Marriage of Adams

2024 MT 170N

Opinion

08/06/2024

DA 23-0219

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2024 MT 170N

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

MIKI L. ADAMS,

Petitioner and Appellee,

and

DIRK S. ADAMS,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, In and For the County of Park, Cause No. DR-20-43 Honorable Yvonne Laird, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Dirk S. Adams, Self-Represented, Cambridge, Massachusetts

For Appellee:

Adrienne R. Ellington, Law Office of Adrienne Ellington, PLLC, Bozeman, Montana

Jami L. Rebsom, Jami Rebsom Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Livingston, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: January 31, 2024 Decided: August 6, 2024

Filed: ir,-6‘A•-if __________________________________________ Clerk Justice James Jeremiah Shea delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating

Rules, this case is decided by memorandum opinion, shall not be cited and does not serve

as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s

quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.

¶2 Dirk S. Adams (Dirk) appeals from the Sixth Judicial District Court’s March 16,

2023 order holding him in contempt of court and imposing a permanent order of protection

(“Contempt Order”), the March 30, 2023 order denying him leave to file a motion for

post-judgment relief (“Order on Lodged Motions”), and the April 19, 2023 order denying

him leave to file a motion for post-judgment relief pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3)

(“Order Denying Post-Judgment Relief”). We affirm.

¶3 Dirk and Miki L. Adams (Miki) were married in October of 2013. Miki filed a

Petition for Dissolution of Marriage on May 11, 2020. The District Court issued its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Dissolution on September 27, 2021

(“Decree”). In the Decree, the District Court issued a 12-month No Contact Order

precluding Dirk from contacting Miki.

¶4 The District Court later extended the initial 12-month No Contact Order for an

additional five years but declined to issue a permanent order of protection against Dirk,

reasoning that the existing safeguards were sufficient to protect Miki. The District Court

based its conclusion to extend the No Contact Order on its finding that “Dirk has

weaponized his Harvard legal education against Miki and her family” by filing a

2 “staggering” number of pleadings and actions for the purposes of, among other things,

gaining access to Miki, harassing and punishing her, and causing her emotional and

financial harm.

¶5 The District Court also declared Dirk a vexatious litigant based on his hundreds of

filings in the dissolution proceedings, as well as numerous other lawsuits filed in other

jurisdictions against Miki, members of her family, and her employer. These other

jurisdictions include Massachusetts, California, Minnesota, and the United States District

Court for the District of Montana. The District Court noted that sanctions against Dirk

were pending in at least one of these other actions because of its frivolous and harassing

nature. The District Court explained that Dirk “blew through [the court’s] stop-sign”—a

pre-filing rule—after Dirk’s non-stop filing continued despite the court’s restriction. The

court noted it had “previously fined Dirk for his pleadings, and yet that type of pleading

has not stopped.” In declaring Dirk a vexatious litigant, the District Court ordered that:

Dirk Adams is declared a vexatious litigant in the State of Montana. He shall not be allowed to file any further actions, represent himself in any future litigation, nor appear pro se without the express written consent of the appropriate Court. This Court would strongly recommend the same prohibition be enforced in any other jurisdiction.

Dirk appealed, and we affirmed. In re Marriage of Adams, 2023 MT 95N, 412 Mont. 553,

529 P.3d 878 (“Adams I”).

¶6 Although we affirmed the District Court’s Order declaring Dirk a vexatious litigant

in Adams I, we did not include the specific language excerpted above in that Opinion. We

noted, though, that at the time the District Court declared Dirk a vexatious litigant, the

District Court observed that the Register of Actions (ROA) in this case contained nearly 3 400 entries (390), which the District Court found to be an “[u]nbelievabl[e]” amount.

Adams I, ¶ 15. At the time of this appeal, the ROA contains an additional 100 entries. In

light of Dirk’s unrelenting conduct since being declared a vexatious litigant, we deem it

appropriate to issue a separate Order of this Court, contemporaneous with this Opinion,

declaring Dirk a vexatious litigant, incorporating the language from the District Court’s

Order we affirmed in Adams I and imposing additional conditions we deem necessary.

¶7 After the Decree was filed, Miki raised the issue of Dirk’s failure to provide her

with specific personal property awarded to her in the Decree. The District Court ordered

Dirk to ship the awarded property, an Apple computer, to Miki’s counsel by March 4, 2022.

Dirk shipped a computer to Miki’s counsel on April 4, 2022, but Miki determined the

computer was not the computer awarded by the Decree. Miki was able to determine the

computer Dirk shipped to her was different from the computer the District Court awarded

her in the Decree because of its appearance, and because it contained no saved data and

when she turned it on she was greeted with a message from eBay thanking the user for their

purchase. Accordingly, Miki filed a motion seeking to hold Dirk in contempt and again

requesting a permanent order of protection on June 27, 2022.1

¶8 The District Court held a two-day hearing on Miki’s motion for contempt and a

permanent order of protection. The hearing took place on December 6, 2022, and

January 24, 2023. Dirk testified at the December 6, 2022 hearing that the computer he

1 On July 5, 2022, Hon. Judge Jon A. Oldenburg, who had presided over the dissolution proceeding since its commencement, retired and jurisdiction was assumed by Hon. Judge Yvonne Laird.

4 shipped to Miki was the computer the District Court awarded her in the Decree. Six weeks

later, Dirk testified at the January 24, 2023 hearing that he was able to find the awarded

computer, and that he had been mistaken regarding the identity of the computer he shipped

to Miki. Miki raised the issue that the awarded computer, provided approximately nine

months after Dirk was ordered to ship it to her, was completely devoid of any of her data,

which included work documents and personal photos.

¶9 In its Contempt Order, the District Court granted both of Miki’s requests and made

detailed findings regarding Dirk’s behavior and attempts to circumvent the safeguards

intended “to protect Miki while imposing minimal detriment to [Dirk].” The District Court

concluded that “[b]ased on Dirk’s relentless persistent efforts to harass and stalk Miki and

Dirk’s ongoing blatant refusal to comply with the terms of the No Contact Order and the

Post Trial Order . . . a permanent order of protection is needed to protect Miki from further

harm and injury.” As a factual basis for these conclusions, the District Court found that

Dirk’s claims that he mistakenly sent the wrong computer to Miki were without merit.

Specifically, the District Court found that Dirk’s testimony that he found the awarded

computer “some weeks after the first day of the hearing after a diligent and exhaustive

search” was not credible given screenshots introduced by Miki showing that “[the

computer’s] location was known to Dirk and that it was in Dirk’s immediate possession on

and shortly after the first day of [the] hearing concluded.” The District Court found that

Dirk hid the awarded computer in his barn to circumvent the terms of the Decree and

5 post-trial orders, and that he linked the shipped computer to one of his electronic devices

“so that he could track Miki’s activities on [the shipped computer].”

¶10 The District Court made findings regarding Dirk’s abuse of the legal system as a

means of getting to Miki. Regarding a 2022 action against a third party in federal district

court, the District Court found that Dirk subpoenaed Miki’s banking records and deposed

Miki for seven hours, asking Miki “questions intended to elicit information on Miki’s

whereabouts and home address.” The District Court found that “sometime after moving to

Utah, Miki learned that Dirk was having her followed by a third person . . . retained by

Dirk, [who] photographed her car in the parking lot at her workplace.” These photos were

then shown to Miki in a separate proceeding filed by Dirk in Massachusetts. The District

Court noted that “[w]hile much of this contact took place in discovery proceedings in other

jurisdictions . . . such contact and the sensitive information sought by Dirk was neither

necessary nor intended to prosecute his claims.” The District Court concluded:

Dirk has intentionally used litigation as a means to circumvent the No Contact Order and the Post Trial Order . . . . Throughout this proceeding, the Court has been patient with Dirk and attempted to craft safeguards to protect Miki while imposing minimal detriment to him. However, Dirk has repeatedly blown past these safeguards and persisted in his efforts to stalk and harass Miki. For these reasons, the Court finds that the safeguards set forth in the No Contact Order and Post Trial Order have proven insufficient to protect Miki from Dirk’s egregious conduct.

¶11 At the close of the contempt hearing, the District Court instructed the parties that

“[t]he Court will not accept any post hearing briefs or any further motions in this matter

without leave of the court, which will not be granted until the [Contempt Order] has been

finalized and filed, and unless directed by the Court. But there will be no further

6 filings . . . in this matter.” (Emphasis in original.) This order (“Bench Order”) was given

in response to Dirk’s request for post-hearing briefing on Miki’s contempt motion.

¶12 After the District Court issued the Contempt Order, Dirk attempted to file two other

motions, which the District Court denied in its Order on Lodged Motions due to Dirk’s

failure to seek leave to file the motions in compliance with the Bench Order. The court

reasoned that the motions were “meritless” and “submitted as part of a vexatious effort to

delay resolution of this proceeding.” Undeterred, Dirk sought leave to file a motion for

post-judgment relief under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3). The District Court again denied Dirk

leave to file the motion in its Order Denying Post-Judgment Relief, finding that the motion

was “clearly frivolous and a blatant attempt to circumvent the Court’s order of protection.”

