08/25/2026
DA 25-0587
Case Number: DA 25-0587
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 2026 MT 205N
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF: CHRISTINE P. LEE FRENCH, Petitioner and Appellant, and BAYNE A. LEE FRENCH, Respondent and Appellee.
APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, In and For the County of Flathead, Cause No. DR-22-373(B)
Honorable Paul Sullivan, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:
For Appellant:
Christine P. Lee French, Self-Represented, Whitefish, Montana For Appellee:
Terin G. Riley, Johnson-Gilchrist Law Firm, Whitefish, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: July 15, 2026 Decided: August 25, 2026
Filed:
__________________________________________
Clerk
Justice Katherine M. Bidegaray delivered the Opinion of the Court.
¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.
¶2 Christine Lee French (Christine) appeals the July 15, 2025 Order of the Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, denying her motion for relief from judgment under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Christine argues that the District Court erred in denying Rule 60(b)(4) relief and abused its discretion by denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief. We affirm.
¶3 Christine and Bayne Lee French (Bayne) married in September 1999. They are the parents of two children, only one of whom, R.L.F., was a minor during the proceedings. On July 5, 2022, Christine petitioned the District Court for dissolution of the marriage. Bayne answered on July 27, 2022, and simultaneously moved for an emergency interim parenting order supported by an affidavit and proposed parenting plan.
¶4 On August 2, 2022, without a hearing, the District Court granted Bayne’s motion, adopted his proposed parenting plan “as if it were set forth in full,” and directed that R.L.F. be returned to Flathead County. Christine asserts that, at the time, R.L.F. was with Christine in California pursuing a longstanding summer routine of tennis and academic camps and visits with her extended family, none of whom live in Montana.
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¶5 Over the following year, the parties litigated interim-parenting and scheduling disputes. On Christine’s ex parte motion, the court modified the interim parenting plan on December 19, 2022, before Bayne could respond, and set a show-cause hearing for February 15, 2023. On Christine’s motion and with Bayne’s agreement, the District Court continued the hearing to March 22, 2023. Christine’s first attorney withdrew on February 21, 2023. Christine did not appear at the March 22 hearing, and she does not deny receiving notice of it.
¶6 Christine later received permission to appear at hearings by telephone or video, and a second attorney entered an appearance for her on May 23, 2023.
¶7 On October 27, 2023, the District Court entered a second amended scheduling order setting a pretrial hearing for March 6, 2024, and a non-jury trial term beginning on April 1, 2024. In its order, the court required both parties and counsel to attend the pretrial hearing “without exception” and warned that nonappearance could result in sanctions. The same day, the court permitted Christine’s second attorney to withdraw, and Christine proceeded without counsel for the remainder of the case. Bayne’s counsel served Christine with notice of the new deadlines on October 30, 2023.
¶8 On January 30, 2024, Bayne moved to require Christine’s parenting time to occur in Flathead County. Christine did not timely respond. In early February 2024, Christine filed a motion requesting family support. Bayne responded on February 14, 2024. On February 21, 2024, the District Court deemed Bayne’s motion well taken and granted it
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without an evidentiary hearing. In the same order, the court denied Christine’s pending request for temporary family support.
¶9 Christine did not appear at the March 6, 2024 pretrial hearing. On April 1, the day before trial, Bayne moved under § 40-4-255(2)(b), MCA, to exclude evidence, citing Christine’s absence from the pretrial hearing and her alleged noncompliance with the financial-disclosure requirements of § 40-4-253, MCA.
¶10 On April 2 and 3, 2024, the District Court held a two-day non-jury trial. Christine did not provide a transcript of either trial day as part of the appellate record. The April 2 minute entry notes Bayne’s motion to exclude evidence and Christine’s continuance request and recites that the court stated that Christine could not call witnesses and would have limited cross-examination. The minute entry for the April 3 hearing recites that Christine requested and received permission to make an offer of proof and that the court directed the parties to submit proposed findings, conclusions, and a decree. We recount what the minute entries record but do not treat them as establishing the precise oral rulings or how the court implemented them.
¶11 Christine missed that deadline. The District Court granted her an extension through May 8, 2024, but she did not file proposed findings by that date. On May 14, the docket reflected a second request for an extension through May 20, 2024. On May 16, the District Court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution. The attached Final Parenting Plan differed in several material respects from the arrangement
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described in Findings 10 and 20. The Decree provided that nothing had been filed after the May 8 deadline.
¶12 On June 13, 2024, Christine moved to stay, set aside, or amend the Decree, or for a new trial. The District Court treated the filing as a motion for reconsideration and denied it on August 16, 2024. Christine filed a notice of appeal on September 17, 2024. This Court dismissed that appeal as untimely on November 19, 2024.
¶13 On November 26, 2024, Christine moved for relief from the Final Parenting Plan and for an ex parte interim order modifying it. On December 3, Bayne moved to suspend Christine’s parenting time, enforce the Decree, and hold her in contempt, asserting that she had again failed to return R.L.F. on time after parenting time. The District Court denied both parties’ motions on December 4, 2024, and left the Decree and Final Parenting Plan in effect.
¶14 On May 20, 2025, Christine moved under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) to set aside the Decree and Final Parenting Plan, invoking subsections (1), (3), (4), and (6). Bayne responded, and Christine replied. On July 15, 2025, the District Court denied Christine’s motion. It concluded that her claims under subsections (1) and (3) were untimely and independently lacked merit; that subsection (4) did not apply because Christine received notice of and participated in the trial and her claims belonged in direct appeal; and that subsection (6) did not apply because she invoked other subsections and failed to show extraordinary circumstances. Christine timely appealed that order.
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¶15 On appeal, Christine principally contends that the parenting and property provisions of the Decree are void under Rule 60(b)(4) because the District Court entered interim orders and imposed trial restrictions without the process that due process and Title 40, MCA, required. Alternatively, she seeks relief under Rule 60(b)(6) based on the cumulative effect of those asserted failures. Bayne responds that Christine received constitutionally sufficient process, that Rule 60(b) cannot substitute for her untimely direct appeal, and that Christine’s failure to provide the trial transcript prevents review of many of her contentions. Bayne also seeks attorney fees under § 37-61-421, MCA.
¶16 We review de novo a ruling on Rule 60(b)(4) because whether a judgment is void presents a question of law. In re Marriage of Wendt, 2014 MT 174, ¶ 7, 375 Mont. 388, 329 P.3d 567; Essex Ins. Co. v. Moose’s Saloon, Inc., 2007 MT 202, ¶ 16, 338 Mont. 423, 166 P.3d 451. A judgment is void only when the issuing court lacked jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process. In re Marriage of Wendt, ¶ 11.
¶17 We review the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief for an abuse of discretion. Essex, ¶ 18. Rule 60(b)(6) applies only in extraordinary circumstances and may not serve as a substitute for a timely appeal. Essex, ¶¶ 25, 28. Rule 60(b)(4)
¶18 Christine does not challenge the District Court’s jurisdiction. The question is whether the process culminating in the May 16, 2024 Decree deprived her of notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Although the record identifies serious procedural
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concerns that could support direct appellate review on an adequate record, Christine has not established that the final Decree is void.
¶19 Rule 60(b)(4) authorizes relief when “the judgment is void.” M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). It does not provide belated correction of procedural, statutory, evidentiary, or factual error. A judgment is void only when the court lacked jurisdiction or acted inconsistently with due process. Greater Missoula Area Fed’n of Early Childhood Educators v. Child Start, Inc., 2009 MT 362, ¶ 21, 353 Mont. 201, 219 P.3d 881. A judgment suffers the “fundamental” infirmity necessary for voidness when a party lacked notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard, not whenever the court may simply have erred. United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 270-71, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1377 (2010).
¶20 Due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S. Ct. 893, 902 (1976). A parent’s interest in the care and custody of a child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by fundamentally fair procedures. Steab v. Luna, 2010 MT 125, ¶¶ 22-27, 356 Mont. 372, 233 P.3d 351; see also § 40-4-220(1), MCA. A parenting determination entered without constitutionally adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard is void. In re Marriage of Wendt, ¶¶ 11-13.
A. The Interim Parenting Orders
¶21 Christine contends that the August 2022 and February 2024 parenting orders did not comply with §§ 40-4-213 and -220, MCA. The August 2022 order did not set a show-cause hearing within “21 days from the execution of the interim parenting plan” as required by
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§ 40-4-220(2)(b), MCA, and the District Court granted the February 2024 geographic restriction without an evidentiary hearing. We assume without deciding that Christine has identified statutory defects in those interim proceedings. See In re Marriage of Handy, 2026 MT 90, ¶¶ 19, 26-27, 428 Mont. 1, 588 P.3d 816 (holding that, once adequate cause exists, § 40-4-220(1), MCA, requires an evidentiary hearing before the court adjudicates a contested amendment to a final parenting plan and that a party’s silence does not extinguish that duty). In re Marriage of Handy and In re Marriage of Wendt involved amended final parenting determinations entered without the evidentiary process required before the court adjudicated the amendment. In re Marriage of Handy, ¶¶ 19, 27; In re Marriage of Wendt, ¶¶ 10-11. Here, the challenged Decree was the first final parenting adjudication and followed a noticed two-day trial. The interim orders do not, by themselves, establish that the later Decree was entered without process. Whether the restrictions imposed at trial deprived Christine of a meaningful hearing requires separate examination.
B. The Asserted Trial Restrictions
¶22 Although Christine challenges rulings made during the trial held April 2 and 3, she did not provide a transcript of either trial day. The order under review identifies Christine’s inability to call witnesses as one of her principal trial-process complaints, and the April 2 clerk’s minute entry recites that the court denied her continuance request and stated that she would not be permitted to call witnesses and would have limited cross-examination because she failed to attend the pretrial hearing. We do not treat the minute entry as a substitute for the transcript necessary to review her claims or as affirmative proof of the
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precise terms, scope, or implementation of any oral ruling. Such restrictions, if imposed and implemented as Christine contends, would be substantial in a case that adjudicated parenting and significant property interests. Christine appeared and testified during the two-day trial, but a party’s presence at a hearing does not, by itself, satisfy due process when the court prevents meaningful cross-examination on central, credibility-dependent issues. See Hennon v. Weber, 2025 MT 260, ¶¶ 13-17, 425 Mont. 14, 579 P.3d 151 (due process requires a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine on central factual issues where credibility is outcome-determinative). But Hennon does not relieve an appellant of the burden to provide a record establishing that such a restriction occurred and deprived the appellant of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.
¶23 Christine’s failure to provide the trial transcript prevents this Court from determining what oral rulings the District Court made, the terms and scope of any restriction, how the court implemented it, which witnesses Christine sought to call, what their testimony would have established, what subjects she sought to explore on cross-examination, the substance of any offer of proof or objection, or whether any restriction prevented meaningful testing of evidence material to the Decree. Under M. R. App. P. 8(2) and (3)(a), Christine bore the responsibility to provide a record adequate for review and to order any transcript necessary to review the issues she raised. See In re Marriage of Hodge, 2003 MT 146, ¶ 7, 316 Mont. 194, 69 P.3d 1192. When appellate review depends on the substance of an untranscribed proceeding, a clerk’s minute entry does not substitute for the transcript. Giambra v. Kelsey, 2007 MT 158, ¶ 36 n.3, 338 Mont.
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19, 162 P.3d 134; Rolison v. Bozeman Deaconess Health Services, Inc., 2005 MT 95, ¶ 32, 326 Mont. 491, 111 P.3d 202. The record Christine provided therefore establishes only that Christine has not carried her burden to show that the final Decree was entered without a meaningful opportunity to be heard. It does not permit us to reconstruct the trial proceedings or affirmatively determine that the District Court ruled or implemented the restrictions exactly as the clerk’s entry summarizes them.
C. The Final Parenting Plan
¶24 Christine correctly identifies material differences between the arrangement described in Findings 10 and 20 and the Final Parenting Plan attached to the Decree.1 The parenting time framework provided in the August 2, 2022 interim parenting plan appears to have permitted Christine more frequent Montana parenting time, two weeks of vacation parenting time, periodic review, and joint decision-making on subjects that the attached plan assigned solely to Bayne. Those discrepancies may reflect inadequate findings, an internal inconsistency between the District Court’s findings and the Final Parenting Plan, or another legal error. Because Christine did not provide the trial transcript, we cannot
1 The Final Parenting Plan attached to the Decree designated Bayne as the primary residential parent, confined Christine’s parenting time to Flathead County, allowed her one week of parenting time not more than once every three months, prohibited her from taking the child outside Montana, and gave Bayne sole authority over education, nonemergency health care, physician or therapist changes, and counseling. Christine contends that those terms materially differed from the August 2, 2022 interim plan and from the arrangement described in Findings 10 and 20. She identifies three principal differences: the interim framework allowed one week of Montana parenting time as often as once each month, afforded each parent two additional vacation weeks annually, and provided joint decision-making over several major issues; the decree-attached plan reduced the Montana parenting time to once every three months, omitted the additional vacation provision, and transferred several decision-making subjects exclusively to Bayne.
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determine whether the evidence supported the challenged terms. Christine had notice that the court would enter a final parenting plan and that parenting time and geographic restrictions were contested; the allocation of parental decision-making authority formed part of the plan the court had to enter. The available record does not establish that the attached plan resolved an issue outside the scope of the noticed trial or that Christine lacked a meaningful opportunity to address the underlying subjects. The discrepancies therefore do not establish voidness under Rule 60(b)(4).
D. The Property Claims
¶25 Christine also argues that the property provisions are void because the District Court, in its marital-estate calculation, improperly classified or valued Bayne’s interest in Ksanka LLC, failed to reconcile the Eureka property, and included accounts held for the parties’ children. These contentions identify potential errors in the property division, but they do not establish that the court lacked jurisdiction or, on the record supplied, that the property provisions were entered without constitutionally adequate process.
¶26 The spreadsheet attached to the Decree places the separation-date values of several accounts identified as UTMA, custodial, or educational accounts in Christine’s allocation columns. Property validly transferred under the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act is indefeasibly vested in the minor, not the custodian. Section 72-26-609(2), MCA. The findings in the Decree also describe the accounts as children’s funds that Christine depleted and as dissipation of the marital estate. The Decree and attached spreadsheet do not clearly reveal whether the District Court purported to adjudicate ownership of existing accounts
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or instead used their former values as a dissipation adjustment. Even assuming the court misclassified some accounts in calculating the marital estate, that error would concern the correctness of a judgment entered within the court’s dissolution jurisdiction, unless the judgment actually divested a nonparty of property without constitutionally adequate process.
¶27 In In re Estate of Johnson, 2024 MT 224, ¶¶ 30-32, 418 Mont. 198, 557 P.3d 36, the district court ordered the transfer of property belonging to an estate that had not participated in the proceeding. The record here does not establish that the District Court adjudicated or transferred an existing property interest belonging to either child or otherwise bound a nonparty in the manner Johnson addressed. Christine received notice that ownership, valuation, dissipation, and equitable distribution were before the court; she appeared and testified at trial. Christine’s complaint that the District Court entered the Decree while her second extension request remained unresolved likewise identifies a potential procedural error, but does not, on this record, establish voidness. The court had already extended her deadline through May 8, 2024, and the May 14 filing requested additional time but did not tender completed proposed findings.
¶28 Christine has identified possible statutory and legal errors, but she has not demonstrated the fundamental infirmity that renders a judgment void. The District Court had jurisdiction, Christine received notice of the final trial, and she appeared and testified. The asserted trial restrictions would have been significant if the District Court imposed and implemented them as Christine contends. The record Christine provided, however, does
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not demonstrate that any restrictions deprived Christine of a meaningful opportunity to be heard on a material issue. We therefore affirm the denial of Rule 60(b)(4) relief. Rule 60(b)(6) Relief
¶29 The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Christine’s arguments principally seek belated review of trial rulings and Decree provisions known to her when judgment was entered. She has not identified an extraordinary circumstance, apart from issues available through ordinary post-judgment and appellate procedures, that prevented her from protecting her interests.
¶30 Rule 60(b)(6) is not a lower-standard catchall. It is available upon a showing that subsections (1) through (5) do not apply and that extraordinary circumstances independently justify relief. In re Marriage of Cline, 2026 MT 108, ¶ 40, 428 Mont. 158, ____ P.3d ____; Essex, ¶ 21. A movant must show extraordinary circumstances, action within a reasonable time, and blamelessness. Essex, ¶ 25 (citing In re Paternity of C.T.E-H., 2004 MT 307, ¶ 45, 323 Mont. 498, 101 P.3d 254, and Bahm v. Southworth, 2000 MT 244, ¶ 14, 301 Mont. 434, 10 P.3d 99).
¶31 The District Court reasoned in part that Christine could not invoke subsection (6) because she also invoked subsections (1), (3), and (4). We need not decide whether her alternative pleading presented a threshold obstacle because she has not satisfied subsection (6) on the merits. See In re Marriage of Cline, ¶¶ 21-23, 40-41 (addressing subsection (6) after considering other Rule 60(b) grounds).
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¶32 Christine characterizes the cumulative proceedings as an extraordinary, court-driven failure: defective interim orders, asserted trial restrictions, denial of a continuance, the trial format, an unresolved extension request, adoption of Bayne’s proposed findings, and inconsistencies in the Decree. These matters, however, were known to Christine when the Decree was entered and were available for post-judgment review and direct appeal. Christine filed a post-judgment motion and attempted an appeal, but this Court dismissed the appeal as untimely. Rule 60(b)(6) cannot revive the direct appeal she failed to perfect. Essex, ¶ 29.
¶33 Christine also contributed materially to the posture she now challenges by failing to attend the pretrial hearing, missing the extended deadline for proposed findings, and failing to perfect her direct appeal. Those circumstances do not demonstrate that she was wronged through no fault of her own. See In re Marriage of Cline, ¶¶ 40-41. Christine’s failure to provide the trial transcript also prevents her from establishing that any asserted trial restrictions, individually or cumulatively, prevented a full presentation or accurate merits determination. Even assuming her Rule 60(b) motion was filed within a reasonable time, she has not shown extraordinary circumstances or blamelessness. The alleged misclassification of the accounts was known when the Decree was entered, and the issue was available through timely post-judgment review and a timely direct appeal.
¶34 Because Christine has not shown extraordinary circumstances attributable to no fault of her own, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
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Attorney Fees
¶35 Bayne seeks attorney fees under § 37-61-421, MCA, contending that the appeal is frivolous and vexatious. In determining whether litigation was pursued vexatiously, we generally consider whether the arguments were made in good faith. In re Estate of Boland, 2019 MT 236, ¶ 61, 397 Mont. 319, 450 P.3d 849. Although Christine has not established entitlement to Rule 60(b) relief, she raises legally cognizable concerns regarding the mandatory parenting-hearing procedures and the asserted trial restrictions. We decline to award attorney fees.
¶36 For these reasons, we affirm the District Court’s July 15, 2025 Order Denying Motion to Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b), and we deny Bayne’s request for attorney fees.
¶37 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents questions controlled by settled law or by the clear application of the standards of review and does not establish new precedent or modify existing precedent.
¶38 Affirmed.
/S/ KATHERINE M. BIDEGARAY We Concur:
/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON /S/ JIM RICE