OPINION
CRIPPEN, Judge.
In this dissolution matter, appellant alleges the trial court erred as a matter of law by classifying appellant’s state trooper pension benefits as marital property. Both appellant and respondent claim the trial court abused its discretion in valuing and dividing property. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Robert Crace and respondent Carol Crace were married in 1962 and have three children. In November 1984, the trial court issued a partial judgment granting a dissolution of their marriage but reserving all other issues. The only unemanci-pated child at that time was James Crace, born November 18, 1970.
Appellant has been employed as a highway patrol officer for over 16 years. He plans to work until retirement, when he will be eligible for state trooper pension benefits. Appellant may retire at age 55; retirement becomes mandatory at age 60. Appellant is not presently eligible for social security benefits.
Respondent is employed as a production clerk at Sanzo Nutrition and anticipates social security benefits upon retirement.
The trial court addressed the reserved issues in two amended judgments, entered in February 1986 and May 1986. The court awarded appellant custody of James and granted liberal visitation rights to respondent, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. The court ordered respondent to pay $190 in monthly child support.
The court valued appellant’s state trooper pension benefits at $25,000 and awarded them to appellant. Appellant’s expert estimated the present value of the anticipated state trooper retirement benefits at $19,749 before taxes and $15,986 after taxes. Respondent’s expert valued the benefits at $88,472, assuming an interest rate of five percent. By affidavit, appellant’s expert rebutted the validity of the assumed interest rate.
Appellant was also granted the parties’ homestead, which the court valued at $32,-000. Respondent Carol Crace was granted cash of $26,786 as her share of the marital property distribution, to be secured by a lien on the homestead. In calculating this award the court took into account the pension and home awarded to appellant, viewing the pension as part of his marital property. The court made no adjustment of this calculation to take into account respondent’s potential social security benefit.
The court originally allocated any potential tax refunds for 1981, 1982, and 1983 to appellant, but in the second amended judgment the court instead divided the refunds equally between the parties. The court also ordered both parties to pay various marital debts. Appellant’s allocation included a debt to the highway credit union, initially valued at $9681 and later amended to $7589.
Appellant claims (1) the trial court erred as a matter of law in treating his state trooper pension as marital property, (2) alternatively, the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the pension benefits, (3) the trial court improperly valued the highway credit union debt, and (4) he is exclusively entitled to possible income tax refunds. Respondent claims the trial court abused its discretion in valuing appellant’s pension benefits at $25,000 rather than $88,472.
[879]*879ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in considering state trooper retirement benefits as marital property?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the valuation and distribution of property and marital debt payments?
ANALYSIS
1. “Determination of whether a particular item of property is marital or nonmari-tal is a question of law * * *." Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). “All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital property.” Id. See Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 5 (1984).
The trial court properly rejected appellant’s argument that state trooper pension benefits are exempt from consideration as marital property. The court relied on both the statutory presumption that property is marital unless shown otherwise and on Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752 (Minn.1983), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court established nonvested, unmatured police officer pension benefits as marital property. Id. at 754-56. In 1978, the legislature expressly noted that “nonforfeitable” (later amended to say “vested”) pensions were marital property. 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 772, § 48. In Janssen, the supreme court said that a nonvested pension was a contractual right, a property interest, and within the “expansive” statutory definition of marital property. Id. at 754-55.
The supreme court in Janssen concluded:
Our reading of legislative intent comports with the growing recognition of pension rights and their importance as a major asset in marital dissolution proceedings. In the instant case, the pension was one of the major assets of the marriage, and only the house ranked with equal stature. To award one party this asset would ignore the presumption of Minn.Stat. § 518.58 (1982) that each spouse contributed to the acquisition of property while they lived together as husband and wife.
Id. at 756.
