25CA0072 Marriage of Kinning 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0072 City and County of Denver District Court No. 18DR30212 Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Jon Lynn Kinning,
Appellee,
and
Aimee Suzanne Kinning,
Respondent,
Samuel J. Stoorman and Associates, P.C.,
Attorney-Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Sullivan and Martinez*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Mechelle Y. Faulk, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
No Appearance for Respondent Haeberle Law, PLLC, William A. Haeberle, Englewood, Colorado, for Attorney- Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this proceeding involving Samuel J. Stoorman and
Associates, P.C. (the firm) and Jon Lynn Kinning (husband), the
firm appeals the district court’s order concerning the enforcement of
its statutory attorney’s lien against its former client, Aimee Susanne
Kinning (wife). We dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the order.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 In 2014, husband and wife entered into a marital agreement
(MA) providing that any equity in their jointly titled Vail residence
would be treated as marital property subject to equal division.
¶3 Four years later, the district court dissolved the marriage. In
the permanent orders, the court allocated the Vail residence to
husband and set aside the $500,000 down payment as his separate
property. On appeal, a division of this court vacated the judgment
and remanded, instructing the district court to classify the down
payment as marital property and to split it equally as required
under the MA. See In re Marriage of Kinning, slip op. at 15-16 (Colo.
App. No. 19CA0123, Apr. 23, 2020) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶4 The district court on remand, however, again allocated the
down payment to husband as his separate property. Another
1 division of this court reversed and remanded with directions,
making it clear that the down payment must be included in the
marital estate. See In re Marriage of Kinning, slip op. at 22 (Colo.
App. No. 22CA1121, Dec. 14, 2023) (not published pursuant to
¶5 Thereafter, the firm withdrew as wife’s counsel. The firm then
initiated a foreclosure on its statutory attorney’s lien against her,
seeking a judgment for $110,338.
¶6 On May 2, 2024, the district court enforced the firm’s lien,
entering judgment against wife and in favor of the firm in the
amount of $110,338 to be paid from the “monies and property
awarded to [wife],” plus 1.5% monthly interest. The court added
that the firm was “entitled to its costs and fees incurred in
collecting upon the judgment.”
¶7 At the second remand hearing ten days later, husband was
present with counsel; wife, still unrepresented, chose not to appear.
¶8 On June 13, 2024, the district court ordered that husband
could satisfy wife’s $250,000 share of the down payment by
transferring to her an equivalent amount of his 401(k) funds via a
2 qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). No one appealed the
judgment.
¶9 On June 27, 2024, the firm then filed a forthwith motion
urging the district court to modify the QDRO so that its lien would
be satisfied directly from the transferred funds:
What need[s] to be addressed . . . is the method by which [husband] should satisfy the May 2 and June 13 [o]rders. The May 2, 2024 [o]rder directs that $110,338.31 (plus interest) of after-tax monies be paid to the [f]irm. The June 13, 2024 [o]rder directs that [husband] pay to [wife] the sum of $250,000 in pre-tax monies. The QDRO should and may be carefully crafted to accomplish both of the court’s orders. Accordingly, the [f]irm requests that . . . the QDRO . . . require that the principal and interest ordered May 2, 2024 be paid directly to the [f]irm from [husband’s] account or from the transfer agent after the funds are beneficially owned by [wife], yet delineated in any instance as paid to the [f]irm by [wife] (to avoid any liability to [husband]; thus any taxes owing will be the sole obligation of [wife]) and the balance paid to [wife] as she directs.
¶ 10 On December 2, 2024, the district court issued an order,
reiterating the lien’s validity but declining to alter the QDRO. The
court required wife to satisfy the $110,338 judgment within sixty
3 days and stated that the firm could “use the full range of creditors’
remedies.”
¶ 11 On January 16, 2025, the firm filed its notice of appeal,
challenging the December 2, 2024, order.
II. Discussion
A. June 13 Judgment
¶ 12 The firm contends that the June 13, 2024 judgment
(1) contravened the mandates of the two prior appeals by allowing
husband to pay wife $250,000 of pretax funds; (2) denied its
procedural due process rights as it received no notice of the second
remand hearing; and (3) violated the attorney’s lien statute, section
13-93-114, C.R.S. 2025, by “[c]hanging the character and value of
the property previously adjudicated to be encumbered.”
¶ 13 Even assuming the firm has standing to seek appellate review
of the June 13, 2024 judgment — and we are dubious that it
does — we lack jurisdiction to review it. This is because the
deadline to appeal that judgment was August 1, 2024, and the
notice of appeal was filed on January 16, 2025. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1)
(in a civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed within forty-nine
days after entry of the order being appealed); In re Marriage of
4 James, 2023 COA 51, ¶ 8 (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal is
a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review.”). As a result, we
must dismiss this portion of the appeal. See In re Marriage of
Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 12 (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to
review issues resolved in orders not appealed).
III. December 2 Order
¶ 14 The firm also contends that the December 2, 2024, order is
unfair. To get there, it says that “if a QDRO is to be used as the
[district] court directed, neither [w]ife nor [the] [f]irm will get paid,
as [the] [f]irm cannot be an alternate payee under the QDRO, and
[h]usband will happily sit back and smile as the years continue to
slip by without having to pay anyone.” The firm gives us no
supporting legal analysis. So, we decline to address the issue. See
In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court
may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal
authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see
also Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n v. Metro. Homes,
Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (an appellate court will “decline to assume
the mantle” when parties offer no supporting arguments for their
claims). To the extent that the firm expands on its contention in
5 the reply brief, we do not address those new arguments either. See
In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.
¶ 15 Next, the firm asserts that the district court erred by not
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25CA0072 Marriage of Kinning 10-30-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0072 City and County of Denver District Court No. 18DR30212 Honorable Jennifer B. Torrington, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Jon Lynn Kinning,
Appellee,
and
Aimee Suzanne Kinning,
Respondent,
Samuel J. Stoorman and Associates, P.C.,
Attorney-Appellant.
APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART AND ORDER AFFIRMED
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Sullivan and Martinez*, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced October 30, 2025
Faegre Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Mechelle Y. Faulk, Denver, Colorado, for Appellee
No Appearance for Respondent Haeberle Law, PLLC, William A. Haeberle, Englewood, Colorado, for Attorney- Appellant
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2025. ¶1 In this proceeding involving Samuel J. Stoorman and
Associates, P.C. (the firm) and Jon Lynn Kinning (husband), the
firm appeals the district court’s order concerning the enforcement of
its statutory attorney’s lien against its former client, Aimee Susanne
Kinning (wife). We dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the order.
I. Relevant Facts
¶2 In 2014, husband and wife entered into a marital agreement
(MA) providing that any equity in their jointly titled Vail residence
would be treated as marital property subject to equal division.
¶3 Four years later, the district court dissolved the marriage. In
the permanent orders, the court allocated the Vail residence to
husband and set aside the $500,000 down payment as his separate
property. On appeal, a division of this court vacated the judgment
and remanded, instructing the district court to classify the down
payment as marital property and to split it equally as required
under the MA. See In re Marriage of Kinning, slip op. at 15-16 (Colo.
App. No. 19CA0123, Apr. 23, 2020) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶4 The district court on remand, however, again allocated the
down payment to husband as his separate property. Another
1 division of this court reversed and remanded with directions,
making it clear that the down payment must be included in the
marital estate. See In re Marriage of Kinning, slip op. at 22 (Colo.
App. No. 22CA1121, Dec. 14, 2023) (not published pursuant to
¶5 Thereafter, the firm withdrew as wife’s counsel. The firm then
initiated a foreclosure on its statutory attorney’s lien against her,
seeking a judgment for $110,338.
¶6 On May 2, 2024, the district court enforced the firm’s lien,
entering judgment against wife and in favor of the firm in the
amount of $110,338 to be paid from the “monies and property
awarded to [wife],” plus 1.5% monthly interest. The court added
that the firm was “entitled to its costs and fees incurred in
collecting upon the judgment.”
¶7 At the second remand hearing ten days later, husband was
present with counsel; wife, still unrepresented, chose not to appear.
¶8 On June 13, 2024, the district court ordered that husband
could satisfy wife’s $250,000 share of the down payment by
transferring to her an equivalent amount of his 401(k) funds via a
2 qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). No one appealed the
judgment.
¶9 On June 27, 2024, the firm then filed a forthwith motion
urging the district court to modify the QDRO so that its lien would
be satisfied directly from the transferred funds:
What need[s] to be addressed . . . is the method by which [husband] should satisfy the May 2 and June 13 [o]rders. The May 2, 2024 [o]rder directs that $110,338.31 (plus interest) of after-tax monies be paid to the [f]irm. The June 13, 2024 [o]rder directs that [husband] pay to [wife] the sum of $250,000 in pre-tax monies. The QDRO should and may be carefully crafted to accomplish both of the court’s orders. Accordingly, the [f]irm requests that . . . the QDRO . . . require that the principal and interest ordered May 2, 2024 be paid directly to the [f]irm from [husband’s] account or from the transfer agent after the funds are beneficially owned by [wife], yet delineated in any instance as paid to the [f]irm by [wife] (to avoid any liability to [husband]; thus any taxes owing will be the sole obligation of [wife]) and the balance paid to [wife] as she directs.
¶ 10 On December 2, 2024, the district court issued an order,
reiterating the lien’s validity but declining to alter the QDRO. The
court required wife to satisfy the $110,338 judgment within sixty
3 days and stated that the firm could “use the full range of creditors’
remedies.”
¶ 11 On January 16, 2025, the firm filed its notice of appeal,
challenging the December 2, 2024, order.
II. Discussion
A. June 13 Judgment
¶ 12 The firm contends that the June 13, 2024 judgment
(1) contravened the mandates of the two prior appeals by allowing
husband to pay wife $250,000 of pretax funds; (2) denied its
procedural due process rights as it received no notice of the second
remand hearing; and (3) violated the attorney’s lien statute, section
13-93-114, C.R.S. 2025, by “[c]hanging the character and value of
the property previously adjudicated to be encumbered.”
¶ 13 Even assuming the firm has standing to seek appellate review
of the June 13, 2024 judgment — and we are dubious that it
does — we lack jurisdiction to review it. This is because the
deadline to appeal that judgment was August 1, 2024, and the
notice of appeal was filed on January 16, 2025. See C.A.R. 4(a)(1)
(in a civil case, a notice of appeal must be filed within forty-nine
days after entry of the order being appealed); In re Marriage of
4 James, 2023 COA 51, ¶ 8 (“The timely filing of a notice of appeal is
a jurisdictional prerequisite for appellate review.”). As a result, we
must dismiss this portion of the appeal. See In re Marriage of
Roddy, 2014 COA 96, ¶ 12 (appellate court lacks jurisdiction to
review issues resolved in orders not appealed).
III. December 2 Order
¶ 14 The firm also contends that the December 2, 2024, order is
unfair. To get there, it says that “if a QDRO is to be used as the
[district] court directed, neither [w]ife nor [the] [f]irm will get paid,
as [the] [f]irm cannot be an alternate payee under the QDRO, and
[h]usband will happily sit back and smile as the years continue to
slip by without having to pay anyone.” The firm gives us no
supporting legal analysis. So, we decline to address the issue. See
In re Marriage of Zander, 2019 COA 149, ¶ 27 (an appellate court
may decline to consider an argument not supported by legal
authority or any meaningful legal analysis), aff’d, 2021 CO 12; see
also Vallagio at Inverness Residential Condo. Ass’n v. Metro. Homes,
Inc., 2017 CO 69, ¶ 40 (an appellate court will “decline to assume
the mantle” when parties offer no supporting arguments for their
claims). To the extent that the firm expands on its contention in
5 the reply brief, we do not address those new arguments either. See
In re Marriage of Dean, 2017 COA 51, ¶ 31.
¶ 15 Next, the firm asserts that the district court erred by not
charging husband 8% statutory interest for wrongfully withholding
its “Vail [condominium] money” in disregard of section 5-12-
102(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 16 The firm first raised this issue in its reply brief to its forthwith
motion, so husband was deprived of the opportunity to respond.
And the court made no findings or conclusions as to the firm’s
assertion. Thus, this issue wasn’t properly preserved and isn’t
properly before us. See Grohn v. Sisters of Charity Health Servs.
Colo., 960 P.2d 722, 727 (Colo. App. 1998) (“Arguments raised for
the first time in a reply brief before a [district] court are not properly
before an appellate court where the opposing party was unable to
respond, and the [district] court made no findings or conclusions
with respect to that contention.”); see also Flagstaff Enters. Constr.
Inc. v. Snow, 908 P.2d 1183, 1185 (Colo. App. 1995) (issue not
preserved for appellate review when raised for first time in a reply in
support of a C.R.C.P. 59 motion). Accordingly, we won’t address it.
6 ¶ 17 Similarly, the firm’s claim for attorney fees in collecting on its
lien was first raised in its reply brief to its forthwith motion, never
ruled on by the district court, and is thus likewise unpreserved.
See Grohn, 960 P.2d at 727.
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 18 The firm seeks an award of appellate attorney fees under
C.A.R. 39.1 and section 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025, alleging that
husband expanded the proceedings by repeatedly taking frivolous
and groundless positions contrary to the MA and the prior
mandates from this court. We deny the request for two reasons.
First, the firm’s arguments concern the permanent orders
judgment, and it doesn’t specifically explain how they relate to the
December 2, 2024, order. Second, the firm identifies no district
court finding of frivolous, groundless, or vexatious conduct by
husband during the proceedings.
¶ 19 Husband, for his part, asks for his appellate attorney fees
under section 13-17-102, maintaining that the appeal lacks
substantial justification. We exercise our discretion and deny the
request. See C.A.R. 39.1.
7 V. Disposition
¶ 20 We dismiss the part of the firm’s appeal challenging the June
13, 2024, judgment and affirm the December 2, 2024, order.
JUDGE SULLIVAN and JUSTICE MARTINEZ concur.