In two separate appeals to this Court, Dirk appealed: (1) the Contempt Order and Order on

Lodged Motions; and (2) the Order Denying Post-Judgment Relief. We have consolidated

the appeals for this Opinion.

¶13 We will not reverse a court’s decision to continue, amend, or make permanent an

order of protection absent an abuse of discretion. Boushie v. Windsor, 2014 MT 153, ¶ 8,

375 Mont. 301, 328 P.3d 631 (citation omitted). Contempt is a discretionary tool for a

court to enforce compliance with its own orders, and we review a district court’s decision

to hold a party in contempt for: (1) whether the court acted within its jurisdiction; and (2)

whether the evidence supports the finding of contempt. Lee v. Lee, 2000 MT 67, ¶ 19, 299

Mont. 78, 996 P.2d 389 (citation omitted). When a district court’s decision to grant or

deny a motion under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b) involves “a discretionary appraisal or

7 weighing . . . of the facts of the case, we review the court’s determination under an abuse

of discretion standard.” In re Marriage of Hopper, 1999 MT 310, ¶ 19, 297 Mont. 225,

991 P.2d 960 (citation omitted).

¶14 “The District Court is in the best position to observe and determine the credibility

of witnesses and we will not second guess its determination regarding the strength and

weight of conflicting testimony.” State v. Pound, 2014 MT 143, ¶ 25, 375 Mont. 241, 326

P.3d 422 (citations omitted). A district court’s discretion in controlling the administration

of the litigation, including “such things as post-trial motions and similar rulings” is broad.

Southwest Mont. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of Bozeman, 2018 MT 62, ¶ 48, 391 Mont. 55,

414 P.3d 761 (citation omitted).

¶15 On appeal, Dirk contests the Contempt Order on the ground that the parties made a

“mutual mistake” regarding the identity of the computer, rendering the court’s factual

findings underlying its Contempt Order clearly erroneous. Dirk asserts the District Court

erred in summarily denying his lodged motions in its Order on Lodged Motions and his

Rule 60(b)(3) motion in its Order Denying Post-Judgment Relief. He argues that we should

remand for an explanation of the District Court’s rationale or for reconsideration of the

three motions. Dirk’s arguments are meritless.

¶16 Dirk does not challenge the District Court’s jurisdiction to issue the Contempt

Order. We therefore confine our review to the factual support underlying the Order. Lee,

¶ 19. Dirk argued extensively before the District Court that his failure to provide the correct

computer awarded to Miki in the Decree was based on a good-faith misunderstanding, but

8 the record speaks for itself. Dirk shipped a computer that Miki immediately determined

was not the computer awarded in the Decree. Regarding Dirk’s arguments to the District

Court and this Court that principles of contract formation and federal copyright law

somehow relieved him of his responsibility to give Miki the awarded computer, they are

so lacking in merit that we will not waste the bytes and ink to address them other than to

note that they are nonsensical. Presented with conflicting testimony from Miki and Dirk,

the District Court made a credibility determination that is abundantly supported by the

record. We affirm the District Court’s Order holding Dirk in contempt.

¶17 Turning to Dirk’s appeal of the permanent order of protection, Dirk has advanced

no cognizable legal argument in support of his assertion that the issuance of a permanent

order of protection against him constitutes an abuse of the District Court’s discretion;

instead, Dirk uses this appeal as an attempt to rehash his factual contentions previously

rejected by the District Court. Assuming solely for the sake of argument that the evidence

might have supported Dirk’s contentions, “we will not second-guess the District Court’s

evaluation of the testimony and will not reverse because the evidence might have supported

other findings or conclusions.” Pound, ¶ 25. The record reflects that Dirk has repeatedly

used the judicial process as a weapon to pursue Miki, and to cause her emotional and

financial harm. Dirk has sued Miki, members of her family, her employers, and even a dog

walker across numerous state and federal courts. Given Dirk’s relentless abuse of

courtroom proceedings in the face of warnings and escalating sanctions, and Miki’s

9 testimony regarding the effect of Dirk’s behaviors, we decline to reverse the District

Court’s grant of a permanent order of protection against Dirk.

¶18 Dirk’s contentions regarding the lack of rationale underlying the District Court’s

Order on Lodged Motions and Order Denying Post-Judgment Relief are unavailing. Dirk

cites In re Marriage of Crowley, 2014 MT 42, ¶ 26, 374 Mont. 48, 318 P.3d 1031, for the

proposition that “[f]indings must be sufficient . . . to permit review without speculation into

a district court’s reasoning.” Dirk’s reliance on Marriage of Crowley is misplaced. The

District Court’s reasoning in this case requires no speculation. The District Court found

Dirk’s motions to be “meritless . . . [and] submitted as part of a vexatious effort to delay

resolution of this proceeding.” The District Court concluded that Dirk’s Rule 60(b)(3)

motion was “clearly frivolous and a blatant attempt to circumvent the Court’s order of

protection.” Dirk’s contention that “[e]ven a vexatious litigant has the right to seek access

[to court] if his claim appears meritorious” presupposes that his Rule 60(b)(3) motion

appeared meritorious, and ignores the determination by the District Court that it was

without merit. Requiring that the District Court fully and substantively entertain the

“clearly frivolous” motion would defeat the purpose of the District Court’s previously well-

founded declaration—affirmed by this Court in Adams I—that Dirk is a vexatious litigant.

The reason the District Court imposed restrictions on Dirk’s pleadings was to provide both

the court and Miki with some relief from Dirk’s firehose of meritless pleadings and enable

these proceedings to approach a final resolution.

10 ¶19 Although not the basis for the District Court’s denial, we also note that Dirk’s

motion under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) is subject to the time constraints imposed by Rule

60(c)(1), which states that “[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable

time – and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment

or order or the date of the proceeding.” M. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Miki correctly points out

that even had Dirk been allowed to file his April 17, 2023 motion, it would be untimely

given that the proposed filing sought relief from the September 27, 2021 Decree. Notice

of Entry of Judgment was entered on October 6, 2021. In short, Dirk’s motion was both

frivolous and futile.

¶20 Miki requests an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to M. R. App. P. 19(5),

arguing that Dirk’s “behavior and lack of reasonable legal or factual basis for bringing this

appeal” entitles her to relief under Rule 19(5). The record demonstrates that Dirk has been

admonished repeatedly for dilatory and harassing motions practice. Dirk has made these

proceedings exceedingly burdensome for the District Court and Miki. Even after we

affirmed the District Court’s order declaring Dirk a vexatious litigant in Adams I,

approximately 100 additional filings have been made in the District Court. This is, as

Judge Oldenberg put it, unprecedented in the context of a dissolution case. The District

Court’s findings relevant to the Contempt Order are also extraordinary. The record

strongly supports the finding that Dirk has attempted to weaponize his resources and legal

education to pursue and harass Miki across numerous jurisdictions.

11 ¶21 Miki is entitled to the relief she requests under Rule 19(5). Dirk’s attempts to extend

these proceedings by doubling down on his frivolous and dilatory motions practice,

re-arguing simple property awards made by the Decree while citing inapplicable contract

law, public policy considerations, and even intellectual property law—all in the face of

numerous warnings and orders to cease these exact behaviors—require sanctions. We

conclude an award of attorney fees reasonably incurred in responding to Dirk’s appeals,

now consolidated for the purposes of this Opinion, is proper. We also conclude that an

additional sanction is appropriate under the circumstances.

¶22 Rule 19(5) provides, in relevant part:

The supreme court may . . . sua sponte, award sanctions to the prevailing party in an appeal . . . determined to be frivolous, vexatious, filed for purposes of harassment or delay, or taken without substantial or reasonable grounds. Sanctions may include costs, attorney fees, or such other monetary or non-monetary penalty as the supreme court deems proper under the circumstances.

¶23 The history of this case demonstrates that Dirk has, as the District Court observed

in its Order of April 18, 2022, “weaponized his Harvard legal education against Miki and

her family.” In the same order in which it made that observation, the District Court

declared Dirk a vexatious litigant because it could “think of no other way to prevent Dirk

from his harassing and vexatious behavior.” And yet this present appeal reveals that the

District Court’s declaration, affirmed by this Court, was not enough. So although we deem

it appropriate to award Miki all of her reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in

defending these appeals, we also take this opportunity to further restrict Dirk’s privileges

to use the courts of Montana for improper purposes, as reflected in the Order issued

12 contemporaneously with this Opinion. We also caution Dirk that should his frivolous,

vexatious, and harassing litigation against Miki and those associated with her persist, such

conduct will be subject to monetary sanctions imposed by this Court, separate from any

fees and costs the opposing party may seek.

¶24 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of our

Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. This appeal presents

no constitutional issues, no issues of first impression, and does not establish new precedent

or modify existing precedent.

¶25 Affirmed and remanded to the District Court for a determination of the amount of

attorney fees and costs reasonably incurred by Miki in defending against these appeals and

for an Order awarding those fees and costs.

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA

We Concur:

/S/ MIKE McGRATH /S/ LAURIE McKINNON /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON