OPINION
SLEET, Chief Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 20, 2012, the plaintiff, Market-Alerts Pry. Ltd. (“Markeb-Alerts”), [488]*488brought the above-captioned six lawsuits against multiple defendants,1 alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 7,941,357 (the “'357 Patent”). On October 15, 2012, several of the defendants (the “petitioning defendants”) filed a Petition for PosN Grant Review of the '357 Patent under 35 U.S.C. § 321 and § 18 of the America Invents Act (the “AIA”). (D.I. 16, Ex. B.)2 On November 9, 2012, the Bloomberg defendants, the E*TRADE defendants, the TD Ameritrade defendants, and Thinkorswim Group, Inc.3 moved to stay this litigation pending post-grant review pursuant to § 18(b) of the AIA. (D.I. 14.) The Schwab defendants and optionsXpress defendants then filed a separate motion to stay on December 21, 2012. (No. 12-781, D.I. 38.) On January 4, 2013, they withdrew that request and joined in the pending, November 9, 2012 motion to stay. (No. 12-781, D.I. 42.) That motion is presently before the court, and, for the reasons that follow, the court will order that all six actions be stayed pending post-grant review.
II. BACKGROUND
Market-Alerts claims to be the exclusive owner of all rights to the '357 Patent, which is entitled “Trading System.” (D.I. 1 at ¶ 8.) Claim 1 of the '357 Patent recites:
A method of informing users of stock market events, comprising the steps of: (a) receiving real-time stock market data on a network of computers; (b) receiving on the network of computers instructions from a user to specify watch data defining an event, the watch data including a stock market technical analysis request specifying technical analysis formulae to be applied to the real-time stock market data; (c) using the network of computers to periodically apply [489]*489the user-specified watch data including the stock market technical analysis formulae to the real-time stock market data in real-time to ascertain whether a valid response to the watch data has occurred based on the real-time stock market data, thereby determining an occurrence of the event defined by the user-specific watch data; and (d) causing a real-time notification by the network of computers to be provided to the user via a remote communications device upon the occurrence of the event defined by the user-specified watch data, the real-time notification directed to a remote communications device of the user so that the user can then provide instructions for share market transaction on an instantaneous basis.
{Id., Ex. A at 9.) Market-Alerts alleges that each of the defendants infringes the'357 Patent by “provid[ing] or operat[ing] real-time stock trading products and/or services, which fall within the scope of the '357 Patent claims.” (D.I. 24 at 3.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Section 18 of the ALA provides for the establishment of transitional post-grant review proceedings to reexamine the validity of covered business method patents (“CBM review”). Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 284, 32931 (2011). The ALA also considers the effect of these proceedings on related patent infringement actions and authorizes the district courts to stay such parallel litigation under certain circumstances. Specifically § 18(b)(1) provides:
If a party seeks a stay of a civil action alleging infringement of a patent under section 281 of title 35, United States Code, relating to a transitional proceeding for that patent, the court shall decide whether to enter a stay based on-
(A) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will simplify the issues in question and streamline the trial;
(B) whether discovery is complete and whether a trial date has been set;
(C) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, would unduly prejudice the nonmoving party or present a clear tactical advantage for the moving party; and
(D) whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court.
Id. § 18(b)(1).
This statutory test closely resembles the stay analysis courts have applied in assessing a motion to stay pending inter partes or ex parte reexamination by the Patent and Trademark Office (the “PTO”). See, e.g., SenoRx, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. 12-173-LPS-CJB, 2013 WL 144255, at *2 (D.Del. Jan. 11, 2013) (applying three-factor stay test that asks “(1) whether granting the stay will simplify the issues for trial; (2) the status of the litigation, particularly whether discovery is complete and a trial date has been set; and (3) whether a stay would cause the non-movant to suffer undue prejudice from any delay, or allow the movant to gain a clear tactical advantage”); Ever Win Int’l Corp. v. Radioshack Corp., 902 F.Supp.2d 503, 505-06, 2012 WL 4801890, at *2 (D.Del.2012) (same). The substantial difference between the test set forth in § 18(b)(1) and that employed by courts in the ordinary patent reexamination context is the inclusion of a fourth factor, which requires the court to consider “whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court.” § 18(b)(1)(D). This additional consideration was included, in part, to ease the [490]*490movant’s task of demonstrating the need for .a stay.4
The AIA was signed into law on September 16, 2011, and CBM review came into effect one year later, in September 2012.
