BARNES, Circuit Judge.
This complex case comes to us as a timely petition to review a decision of the Tax Court of the United States. The Tax Court entered its decision on April 20, 1972, in accordance with its lengthy opinion, filed June 24, 1970, appearing in 54 U.S. Tax Court Rp. 1364 to 1402 (hereinafter “opinion”).
The findings of fact of the Tax Court appear in said opinion at pages 1366 to 1383. Appellant’s counsel states: “Those findings are correct and objectively set forth the evidence at trial. We would adopt them as a faithful statement of the evidence.” (Opening Brief at 9).
This appeal, therefore, rests on the merits of appellant’s claim that the Tax Court made erroneous conclusions upon the evidence before it.
Because of their length, we will not repeat the complete findings herein, but will assume a sufficiently interested reader of this opinion will have reviewed them himself. Some necessary facts, however, will be recited under the different issues presented.
I. FACTS, GENERALLY.
For several years in Argentina prior to coming to the United States, appellant Marko Durovic (a lawyer), aided, financially and otherwise, his brother, Stevan Durovic (a physician), who had been experimenting, and conducting research into the cause of cancer. It was the latter’s theory “that if a proper stimulant for the reticuloendothelial system could be found, the defensive and reparative cells comprising this system [38]*38could be made to produce a substance which would control malignant growth.” (Opinion at 1367). In his experiments in Argentina, Stevan had unexpectedly, separated a substance (named Kositerin) which showed activity against hypertension. Some of this substance was -tested in 1949 at the School of Medicine at Northwestern University in Illinois. The results were uncertain. No Kosite-rin was sold in Argentina, but .some 72,-200 ampules of the substance was made and placed in storage there. The Minister of Public Health of Argentina later ordered these 72,200 ampules destroyed, as a result of spoilage, on February 17, 1956.
Meanwhile in 1947 Stevan, in Argentina, continuing his research in the area of cancer, came upon a new substance, called drug “X”, later to be called Kre-biozen. It was produced by a similar method to that used to extract Kositerin. It used the, same horse and cattle blood, stimulated with a new substance, “ac-tinomyces bovis” instead of “actino-baeilus lignieris.”
In 1949, both Marko’s wife Olga (who spoke English) and Stevan traveled to the United States to interest and obtain financial backing for the commercial production of these drugs. The previous financial backers in the Argentine during 1947, 1948 and 1949 (Tanoira, et al), were holding 2 grams, 35 centigrams of Krebiozen as security for the moneys they had advanced. Marko borrowed M$N2 million pesos and paid some 3,005,000 pesos to Tanoira on January 26, 1950, so that Marko and Stevan could have all papers and products shipped to the United States and could continue their previous experiments (from 1951 on) in the United States, at the Duga Biological Institute. (On April 5, 1954, the name was changed to Duga Laboratories.) (Both are-referred' to as “Duga, Illinois” in the Tax Court opinion.) Duga, Illinois operated as an equal partnership between Marko and Stevan for the production, testing and distribution of the drug Krebiozen.
It was the partnership returns of “Duga, Illinois” which were filed with the collector in 1954 and which the appellant now urges gave notice to the government that Marko had no individual income, and allegedly commenced the running of the statute of limitations against the collection of deficiencies on any individual income taxes owed by the parties.
Although there is considerable dispute as to “cost of product”, and a different total product cost used in the partnership 1954 return ($1,326,000) compared to the 1955-59 returns ($1,404,511.33) ; when divided by the number of capsules of drug “X” on hand (200,000 in 1951 and 136,097 in April, 1954), the 1954 computation asserted a cost of about $9.50 per ampule; the later computation about $10.32 per ampule.1 *****We will consider other facts connected with product cost hereafter. We now turn to each issue. .
II. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. WHETHER THE TIMELY AND COMPLETE FILING OF PARTNERSHIP RETURNS . . . COVERING THE TAX YEARS HERE IN QUESTION, AND DISCLOSING THERE WAS NO INDIVIDUAL INCOME COMMENCED THE RUNNING OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR ASSESSMENTS AND COLLECTIONS OF ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAXES AND ADDITIONS THERETO.2
We must decide what information is required on an individual taxpay[39]*39er’s return, as distinguished from that required and returned on this partnership return.
