Marquard v. Pacific Columbia Mills

Supreme Court of South Carolina

Marquard v. Pacific Columbia Mills

295 S.E.2d 870, 278 S.C. 323, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 429

CourtSupreme Court of South Carolina

DecidedSeptember 27, 1982

Docket21789

StatusPublished

Cited by3 cases

This text of 295 S.E.2d 870 (Marquard v. Pacific Columbia Mills) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Marquard v. Pacific Columbia Mills, 295 S.E.2d 870, 278 S.C. 323, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 429 (S.C. 1982).

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Opinions

Ness, Justice:

This is a workmen’s compensation case. Respondent’s decedent suffered a fatal heart attack on September 23, 1975, in the card room¹ at Pacific Columbia Mills, his place of employment for the fifteen years preceding his death. Appellants appeal from a finding that respondents were entitled to compensation for accidental injury. We affirm.

For several years preceding Marquard’s death, he experienced symptoms of byssinosis,² i.e., difficulty in breathing, tightness in his chest, and coughing fits. The hearing commissioner determined that the unusual stress placed upon Mar-quard’s heart by byssinosis caused his fatal heart attack and that his death was due to accidental injury.

Appellants first contend respondents should have been required to elect between their accidental injury claim and their occupational disease claim. We disagree. Nowhere does the Workmen’s Compensation Act require claimants to elect; rather, § 42-11-110 preserves claimants’ right not to elect:

“ ... [T]he employee shall not be deprived of any benefits to which he may be entitled because he may have misconceived his remedy to be for an occupational disease.”

The Commission has broad discretion in procedural matters. Gurley v. Mills Mill, et al., 225 S. C. 46, 80 S. E. (2d) 745 (1954). We hold the Commission did not err in refusing to require respondents to elect.

Appellants next assert error in the Commission’s refusal to submit the case to a medical board pursuant to § 42-11-120. This section applies to occupational disease claims and is inapplicable here since the award was properly based on the accidental injury claim.

The circuit court and this Court are bound by the Commission’s decision unless clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record. [325]*325Mitchem, et al. v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., et al., S. C. 293 S. E. (2d) 701 (1982); Spires v. Mount Vernon Mills, S. C., 286 S. E. (2d) 379 (1982). There is ample evidence in this record to show the employment conditions caused lung disease and the resulting stress on Marquard’s heart caused his heart attack. In Sturkie v. Ballenger Corporation, et al., 268 S. C. 536, 235 S. E. (2d) 120 (1977), we held that the term “accidental injury” encompasses unexpected events caused by employment-related disease. There is sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the death was due to accidental injury, and we hold there was no error in its refusal to submit the case to a medical board.

Lastly, appellants argue the Commission’s findings of fact do not comply with the requirements of § 42-17-40 of the Code in that the names of the minor dependents of decedent do not appear in the Orders of the Commission and the Circuit Court. This exception is frivolous and without merit.

Affirmed.

Lewis, C. J., and Harwell, J., concur. Gregory and Littlejohn, J. J., concur and dissent.

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Ness, Justice:

This is a workmen’s compensation case. Respondent’s decedent suffered a fatal heart attack on September 23, 1975, in the card room¹ at Pacific Columbia Mills, his place of employment for the fifteen years preceding his death. Appellants appeal from a finding that respondents were entitled to compensation for accidental injury. We affirm.

For several years preceding Marquard’s death, he experienced symptoms of byssinosis,² i.e., difficulty in breathing, tightness in his chest, and coughing fits. The hearing commissioner determined that the unusual stress placed upon Mar-quard’s heart by byssinosis caused his fatal heart attack and that his death was due to accidental injury.

Appellants first contend respondents should have been required to elect between their accidental injury claim and their occupational disease claim. We disagree. Nowhere does the Workmen’s Compensation Act require claimants to elect; rather, § 42-11-110 preserves claimants’ right not to elect:

“ ... [T]he employee shall not be deprived of any benefits to which he may be entitled because he may have misconceived his remedy to be for an occupational disease.”

The Commission has broad discretion in procedural matters. Gurley v. Mills Mill, et al., 225 S. C. 46, 80 S. E. (2d) 745 (1954). We hold the Commission did not err in refusing to require respondents to elect.

Appellants next assert error in the Commission’s refusal to submit the case to a medical board pursuant to § 42-11-120. This section applies to occupational disease claims and is inapplicable here since the award was properly based on the accidental injury claim.

The circuit court and this Court are bound by the Commission’s decision unless clearly erroneous in view of the substantial evidence on the whole record. [325]*325Mitchem, et al. v. Fiske-Carter Construction Co., et al., S. C. 293 S. E. (2d) 701 (1982); Spires v. Mount Vernon Mills, S. C., 286 S. E. (2d) 379 (1982). There is ample evidence in this record to show the employment conditions caused lung disease and the resulting stress on Marquard’s heart caused his heart attack. In Sturkie v. Ballenger Corporation, et al., 268 S. C. 536, 235 S. E. (2d) 120 (1977), we held that the term “accidental injury” encompasses unexpected events caused by employment-related disease. There is sufficient evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the death was due to accidental injury, and we hold there was no error in its refusal to submit the case to a medical board.

Lastly, appellants argue the Commission’s findings of fact do not comply with the requirements of § 42-17-40 of the Code in that the names of the minor dependents of decedent do not appear in the Orders of the Commission and the Circuit Court. This exception is frivolous and without merit.

Affirmed.

Lewis, C. J., and Harwell, J., concur. Gregory and Littlejohn, J. J., concur and dissent.

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Bluebook (online)

295 S.E.2d 870, 278 S.C. 323, 1982 S.C. LEXIS 429, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/marquard-v-pacific-columbia-mills-sc-1982.

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