24CA1633 Marriage of Broderick 04-02-2026
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1633 El Paso County District Court No. 23DR30179 Honorable Marcus Henson, Judge
In re the Marriage of
Edward Stephan Broderick, Jr.,
Appellee and Cross-Appellant,
and
Samantha Allyn Weeks,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division III Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Dunn and Moultrie, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced April 2, 2026
The Drexler Law Group, LLC, Matthew B. Drexler, Teresa A. Drexler, M. Addison Freebairn, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellee and Cross- Appellant
Law Office of Joel M Pratt, Joel M. Pratt, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Appellant and Cross-Appellee ¶1 In this dissolution of marriage case between Samantha Allyn
Weeks (wife) and Edward Stephen Broderick, Jr. (husband), both
parties appeal those portions of the permanent orders concerning
the property division and child support. We reverse the marital
property division and therefore also reverse the district court’s
orders concerning maintenance and child support. We remand the
case for further proceedings.
I. Background
¶2 In 2023, husband petitioned to dissolve the parties’ eight-year
marriage. The proceedings were bifurcated: the district court
entered a decree of dissolution effective October 23, 2023, and held
the permanent orders hearing on March 21, 2024. In the resulting
permanent orders, the court equally divided the marital estate,
which was valued in excess of $3 million. The court declined to
award either party maintenance but it ordered husband to pay wife
$694 per month in child support.
II. Bifurcation
¶3 As an initial matter, we consider and reject husband’s
contention that the district court abused its discretion by
bifurcating the proceedings.
1 ¶4 Under section 14-10-106(1)(b), C.R.S. 2025, a district court
may defer the entry of the permanent orders until after the entry of
the decree of dissolution, if it finds that such a deferral is in the
parties’ best interests. This option should be considered only in
exceptional circumstances. Estate of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d
943, 951 (Colo. 1997). Even so, we will not disturb a court’s
decision to bifurcate absent a showing of an abuse of discretion.
See id. (“Therefore, the district court properly exercised its
discretion, under these exceptional circumstances, in bifurcating
the proceedings.”). A court abuses its discretion when its decision
is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it
misconstrues or misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Medeiros,
2023 COA 42M, ¶ 28.
¶5 Here, the district court continued the original, half-day
permanent orders hearing scheduled for October 4, 2023, to March
21, 2024, because husband asked that the hearing be set for a full
day. However, when the court granted husband’s motion, the
parties had already assembled exhibits and prepared for the
original hearing date.
2 ¶6 Accordingly, wife asked the court to immediately enter the
decree so that the parties would not have to redo the entirety of
their trial preparation for the new hearing, including updating
sworn financial statements and exhibits to reflect changes in the
value of the parties’ property. Wife cited the escalating costs of the
proceeding, arguing that because of the parties’ litigiousness, she
had already incurred an extraordinary amount of attorney fees,
even though a permanent orders hearing had yet to occur.
Therefore, wife asserted that bifurcation would contain costs by
preventing disputes as to constant changes in the value of the
marital estate. Wife also cited the complex financial issues involved
and her desire to be divorced.
¶7 The district court agreed with wife and dissolved the parties’
marriage as of October 23, 2023. In doing so, the court cited the
“extraordinary expense[s]” that would be incurred by both parties if
the court did not bifurcate because the parties had already incurred
significant costs to prepare for the original hearing.
¶8 Given that (1) the original continuance was at the behest of
husband; (2) the gap between the decree and permanent orders
hearing was less than five months; (3) both parties were litigious;
3 and (4) the parties had already spent substantial money and effort
preparing for an October 2023 division of the marital estate, we
cannot say that the court’s decision to bifurcate the proceedings
was manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. See Burford, 935
P.2d at 951; see also In re Marriage of Lester, 647 P.2d 688 (Colo.
App. 1982) (no error in bifurcating decree and continuing hearing
on property division).
¶9 Husband also argues that the court should have held an
evidentiary hearing as to whether bifurcation was warranted under
Burford, 935 P.2d at 951. But the court’s decision to bifurcate was
made at a status conference at which the parties, who had received
notice that bifurcation would be addressed, presented extensive
argument on the issue. At no point during that status conference
did husband request an evidentiary hearing on bifurcation.