The partnership return showed:
Received for Krebiozen Cost of Goods Sold
1954 149,694.10 172,957.74
1955 205,936.73 319,682.64
1956 171,926.98 244,738.80
1957 263,336.53 344,244.24
1958 217,213.36 251,611.92
Title 26 U.S.C. § 6012(a)(1)(A) requires that an income tax return be filed by “every individual having for the taxable year a gross income of $600 or more.” Taxpayer had, in each year mentioned above, a gross income of $600 or more. 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(13), and 26 U.S.C. § 702(c). In addition, the •taxpayer and his wife had interest on a joint savings account of $680.00 in 1957 and $891.28 in 1958, and no other income during the years 1954 through 1958. Taxpayers must file a return “according to the forms and regulations” prescribed by the Secretary, and must include therein the information required by such forms or regulations. (§ 6011 (a)).
Title 26 U.S.C. § 6031 requires that every partnership shall make an information return, stating its gross income and the deductions allowable, and such other information as the Secretary of the Treasury requires. But the partnership is not liable for any tax: the individual taxpayers, in their individual capacity, are; and all partners are required to report their distributive shares on their individual returns.
Appellant asserts that “by reason of the family tax exemptions and deductions, and the losses of the Duga partnership, no individual tax return was required to be filed by petitioner for any years 1954 to 1958”. (Brief, at 10.) The fallacy of his argument is that appellant refers to net income, not the gross income of $600 or more specified in the statute, and required to be filed by every individual, whether or not a partner.
There is simply no way to equate the two terms and appellant cites no cases to support the theory that the partnership return, standing alone, is a sufficient return to toll the statute of limitations.
The sine qua non expressed in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lane-Wells Co., 321 U.S. 219, 64 S.Ct. 511, 88 L.Ed. 684 (1944) is that: “The returns did not show the facts on which liability would be predicated.” (P. 223, 64 S. Ct. p. 513).
And see: Automobile Club v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 353 U.S. 180, 77 S.Ct. 707, 1 L.Ed.2d 746 (1957); F. E. McGillick Co. v. Commissioner, 30 T. C. 1130 (1958); Danz v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 454 (1952).
Appellant next asserts that since the Tax Court determined there was no fraud with respect to the deficiency determined for any year (54 T.C. at 1399, cited as 54 T.C. at 3075, Opening Brief at 11), and that there were no substantial omissions from gross income, Section 6501(e) of the Internal Revenue Code started the statute of limitations to run each year. This argument overlooks the fact that there is an exception to the “substantial omission rule” in § 6501 (e)’s opening paragraph:
“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (c) . . . .”
Subsection (c)(3) provides:
“NO RETURN. — In the case of failure to file a return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment, at any time.” (Emphasis added.)
It is true that the partnership return filed by Duga Laboratories reported all of appellant’s actual income for 1954-56 and all income with the exception of dividend earnings of $681.00 and $891.-28 for 1957 and 1958 respectively. Appellant asserts that under the rationale of Germantown Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 309 U.S. 304, 60 S.Ct. 566, 84 L.Ed. 770 (1940), this information was sufficient notice to the [40]*40Commissioner of his tax liability to begin the running of the statute of limitations. We cannot accept this argument which makes the running of the limitations period depend upon such happenstance. An individual income tax return, if filed, would have accomplished its statutory purpose of making the Commissioner’s auditing task simpler by assuring him that petitioner claimed no other income, credits, or deductions other than the ones on the partnership return. The filing of an informational partnership return, upon which no assessment can be made within the meaning of 26 U.S.C. § 6501, could not begin the running of the statute of limitations. We adhere to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Lane-Wells, 321 U.S. 219, 223-224, 64 S.Ct. 511, 513, 88 L.Ed. 684 (1944), which refused to find that the filing of one return began the running of the period of limitations on a tax due under a second return that was not filed, even though the first return contained a “full disclosure of . gross income and deductions and ... resulting net income” Lane-Wells Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 134 F.2d 977, 978 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1943) :
“Congress has given discretion to the Commissioner to prescribe by regulation forms of returns and has made it the duty of the taxpayer to comply. It thus implements the system of self-assessment which is so largely the basis of our American scheme of income taxation. The purpose is not alone to get tax information in some form but also to get it with such uniformity, completeness, and arrangement that the physical task of handling and verifying returns may be readily accomplished. For • such purposes the regulation requiring two separate returns for these taxes was a reasonable and valid one and the finding of the Board of Tax Appeals that the taxpayer is in default is correct.”
