OPINION OF THE COURT
LARSEN, Justice.
This appeal involves the question of whether a default of the due-on-sale clause of a mortgage agreement by the residential mortgage debtor excuses compliance with the notice and cure [189]*189provisions of Act 6 of 19741 by the residential mortgage lender.
The facts of the case are as follows. A mortgage in the amount of $49,000 for property at 704 Mauch Chunk Street, Easton, Northampton County, Pennsylvania, was executed between Appellee, Merchants Bank (the Bank) and Appellees, Robert and Marie Apgar (the Apgars) on November 11, 1982. On June 3, 1985, the Bank mailed to the Apgars a “Notice of Intention to Foreclose” pursuant to Act 6 of 1974; 41 P.S. § 403.2 The notice stated that the Apgars were in default of monthly payments for the months of March, April and May of 1985 and that unless the default was cured within thirty days, foreclosure proceedings would be commenced.
In addition to being delinquent in mortgage payments, the Apgars were also delinquent in the payment of property taxes and on September 9,1985, Appellants, Lawrence and Francesca Marra purchased the property at a tax upset sale for $1614. [190]*190The property was deeded by the tax claim bureau to the Marras and recorded in Northampton County Deed Book vol. 693 page 707 on December 16, 1985.
During the intervening time between the tax upset sale and the recording of the deed, the Bank, on September 26, 1985, filed an action in mortgage foreclosure against the Apgars in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas. The Marras, who were not yet record owners of the property, were not named as parties. The ground for default pleaded in the complaint was that the Apgars “were delinquent in payments on account of principal and interest due from and after April 1, 1985”.3
On March 12, 1986, Lawrence Marra notified the Bank in writing of the Marras’ ownership of the property and requested the then present balance due on the mortgage. On May 15, 1986, Mr. Marra forwarded to the Bank a copy of the records of the tax claim bureau in order to verify the Marras’ ownership of the property and again requested the then present balance due on the mortgage. The Bank did not respond to either request. On December 22, 1986, a second complaint in mortgage foreclosure was filed by the Bank against the Apgars/defendants and the Marras/terre tenants.4 This second complaint was not preceded by Act 6 notice of intention to foreclose to the Apgars or the Marras.
The Marras and the Apgars did not answer the complaint nor appear in the action and a default judgement was entered resulting in a court ordered sheriff sale of the property which took place on April 10,1987. Lawrence Marra was present at the sheriff sale but did not bid on the property. Appellee, Brian Hartman, successfully bid on the property in the [191]*191amount of $65,400. Hartman deposited ten percent of that amount, $6500, with the sheriff to secure his interest. Financing for remainder of the sale price was arranged between Hartman and the Bank. The closing was set for September 18, 1987.
On September 14, 1987, the Marras filed a petition to set aside the sheriff sale. The Marras alleged that the sheriff sale was null and void because they did not receive a notice of intention to foreclose prior to the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings as required by Act 6. Following a non-jury trial, the court upheld the sheriff sale despite having determined that the Marras were “residential mortgage debtors” under Act 6, and, thus, were entitled to notice. The trial court reasoned that because the property was transferred in violation of the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage,5 the Marras could not cure the default and thus, “technical compliance” with the notice provisions of Act 6 was not required. In addition, the court determined that since the Marras received actual notice of the foreclosure proceedings by service of the mortgage foreclosure complaint, they were not prejudiced by the lack of “technical compliance” with Act 6. Finally, the court determined that to require “technical compliance” would be unjust to the purchaser at the sheriff sale. The Superior Court affirmed on the same grounds, 389 Pa.Super. 5, 566 A.2d 320. We reverse.
A petition to set aside a sheriff sale is governed by our rules of civil procedure which provide that “[u]pon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the ... sheriffs deed to real property, the court, may upon proper cause shown, set aside the sale and order a resale or enter any other [192]*192order which may be just and proper under the circumstances”. Pa.R.Civ.Pro. 3132. In Doherty v. Adal Corp., 437 Pa. 109, 261 A.2d 311 (1970) we held that a petition to set aside a sheriff sale is an equitable proceeding, governed by equitable principles. Appellate review of equitable matters is limited to a determination of whether the lower court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa. 152, 413 A.2d 1059 (1980).6
As noted previously, Act 6 requires that the residential mortgage lender give notice to the residential mortgage debt- or of its intention to foreclose and the right to cure the default thirty days prior to acceleration, or the commencement of any legal proceedings including mortgage foreclosure. 41 P.S. § 403. A residential mortgage debtor is defined in Act 6 as “a non-corporate borrower who is obligated to a residential mortgage lender to repay in whole or in part a residential mortgage and a successor record owner of the property, if any, who gives notice thereof to the residential mortgage lender. ” 41 P.S. § .101 (emphasis added). In this case the Marras were successor record owners of the property on December 16, 1985, when the property was deeded to them and recorded by the tax claim bureau. On March 12,1986, the Marras notified the Bank of their ownership of the property. Thus, the Marras were residential mortgage debtors and were entitled to Act 6 notice.