¶ 10 Therefore, to the extent that husband may have been entitled
to a hearing on bifurcation, we agree with wife that he failed to
preserve the issue for appeal. See Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P.
v. Hannon L. Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, ¶ 18 (“It is axiomatic that
issues not raised in or decided by a lower court will not be
addressed for the first time on appeal.”).
4 III. Marital Property Division
¶ 11 We next address the parties’ contentions concerning the
marital property division.
A. Restricted Stock Units
¶ 12 Both parties assert that the district court erred when valuing
and dividing certain restricted stock units (RSUs) associated with
wife’s employment. Specifically, wife argues that the court erred in
finding that the unvested portion of the RSUs were marital property
subject to division, and both parties challenge the court’s $710,000
valuation of the RSUs. Husband also asserts that the court failed
to value and divide the vested RSUs.
1. Additional Facts
¶ 13 Starting in April 2021, wife was employed by Shift4 Payments,
Inc., and in mid-2022, she was promoted to the role of chief
transformation officer. As part of her compensation package, wife
was awarded four separate grants of RSUs.
¶ 14 Wife received such grants in August 2021, December 2021,
and March 2023, with the RSUs incrementally vesting between
August 2022 and March 2026. The grants of RSUs were governed
5 by both the Restricted Stock Unit Award Agreement accompanying
each grant and Shift4’s Incentive Award Plan.
¶ 15 However, between the entry of the decree and the permanent
orders hearing, wife’s position at Shift4 was eliminated. In the
process, wife signed an employment separation agreement with
Shift4 ending her employment as of February 23, 2024. That
agreement provided wife severance benefits to “assist [her] while
[she] pursue[d] other opportunities.” Specifically, the agreement
entitled wife to a lump sum severance payment of $710,000 and
lifted certain non-competition restrictions that she had previously
agreed to. The agreement also required wife to forfeit any RSUs
that had been granted to her but had not yet vested.
¶ 16 At the permanent orders hearing, husband suggested that
wife’s severance payment was effectively an in-kind exchange for
her unvested RSUs. Husband valued the unvested RSUs at
$967,000 based on the stock price of Shift4 as of March 11, 2024,
the date wife executed the separation agreement.
¶ 17 Conversely, wife argued that only the vested RSUs were
marital property, and given the elimination of her position at Shift4,
6 she had lost any right to the unvested RSUs. Wife denied that the
severance payment was in exchange for the unvested RSUs.
¶ 18 The district court first found that all the RSUs were marital
property, reasoning that even though some of the RSUs had not
vested, wife had an enforceable right to receive them. Then, the
court valued the RSUs at $710,000 because (1) the unvested RSUs
could not be divided in kind as they no longer existed given wife’s
separation from her employment at Shift4, and (2) wife had received
a $710,000 payment as part of her severance package. Therefore,
the court linked wife’s severance package to the value of the RSUs,
explaining that “the Court does find it appropriate [to] allocate
$710,000 in value related to the Shift4 RSUs” on the marital
spreadsheet.
2. Governing Legal Standards
¶ 19 A property division requires two steps: first, the court
determines whether an interest constitutes “property” and then, if
so, whether it is marital or separate property. In re Marriage of
Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 35 (Colo. 2001). It then sets apart the
separate property and divides the marital property. § 14-10-113(1),
C.R.S. 2025. With certain exceptions not applicable here, marital
7 property means all property acquired by either spouse during the
marriage. § 14-10-113(2); Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35-36.
¶ 20 An RSU is “a form of equity-based compensation consisting of
contractual promises by an employer to deliver shares of stock at a
future date once the [units] have vested.” In re E.J.S., 483 P.3d
110, 111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2021). It is similar to a stock option,
which is a “contractual right to purchase stock during a specified
period at a predetermined price” once the option has vested. In re
Marriage of Miller, 915 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Colo. 1996). The only
substantive difference between an RSU and a stock option is that
an RSU results in an employee being granted ownership of company
stock, as opposed to merely receiving the option to purchase stock.
See E.J.S., 483 P.3d at 111; Miller, 915 P.2d at 1317.
¶ 21 We thus find instructive the cases discussing whether stock
options received during the marriage are marital property. Under
Balanson, 25 P.3d at 39, stock options constitute property for
purposes of dissolution proceedings only when the spouse has an
enforceable right to the options. If the options were granted as an
incentive for accepting employment or as consideration for past
services, the spouse has an enforceable right to them even if that
8 right is not yet exercisable because the options are unvested. Id.
Conversely, if the options are awarded in consideration for future
services, the spouse “does not have enforceable rights under the
option agreement until such time as the future services have been
performed.” Id. at 40 (quoting Miller, 915 P.2d at 1318). “In
determining whether one has an enforceable right to employee stock
options, a court must look to the terms of the contract granting
such options.” Id. at 39.
¶ 22 We review de novo the district court’s interpretation of the
documents governing the interest in question and the court’s
resulting determination of whether the interest is property. See In
re Marriage of Powell, 220 P.3d 952, 954 (Colo. App. 2009)
(reviewing stock option plan de novo in determining whether the
options were marital property); cf. Miller, 915 P.2d at 1319-20
(concluding, based on the restricted stock agreement, that
restricted stock received during the marriage was marital property).
¶ 23 The valuation of marital property — and thus, necessarily, the
determination of whether something is property at all — is
established on the date of the decree where, as here, the date of the
decree preceded the date of the hearing on disposition of property.
9 See § 14-10-113(5); In re Marriage of Turner, 2022 COA 39, ¶ 15.
We will not disturb the court’s determination of the value of marital
property unless the valuation is unsupported by the record. In re
Marriage of Schmedeman, 190 P.3d 788, 790 (Colo. App. 2008); see
also In re Marriage of Krejci, 2013 COA 6, ¶ 23 (noting that the
district court’s property valuation will not be disturbed if it is
reasonable in light of the evidence as a whole).
3. The District Court Properly Concluded that the Unvested RSUs were Marital Property
¶ 24 Both parties agree that any RSUs that were vested as of date
of the decree of dissolution were marital property. See Turner, ¶ 15.
Therefore, our inquiry is limited to the district court’s
characterization of the unvested RSUs as marital property. And we
conclude that as of the October 23, 2023, decree, the unvested
RSUs were entirely marital property.
¶ 25 We reach this conclusion based on a de novo review of the
documents governing wife’s RSUs. To start, we observe that the
RSU Award Agreement did not clearly state whether the RSUs were
awarded to wife in consideration for past or future services.
Instead, the agreement provided that the RSUs were granted “[i]n
10 consideration of [wife’s] past and/or continued employment with or
service to [Shift4] and for other good and valuable consideration.”
Yet, despite this lack of clarity, we nevertheless conclude that wife
had an enforceable right to the RSUs based on other language in
both the RSU Award Agreement and Shift4’s Incentive Award Plan.
¶ 26 The Award Agreement provided that each RSU represented the
right to receive one share of Shift4 stock, but “unless and until the
RSUs have vested, [the employee] will have no right to the payment
of any Shares.” In turn, the agreement provided that “[s]ubject to
[wife’s] continued employment with . . . [Shift4,] on each applicable
vesting date . . ., the RSUs shall vest . . . as . . . set forth in [each
RSU] Grant Notice.” The agreement also stated that wife would
surrender all unvested RSUs in the event her employment was
terminated.
¶ 27 The Award Agreement also listed certain events that would
trigger either the immediate or ongoing, automatic vesting of any
unvested RSUs, such as wife’s death, disability, or the occurrence
of certain triggering events following a change in control of Shift4.
In addition, while under certain circumstances, the plan
administrator could terminate the Shift4 Incentive Award Plan, and
11 could amend the plan, any award granted under the plan, and any
corresponding award agreement, such changes could not
“materially and adversely” affect an award holder unless the award
holder had consented.
¶ 28 Given such terms in the Award Agreement and Incentive
Award Plan, we are convinced that wife had enforceable rights to
the RSUs. Critically, after the grants of the RSUs to wife, absent
the termination of her employment, there was no provision in the
RSU Award Agreement or Incentive Award Plan which would have
terminated her interest in the RSUs. See Powell, 220 P.3d at 956-
57 (even where terms of the relevant documents were unclear as to
whether stock options were granted for past or future services,
stock options that had already been granted to wife were marital
property because, so long as wife remained employed, there was
nothing which could have terminated her interest in the options).
¶ 29 And we disagree with wife that the RSUs were mere
expectancies because they were unvested. The fact that wife would
not realize the value of the RSUs unless and until she remained
employed for a specified period after each grant does not make the
RSUs a mere expectancy. See Miller, 915 P.2d at 1319-20; see also
12 Balanson, 25 P.3d at 39 (vesting is not determinative of whether a
stock option, or similar interest, is a divisible property interest).
Instead, the determinative issue is whether she has an enforceable
right to the interest regardless of whether that right is presently
exercisable. Balanson, 25 P.3d at 39; see also Miller, 915 P.2d at
1317-20; Powell, 220 P.3d at 957.
¶ 30 Lastly, because wife remains entitled to her RSUs even if the
Incentive Award Plan is terminated by Shift4, and because the plan
and Award Agreement cannot be modified to adversely affect the
RSUs already granted to her without her consent, her RSUs are not
akin to a revocable trust or an interest under a will of a living
person, which are not “property” under section 14-10-113(7)(b).
See Balanson, 25 P.3d at 41 (spouse’s interest in a revocable or
discretionary trust is not a property interest, but an interest in an
irrevocable trust is a property interest).
¶ 31 In sum, the district court did not err by concluding that the
unvested RSUs were a marital asset subject to the court’s division.
4. The District Court’s Valuation of the RSUs
¶ 32 We next address the district court’s valuation of the RSUs. We
agree with wife that the court erred by valuing the RSUs based on
13 her $710,000 in severance pay, but we disagree with husband that
the court was required to value the unvested RSUs on the date that
wife signed her separation agreement with Shift4.
¶ 33 We conclude that the district court abused its discretion for
multiple reasons. To start, the court was required to value the
RSUs as of the date of the decree because the decree preceded the
permanent orders hearing. See § 14-10-113(5); Turner, ¶ 15.
Instead, the court valued the RSUs based on wife’s severance
payment, which she received multiple months after the entry of the
decree. In doing so, the court did not explain how the value of
wife’s severance payment was indicative of the value of the RSUs as
of the date of the decree given such a lapse in time. See In re
Marriage of Gibbs, 2019 COA 104, ¶ 9 (requiring the district court
to make sufficiently explicit findings of fact to provide a clear
understanding of the basis of its order); C.R.C.P. 52.
¶ 34 Moreover, the district court erred because, by using the
severance payment to value the RSUs, it de facto divided wife’s
severance payment as marital property in place of the RSUs,
without first making any findings as to whether the severance
14 payment was in fact property as of the date of the decree. See
Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35; Turner, ¶ 15.
¶ 35 While section 14-10-113(2)(c) defines marital property as “all
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage,”
the district court may only divide assets or debt “existing at the
time of dissolution,” In re Marriage of Lockwood, 971 P.2d 264, 267
(Colo. App. 1998). Therefore, assets acquired post-decree “are not
considered marital property and . . . are not distributable.” In re
Marriage of Heupel, 936 P.2d 561, 572 (Colo. 1997). Consequently,
absent a finding that wife had a contractually enforceable right to
her severance payment as of the date of the decree, see Balanson,
25 P.3d at 35, 39-40, the district court was prohibited from dividing
wife’s severance payment as marital property. Cf. In re Marriage of
Holmes, 841 P.2d 388, 389 (Colo. App. 1992) (holding that
“severance pay [received] to replace expected loss of income and not
deferred compensation for services rendered during the marriage” is
not marital property subject to division).
¶ 36 Lastly, notwithstanding the district court’s insufficient
findings, we agree with wife that the court’s valuation of the RSUs
was unsupported by the record. Husband speculated that wife
15 received the severance payment as an in-kind payment for
surrendering her unvested RSUs. But the court sustained wife’s
objection to some of husband’s testimony, and husband’s theory
and even higher $967,000 proposed valuation of the unvested RSUs
were based on Shift4’s stock price as of March 11, 2024, when wife
signed the separation agreement. Thus, husband’s testimony could
not support a valuation of the RSUs as of the date of the decree,
which was almost five months earlier. See § 14-10-113(5); Turner, ¶
15.
¶ 37 In support of his $967,000 valuation, husband asks us to
apply In re Marriage of Finer, 920 P.2d 325, 331 (Colo. App. 1996),
which holds that “if marital assets are dissipated by one of the
parties, they must be valued as of the time when they existed.”
¶ 38 But Finer is inapplicable here. There was no finding of
dissipation, as the district court explicitly rejected husband’s
suggestion that wife had lost her job for “nefarious” reasons. And
nothing in Finer suggests that, even in cases of dissipation, the
court may value marital property based on a date occurring after,
as applicable here, the entry of the decree. See id. (recognizing that
compliance with section 14-10-113(5) is “mandatory”). Thus, under
16 no circumstances could the district court have valued the RSUs as
of March 11, 2024.
¶ 39 In sum, because the district court abused its discretion when
valuing the RSUs, we reverse the marital property division and
remand for the court’s reconsideration.
5. Vested RSUs
¶ 40 We agree with husband, however, that to the extent the
district court failed to value and divide the vested RSUs, which both
parties agreed were marital property, it erred. In the permanent
orders, the court simply divided the entirety of the RSUs at a
$710,000 valuation, without explaining what portion, if any, of that
value corresponded to the vested RSUs. Thus, when reconsidering
the marital property division, the court should both value and
divide the vested RSUs along with the unvested RSUs and
sufficiently explain the basis of its ruling. See § 14-10-113(1)
(requiring the court to divide the marital property as it deems just);
Gibbs, ¶ 9.
6. Remand Instructions
¶ 41 Because we are reversing the marital property division, the
court must consider the parties’ economic circumstances at the
17 time of the remand. In re Marriage of Morton, 2016 COA 1, ¶ 14;
see § 14-10-113(1)(c) (When equitably dividing the marital estate, a
court must consider “[t]he economic circumstances of each spouse
at the time the division of property is to become effective.”).
¶ 42 Except as otherwise expressed herein, the court may not
recharacterize or revalue the marital property or debts properly
accounted for in the existing property division. See § 14-10-113(5);
see also Medeiros, ¶ 25 (noting that in most circumstances there is
no basis for the court on remand to recharacterize or revalue the
marital property or debts accounted for in the existing property
division). However, it may reallocate the marital estate in light of
the new evidence, if any, on the parties’ current economic
circumstances, as well as the relevant evidence from the previous
permanent orders hearing. In re Marriage of Wells, 850 P.2d 694,
697 n.6 (Colo. 1993); In re Marriage of Evans, 2021 COA 141, ¶ 52;
In re Marriage of Joel, 2012 COA 128, ¶ 28. It is within the court’s
discretion to receive additional evidence, including evidence as to
the value of the vested and unvested RSUs as of the date of the
decree. See In re Marriage of Lee, 781 P.2d 102, 104 (Colo. App.
1989); § 14-10-113(5).
18 B. Wife’s Military Retirement
¶ 43 Wife next contends that the district court abused its discretion
by valuing the marital portion of her military retirement, which her
attorney characterized as a “military pension,” at $391,762. We
disagree, although the district court may nevertheless reconsider
the way it divides the military retirement on remand.
¶ 44 The district court may distribute a spouse’s pension in one of
three ways: (1) net present value; (2) deferred distribution; and (3)
reserve jurisdiction. In re Marriage of Kelm, 912 P.2d 545, 547
(Colo. 1996) (describing the three methods); In re Marriage of Hunt,
909 P.2d 525, 530-31 (Colo. 1995) (same). The decision of which
method to use lies within the district court’s sound discretion. See
Kelm, 912 P.2d at 551.
¶ 45 It was undisputed that wife’s military retirement was vested
and had matured. Wife asked the court to use the time rule
formula to divide the retirement, which would have involved using
either the deferred distribution or reserve jurisdiction method. See
Hunt, 909 P.2d at 531-35. Instead, the district used the net
present value method, as proposed by husband, and divided wife’s
19 military retirement as part of the marital estate at a value of
$391,762.
¶ 46 Wife argues that the district court made inadequate findings in
support of its valuation and that the valuation was otherwise
unsupported by the record. But we are unpersuaded because it is
apparent to us that the court’s valuation was based on husband’s
proposed marital spreadsheet, which in turn listed an expert report
admitted as Exhibit 26 valuing the marital portion of the military
retirement at $391,762.
¶ 47 While wife contends that Exhibit 26 was not admitted into
evidence, the record does not support her assertion. Specifically,
during the permanent orders hearing, the parties discussed
admitting by stipulation their respective proposed marital
spreadsheets (as demonstratives), plus the supporting exhibits
listed in each spreadsheet. In discussing a stipulation, husband’s
attorney proposed that “we could at least start with the exhibits
that [our] spreadsheets are based on coming into evidence,” to
which wife’s attorney replied, “I think that’s fine.” While neither
party moved to admit any exhibits at that time, at the start of
husband’s testimony, “because there’s a stipulation,” husband
20 asked for exhibits one through thirty-two be considered admitted.
Wife’s attorney remained silent, and the district court admitted the
exhibits into evidence by responding, “[t]hey will be.”
¶ 48 Wife disputes whether Exhibit 26 was in evidence because,
sometime later, while the parties were discussing a different exhibit,
her attorney interjected and stated that “I want to make sure we’re
clear on the stipulation. . . . I agreed to any financial documents
that are statements, but I don’t agree, like, to Robert Johnson’s
report [Exhibit 26] coming into evidence without cross-
examination.” The court then responded, “I don’t think that’s where
[husband’s] counsel was headed,” and the exchange ended with
wife’s attorney replying: “Okay. . . . I wanted to make sure.”
¶ 49 However, because Exhibit 26 had already been admitted into
evidence, and because wife did not move the court for any
affirmative relief from its earlier ruling admitting Exhibit 26, we
conclude that wife failed to preserve for our review any challenge to
the admission of that exhibit. See Melat, ¶ 18; cf. Herrera v.
Anderson, 736 P.2d 416, 418 (Colo. App. 1987) (“[I]t goes without
saying that one who affirmatively seeks relief . . . must pursue his
request to its disposition before he can complain.”); Brown v. Am.
21 Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 2019 COA 11, ¶ 21 (“If a party
raises an argument to such a degree that the court has the
opportunity to rule on it, that argument is preserved for appeal.”).
¶ 50 Therefore, on remand, the district court may not revalue wife’s
military retirement. See Medeiros, ¶ 25. However, because the
court must reconsider the property division based on the parties’
current economic circumstances, Morton, ¶ 14, the court may use a
different method to divide wife’s military retirement if, in its
discretion, it concludes that a different method is appropriate in
light of the new property division. Kelm, 912 P.2d at 551. We
therefore decline to address wife’s additional argument that, even
assuming the record supports husband’s valuation, the court
abused its discretion by dividing her military retirement using the
net present value method.
C. Husband’s Bonus
¶ 51 We next address wife’s claim that the district court
erroneously excluded a bonus that husband received from his
employer from the marital estate. We conclude that the district
court must reconsider its treatment of husband’s bonus on remand.
22 ¶ 52 At the permanent orders hearing, husband acknowledged that
he had received an approximately $111,000 bonus from his
employer, Southwest Airlines, in February 2024. The district court
left the bonus off of the marital spreadsheet, and when wife
inquired as to whether the court would be dividing the bonus, the
court found that “[t]o the extent that something like that was
actually something paid out to these pilots, as I understood it, I
didn’t have sufficient evidence to conclude that there was any
substantial lump sum that I could divide.” The court acknowledged
“some evidence” of a bonus paid to husband but then explained
that it “did not find that there was something I could divide as
marital property under the circumstances.”
¶ 53 We agree with wife that the district court erred because we are
unable to understand the basis of its ruling addressing the bonus.
See Gibbs, ¶ 9. It was undisputed that husband received an
approximately $111,000 bonus. Wife called a Southwest pilot as a
witness, who explained in detail that the bonus represented a
retroactive pay increase based on husband’s salary during the
parties’ marriage, whereas husband testified that the bonus was an
incentive for ratifying the union’s new contract.
23 ¶ 54 It was the district court’s role as factfinder to resolve this
conflicting evidence concerning husband’s bonus. See In re
Marriage of McNamara, 962 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Colo. App. 1998).
Yet, the court did not do so and instead suggested that it had not
heard sufficient evidence as to whether the bonus existed.
¶ 55 Accordingly on remand, the district court must reconsider its
ruling concerning husband’s bonus and make sufficient findings in
support of its decision. See Gibbs, ¶ 9. As a threshold matter, the
court must determine whether, as of the date of the decree,
husband’s bonus in fact constituted property. See Turner, ¶ 24
(recognizing that under Balanson, “contractual enforceability at the
time of the permanent orders hearing (or, if earlier, the date of the
decree) is essential to the determination of whether [a bonus] is
property”). Then, only if husband’s bonus constituted property as
of the date of the decree, may the district court determine whether
the bonus was marital property and allocate it accordingly. See
Turner, ¶¶ 15-25 (holding that the district court properly excluded
wife’s bonuses from the marital property division where “no
evidence demonstrated that she had an enforceable right to them at
24 the time of the permanent orders hearing,” which predated the
decree); Balanson, 25 P.3d at 35.
¶ 56 Wife suggests that we must apply In re Marriage of Huston,
967 P.2d 181, 186 (Colo. App. 1998), disagreed with by Balanson,
25 P.3d at 39, for the proposition that a bonus “which is deferred
until after the dissolution, but fully earned during the marriage, is
marital property.” But we agree with Turner, ¶ 20, that Huston is
only applicable if the spouse first had an enforceable right to their
bonus at the time of the decree. Thus, the district court’s primary
inquiry on remand remains whether husband had an enforceable
right to his bonus as of the October 23, 2023, decree.
D. Wife’s Consulting Business
¶ 57 We next reject husband’s assertion that the district court
erred by assigning no value to a consulting business that wife
operated as a source of secondary income.
¶ 58 The expert report in husband’s Exhibit 26 also valued wife’s
side business, Samantha Weeks Consulting, LLC, at $164,100.
However, noting a “dearth of testimony” about wife’s business, the
district court found that “[Samantha] Weeks’ Consulting is pretty
25 much just the value of [wife],” and therefore, “I can’t assign any
particular marital value [to the business].”
¶ 59 Husband argues that the district court erred by ignoring the
expert’s valuation. But the court “can believe all, part, or none of
[the evidence], even if uncontroverted, and its resolution of
conflicting evidence is binding on review.” In re Marriage of Amich,
192 P.3d 422, 424 (Colo. App. 2007); see also Krejci, ¶ 23 (“The
court may select the valuation of one party over that of the other
party, or make its own valuation, and its decision will be upheld on
appeal unless clearly erroneous.”).
¶ 60 Given that the expert did not testify, and husband neither
presented nor elicited any other testimony concerning the
consulting business, it is apparent to us that the court was not
persuaded by the expert report alone as to the value of the
business. Cf. People in Interest of S.E.G., 934 P.2d 920, 922 (Colo.
App. 1997) (“The burden of proof generally rests upon the party who
asserts the affirmative of an issue.”). Thus, we may not disturb the
court’s findings as to the consulting business, Amich, 192 P.3d at
424, and the court may not otherwise revalue the business on
remand, see Medeiros, ¶ 25.
26 IV. Maintenance and Child Support
¶ 61 Because we are reversing the property division, we also reverse
the portion of the permanent orders addressing maintenance and
child support for the district court’s reconsideration. See In re
Marriage of de Koning, 2016 CO 2, ¶ 22 (when a district court
revisits a property division, it must also reevaluate its maintenance
and child support determinations because the issues are
interdependent). On remand, the court should consider the revised
property division and the parties’ present economic circumstances.
See Wells, 850 P.2d at 697-99; In re Marriage of Cardona, 321 P.3d
518, 525 (Colo. App. 2010). Accordingly, we decline to address the
parties’ respective contentions that the district court erred in
determining wife’s income for child support purposes.
V. Disposition
¶ 62 Those portions of the permanent orders concerning the marital
property division, maintenance, and child support are reversed.
The remainder of the judgment is not before us and remains
undisturbed. The case is remanded to the district court to conduct
further proceedings and reconsider the permanent orders
consistent with this opinion.
27 JUDGE DUNN and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.