“Taxpayer cites no precedent for the relief he requests, and our research reveals none. The statute itself provides two forms of relief. Section 6861(g) of the Code, Appendix, infra, provides that the Secretary or his delegate may abate the jeopardy assessment if he' finds that jeopardy does not exist, provided that the abatement is made prior to a decision [41]*41of the Tax Court or, if no petition is filed, prior to expiration of the period for filing such petition. Additionally, Section 6863(a) of the Code provides that collection of a jeopardy assessment shall be stayed if the taxpayer furnishes a bond. Under Section 686.3 (b) (2) if ‘the Tax Court determines that the amount assessed is greater than the amount which should have been assessed, then when the decision of the Tax Court is rendered the bond shall, at the request of the taxpayer, be proportionately reduced.’ Taxpayer has not availed himself of these forms of relief. Under such circumstances, the jeopardy assessment remains validly in force.”
[40]*40We find the Tax Court properly held the statute of limitations did not bar the action against appellant.
III. THE JEOPARDY ASSESSMENT. APPELLANT ASSERTS THE PATENT ILLEGALITY OF THE JEOPARDY ASSESSMENT AND CALLS FOR THE COURT’S INTERCESSION. THE GOVERNMENT ASSERTS THE ASSESSMENT WAS LEGAL, AND APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO NO RELIEF.
Section 6861(a) of the Internal Revenue Code Appendix, provides that the making of such assessment is within the discretion of the Secretary or his delegate. Section 6861(c) permits either of the said officers (they may) to abate such assessment if he believes it to be excessive, “before the decision of the Tax Court is rendered”. Congress, in its wisdom, has thus seen fit to give the Secretary or his delegate a wide discretion, but only prior to litigation over the tax.
This Circuit has previously held that this discretionary power is not subject to judicial review. Veeder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 36 F.2d 342 (7th Cir. 1929) and Kohler v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 37 B.T.A. 1019 (1938), dismissed by this Court on September 10, 1940. We have heretofore noted that “jeopardy assessments are of their nature and purpose arbitrary.” Homan Mfg. Co. v. Long, 242 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1957).
Thus, while we might think the continuing jeopardy assessment, while perhaps originally reasonable, is presently unfair and unreasonable (and we do), we are without power to act.3 The [41]*41jeopardy assessment remains validly in force.
IV. IS THE PETITIONER ENTITLED TO FILE A JOINT RETURN WITH HIS WIFE, AND COMPUTE TAXES AT THE RATES APPLICABLE TO MARRIED PERSONS?
IV A. — FACTS.
We now add to the recital of facts that subsequent to the assessed jeopardy deficiency against appellant on October 28, 1964'and the statutory notice of deficiency, identical in amount, issued within the 60 day period prescribed on December 28, 1964, the taxpayer and his wife, Olga, filed on March 10, 1965, joint income returns for the years 1954 through 1958, purportedly pursuant to § 6013(a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
Appellee relies on the express exceptions mentioned in § 6013(b) with respect to the rights given husband and wife taxpayers, under § 6013(a), to file joint returns.4
IV B. — DISCUSSION.
The last taxable year here involved is 1958, and the last date prescribed by law for filing a 1958 return is April 15, 1959. The three years expired April 15, 1962. The appellants’ joint return was filed March 10, 1965, almost three years too late for the last year with which we are concerned.
