Marlon Ortiz Melendez v. Warden, Golden State Annex Detention Facility

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 MARLON ORTIZ MELENDEZ Case No. 1:26-cv-3528-DC-JDP 11 (A-Number: 240-128-032),

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 13 v. 14 WARDEN, GOLDEN STATE ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, 15 Respondent. 16 17 Petitioner Marlon Ortiz Melendez, a citizen of Nicaragua, was paroled into the United 18 States on September 19, 2022. ICE re-detained him on March 19, 2026, when he reported to an 19 ICE office. Petitioner, proceeding pro se, seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 20 For the following reasons, I recommend that the petition be granted and that petitioner be 21 immediately released. 22 Background 23 In September 2022, petitioner entered the United States and was detained by the 24 Department of Homeland Security.1 ECF No. 7 at 4. Respondent acknowledges that it paroled 25 petitioner into the United States on November 18, 2022. Id. Petitioner indicates that he has kept 26

27 1 Several of respondent’s exhibits state that petitioner entered in January 2022, however the card first documenting his contact with DHS states that he entered on September 19, 2022. 28 See ECF No. 7 at 4. 1 his paperwork up to date since then. ECF 1 at 5. He states that he has a social security number, a 2 work permit, and a Florida driver’s license. Id. Respondent confirms that petitioner has work 3 authorization from November 21, 2023, through November 20, 2028. ECF No. 7 at 1. There is 4 no allegation or evidence that petitioner has committed a crime or failed to comply with the terms 5 of his release. 6 On March 19, 2026, petitioner was re-detained by ICE when he reported to an ICE office 7 pursuant to his order of supervision. ECF No. 7 at 7. Petitioner states that he was detained when 8 ICE directed him to appear “for a hearing about a future court date [he] was going to be given.” 9 ECF No. 1 at 5. Petitioner brought all his legal documents with him and states that these 10 documents were “stripped from [him].” Id. at 6. Petitioner states that he is pursuing an asylum 11 claim. ECF No. 1 at 5. 12 Legal Standard 13 A federal court may grant habeas relief when a petitioner shows that his custody violates 14 federal law. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), 2254(a); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 374-75 15 (2000). “[T]he essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of 16 that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” 17 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a 18 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 19 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of 20 reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have 21 been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction 22 includes challenges to immigration detention. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001). 23 Analysis 24 Petitioner claims that his re-detention without a bond hearing violates due process. ECF 25 No. 1 ¶¶ 46-49. Respondent argues that petitioner’s detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. 26 § 1225(b)(2), and that, consequently, petitioner does not have a liberty interest in remaining out 27 of custody. ECF No. 5 at 2. Respondent fails to acknowledge or distinguish the many cases in 28 which courts in this Circuit have held the contrary. See, e.g., Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F. Supp. 3d 1 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (collecting cases). Respondent does not explain what, if any, 2 binding precedent supports its statutory position. More fundamentally, respondent’s argument is 3 misplaced because it only addresses petitioner’s due process rights through the lens of its 4 statutory position. ECF No. 5. 5 Courts analyze procedural due process claims in two steps: first, we consider whether 6 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and, second, we evaluate 7 what procedures are necessary to ensure that any deprivation of that protected liberty interest 8 accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 9 (1989). I consider each in turn. 10 To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty 11 interest, courts have compared “specific conditional release in the case before them with the 12 liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey [v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971)].” 13 Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and 14 citation omitted). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole from a criminal 15 conviction “enables [the parolee] to do a wide range of things open to persons” who have never 16 been in custody or convicted of any crime, including to live at home, work, and “be with family 17 and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life.” 408 U.S. at 482. The 18 court observed that while “the [government] properly subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions 19 not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring and seeking authorization to work and travel, 20 the petitioner’s “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The 21 parolee has relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live 22 up to the parole conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss 23 on the parolee.” Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, in Morrissey, the Supreme Court found that 24 a parolee in a criminal case possessed a protected interest in “continued liberty.” Id. at 481-84. 25 Recently, confronted with issues similar to those raised by petitioner, courts in this Circuit 26 have found that noncitizens released from ICE custody acquire a liberty interest in their continued 27 release. See, e.g., Labrador-Prato v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1598-DC-SCR, 2025 WL 3458802, at 28 *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025). 1 “Even where the revocation of a person’s freedom is authorized by statute, that person may retain 2 a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.” Rico-Tapia v. Smith, No. 1:25-cv- 3 00379-SASPKJM, 2025 WL 2950089, at *8 (D. Haw. Oct. 10, 2025) (citing Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 4 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) and Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972)). I agree with 5 the bulk of other courts to have considered the issues presented here and find that petitioner has a 6 protected liberty interest in his continued release. 7 Petitioner entered the United States in September 2022 and was paroled by ICE in 8 November 2022. ECF 7 at 4. He has a Social Security number, a Real ID driver’s license, and a 9 work permit. ECF No. 7 at 1, 6, 8. Accordingly, the record indicates that petitioner lived in the 10 United States, subject to ICE supervision but out of custody, for well over three years prior to his 11 re-detention in March 2026. Petitioner thereby formed “enduring attachments of normal life.” 12 See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. 13 I conclude that petitioner’s initial release and time out of custody have created a 14 constitutionally protected liberty interest in continued release. See Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 15 25-cv-5436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the 16 liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is inherent in the Due 17 Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-5259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 18 June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding released noncitizens to have strong liberty interests). 19 Once a court has found that a noncitizen has a liberty interest in continued release, the 20 court must next determine what procedural protections the government must afford the noncitizen 21 before depriving him of that liberty interest. This requires balancing the factors laid out in 22 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 23 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in immigration detention context). 24 The Mathews test requires courts to consider: 25 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through 26 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 27 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 28 requirement would entail. 1 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 2 First, petitioner has a significant private interest in his continued release. “Freedom from 3 imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at 4 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. 5 Petitioner has a private interest in his continued release that developed over the three years 6 between his release and re-detention. See Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 7 WL 2800149, at *10 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2025) (“Petitioner has a private interest in remaining free, 8 which developed over the year he resided in the United States.”). 9 Turning to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation without a bond 10 hearing is high. Prior to releasing petitioner, respondent necessarily determined that he presented 11 neither a danger to the community nor a risk of flight. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1034 12 (explaining that a petitioner’s “release from ICE custody after her initial apprehension reflected a 13 determination by the government that she was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the 14 community”). Absent a pre-deprivation bond hearing in front of a neutral arbiter, the risk of 15 erroneous deprivation is high given the possibility that petitioner’s re-detention will not be 16 pursuant to a valid state interest. See Omer G.G. v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01471-KES-SAB, 2025 17 WL 3254999, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2025) (“Civil immigration detention, which is 18 ‘nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]’ is justified when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or 19 danger to the community.”) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 20 “Where, as here, ‘[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody . . . hearing,’ ‘the 21 risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high’ because neither the government nor [the 22 petitioner] has had an opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for her detention.” 23 Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (quoting Singh v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00801, 2025 WL 24 1918679, at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 11, 2025)). Respondent offers no evidence or argument indicating 25 that any procedural safeguards have been employed following petitioner’s re-detention; more 26 generally, it gives the court no reason to believe that any efforts have been made to prevent 27 erroneous deprivation of petitioner’s liberty. See id. On the contrary, the fact that the 28 government maintains that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention indicates that it has not 1 made sufficient efforts to prevent an erroneous deprivation of his liberty. Accordingly, “the 2 probable value of additional procedural safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” See A.E. v. 3 Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025), 4 report and recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 1808676 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025). 5 “Third, the Government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without . . . a hearing is ‘low.’” 6 Salazar v. Casey, No. 25-cv-2784-JLS, 2025 WL 3063629, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025) 7 (citation omitted). “In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a ‘minimal’ 8 cost.” Carballo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-0978-KES-EPG, 2025 WL 2381464, at *8 (E.D. Cal. 9 Aug. 15, 2025) (quoting Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. 2025)). 10 Respondent has not provided any information about the additional burden it would bear as a result 11 of being required to provide a bond hearing. See ECF No. 5; ECF No. 7. 12 Accordingly, a consideration of the Mathews factors demonstrates that petitioner’s re- 13 detention without a bond hearing violates his due process rights. Given this finding, I must 14 determine the appropriate remedy. Petitioner seeks immediate release or, alternatively, a bond 15 hearing. ECF No. 1 at 17. Respondent does not discuss this issue. See ECF No. 5; ECF No. 7. 16 The Supreme Court has recognized that “[h]abeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful 17 executive detention,” and the “typical remedy for such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v. 18 Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008); see also Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 19 103, 107 (2020) (“Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful 20 detention.”). To satisfy due process, “the Court usually has held that the Constitution requires 21 some kind of a hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. 22 Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990) (emphasis in original). In some circumstances, however, the 23 Court has held that a post-deprivation hearing satisfies due process, such as where there is “the 24 necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation 25 process.” Id. at 128 (cleaned up). Where a petitioner is entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing, 26 courts have found that “[t]he appropriate relief . . . is their immediate release from custody, and to 27 be provided with relief returning them to status quo ante, i.e., the last uncontested status which 28 preceded the pending controversy.” Cardin Alvarez v. Rivas, No. 25-cv-2943-PHX-GMS, 2025 1 WL 2898389, at *21 (D. Ariz. Oct. 7, 2025), report and recommendation adopted in part, 2 rejected in part on other grounds, 2025 WL 2899092 (D. Ariz. Oct. 10, 2025). 3 Here, there is no evidence, nor has respondent presented any argument, suggesting that 4 there was “the necessity of quick action” by ICE such that petitioner could not have been 5 provided a pre-deprivation hearing. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128. Indeed, respondent does not 6 argue that petitioner is a danger to the community or a flight risk. See ECF No. 5; ECF No. 7. As 7 noted, there is no evidence that petitioner has committed a crime or failed to comply with the 8 terms of his release. Moreover, respondent concedes that petitioner was arrested when he 9 voluntarily appeared at the ICE Office in response to a request. ECF No. 7 at 7. 10 Under these circumstances, I find that the “typical remedy” of release is appropriate 11 because the government has not provided a lawful justification for re-detaining petitioner without 12 a pre-deprivation hearing. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693. Petitioner’s due process rights have been 13 violated such that the appropriate relief is immediate release from custody, thereby returning him 14 to the “status quo ante.” See Cardin Alvarez, 2025 WL 2898389, at *21. 15 Conclusion 16 Accordingly, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that: 17 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus, ECF No. 1, be GRANTED. 18 2. Respondent be ordered to immediately release petitioner (A-Number: 240-128-032) 19 from its custody. Respondent shall not impose any additional restrictions on petitioner, unless 20 that is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation hearing. If the government seeks to 21 re-detain petitioner, it must provide no less than seven days’ notice to petitioner and must hold a 22 constitutionally compliant pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter at which the 23 government bears the burden of proving flight risk or danger by clear and convincing evidence. 24 This order does not address the circumstances in which respondent may detain petitioner in the 25 event petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of removal. 26 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to serve Golden State Annex Detention Facility with a 27 copy of this order. 28 4. The Clerk of Court be ordered to enter judgment accordingly and close this case. ] These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 2 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of 3 | service of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the 4 | court and serve a copy on all parties. Any such document should be captioned “Objections to 5 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations,” and any response shall be served and filed 6 | within seven days of service of the objections. The parties are advised that failure to file 7 | objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See 8 | Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 9 | 1991). 10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ May 29, 2026 aw—— 13 JEREMY D. PETERSON 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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