Markusen v. General Aniline & Film Corp.

16 F.R.D. 455, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4286
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedDecember 9, 1954
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 16 F.R.D. 455 (Markusen v. General Aniline & Film Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Markusen v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 16 F.R.D. 455, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4286 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).

Opinion

IRVING R. KAUFMAN, District Judge.

The defendant moves for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and in the alternative for a new trial. The plaintiff sued upon an alleged oral agreement to recover so-called severance pay amounting to $5,500 plus certain designated expenses amounting to $1,500.

With regard to the motion for judgment n. o. v., the sole question before me is whether as a matter of law there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the contract as alleged in the complaint was made. The defendant sums up its position in the following manner: “Defendant’s contention is—not that the contract was too indefinite—but that there was no proof of any contract at all.” (p. 2, defendant’s brief).

Upon this application the evidence must be construed most favorably to the plaintiff and tf reasonable and fair-minded men properly instructed on the law could find a verdict in plaintiff’s favor, the verdict cannot be upset. Bell v. Brown, 1942, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 128 F.2d 317; Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 1943, 318 U.S. 54, 67, 63 S.Ct. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610; Stueber v. Admiral Corp., 7 Cir., 1949, 171 F.2d 777, 779; See 5 Moore, Federal Practice, 2314-20.

It is noted that the interpretation of the applicable contract law applied by the Court in its charge was not excepted to by either party to this litigation nor were there any requests for additional charges. Starting from this point, it is reiterated that if the Court properly instructed the jury on the law, all that is required is to examine the record in order to determine whether there is a complete absence of any evidence in the record to support plaintiff’s claim. An examination of the record with this in mind impels the conclusion that there is adequate evidence in the record to sustain the verdict of the jury and specifically the jury’s inherent finding that there was a contract. That the issues and the applicable law concerning the making of a valid contract were squarely submitted [457]*457to the jury cannot be doubted as the footnoted excerpts indicate.1 The plaintiff’s testimony, if believed by the jury, was ample to sustain the alleged agreement for the payment of $5,500 severance pay and expenses of $1,500. A reading of a portion of Markusen’s testimony, dispels doubt on this score.2

In summary, it may be said that the propositions now urged by the defendant [458]*458for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial were in substance urged at the trial. The propositions were incorporated into the Court’s charge and squarely submitted to the jury. The jury was asked to decide whether there had been an agreement entered into, and had been instructed that:

(1) if the language used by the parties was too indefinite, uncertain or unclear, no binding contract could result;

(2) it could not speculate as to what the parties intended. It had to find from the words used that prudent business men would believe that an agreement as to terms and conditions as alleged had been made;

(3) if the terms were very loose and very vague, then it did not amount to a binding agreement but would constitute merely a discussion of what was intend[459]*459ed to be done by the parties in the future;

(4) an agreement in order to be binding must be sufficiently definite to have meaning, and if it cannot be given meaning then there cannot be an agreement.

The issue was sharply drawn between the plaintiff Markusen and the defendant through its president, Mr. Frye. The jury undoubtedly gave credence to the plaintiff’s version and believed that the contract as alleged had been made. Defendant, through this motion, would have the Court usurp the jury’s function. This it cannot do. The motion for judgment n.o.v. is denied.

The motion for a new trial on the ground, inter alia, that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the Court’s discretion. See 6 Moore, Federal Practice, 3814-21. The trial judge cannot set aside a verdict merely because, if he were a juror, he would have reached a different result. In the instant case, as the preceding discussion indicates, the verdict was clearly not against the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial is denied in all respects.

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Bluebook (online)
16 F.R.D. 455, 1954 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4286, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/markusen-v-general-aniline-film-corp-nysd-1954.