Appellant states that “§ 6013 has never been construed to bar an initial eleetion to file a joint return made after the due date of a return”. (Brief, at 21), citing one case — Spanos v. United States, 212 F.Supp. 861, fn. 3 (D.C. 1963); and Spanos v. United States, 323 F.2d 108 (4th Cir. 1963) — affirming in part, and reversing in part.
As the Tax Court stated, § 6013(b) was passed by the Congress “to remedy the dilemma which often befell married taxpayers who were required to make a binding election (as to the type of return they would file) at a time when they lacked ‘informed tax knowledge not possessed by the average person’ ” “It was to permit married persons, who originally elect to file individual returns, to later change their election, and file joint returns at any time within the three year period of the statute of limitations.” (54 U.S.T.C.Rep. .at 1401).
This same problem was faced by Mrs. Spanos after her husband had fraudulently failed to file a timely return for the year 1955, due April 15, 1956. On July 2, 1956, the husband and wife filed a joint return correctly setting forth their tax. Later that year, her husband died. The government sought a fraud penalty against her, even though she was innocent of any fraud, had no taxable income, and the tardy return was free from fraud.
Mrs. Spanos first took the position, as outlined in the Court of Appeals’ Spanos opinion, “that a joint return belatedly filed is an ineffective election and imposed no legal obligation upon her.
[42]*42The Court of Appeals, though reversing any liability on her for her husband’s fraudulent failure to file a return by April 15, 1956, disposed of her other contention as appears in the margin.5
The Tax Court here reasoned — “had (Mr. and Mrs. Durovic) originally filed individual returns for these years (1954-58), their election in 1965 to file joint returns would have been untimely. We see no reason why the same rule should not obtain where, as here, no returns were originally filed. However ... ‘as the result of a failure to file a return, the Commissioner has been required to make an election for ■ the taxpayers . . . that election may not thereafter be altered.’ Spanos v. United States, 212 F.Supp. 861, 864 (D. Md.1963).”
Appellant, in opposing this view, asserts that petitioner and his wife did not file individual returns originally, therefore, there is no statute of limitations to commence the running of the time within to make an election under any applicable provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (Appellant’s brief, at 25). No cases are cited in support of this theory of Iww. Spanos, supra, does not support it. Section 6013 prohibits an election after the expiration of three years from the last date prescribed by law for filing the return for each taxable year .(without regard to any extensions granted). By no stretch of imagination can this statute be interpreted to mean a complete failure to file erases the date from which the 3-year limitation starts to run. Congress could not have intended to put such power in the hands of a recalcitrant taxpayer, where, as the.Tax Court noted, our system of “taxation is based on voluntary disclosure.” (at 1402).
We agree with the Tax Court that the petitioner was not entitled to an election on March 10, 1965 that he would file a joint return with his wife.
■ V. THE COST OF GOODS.
DID TAX COURT ERRONEOUSLY COMPUTE THE COSTS OF GOODS SOLD?
Y-A. FACTS.
Petitioner, on January 21, 1950, in Argentina, paid 1,268,193 Argentine pesos for the formula and rights to manufacture the drug Kositerin. On January 26, 1950, he purchased a half interest in the drug “X” or Krebiozen for 3,500,-000 Argentine pesos. Physically, he thus obtained the then entire supply of raw material Krebiozen (2 grams, 35 centigrams) later manufactured into 200,000 ampules. On February 7, 1950, petitioner came to the United States, manufactured the ampules of Krebiozen, and without cost, gave enough of them to certain doctors and institutions for experimentation and other evaluation of their value in the treatment of cancer.
In 1954, when a demand for the ampules became evident, they were sold for the first time. To make the partnership return in 1955 for 1954, it became necessary to convert the petitioner’s investment into United States dollar equivalents. Petitioner used the figure of 3.36 pesos to the United States dollar. He arrived at the figure of 4,280,000 Argentine pesos as the total cost of both Kositerin and Krebiozen, or $1,273,809.-52.6
[43]*43The Tax Court found the cost of the Krebiozen ampules 3,005,000 Argentine pesos, and found that was the fair cost of the 200,000 ampules of Krebiozen produced in the United States. This would amount to $894,345 if we were to use petitioner’s figure of 3.36 pesos per dollar.
V-B. DISCUSSION.
There were three principal differences however, between the figures claimed by-petitioner, and those allowed by the Tax Court.
First, the amount of research expenditures in the United States.
The figure claimed by taxpayers as “research expense” admittedly included “extensive research relating to sterilizing, ampuling and packaging the drug,” 7 totaling $105,387.38.8
This figure was cut in half by the Tax Court, and one half allowed as “properly applicable to cost of goods sold. Cohan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 39 F.2d 540 (2nd Cir. 1930).”
This cryptic statement relies on what has long been a land-mark case in tax law — one written by one of our most illustrious and revered judges. We assume the Tax Court relies on his language that “the Board should maké as close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer whose inexactitude is of his own making.” (Id. at 544).
But in the Cohan case, Cohan kept no records whatsoever! His figures were pure guesses. Yet, Learned Hand thought he would not permit the Board to allow Cohan Nothing as deductible expenses.
Here the figures come from original records kept by Mrs. Durovic during a four and one-half year period.9 While, as we have stated above, we hold that the two amounts ($20,953.44 and $4,372.-66) eliminated from the $130,713.48 amount -claimed by taxpayer as expenses were properly deductible, we consider the halving of the $105,387.38 established by the records stipulated into evidence was arbitrary and capricious, and is not supported by Cohan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra, and that the expenses of research should have been allowed in the sum of $105,387.38, instead of $52,693.69.
This would result in an increased cost basis for the 200,000 ampules, in favor of the taxpayer.
Second, the number of ampules sold.
Petitioner insists that the 200,-000 figure should not be used, as the number of ampules produced (and as the [44]*44Tax Court did), in determining ampule cost, but the figure of 136,097, the number of ampules remaining after Duga, Illinois had distributed 63,903 ampules to the medical profession, and to research, free of charge.
The Tax Court explained its holding, without the citation of cases, in the following language:
“. . . Though we fully appreciate the altruistic as well as practical considerations which governed the choice of spreading cost over 136,-097 ampules as opposed to 200,000 ampules, we are constrained to hold that for the years 1954 through 1958, this method of apportionment did not clearly reflect income.”
Thus, says petitioner, the Tax Court refused to credit petitioner the costs of manufacture of the 63,903 ampules distributed without charge.
As we understand the opinion, the United States expenditures of $52,693.-69 at which the Tax Court arrived by halving the $105,387.38 figure (net after deducting the Durovies’ living expenses of $20,953.44, and the monies advanced to the “Institute” ($4,372.66, which deductions we have approved above), the balance of the $105,387.38 deduction sought was expended, because the partnership also incurred extensive research expenses, “as well as extensive expenses relating to sterilizing, am-puling, and packaging the drug.” (Opinion, at 1394). Petitioners assert the amount expended in pure research in the United States was not more than $500.00.
We think it rather obvious that before Krebiozen could be sold in the United States, it would require certain approval and acceptance from the medical profession, from medical schools and from certain governmental agencies. It is undisputed factually that 63,903 ampules were so distributed without charge for such purposes.
We think that the attempt to gain acceptance of the drug Krebiozen by giving away samples to responsible physicians and medical schools was as much a business expense as the giving away of drug samples to physicians or tooth paste samples to dentists.10
Goods distributed free of charge should be treated as an expense for promoting good will,11 or as an advertising expense, deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expenditure.11» Whatever way the expense of the goods distributed free of charge is to be deducted, they must have some cost for tax purposes. For this reason it is essential that the cost of producing the ampules should be spread over the 200,000 ampules actually produced. This case must be remanded, then, to permit the Tax Court to determine whether the taxpayer is to get a deduction for the cost of the 63,903 free ampules distributed as an advertising expense or as an ámortizable good will expense.
Thirdly: The proper conversion rate.
Petitioner claims in his brief the applicable rate of exchange was “the basic buying rate,” 3.36 M$N per United States dollar.12 The Tax Court held the [45]*45applicable rate of exchange was the “commercial rate” of 9.66 M$N to the United States dollar. The problem we face is that the petitioners presently-claimed a “basic buying rate” should be used, and no basic buying rate appears in the record considered by the Tax Court.
