Marlon v. Marlon

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
• Decided: August 27, 2025
• Docket: 24-20443
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Case: 24-20443 Document: 42-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/27/2025

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit ____________ FILED August 27, 2025 No. 24-20443 Lyle W. Cayce Summary Calendar Clerk ____________

Nanette Yvette Marlon; Frances Diane Redd,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Oliveira Florinda Marlon,

Defendant—Appellant. ______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 4:24-CV-1136 ______________________________

Before Clement, Richman, and Willett, Circuit Judges. Per Curiam: * Oliveira Florinda Marlon, pro se, filed a notice of removal in the district court, identifying two proceedings in Waller County Court at Law #2 in Texas as the matters being removed. The district court sua sponte remanded the action to state court due to Marlon’s failure to attach to his

_____________________ * This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5. Case: 24-20443 Document: 42-1 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/27/2025

No. 24-20443

notice of removal a copy of the underlying state court pleadings and other papers, in violation of the district court’s order and a local court rule. “Congress has severely circumscribed the power of federal appellate courts to review remand orders.” Schexnayder v. Entergy La., Inc., 394 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2004). As a general matter, “an order of a district court remanding a case to the state court is not subject to review on appeal or otherwise” under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Albarado v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 199 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 1999). Yet § 1447(d) must be “read in pari materia with 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), so that only remand orders based on grounds recognized in § 1447(c) are unreviewable.” Price v. Johnson, 600 F.3d 460, 462 (5th Cir. 2010). In short, the grounds for remand recognized in § 1447(c) “are defects in the removal procedure or lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. Here, the district court remanded based on defects in the removal procedure, a ground recognized in § 1447(c). See id.; Covington v. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 251 F.2d 930, 932–33 (5th Cir. 1958); 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). At any rate, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over the remand order because the district court exceeded its statutory authority. See In re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 219, 222–24 (5th Cir. 1993); F.D.I.C. v. Loyd, 955 F.2d 316, 320–21, 329 (5th Cir. 1992). Under § 1447(c), district courts lack the discretion to sua sponte remand for defects in the removal procedure; instead, such remands must be tethered to a party’s motion. In re Allstate, 8 F.3d at 222–24. The district court’s sua sponte remand based on procedural defects, therefore, exceeded its statutory authority. See id. For these reasons, we accordingly vacate the remand order, and we remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. See id.; Tramonte v. Chrysler Corp., 136 F.3d 1025, 1028, 1032 (5th Cir. 1998). VACATED AND REMANDED.