Janssen followed a series of cases finding both private and public pension benefits to be marital property, including Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn.1978) (private pension benefits are property for purposes of distribution under Minn.Stat. § 518.58, the division of marital property statute); Jensen v. Jensen, 276 N.W.2d 68, 69 (Minn.1979) (fact that benefits are not readily available until a number of contingencies have occurred does not exclude their consideration as marital property); Faus v. Faus, 319 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn.1982) (firefighter pension benefits are property to be considered by the court in division of marital property); and Taylor v. Taylor, 329 N.W.2d 795, 797-98 (Minn.1983) (applying Faus, Jensen, and Elliott). The supreme court has reaffirmed this rule since Janssen. See DuBois v. DuBois, 335 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn.1983) (valuation and division of pension rights is generally a matter for the trial court’s discretion, citing Faus and Janssen).
Appellant, however, argues that a 1983 amendment to the state trooper retirement statutes overrules this line of cases and exempts state trooper pension benefits from consideration as marital property. See 1983 Minn.Laws ch. 128, § 24. The 1983 statute, in effect at the time this action began, provides that:
None of the moneys, annuities, or other benefits provided for in [Chapter 352B] shall be assignable either in law or in equity or be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, including actions for dissolution, legal separation, or child support.
Minn.Stat. § 352B.071 (Supp.1983) (amended 1984) (emphasis added).
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OPINION
CRIPPEN, Judge.
In this dissolution matter, appellant alleges the trial court erred as a matter of law by classifying appellant’s state trooper pension benefits as marital property. Both appellant and respondent claim the trial court abused its discretion in valuing and dividing property. We affirm.
FACTS
Appellant Robert Crace and respondent Carol Crace were married in 1962 and have three children. In November 1984, the trial court issued a partial judgment granting a dissolution of their marriage but reserving all other issues. The only unemanci-pated child at that time was James Crace, born November 18, 1970.
Appellant has been employed as a highway patrol officer for over 16 years. He plans to work until retirement, when he will be eligible for state trooper pension benefits. Appellant may retire at age 55; retirement becomes mandatory at age 60. Appellant is not presently eligible for social security benefits.
Respondent is employed as a production clerk at Sanzo Nutrition and anticipates social security benefits upon retirement.
The trial court addressed the reserved issues in two amended judgments, entered in February 1986 and May 1986. The court awarded appellant custody of James and granted liberal visitation rights to respondent, pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. The court ordered respondent to pay $190 in monthly child support.
The court valued appellant’s state trooper pension benefits at $25,000 and awarded them to appellant. Appellant’s expert estimated the present value of the anticipated state trooper retirement benefits at $19,749 before taxes and $15,986 after taxes. Respondent’s expert valued the benefits at $88,472, assuming an interest rate of five percent. By affidavit, appellant’s expert rebutted the validity of the assumed interest rate.
Appellant was also granted the parties’ homestead, which the court valued at $32,-000. Respondent Carol Crace was granted cash of $26,786 as her share of the marital property distribution, to be secured by a lien on the homestead. In calculating this award the court took into account the pension and home awarded to appellant, viewing the pension as part of his marital property. The court made no adjustment of this calculation to take into account respondent’s potential social security benefit.
The court originally allocated any potential tax refunds for 1981, 1982, and 1983 to appellant, but in the second amended judgment the court instead divided the refunds equally between the parties. The court also ordered both parties to pay various marital debts. Appellant’s allocation included a debt to the highway credit union, initially valued at $9681 and later amended to $7589.
Appellant claims (1) the trial court erred as a matter of law in treating his state trooper pension as marital property, (2) alternatively, the trial court abused its discretion in valuing the pension benefits, (3) the trial court improperly valued the highway credit union debt, and (4) he is exclusively entitled to possible income tax refunds. Respondent claims the trial court abused its discretion in valuing appellant’s pension benefits at $25,000 rather than $88,472.
[879]*879ISSUES
1. Did the trial court err in considering state trooper retirement benefits as marital property?
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in the valuation and distribution of property and marital debt payments?
ANALYSIS
1. “Determination of whether a particular item of property is marital or nonmari-tal is a question of law * * *." Erdahl v. Erdahl, 384 N.W.2d 566, 568 (Minn.Ct.App.1986). “All property acquired during the marriage is presumed to be marital property.” Id. See Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 5 (1984).
The trial court properly rejected appellant’s argument that state trooper pension benefits are exempt from consideration as marital property. The court relied on both the statutory presumption that property is marital unless shown otherwise and on Janssen v. Janssen, 331 N.W.2d 752 (Minn.1983), in which the Minnesota Supreme Court established nonvested, unmatured police officer pension benefits as marital property. Id. at 754-56. In 1978, the legislature expressly noted that “nonforfeitable” (later amended to say “vested”) pensions were marital property. 1978 Minn. Laws ch. 772, § 48. In Janssen, the supreme court said that a nonvested pension was a contractual right, a property interest, and within the “expansive” statutory definition of marital property. Id. at 754-55.
The supreme court in Janssen concluded:
Our reading of legislative intent comports with the growing recognition of pension rights and their importance as a major asset in marital dissolution proceedings. In the instant case, the pension was one of the major assets of the marriage, and only the house ranked with equal stature. To award one party this asset would ignore the presumption of Minn.Stat. § 518.58 (1982) that each spouse contributed to the acquisition of property while they lived together as husband and wife.
Id. at 756.
Janssen followed a series of cases finding both private and public pension benefits to be marital property, including Elliott v. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d 75, 77 (Minn.1978) (private pension benefits are property for purposes of distribution under Minn.Stat. § 518.58, the division of marital property statute); Jensen v. Jensen, 276 N.W.2d 68, 69 (Minn.1979) (fact that benefits are not readily available until a number of contingencies have occurred does not exclude their consideration as marital property); Faus v. Faus, 319 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Minn.1982) (firefighter pension benefits are property to be considered by the court in division of marital property); and Taylor v. Taylor, 329 N.W.2d 795, 797-98 (Minn.1983) (applying Faus, Jensen, and Elliott). The supreme court has reaffirmed this rule since Janssen. See DuBois v. DuBois, 335 N.W.2d 503, 505 (Minn.1983) (valuation and division of pension rights is generally a matter for the trial court’s discretion, citing Faus and Janssen).
Appellant, however, argues that a 1983 amendment to the state trooper retirement statutes overrules this line of cases and exempts state trooper pension benefits from consideration as marital property. See 1983 Minn.Laws ch. 128, § 24. The 1983 statute, in effect at the time this action began, provides that:
None of the moneys, annuities, or other benefits provided for in [Chapter 352B] shall be assignable either in law or in equity or be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, including actions for dissolution, legal separation, or child support.
Minn.Stat. § 352B.071 (Supp.1983) (amended 1984) (emphasis added). The 1983 amendment added the emphasized language that was already a part of the legal process exemption for public employees’ retirement benefits, Minn.Stat. § 353.15 (1982) (amended 1984).
These process exemptions do not deal with the definition of marital property for [880]*880dissolution cases; they do not overcome the expansive statutory definition of marital property nor do they change the holding in Janssen classifying pensions as marital property. See Janssen, 331 N.W.2d at 754-56; Faus, 319 N.W.2d at 411, 413. In addition to adherence to the public policy and statutory construction concerns articulated in Janssen, we are compelled to reach this conclusion by other case law applying the process exemptions, and subsequent legislative history.
In Faus, the supreme court construed a legal process exemption statute that made no reference to dissolution actions, reasoning that:
Even where the exemption provision is absolute on its face, it has been held that exemptions contained in pension statutes are inapplicable to a claim for alimony or child support. These courts have reasoned that the purpose of the exemption statutes is to preserve the retirement benefits for the dependents as well as for the pensioner.
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We do not believe that the legislature intended to create an exemption so broad' and so inconsistent with the policy that it has declared in other acts [enforcing an obligor’s duty of maintenance and support]. We therefore conclude that appellant’s legal dependents should not be classified, for purposes of [the exemption statute], with strangers holding claims hostile to his interest and their own.
Faus, 319 N.W.2d at 411 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
A more recent (1984) amendment to the legal process exemption statutes affirms the reasoning in Faus and Janssen and reinforces the recognition of the importance of pension rights as a “major asset in marital dissolution proceedings.” Janssen, 331 N.W.2d at 756. Chapters 352B (governing state trooper pensions), 353 and others were further amended in 1984 to limit the legal process exemption by allowing for the collection of child support or maintenance pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 518.611, which provides for the withholding of income to pay support and maintenance. 1984 Minn.Laws ch. 547, §§ 5, 6.1 The 1984 amendment gives legislative approval to the reasoning in Faus that exemption provisions act only to protect a pensioner’s dependents and not to exclude a major marital asset from consideration in dissolution proceedings.
Appellant nevertheless argues that the 1983 amendment governs this case and overruled Faus and Janssen, even if only for the brief time preceding the 1984 amendment. This argument cannot prevail. Section 352B.071 is a process exemption statute, nothing more than that. This was true before and after the 1983 amendment referring to process in dissolution cases. The public policy concerns addressed in Faus and Janssen have continuing validity, and those concerns have been reaffirmed by the 1984 legislature. Furthermore, in enacting the 1983 amendment, the legislature chose not to completely insulate the benefits from the courts’ reach as could have been done by defining some or all pensions as nonmarital property in Minn.Stat. § 518.54, subd. 5, and exempting them from consideration under Minn. Stat. § 518.58.
2. “Trial courts are accorded broad discretion in the valuation and distribution of marital assets.” Johns v. Johns, 354 N.W.2d 564, 566 (Minn.Ct.App.1984). “Where the trial court’s decision on valuation and division are supported by evidence in the record, they will not be disturbed.” Id.
Appellant first argues that if his pension benefits are included in the property division then respondent’s social security benefits must also be considered. In Elliott, the supreme court discussed the diffi[881]*881culty of treating future social security benefits as property. Elliott, 274 N.W.2d at 78. The court considered the contingent nature of social security benefits, noting that early death prevents a person from receiving any benefits, and the court observed that a previously ineligible person can readily gain eligibility for benefits by working several quarters in employment covered by the social security system. Id. The court also observed that the benefits should be given some consideration because they represent a loss of spending power to the nonemployee spouse. Id.
Elliott neither adopted nor rejected the notion that social security benefits are property, while acknowledging the trend in various states as well as the federal law against assignment of the benefits. Id. at n. 9. Rather, the court concluded that “[c]onsideration of these matters is within the discretion of the trial court in devising a property settlement.” Id. Here, the trial court specifically considered appellant’s pension as marital property and took no like account of respondent’s social security benefits; it awarded appellant the homestead as well as all right, title and interest to his retirement benefits, and awarded a cash differential to respondent. While a smaller cash award could have been made and might enhance the fairness of the division of this small marital estate, the division does not constitute an abuse of discretion. See also Taylor, 329 N.W.2d at 799 (it is “proper to consider pension benefits as property rights and social security benefits as future income.”). To hold otherwise would improperly substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.
Both parties claim the trial court abused its discretion in valuing appellant’s highway patrol pension at $25,000. Appellant’s expert valued the benefits at $19,749 before taxes and $15,986 after taxes, based on mandatory retirement at age 60. Appellant testified the earliest possible date he could retire would be at age 55. Respondent’s expert placed the value at $88,-472.88, based on early retirement and a five percent discount factor. Appellant’s expert rebutted the validity of the percentage rate by affidavit.
Valuation is necessarily an approximation, and “it is only necessary that the value arrived at lies within a reasonable range of figures.” Hertz v. Hertz, 304 Minn. 144, 145, 229 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn.1975). Given equivocation about the exact year of retirement, $25,000 is within a reasonable range of the valuation before taxes. See Helland v. Helland, 354 N.W.2d 591, 592 (Minn.Ct.App.1984), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. Jan. 3, 1985) (trial court has discretion to consider tax consequences of a property award). Similarly, the court’s valuation of the highway credit union debt of $7589 is within a reasonable range supported by the record.
Appellant also claims he should be exclusively entitled to possible income tax refunds for the years 1981 through 1983. Since the parties filed jointly as a married couple during the time period, the trial court’s equal division of the possible refunds is proper. See MinmStat. § 518.58 (1984).
DECISION
The trial court properly considered appellant’s state trooper pension benefits as marital property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in valuing and dividing the marital estate.
Affirmed.
POPOVICH, C.J., dissents.