IV. DISCUSSION
The petitioning defendants have sought post-grant review of the '357 Patent as a covered business method patent under 35 U.S.C. § 321 and § 18 of the AIA. The moving defendants now request a stay of this litigation pending the resolution of those CBM review proceedings.5 The court will discuss each of the statutory stay factors outlined in § 18(b) below, addressing the parties’ specific arguments where applicable.6
A. Issue Simplification
Section 18(b)(1)(A) instructs the court to consider “whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will simplify the issues in question and streamline the trial.” Id. As the court has previously recognized, staying an infringement case pending administrative review of the patent-in-suit’s validity can simplify litigation in several ways:
[491]*491(1) all prior art presented to the court at trial will have been first considered by the PTO with its particular expertise, (2) many discovery problems relating to the prior art can be alleviated, (3) if patent is declared invalid, the suit will likely be dismissed, (4) the outcome of the [administrative review] may encourage a settlement without further involvement of the court, (5) the record of the [administrative review] would probably be entered at trial, reducing the complexity and the length of the litigation, (6) issues, defenses, and evidence will be more easily limited in pre-trial conferences and (7) the cost will likely be reduced both for the parties and the court.
Gioello Enters. Ltd. v. Mattel, Inc., No. 99-375-GMS, 2001 WL 125340, at *1 (D.Del. Jan. 29, 2001).
The moving defendants reference the high rates of claim amendment and cancellation in the inter partes reexamination context to suggest that granting a stay here will narrow the issues before the court.7 (D.I. 15 at 7.) Market-Alerts responds that a stay will not achieve the goal of issue simplification because (1) the limited scope of CBM review proceedings ensures that certain issues will remain in litigation even after the administrative process is complete and (2) the CBM review is unlikely to result in claim cancellation or amendment (D.1.19 at 1617.)
Of course, these two worries collapse into each other to some degree. In raising its “scope” concern, Market-Alerts claims that “at least the issues of infringement, other invalidity defenses, damages and other equitable defenses will still have to be litigated even if the PTO grants CBM Review.” (Id.) Implicit in this argument is an assumption that CBM review will not result in the cancellation of all claims of the '357 Patent — if that were to occur, it would effectively end these cases and extinguish any concerns about the scope of the review process. The merit of Market-Alerts’ scope argument thus depends, in part, on the strength of the petitioning defendant’s administrative challenge itself,8 and, on that broader point, Market-Alerts contends that the petition for CBM review is unlikely to be granted or to succeed. (Id. at 815.)
1. Likelihood of Petition Being Granted
Market-Alerts first suggests that the petition for review will not even be granted because the claims of the '357 Patent fall within a statutory exception for “technological inventions.” The AIA permits CBM review only for “covered business method patents,” which it defines as “patent[s] that claim[ ] a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions. ” § 18(d)(1) (emphasis added). Pursuant to rulemaking authority [492]*492delegated by § 18(d)(2) of the AIA, the PTO has further clarified that,
[i]n determining whether a patent is for a technological invention solely for purposes of the Transitional Program for Covered Business Methods ... the following will be considered on a case-by-case basis: whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that is novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a technical solution.
37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b) (2012). As the PTO has noted, this definition is consistent with the legislative history of the AIA. Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents — Definitions of Covered Business Method Patent and Technological Invention, 77 Fed.Reg. 48735 (Aug. 14, 2012) (quoting, inter alia, 157 Cong. Rec. S1364 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer) (“The ‘patents for technological inventions’ exception only excludes those patents whose novelty turns on a technological innovation over the pri- or art and are concerned with a-technical problem which is solved with a technical solution and which requires the claims to state the technical features which the inventor desires to protect.”)).
Market-Alerts contends that the '357 Patent falls within this technological invention exception because “the 357 Patent claims, as a whole, a set of technological features that are novel and unobvious over the prior art. Moreover, the widespread adoption of the patented invention within the industry, particularly by the big brokerages, directly evidences the value of the patented invention as a technical solution.” (D.I. 19 at 11.) The court, however, believes that the '357 Patent likely does not meet the requirements of the statutory exception. The plain language of the PTO definition makes clear that when a party seeks to invoke the “technological invention” exception, it must do more than demonstrate that the method being claimed is novel — it must show that the “technological feature” itself is novel and unobvious. Here, the court presumes that the claimed “technological features” of the '357 Patent are the “network of computers” and the “remote communications device.” As such, and despite Market-Alerts’ generalized protests to the contrary, neither a “network of computers” nor a “remote communications device” strikes the court as particularly novel.9 Put simply, it seems likely that the petition for CBM review will be granted.10
[493]*4932. Likelihood of Administrative Challenge Succeeding
Market-Alerts next contends that, even if the petition is granted, the defendants’ validity challenge will fail before the PTAB. (D.I. 19 at 13-15.) Its principal argument on this point relates to the petitioning defendants’ submission of material obtained through the Internet Archive’s “Wayback Machine” as prior art.11 (Id. at 13.) The court, however, is unimpressed by this line of attack. While the admissibility of Wayback-generated webpages remains somewhat uncertain,12 Market-Alerts makes no attempt to discredit the additional printed publications presented by the defendants as prior art. (D.I. 22 at 8.) The court believes there is at least a reasonable chance that the PTAB will ultimately invalidate or cause Market-Alerts to amend some or all of the claims of the '357 Patent, and such a result would have simplifying effects on this litigation re[494]*494gardless of the scope limitations of CBM review. As such, this factor weighs lightly in favor of granting the motion to stay.
