimination of the term “alimony” is effectuated throughout the entire text of 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 772.

The grounds for awarding “maintenance” were established by 1978 Minn. Laws, ch. 722, § 51 (now codified as Minn. Stat. § 518.552 (1978 & Supp.1979)), which provides:

Subdivision 1. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or in a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse and which has since acquired jurisdiction, the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:

(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, especially during a period of training or education, and

(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.

Subd. 2. The maintenance order shall be in amounts and for periods of time as the court deems just, without regard to martial misconduct, and after considering all relevant factors including:

(a) The financial resources of the party seeking maintenance, including marital property apportioned to him, and his ability to meet his needs independently, including the extent to which a provision for support of a child living with the party includes a sum for that party as custodian;

(b) The time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment;

(c) The standard of living established during the marriage;

(d) The duration of the marriage;

(e) The age, and the physical and emotional condition of the spouse seeking maintenance; and

(f) The ability of the spouse from whom maintenance is sought to meet his needs while meeting those of the spouse seeking maintenance.

This section is taken in large part from the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act and we find commentaries and decisions of other jurisdictions involving this Uniform Act provision and similar provisions instructive.

The basic additudinal change reflected in the new provision has been summarized as follows:

In recent years, courts have retreated from traditional attitudes toward spousal support because society no longer perceives the married woman as an economically unproductive creature who is “something better than her husband’s dog, a little dearer than his horse.” Traditionally, spousal support was a permanent award because it was assumed that a wife had neither the ability nor the resources to become self-sustaining. However, with the mounting dissolution rate, the advent of no-fault dissolution, and the growth of the women’s liberation movement, the focal point of spousal support determinations has shifted from the sex of the recipient to the individual’s ability to become financially independent. This change in focus has given rise to the concept of rehabilitative alimony, also called maintenance, spousal support, limited alimony, or step-down spousal support.

Rehabilitative Spousal Support: In Need of a More Comprehensive Approach to Mitigating Dissolution Trauma, 12 U.S.F.L.Rev. 493, 494-95 (1978) (footnote omitted).

The Missouri Court of Appeals expressed the concerns concisely:

The most that can be accurately said about the amount to be granted is that it is neither the policy of the law to give the spouse receiving maintenance a lifetime annuity nor to reduce her to menial labor to eke out an existence.

In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Mo.App.1977).

The Florida Court of Appeals, which has had various occasions to consider alimony questions, has adopted an approach similar to that of the Uniform Act. The court has recognized the distinction between permanent alimony and rehabilitative alimony (maintenance):

Under the circumstances, the trial court erred in. awarding permanent rather than rehabilitative alimony. As we have previously stated: “The public policy under the new law which the legislature passed and which therefore we must apply seems to be that if the spouse has the capacity to make her own way through the remainder of her life unassisted by the former husband, then the courts cannot require him to pay alimony other than for rehabilitative purposes.” (Roberts v. Roberts, Fla.App. 1st 1973, 283 So.2d 396, 397); * * *.) The public policy of the State would be utterly frustrated by an award of permanent alimony where it affirmatively appears that the wife has not only the capacity but also the desire to be self-supporting.

Cann v. Cann, 334 So.2d 325, 330 (Fla.App. 1976) (citations omitted). More recently that court emphasized, in setting aside a 20-year award of alimony, that rehabilitative alimony must be of reasonable duration:

Rehabilitative alimony is not a substitute for either unemployment compensation or retirement benefits. The award is clearly an incentive to assist one in reclaiming employment skills outside the home which have atrophied during the marital relationship. It was not meant to remove the recipient from the job market. In Manning v. Manning, 353 So.2d 103 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) we stated that when a wife has completed her maternal role, and provided she is in good health, she should make every effort to rehabilitate herself within a reasonable time thereafter, and when she has done so, rehabilitative alimony is to be discontinued.

Robinson v. Robinson, 366 So.2d 1210, 1211-12 (Fla.App.1979). The Florida Court has also indicated that a substantial difference in the earning capacities of the spouse does not justify continuing alimony once a spouse has become self-supporting:

In view of the foregoing, under the applicable law the ability of the husband to pay does not justify continuation of the alimony where, as here, the rehabilitated wife is shown to have become self-supporting.

Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So.2d 484, 487 (Fla.App.1976).

We are now faced in Minnesota with new legislation which effects a substantial change in the role of the courts in awarding periodic or lump-sum payments to a divorced spouse. Minnesota decisions decided pri- or to this time provide only minimal help in passing on the validity of trial court awards under the new act.² Rather, the focus of this court must now be on a determination of the two basic standards established by the new legislation; namely, we must determine if the spouse seeking maintenance-

(a) Lacks sufficient property, including marital property apportioned to him, to provide for his reasonable needs, especially during a period of training or education, and

(b) Is unable to support himself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose condition or circumstances make it appropriate that the custodian not be required to seek employment outside the home.

In construing the Uniform Act provision, the Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that the statute required satisfaction of the conditions of both subsections. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky.App.1979). Applying these standards to the findings of the trial court which we are bound to accept in the absence of a transcript, we conclude that the decision of the trial court is not clearly erroneous.

Affirmed.

1 . The parties have agreed to submit this case without a transcript. Therefore, we are bound to accept this finding of the trial court since there is no factual basis to declare it clearly erroneous.

2 . Our recent decision in Ruzic v. Ruzic, 281 N.W.2d 502 (Minn.1979), while not decided under the provisions of 1978 Minn.Laws, ch. 722, applied the standards adopted herein in affirming an award of alimony which was to terminate after six years.