Joint Exhibit 23-P indicates the “official rate of exchange” Argentine pesos to American dollars was constant for many years at 3.36 to $1 up to August 29, 1950 (at which time it advanced 5.00 to $1) and remained there through 1954. The Argentine transaction by which the Krebiozen powder was brought to the United States occurred, as was stated above, on January 26, 1950. On that the “commercial rate” of exchange was apparently 9.66 pesos to $1 dollar. (Joint Exhibit, per stipulation, 23-P). That, at least, was the Tax Court’s interpretation of the evidence.
The determination of this issue is not aided by the varying language used to describe the same matters sought to be described. The opinion of the Tax Court refers only to “official rate of exchange”, and “commercial rate of exchange”. (See note 11.) Title 31, § 372(b) and (c) now relied on by petitioner in his brief, refers to “the buying rate in the New York market”, and “the buying rate for cable transfers”, but these were apparently not in evidence before the Tax Court. Even these definitions are obscured, as to Argentina alone, by four apparent separate “buying rates” for that country from January 16, 1950 to January 27, 1950:
Argentina-basic 29.7778 American cents for pesos
Argentina-Preferential "A" 20.6949
Argentina-Preferential "B" 17.4562
Argentina-Special 13.8958
Apparently these existed until August 29, 1950, when a rate designated “preferential” replaced preferential “A”, and preferential “B”, and the “special rate” was discontinued. The “basic rate” remained the same (29.778 cents for the peso until August 28 (or August 29), 1950. The “preferential rate” came into being at that time at 13.333 cents per peso, and the “free rate” came into existence two months earlier in July, 1950, at 11.100 cents per peso. (See Appendix, Petitioner’s Brief, Exs. A., B. & C. and Ex. 62.)
The documents in the Appendix attached to petitioner’s brief apparently were not introduced into evidence before the Tax Court, for the petitioner asks this Court “to take judicial notice of those releases and bulletins reprinted herein.” (Petitioner’s brief, at 29).
Respondent challenges petitioner’s use of the material attached to his brief; charging that petitioner seeks “to disavow the commercial rate schedule freely stipulated to by the parties (Joint Exhibit 23-P)” and used partially by the Tax Court in its opinion — (Table, Opinion at 1388).
The Tax Court opinion stated its “research had failed to uncover any cases that are on all fours with the question before us” (at 1389), citing Morris Marks Landau, 7 T.C. 12 (1946); Estate of A.H.G. Fokker, 10 T.C. 1225 (1948); and Credit & Investment Corp., 47 B.T.A. 673 (1942).
The Tax Court then said:
“In almost all these cases Commissioner asserted deficiencies based upon the official rate of exchange. See Ceska Cooper, 15 T.C. 757 (1950); Estate of Meinhuys [Nienhuys], 17 T.C. 1149 (1952); and Credit & Investment Corp., swpra. However, in each instance the courts were unwilling to accept this argument when it was patently clear that the official rate of exchange did not reflect the [46]*46exchange rate at which foreign currency could be traded for United States dollars”, citing Ceska Cooper, swpra [15 T.C. 757], at 765.
“United States taxation is ‘based on the value of property measured in United States dollars.’
“. . . where gain or loss must be computed it is the actual cost of the investment in the terms of the number of dollars needed which establishes basis, and the obtainable dollar equivalent of the currency received.”
Thus the court concluded it should use the “actual dollars worth in terms of salient market conditions”, and held the commercial rate of exchange should be used. (Opinion, at 1390).13 Can it be said here that “it is patently clear that the official rate of exchange did not reflect the exchange rate at which foreign currency could be traded for United States dollars” (emphasis added) in January, 1950?”
In coming to its pragmatic endeavor to adopt
“a rule of reason which reflects actual dollars worth in terms of salient market conditions”, and “the realities of the situation”, the Tax Court cites Edmond Weil, Inc., a memorandum opinion dated August 9, 1944 (Opinion, Note 21 at 1390), in which the Tax Court used the commercial rate of exchange where the “evidence [established] that petitioner was never paid the ‘official’ rate in exchange transactions.”
In considering the Tax Court’s conclusions we note (a) that Joint Exhibit 23-P was stipulated into evidence as proof the “official rate of exchange” was 3.36 up to August 29, 1950; and the “commercial rate of exchange”, 9.66 throughout 1950; (b) that the relevant dates are January 26, 1950, and February 7, 1950 (when the Krebiozen powder was bought and brought into the United States); (c) that there was no evidence before the Tax Court that there existed any restrictions making the use of the “official rate” impossible. (Ex. 62).
Willard Hellburn, Inc., 20 T.C. 740 (1953) ; Edmond Weil, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 150 F.2d 950 (2nd Cir. 1945) ; and James Q. Wlieatley, 8 B.T.A. 1246, 1249 (1927) and in note 20, Elder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 138 F.2d 27 (2nd Cir. 1943).
When the Argentine peso began to cheapen with respect to the American dollar, the banker who had lent petitioner roughly 2 million Argentine pesos in January, 1950, apparently became sufficiently worried by the slump in the peso’s value to travel to Chicago to discuss the rate of exchange to be used by the parties. The loan was converted by mutual agreement of the parties into United States dollars at the rate of 3.36 pesos for one dollar. The rate used was the “official rate” described in Exhibit 62, which was based on the “buying rate” determined by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System in New York for the two weeks ending January 30,1950. While we do not agree with appellant that this post facto recognition of an exchange rate to be used by agreement of the parties to the transaction binds the government in the collection of income taxes, neither are we impressed with the position of the Tax Court that despite the fact it can find no cases on all fours with the facts of this case, it is “the inescapable conclusion” (Opinion, at 1389) from the cases it cites, supra, and Note 13, supra, the commercial rate of exchange “actually determines the number of dollars which reasonable businessmen, dealing at arms length will be willing to pay for a commodity at a given time.” For, here, in the transaction under scrutiny, it did not. A figure different than the commercial rate, was utilized, agreeable to the understanding of the parties.
[47]*47Further, in Eder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 138 F.2d 27, at 28 (2nd Cir. 1943), Judge Frank wrote:
“We agree with the taxpayers that the Commissioner and the Tax Court were in error in adopting as the value of ‘blocked’ pesos the current rate of exchange for ‘free’ pesos.”
Judge Frank goes on to say this does not mean the taxpayer must win, however, because it may have been possible for the taxpayer to show the value of “blocked” pesos in Columbia, and that he could have invested or spent them there; thus obtaining economic satisfaction. But there was no evidence in that record “to show how economic satisfaction in Columbia can be measured in American dollars”. The Court therefore remanded the case to the Tax Court for further consideration of the appropriate measure of valuation.
Here the Argentine pesos were not “blocked”, hence Eder, supra, is no authority for the position that the current rate of exchange for “free” pesos could not be used, nor is it authority for the position that the exchange rate for “free” pesos should be used.
The Fokker case supra, likewise .deals with blocked Dutch guilders. We note, however, that Judge Arnold of the Tax Court wrote the following significant dicta :
“What rate of exchange shall be used in converting Dutch guilders into American dollars ? There would be no problem if the valuation could be made at the date of decedent’s death. At that time the official rate of exchange was $0,531 per guilder. (Emphasis added.) But the executor chose, as was his right, the date for evaluation as one year after death. The Tax Court followed Landau, supra, and valued the then blocked Dutch guilders at 5 cents per guilder.”
Credit & Investment Corp. v. Commissioner, supra, likewise involved “blocked” German marks, and Estate of Jan Wil-lem Nienhuys, supra, involved “blocked” Dutch guilders (valued at 10 cents per guilder). Wheatley, supra, involved a loss sustained in purchasing Argentine pesos, but if anything, favors taxpayer.
The Commissioner’s Brief cites several of the same cases mentioned in the opinion involving “blocked” currency, and adds the following cases: . Cooper v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 757 (1950); The Foundation Company v. Commissioner, 14 T.C., 1333,1355 (1950).
Here the Commissioner’s Brief states it is “[T]he inevitable conclusion dictated by the foregoing cases . . . that the commercial exchange rate must be applied in the instant case.” (Brief, at 29). Referring to the taxpayer’s position dealing with appropriate conversion rates for assessing duties on imports, and that the “buying rate” for cable transfers is the proper conversion rate, the Commissioner states:
. . both the statute cited (31 U.S.C. § 732(b) [§ 372(b) & (c)] and (c) and the case (Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83 [65 S.Ct. 522, 89 L.Ed. 765] (1945)) relate to custom duties and have no bearing upon proper conversion rates to be used in conjunction with questions arising under the Internal Revenue Code.”
But the Commissioner cites no cases or statutes which support such a broad general statement. In The Foundation Company, Petr. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 1333, “blocked” Chilean pesos prevented the use of an official rate, and Judge Harron held:
“We have come to the conclusion that the loss is properly computed, in this proceeding and under its particular facts, by using the ‘free’ rate of exchange, and the ‘free’ rates on the dates petitioner received the respective payments in 1931, 1932 and 1933.” (Id. at 1355).
This ruling was followed in Ceska Cooper, 15 T.C. 756, 765, relying on Landau v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 12, “The official rate of exchange does not apply to blocked pounds.” The Cooper case concludes: “The Commissioner has used in his determination of the defi[48]*48ciencies the official rate of exchange of the pound. This, we hold, was error on his part, and the free rate of exchange should be used instead. But see The Foundation Company v. Commissioner, 14 T.C., 1333. As to this issue, the petitioner is sustained.”
On this admittedly very unsatisfactory and unclear state of the law; (a) because of the efforts of petitioner to have us consider evidence not introduced below (by taking judicial notice of it); (b) because of the flat statements of the petitioner that Title 31, § 372(b) and (c) controls not only conversion of foreign currencies with respect to Custom’s collection of duties, but also with respect to all tax matters, and the failure of either side to present controlling law or convincing analogy; (c) because Barr v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 65 S.Ct. 522, 89 L.Ed. 765, al-. though referring specifically to “the search which has been made for a measure of the true dollar value of imported merchandise for customs purpose”; and the right of Congress “to choose any standard of evaluation for the assessment and collection of duties”, allegedly prevents any judicial review of the determination and certification by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, of the “buying rate” to be used in all foreign currency conversion to which the Commissioner states this case “has no bearing” on our problem: (d) because petitioner seeks to be released by this court from his stipulation with respect to Joint Exhibit 23-P; (e) because Exhibit C in the Appendix, attached to Appellant’s Brief, if properly introduced into evidence, indicates there was no such thing as an authorized “commercial rate” or “free rate”, or “preferential rate”, or anything other than a “basic” foreign exchange rate for Argentine pesos prior to the end of June, 1950; (f) because the Commissioner in support of the Tax Court relies almost exclusively on “blocked currency” cases; (g) because the Commissioner relies on “inevitable conclusions” that do not seem to be required by the cases submitted, which largely rest on a different factual basis; and (h) because we believe the matter must be remanded to the Tax Court for recomputation in view of our findings as to number of ampules (Issue IV-A), we reverse the Tax Court on the issue of conversion values and remand for further exploration of the law and the fact, and a proper determination of that issue.
We are satisfied the Tax Court correctly ruled that taxpayer’s investment in Kositerin was not part of the cost of Krebiozen sold; correctly excluded (1) taxpayer’s living expenses from October, 1949 through June, 1952; and (2) office maintenance of the Krebiozen Foundation.
We have likewise concluded we can give no relief to the petitioners with respect to the jeopardy assessment.
Due to the unusual delays heretofore encountered in this matter, and the additional delays necessitated by the length of the record before us, we recommend that the Secretary of the Treasury, or his delegate, consider the advisability of raising the jeopardy assessment against petitioner with the use of amply sufficient bonding procedures.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part, and remanded in part for further consideration by the Tax Court in accordance with this opinion.