MARKEITH MITCHELL v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: CR-24-249
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. 158 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-24-249

Opinion Delivered: October 16, 2025 MARKEITH MITCHELL APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE UNION COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT [NO. 70CR-21-150] V. HONORABLE SPENCER SINGLETON, JUDGE STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE DISSENTING OPINION FROM THE DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REVIEW.

NICHOLAS J. BRONNI, Associate Justice

Yet again, the court declines to clarify the standard for giving and reviewing lesser-

included instructions. Here, the court of appeals reversed Markeith Mitchell’s conviction

in part because the trial court declined to give an extreme-emotional-disturbance

manslaughter instruction. Bound by our case law, the court of appeals held that a trial court

abuses its discretion and commits reversible error when it declines to give a lesser-included

instruction that is supported by “‘the slightest evidence’” and there is a “rational basis for

giving it.” Mitchell v. State, 2025 Ark. App. 233, at 13, 711 S.W.3d 838, 848 (citing Rainey

v. State, 310 Ark. 419, 422, 837 S.W.2d 453, 455 (1992). We’re not so bound, and this

case is yet another missed opportunity to clarify the standard for giving lesser-included

instructions.

As I explained just last term, our abuse-of-discretion-revesible-error-slightest-

evidence-rational-basis standard doesn’t make sense, is self-contradictory, and cannot be squared with the relevant statutory framework. See Parker v. State, 2025 Ark. 55, at 10–14,

709 S.W.3d 807, 814–16 (Bronni, J., concurring). Nor does that framing jibe with our case

law, which routinely affirms trial court decisions declining to give such instruction. See id.

at 10, 709 S.W.3d at 814. That’s hardly surprising since our standard “isn’t the result of

principled statutory interpretation or considered analysis” but “the result of reading language

out of context and decades of layering various standards on top of one another without ever

attempting to reconcile those various layers.” Id.

So rather than adhere to a standard that doesn’t provide any meaningful guidance to

lower courts, I’d grant the petition; end the confusion; and—as I explained in Parker—

articulate the standard that our cases actually apply. I respectfully dissent.