Marlon Edwards v. Dr. Kaleka, et al.

District Court, E.D. California·Decided January 29, 2026·No. 1:25-cv-00120·Unknown

Opinion

MARLON EDWARDS, No. 1:25-cv-00120-SAB (PC) Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN A DISTRICT JUDGE v. TO THIS ACTION DR. KALEKA, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION Defendants. FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF No. 27) Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, filed October 29, 2025. I. BACKGROUND This action is proceeding on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendants Dr. Kaleka, Dr. Odeluga, and Dr. A. Shittu. (ECF No. 9.) Defendants filed an answer to the operative complaint on June 17, 2025. (ECF No. 21.) On July 2, 2025, the Court issued the discovery and scheduling order. (ECF No. 25.) On October 29, 2025, Defendants Kaleka and Shittu filed a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust the administrative remedies.1 (ECF No. 27.) Plaintiff did not file an opposition and the time to do so has passed. Local Rule 230(l). Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is deemed submitted without oral argument. (Id.) II. A. Statutory Exhaustion Requirement The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, requires that prisoners exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before commencing a suit challenging prison conditions.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 638 (2016) (“An inmate, that is, must exhaust available remedies, but need not exhaust unavailable ones.”). Exhaustion is mandatory unless unavailable. “The obligation to exhaust ‘available’ remedies persists as long as some remedy remains ‘available.’ Once that is no longer the case, then there are no ‘remedies … available,’ and the prisoner need not further pursue the grievance.” Brown v. Valoff, 422 F.3d 926, 935 (9th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original) (citing Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 739 (2001)). This statutory exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) (quotation marks omitted), regardless of the relief sought by the prisoner or the relief offered by the process, Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. at 741, and unexhausted claims may not be brought to court, Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 211 (2007) (citing Porter, 534 U.S. at 524). The failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense, and the defendants bear the burden of raising and proving the absence of exhaustion. Jones, 549 U.S. at 216; Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2014). “In the rare event that a failure to exhaust is clear from the face of the complaint, a defendant may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Albino, 747 F.3d at 1 Concurrently with their motion for summary judgment, Defendants served Plaintiff with the requisite notice of the requirements for opposing the motion. Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939-41 (9th Cir. 2012); Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 960-61 (9th Cir. 1998). 1166. Otherwise, the defendants must produce evidence proving the failure to exhaust, and they are entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56 only if the undisputed evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, shows he failed to exhaust. Id. B. Summary Judgment Standard Any party may move for summary judgment, and the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (quotation marks omitted); Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166; Washington Mut. Inc. v. U.S., 636 F.3d 1207, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Each party’s position, whether it be that a fact is disputed or undisputed, must be supported by (1) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (quotation marks omitted). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, although it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001); accord Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2010). The defendants bear the burden of proof in moving for summary judgment for failure to exhaust, Albino, 747 F.3d at 1166, and they must “prove that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy,” id. at 1172. If the defendants carry their burden, the burden of production shifts to the plaintiff “to come forward with evidence showing that there is something in his particular case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.” Id. “If the undisputed evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the prisoner shows a failure to exhaust, a defendant is entitled to summary judgment under Rule 56.” Id. at 1166. However, “[i]f material facts are disputed, summary judgment should be denied, and the district judge rather than a jury should determine the facts.” Id. /// /// A. Description of CDCR’s Administrative Remedy Process Since August 1, 2008, health care grievances involving medical services for incarcerated persons within the jurisdiction of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) have been processed by California Correctional Health Care Services (CCHCS). (Declaration of K. Martin (Martin Decl.), ¶ 1.) The Health Care Correspondence and Appeals Branch (HCCAB) is the branch responsible for statewide oversight of health care grievances submitted by the incarcerated adult population. (Martin Decl., ¶ 2.) Under California Code of Regulations, title 15, sections 3999.226 and 3999.227(a), incarcerated persons may grieve issues regarding health care policies, decisions, actions, conditions, or omissions using a CDCR 602 HC, Health Care Grievance form. (Martin Decl., ¶ 3.) Once submitted, health care grievances are subject to two levels of review: health care grievances are processed at the institutional level by Health Care Grievance Offices at each institution and health care grievance appeals are processed at the headquarters level by the HCCAB, if requested by the incarcerated person. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3999.226(a)(1) (2019). (Id.) Health care grievances are subject to a headquarters disposition before administrative remedies are deemed exhausted. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3999.226(g) (2019). (Id.) Health care grievances are tracked and maintained in an electronic database known as the Health Care Appeals and Risk Tracking System (HCARTS). (Martin Decl., ¶ 4.) B. Allegations of Complaint Since 2003, Plaintiff has experienced pain in both of his knees and in his lower back. In 2003, Plaintiff was given a cane

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Marlon Edwards v. Dr. Kaleka, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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