The trial court erred in concluding that “technical compliance” with Act 6 was not required in this case because there was a violation of the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage. The trial court based its ruling upon two Superior Court cases: Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Board v. Goldsworthy, 253 Pa.Super. 321, 385 A.2d 358 (1978); and New Home Federal Savings & Loan v. Trunk, 333 Pa.Super. 393, 482 A.2d 625 (1984).
[193]*193In Goldsworthy the mortgagor sold the property to a third party in violation of the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage. The Superior Court held that notice of intention to foreclose which did not contain all of the information required by Act 6 was not defective. That court reasoned that § 404 of Act 6 (Right to cure default)7
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OPINION OF THE COURT
LARSEN, Justice.
This appeal involves the question of whether a default of the due-on-sale clause of a mortgage agreement by the residential mortgage debtor excuses compliance with the notice and cure [189]*189provisions of Act 6 of 19741 by the residential mortgage lender.
The facts of the case are as follows. A mortgage in the amount of $49,000 for property at 704 Mauch Chunk Street, Easton, Northampton County, Pennsylvania, was executed between Appellee, Merchants Bank (the Bank) and Appellees, Robert and Marie Apgar (the Apgars) on November 11, 1982. On June 3, 1985, the Bank mailed to the Apgars a “Notice of Intention to Foreclose” pursuant to Act 6 of 1974; 41 P.S. § 403.2 The notice stated that the Apgars were in default of monthly payments for the months of March, April and May of 1985 and that unless the default was cured within thirty days, foreclosure proceedings would be commenced.
In addition to being delinquent in mortgage payments, the Apgars were also delinquent in the payment of property taxes and on September 9,1985, Appellants, Lawrence and Francesca Marra purchased the property at a tax upset sale for $1614. [190]*190The property was deeded by the tax claim bureau to the Marras and recorded in Northampton County Deed Book vol. 693 page 707 on December 16, 1985.
During the intervening time between the tax upset sale and the recording of the deed, the Bank, on September 26, 1985, filed an action in mortgage foreclosure against the Apgars in the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas. The Marras, who were not yet record owners of the property, were not named as parties. The ground for default pleaded in the complaint was that the Apgars “were delinquent in payments on account of principal and interest due from and after April 1, 1985”.3
On March 12, 1986, Lawrence Marra notified the Bank in writing of the Marras’ ownership of the property and requested the then present balance due on the mortgage. On May 15, 1986, Mr. Marra forwarded to the Bank a copy of the records of the tax claim bureau in order to verify the Marras’ ownership of the property and again requested the then present balance due on the mortgage. The Bank did not respond to either request. On December 22, 1986, a second complaint in mortgage foreclosure was filed by the Bank against the Apgars/defendants and the Marras/terre tenants.4 This second complaint was not preceded by Act 6 notice of intention to foreclose to the Apgars or the Marras.
The Marras and the Apgars did not answer the complaint nor appear in the action and a default judgement was entered resulting in a court ordered sheriff sale of the property which took place on April 10,1987. Lawrence Marra was present at the sheriff sale but did not bid on the property. Appellee, Brian Hartman, successfully bid on the property in the [191]*191amount of $65,400. Hartman deposited ten percent of that amount, $6500, with the sheriff to secure his interest. Financing for remainder of the sale price was arranged between Hartman and the Bank. The closing was set for September 18, 1987.
On September 14, 1987, the Marras filed a petition to set aside the sheriff sale. The Marras alleged that the sheriff sale was null and void because they did not receive a notice of intention to foreclose prior to the commencement of the foreclosure proceedings as required by Act 6. Following a non-jury trial, the court upheld the sheriff sale despite having determined that the Marras were “residential mortgage debtors” under Act 6, and, thus, were entitled to notice. The trial court reasoned that because the property was transferred in violation of the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage,5 the Marras could not cure the default and thus, “technical compliance” with the notice provisions of Act 6 was not required. In addition, the court determined that since the Marras received actual notice of the foreclosure proceedings by service of the mortgage foreclosure complaint, they were not prejudiced by the lack of “technical compliance” with Act 6. Finally, the court determined that to require “technical compliance” would be unjust to the purchaser at the sheriff sale. The Superior Court affirmed on the same grounds, 389 Pa.Super. 5, 566 A.2d 320. We reverse.
A petition to set aside a sheriff sale is governed by our rules of civil procedure which provide that “[u]pon petition of any party in interest before delivery of the ... sheriffs deed to real property, the court, may upon proper cause shown, set aside the sale and order a resale or enter any other [192]*192order which may be just and proper under the circumstances”. Pa.R.Civ.Pro. 3132. In Doherty v. Adal Corp., 437 Pa. 109, 261 A.2d 311 (1970) we held that a petition to set aside a sheriff sale is an equitable proceeding, governed by equitable principles. Appellate review of equitable matters is limited to a determination of whether the lower court committed an error of law or abused its discretion. Sack v. Feinman, 489 Pa. 152, 413 A.2d 1059 (1980).6
As noted previously, Act 6 requires that the residential mortgage lender give notice to the residential mortgage debt- or of its intention to foreclose and the right to cure the default thirty days prior to acceleration, or the commencement of any legal proceedings including mortgage foreclosure. 41 P.S. § 403. A residential mortgage debtor is defined in Act 6 as “a non-corporate borrower who is obligated to a residential mortgage lender to repay in whole or in part a residential mortgage and a successor record owner of the property, if any, who gives notice thereof to the residential mortgage lender. ” 41 P.S. § .101 (emphasis added). In this case the Marras were successor record owners of the property on December 16, 1985, when the property was deeded to them and recorded by the tax claim bureau. On March 12,1986, the Marras notified the Bank of their ownership of the property. Thus, the Marras were residential mortgage debtors and were entitled to Act 6 notice.
The trial court erred in concluding that “technical compliance” with Act 6 was not required in this case because there was a violation of the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage. The trial court based its ruling upon two Superior Court cases: Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Board v. Goldsworthy, 253 Pa.Super. 321, 385 A.2d 358 (1978); and New Home Federal Savings & Loan v. Trunk, 333 Pa.Super. 393, 482 A.2d 625 (1984).
[193]*193In Goldsworthy the mortgagor sold the property to a third party in violation of the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage. The Superior Court held that notice of intention to foreclose which did not contain all of the information required by Act 6 was not defective. That court reasoned that § 404 of Act 6 (Right to cure default)7 applies “almost exclusively to monetary defaults” and that “where acceleration is predicated upon a default which cannot be cured, [i.e. a default of the due-on-sale clause] the reason for, and the necessity of this information [§ 403(c)(3)(4)(5)(6) ] disappears”.
This rule in Goldsworthy was extended in Trunk where the mortgagor executed an installment sale contract with a third party in violation of the due-on-sale clause of the mortgage. In Trunk the Superior Court held that the notice requirements of Act 6 applied where the mortgagor defaulted on his obligation to pay overdue sums on the mortgage but not where [194]*194a violation of the due-on-sale clause occurred. That court reasoned that the notice which was given to the residential mortgage debtor after, rather than before, acceleration was not defective because the default could not be cured by the residential mortgage debtor acting alone, but required some action by the third party transferee. Id. at 410-11, 482 A.2d at 634.
The Superior Court in the preceding cases has engrafted an artificial exception onto an unambiguous legislative notice requirement. The Statutory Construction Act mandates that “[w]hen the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit”. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b). Contrary to the Superior Court’s interpretation, it is clear that Act 6 notice applies to all defaults, not just monetary; hence, the “nature of the default claimed” and “exactly what performance including what sum of money, if any, must be tendered to cure the default” must be stated in the notice of intention to foreclose. 41 P.S. § 403(c)(2) and (3) (emphasis added). There is no exception to the notice requirements of Act 6 and to read one into the statute would be to amend it and, thereby, improperly engage in legislating.
Furthermore, we disagree with the lower courts that the Marras were not prejudiced because they received actual notice of the foreclosure proceedings by service of the complaint. Prejudice to the Marras is evident in the interest, court and sheriff costs, attorneys fees, etc., which attached upon the commencement of the mortgage foreclosure action. (For example, the Act provides that the residential mortgage lender may contract for or receive a maximum of $50 on attorney’s fees from the residential mortgage debtor prior to the commencement of foreclosure; upon commencement, however, all attorney’s fees which are reasonable and actually incurred may be charged to the residential mortgage debtor. [41 P.S. § 406]). The Marras, as purchasers of property at a tax upset sale, received fee simple title to the property subject to any recorded mortgage. 72 Pa.C.S. § 5860.608 and § 5860.609. The Bank’s sole interest in the property was as [195]*195security for the payment of the mortgage and compliance with the law (notice provisions of Act 6) in no way adversely affects that security interest. The Bank could not deviate from the clear language of the statute, ie., pick and choose the factual scenario to which the statute would apply.
Finally, contrary to the conclusion of the lower courts, the setting aside of the sheriff sale would not be inequitable to the purchaser at the sale [Hartman]. Appellee, Hartman, bid on the property at the sheriff sale with knowledge of the Marras record ownership. Hartman has not yet paid the purchase price of $65,400, but, instead, deposited with the sheriff ten percent of that amount, or $6500, to secure his interest in the property. Hartman’s interest in the property, if any, is subordinate and his money will be readily returned. There is no inequity or prejudice here.
The order of the Superior Court is reversed and the case is remanded to the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas for the entry of an order setting aside the sheriff sale of the property at 704 Mauch Chunk Street held on April 10, 1986.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion.