Marriage of Johnson

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 14, 2025
• Docket: 24CA1368
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24CA1368 Marriage of Johnson 08-14-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1368 El Paso County District Court No. 21DR30652 Honorable Chad Miller, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Cecilia Elizabeth Johnson,

Appellee,

and

Morgan Paul Johnson,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division I Opinion by JUDGE MOULTRIE J. Jones and Kuhn, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced August 14, 2025

Beltz & West, P.C., Daniel A. West, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee

Law Office of Joel M. Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant ¶1 This appeal arises from a contempt order and the resulting

entry of punitive sanctions. The contempt charges arose from the

dissolution of the marriage between Cecilia Elizabeth Johnson

(mother) and Morgan Paul Johnson (father).

I. Background

¶2 Mother and father were married in 2005 and have four

children. They separated in 2021 and were divorced in 2023. At

the time of the appeal, the children ranged in age from sixteen to

seven.

¶3 As relevant here, the permanent orders required father to pay

mother $1,222 monthly for child support “through the Family

Support Registry” (FSR). Days after the court issued final orders,

mother filed an emergency motion to restrict father’s parenting time

due to allegations of physical abuse. To resolve this motion, the

parties stipulated, among other things, that they would “participate

in family therapy with a new therapist,” and “[n]either party would

use physical discipline with any of the children.”

¶4 A year later, mother moved for issuance of a contempt citation

against father, alleging that he had (1) not participated in family

therapy; (2) physically disciplined a child; and (3) not paid

1 court-ordered child support through the FSR. After a hearing, a

magistrate dismissed the remedial contempt requests, but held

father in punitive contempt, ordering him to pay $1,500. The

magistrate ruled from the bench and later issued a written order

adopting the magistrate’s oral ruling. The magistrate found, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that punitive contempt sanctions were

warranted because the stipulated order existed and father knew of

it, and father was capable of complying with its terms, but willfully

refused. Father petitioned for review with the district court, which

denied father’s petition.

II. Punitive Contempt

¶5 Father contends that the district court erred by holding him in

punitive contempt. We see no basis for reversal.

A. Legal Framework

¶6 In punitive contempt proceedings under C.R.C.P. 107, the

movant must prove beyond a reasonable doubt (1) the existence of a

lawful court order; (2) the contemnor’s knowledge of the order;

(3) the contemnor’s ability to comply with the order; and (4) that the

contemnor’s refusal to do so was willful. In re Marriage of Sheehan,

2 2022 COA 29, ¶ 25. Father does not contest the existence of a

lawful court order or his knowledge of that order.

B. Adequacy of the Magistrate’s Order

¶7 Father argues that the magistrate’s order is inadequate

because it doesn’t provide adequate findings of fact and conclusions

of law for us to determine the basis of the magistrate’s decision.

We aren’t persuaded.

1. Relevant Law and Standard of Review

¶8 The division in People v. Shifrin, 2014 COA 14, ¶ 90, opined

that “the adequacy of a trial court’s findings, as contrasted with the

sufficiency of the evidence to support them, is tested by whether an

appellate court can discern the lower court’s rationale.” We

therefore review de novo the adequacy of the court’s ruling.

¶9 A trial court’s order is adequate when it contains findings of

fact and conclusions of law sufficient to give an appellate court a

clear understanding of the basis of its order and to enable the

appellate court to determine the grounds upon which it reached its

decision. In re Marriage of Van Inwegen, 757 P.2d 1118, 1121

(Colo. App. 1988). We consider the trial court’s findings and rulings

from the bench as a supplement to its written order. See Friends of

3 Denver Parks, Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 2013 COA 177,

¶¶ 34-37.

2. Analysis

¶ 10 The magistrate’s written order — which was proposed and

approved by both parties — noted the magistrate’s consideration of

the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing. The court

found beyond a reasonable doubt that father could comply with the

order to participate in therapy but willfully failed to do so. These

findings were “[b]ased on testimony presented,” which included

testimony that father coordinated the child’s independent therapy

with mother but considered his own participation in therapy to be

unimportant.

¶ 11 Likewise, with respect to the order’s prohibition on physical

discipline, the magistrate found based on the evidence presented at

the contempt hearing — including testimony that father choked a

child, “slammed [him] against a wall,” and repeatedly kicked him in

the ankle — that father could have complied with the order but he

willfully did not.

4 ¶ 12 Finally, the magistrate found that father could have complied

with the order to pay child support through the FSR, but that he

¶ 13 The magistrate’s order applied the appropriate law to the

relevant evidence presented at the hearing to reach its conclusions.

Because — relying on both the written and oral rulings — we are

able to discern the court’s rationale for its determination on each

count, we are satisfied with the adequacy of the order.1

C. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶ 14 Father also contends there was insufficient evidence to

support the magistrate’s punitive contempt determination beyond a

reasonable doubt. Again, we aren’t persuaded.

1. Standard of Review for Sufficiency Claims

¶ 15 We must accept the magistrate’s factual findings unless they

are clearly erroneous. In re Parental Responsibilities Concerning

1 We reject father’s assertion that the court’s finding that he

willfully failed to comply was inadequate because it contradicted the court’s refusal to infer that he had a present ability to comply. Father’s present ability to comply with the therapy order was not necessary to support the court’s punitive contempt conclusion. See Sheehan, ¶ 41 (“[T]he issue of the present ability to comply is not the focus of punitive contempt; rather, the issue is whether at some point the contemnor had the ability to pay but did not do so.”).

5 G.E.R., 264 P.3d 637, 638-39 (Colo. App. 2011). We review de novo

issues of law, including whether the magistrate abused his

discretion in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence presented.

In re Marriage of Young, 2021 COA 96, ¶ 9.

¶ 16 As was his right, father declined to testify at the hearing.

Father didn’t present any other evidence. The only evidence before

the court therefore was mother’s testimony and her admitted

exhibits. For each count of contempt, father asserts that the

evidence was insufficient to prove his ability to comply with the

order and that any noncompliance was willful. We disagree.

¶ 17 The magistrate applied the appropriate law to determine

contempt. Sheehan, ¶ 25. Moreover, as we discuss below, there is

sufficient record evidence to prove each count. Accordingly, we see

no abuse of discretion.

a. Participation in Therapy

¶ 18 The record supports the magistrate’s findings of father’s ability

to comply with the requirement to participate in therapy and his

willful failure to do so. Namely, it shows that father was able to

confer with mother about other therapeutic issues — for example,

6 regarding a child’s individual therapy. Nonetheless, father chose

not to confer with mother after she suggested a new family

therapist, in accordance with the stipulation’s terms. Relevant to

father’s willfulness, the hearing testimony included unrefuted

statements from father that he would not participate in therapy

because he “did not see the importance of [it] or any need to attend”

and evidence of father being unresponsive to attempts by the

children’s therapist to engage him in the children’s therapy. Father

considered therapy “pseudoscience” and therapists “charlatans.”

b. Physical Discipline

¶ 19 The record evidence also supports the magistrate’s finding that

father willfully failed to comply with the court’s order to refrain from

physical discipline. The record includes testimony and photographs

concerning incidents in which father “slammed [a child] against a

wall” and kicked a child in the ankle in response to the child’s

behavior. The child also suffered bruising on his neck while in

father’s care. The testimony shows that father, who could have

refrained from this behavior, acted willfully.

¶ 20 To the extent father contends that this testimony concerning

the child’s injuries was erroneously admitted, he does not develop

7 this claim. Though he accurately asserts that his attorney lodged a

hearsay objection to this evidence, he does not now challenge the

court’s admission of the testimony on the basis that it was hearsay.

See Middlemist v. BDO Seidman, LLP, 958 P.2d 486, 495 (Colo. App.

1997) (Claims are not properly presented for appeal when the

appellant “fails to identify any specific errors committed by the trial

court . . . and provides no legal authority to support an allegation

that the trial court erred in making its rulings.”).

c. FSR Payment

¶ 21 The record shows that father knew of the court order and

nevertheless paid mother by directly depositing funds into their

joint checking account and later, her personal account; he did not

begin paying child support into the FSR for more than a year. The

record also supports a determination of father’s willfulness.

Mother’s unrefuted testimony was that, before using the FSR,

father’s inconsistent and intrusive methods of payment exacerbated

the anxiety father had caused her by “financial[ly] abus[ing]” her

during the marriage.

¶ 22 Given this evidence supporting the magistrate’s determination,

his finding that the legal factors for contempt had been met are not

8 arbitrary or unreasonable or a misapplication of the law. To the

extent father wishes this court to reweigh the evidence, we cannot.

See In re Marriage of Nelson, 2012 COA 205, ¶ 35 (“[Even where]

there is evidence in the record that could have supported a different

conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the

district court.”); see also In re Marriage of Hatton, 160 P.3d 326, 330

(Colo. App. 2007) (“It is the responsibility of the trial court as the

trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the

sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence.”).

3. Remaining Arguments

¶ 23 Incredibly, father also argues that because the order only

prohibited physical discipline — which he asserts requires finding

that his physical interaction with the children had “some purpose of

correction or punishment” — any injuries to the children indicative

of abuse were insufficient to support the court’s contempt

determination.

¶ 24 It’s not clear whether father intends this argument as an

assertion that there was not a lawful order, that there was

insufficient evidence of a violation of a lawful order, or both.

Regardless, we reject this argument because (1) prohibiting physical

9 discipline by a parent that endangers children is the type of order

authorized by section 14-10-129(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. 2024; and (2) the

record indicates that at least one of the child’s injuries (bruising

from father repeatedly kicking him in the ankle) was sustained as

part of father’s reaction to the child’s behavior (sledding into his

sibling).

¶ 25 Finally, without citing to any legal authority, father argues

that mother improperly “weaponized” contempt. But father does

not otherwise develop this claim. We therefore decline to address it.

Middlemist, 958 P.2d at 495.

III. Disposition

¶ 26 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE KUHN concur.