B. Stage of Litigation
The second factor, which has the court consider how far litigation has already progressed, likewise favors a stay. America Invents Act § 18(b)(1)(B). Staying a case at an early juncture “can be said to advance judicial efficiency and maximize the likelihood that neither the [cjourt nor the parties expend their assets addressing invalid claims.” SenoRx, Inc., 2013 WL 144255, at *5 (internal quotation omitted). On the other hand, when confronted with a motion to stay in the later stages of a case, “the [cjourt and the parties have already expended significant resources on the litigation, and the principle of maximizing the use of judicial and litigant resources is best served by seeing the case through to its conclusion.” Id.
As the moving defendants accurately point out, these actions are “still at the earliest possible stage. No conferences with the [c]ourt have occurred; no schedules have been set; no substantive motions have been filed; and the [cjourt has issued no substantive rulings.” This factor thus weighs strongly in favor of a stay.13 See Abbott Diabetes Care, Inc. v. Dexcom, Inc., No. 06-514-GMS, 2007 WL 2892707, at *5 (Sept. 30, 2007) (finding that a stay pending PTO reexamination was warranted “where the court has not yet conducted a Rule 16(2)(b) scheduling conference, no scheduling Order is in place, no discovery has taken place, and little time has yet to be invested in the litigation”).
C. Undue Prejudice
The court is next instructed to consider the potential for a stay to unduly prejudice the plaintiff or place it at a clear tactical disadvantage. America Invents Act § 18(b)(1)(C). In the context of a motion to stay pending reexamination, the court has previously noted that waiting for the administrative process to run its course risks prolonging the final resolution of the dispute and thus may result in some inherent prejudice to the plaintiff. See Textron Innovations, Inc. v. Toro Co., No. 05-486-GMS, 2007 WL 7772169, at *3, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100102, at *8 (D.Del. Apr. 25, 2007). The court also recognizes, however, that the potential for delay does not, by itself, establish undue prejudice. See Enhanced Sec. Research, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., No. 09-571-JJF, 2010 WL 2573925, at *3 (D.Del. June 25, 2010); Wall Corp. v. BondDesk Grp., LLC, No. 07-844-GMS, 2009 WL 528564, at *2 (D.Del. Feb. 24, 2009). Rather, in determining whether a plaintiff might be unacceptably prejudiced by a stay, the court turns to additional considerations including the timing of the stay request, the timing of the administrative review request, the status of the review proceedings, and the relationship between the parties. See, e.g., Boston Scientific Corp. v. Cordis Corp., 777 F.Supp.2d 783, 789 (D.Del.2011); Vehicle IP, LLC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 10-503-SLR, 2010 WL 4823393, at *2 (D.Del. Nov. 22, 2010).
In these actions, neither the timing of the CBM review petition nor the timing of the stay request suggest any inappropriate [495]*495dilatory motive on the defendants’ part. The petition was filed on October 15, 2012, less than one month after the review program went into effect, and the motion to stay was filed on November 9, 2012. (D.I. 15 at 4.)
The relationship between the parties is also considered, as “[c]ourts are generally reluctant to stay proceedings where the parties are direct competitors.” Boston Scientific Corp., 777 F.Supp.2d at 789; see also ImageVision.Net, Inc. v. Internet Payment Exch., Inc., No. 12-054-GMS-MPT, 2012 WL 5599388, at *4-5 (D.Del. Nov. 15, 2012); Vehicle IP, LLC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 10-503-SLR, 2010 WL 4823393, at *2 (D.Del. Nov. 22, 2010). In such cases, “there is a reasonable chance that delay in adjudicating the alleged infringement will have outsized consequences to the party asserting infringement has occurred, including the potential for loss of market share and an erosion of goodwill.” SenoRx, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., No. 12-173-LPS-CJB, 2013 WL 144255, at *5 (D.Del. Jan. 11, 2013). There is no evidence, however, that Market-Alerts directly competes with any - of the defendants’ accused products, (D.I. 15 at 10 n. 5), and its own responsive brief indicates that, at this point, patent infringement litigation represents its primary business, (D.I. 19 at 6). As such, this consideration does not suggest that a stay would cause Market-Alerts undue prejudice.
Finally, the court examines the status of the administrative review. In order to make that assessment here, however, it first is necessary to understand the expected timeline for CBM review proceedings. The PTO provides the following summary:
Generally, the proceedings begin with the filing of a petition that identifies all of the claims challenged and the grounds and supporting evidence on a claim-by-claim basis. Within three months of notification of a filing date, the patent owner in a[ ] ... CBM proceeding may file a preliminary response to the petition, including a simple statement that the patent owner elects not to respond to the petition. The Board acting on behalf of the Director will determine whether to institute a trial within three months of the date the patent owner’s preliminary response was due or was filed, whichever is first ... The Board will enter a Scheduling Order ... concurrent with the decision to institute atrial. The Scheduling Order will set due dates for the trial taking into account the complexity of the proceeding but ensuring that the trial is completed within one year of institution.
Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48757 (Aug. 14, 2012) (including a graphic detailing the timeline for CBM review proceedings). The court notes that the PTO may extend the proceeding by up to six months upon a showing of good cause. 37 C.F.R. § 42.200(c) (2012).
Here, the petitioning defendants filed their request for CBM review on October 15, 2012, and Market-Alerts was notified of the petition on October 22, 2012. (D.I. 16, Ex. C.) As such, Market-Alerts’ preliminary response was due and presumably filed on January 22, 2012. (Id.) It is possible that the PTO may not decide to grant the petition for CBM review of the '357 Patent until April 2013, and, if review is granted, a decision may not be issued until April 2014. (D.I. 19 at 6.) With this time-line in mind, the court has little difficulty concluding that the CBM review is in its early stages and that this particular consideration weighs against granting a stay.
Nevertheless, viewing the “undue prejudice” factor as a whole, the court finds that it favors a stay of litigation. The potential for excessive prejudice is reduced by the [496]*496fact that the parties do not directly compete with each other, and there is no evidence of dilatory motive on the part of the defendants. While the CBM review proceedings are admittedly in their early stages, the delay that can be expected from that process neither outweighs the above considerations nor controls the court’s analysis.
D. Burden of Litigation
Section 18 of the AIA adds a fourth factor to the traditional stay analysis, instructing the court to consider “whether a stay, or the denial thereof, will reduce the burden of litigation on the parties and on the court.” § 18(b)(1)(D). It appears the intent of this provision was to ensure that district courts would grant stays pending CBM review proceedings at a higher rate than they have allowed stays pending ex parte reexaminations.14
Market-Alerts argues that, if a stay were granted in this litigation, the issue simplification goal would be frustrated by the fact that related lawsuits would proceed normally during the course of the stay. (D.I. 19 at 17.) As noted above, while the defendants in the 12-784 and 12-785 actions agree that a stay is appropriate here and do not oppose the moving defendants’ request, they have not actually moved to stay their own cases. Market-Alerts warns that granting a stay in the moving defendants’ actions would compel it “to litigate essentially identical cases in multiple forums, wasting the time and resources of both this Court and the PTO. In fact, a stay may actually result in an increased burden on the parties or the Court, which would normally be avoided through consolidation and coordination of related cases.” (Id.)
While the court appreciates Market-Alerts’ argument on this point and might even be inclined to agree with it under different circumstances, it is inapplicable here, as the court will order that the non-moving defendants’ actions also be stayed. Of course, the complicating issue here is that § 18(b) of the AIA does not authorize a district court to stay a case unless a party affirmatively seeks such relief. Since none of the defendants in the 12-784 and 12-785 actions have requested a stay, the court cannot stay these cases under the statutory authority conferred by the AIA. Rather, the court will order a stay as an exercise of its discretion and in the interests of judicial and litigant economy.15 [497]*497The rationale underlying this order is captured in Sections IY.AC above, and the court’s decision is further grounded in the fact that all parties involved have expressed willingness to stay each of the related actions. (D.I. 19 at 19; D.I. 22 at 10.)
Given the court’s decision to stay the 12-784 and 12-785 actions, it is clear that granting the present motion will reduce the burden of litigation on both the parties and the court. This conclusion is only reinforced by the legislative intent underlying this fourth stay factor.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant the motion to stay the 12-780, 12-781, 12-782, and 12-783 actions pursuant to § 18(b) of the ALA Each of the four statutory factors weighs in favor of granting a stay pending resolution of the CBM review proceedings. Additionally, the court will stay the 12-784 and 12-785 actions as an exercise of its discretion and in the interests of judicial and litigant economy.
ORDER
At Wilmington this 5th day of February 2013, consistent with the court’s Opinion of this same date, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. The Motion to Stay Proceedings Pursuant to Section 18(b) of the America Invents Act (No. 12-780, D.I. 14; No. 12-781, D.I. 42; No. 12-782, D.I. 14; and No. 12-783, D.I. 14) is GRANTED; and
2. The above-captioned actions are each STAYED pending resolution of the post-grant review proceedings for U.S. Patent No. 7,941,357 under the Transitional Program for Covered Business Method Patents.